AHC: Save the Morsi Presidency

Here is a question I’ve been wondering about lately. Was there any way to save the Presidency of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt?

The initial gut reaction I had was that the answer was yes. Morsi did almost everything wrong during his brief time as president of Egypt, and in two years he alienated pretty much everyone. Having him avoid the constitutional crisis would, at first glance, appear to be enough.

But I wonder...with Syria’s war descending into hell and with the military (which never trusted him from day one) becoming terrified of something similar transpiring in Egypt by 2014 would Morsi have been ousted no matter what? Was there any way he could have made it to the end of his term…even if he loses re-election by a landslide?

 
I think he could have, the SCAF tentatively backed the original Islamist constitution. It seems like the SCAF were willing to work with the MB as long as they kept things stable, but Morsi's gross abuses of Presidential authority gave the SCAF an opportunity to take him down.
 
Eh honestly, from the US perspective, the SCAF Coup D'etat is a better outcome than an emboldened Morsi breaking the SCAF's hold on Egyptian politics/institutions.
 
Is there any way the US could have backed Morsi?

They sort of did. At least, thy didn't actively oppose him in any apparent way.
However, my peception is that Morsi really screwed up everything very quickly and very thoroughly. This, by the way, was unexpected, and seems to have surprised a lot of very well-informed observers (and almost every Egyptian I had the occasion to talk about this). The MB were supposed to be a lot more compromising and generally smarter.
Of course, the key issue in Egypt is fixing the economy. Morsi maybe thought he couldn't do that (getting aid from parties whose vested interest in Egypt is in its economy being NOT fixed, at least not to the benefit of the average Egyptian is a problem) and so went on to rally his people with "symbolic" stuff about Islamic identity (which wasn't all that symbolic in many cases, see Constitution and family law). That rubbed a lot of people (many of his electors included) in a very wrong way.
Morsi should have understood differently needed priorities. He could have hard pedaled the social justice dimension of MB doctrine while keeping quiet, or at least patient, about the rest (again, that's not easy when your safest backer is Qatar). The country was yearning for stability and some measure of welfare if not prosperity, and few were impressed when he conveyed the notion that he was interested more about the girls' virginity.
The possible way out is a very close cooperation with Turkey (including taking some leaflets from their book). That would also change the ssituation a lot in Syria (and make Israel a bit more nervous).
 
Eh honestly, from the US perspective, the SCAF Coup D'etat is a better outcome than an emboldened Morsi breaking the SCAF's hold on Egyptian politics/institutions.

Except it calls BS on pretty much everything Obama has been trying to say about democracy, human rights and respect among religions, particularly in a very famous speech he gave in Cairo.
Not that the average Arab has not already ample basis to feel that the US have a hypocritical policy anyway, so perhaps it does not matter much. Still, backing the Army in Egypt certainly does not bring the cause of democracy, accountable governance, or basic human rights in the Middle East forward a millimeter.
 
Except it calls BS on pretty much everything Obama has been trying to say about democracy, human rights and respect among religions, particularly in a very famous speech he gave in Cairo.
Not that the average Arab has not already ample basis to feel that the US have a hypocritical policy anyway, so perhaps it does not matter much. Still, backing the Army in Egypt certainly does not bring the cause of democracy, accountable governance, or basic human rights in the Middle East forward a millimeter.


I'm talking about actual practical policy here, not rhetoric. US FP in the ME is driven by three things: Preserving the stability of regional regimes, protection of the Israeli state, and curtailing Iranian influence (dovetails into the second principle). Obama can talk about changing the dynamic of interaction with Arab countries all he wants, but the truth is there is no political will in Washington to do so. Besides, the tyranny of the majority Morsi stood for was hardly better than the despotism of the Military Junta.

Not that the US should be writing the SCAF blank checks, but you have to understand the pragmatic underpinnings here.
 
Without the 2012 Gaza War maybe Morsi isn't emboldened to stage his constitutional coup which really started the downward spiral.

Egypt wasn't going to be a shining democracy under Morsi or any other alternative post-Mubarak president, as the military would almost certainly remain a major force for several years. But the complete collapse into an even worse military autocracy could certainly have been avoided.

The key would have been for Morsi to survive a full term, for another round of parliamentary and presidential elections to take place, and for electoral politics to become somewhat institutionalized. That would still have meant a long-term battle to restrict the power of the military, but it would have been better than what actually happened.
 
I'm talking about actual practical policy here, not rhetoric. US FP in the ME is driven by three things: Preserving the stability of regional regimes, protection of the Israeli state, and curtailing Iranian influence (dovetails into the second principle). Obama can talk about changing the dynamic of interaction with Arab countries all he wants, but the truth is there is no political will in Washington to do so. Besides, the tyranny of the majority Morsi stood for was hardly better than the despotism of the Military Junta.

Not that the US should be writing the SCAF blank checks, but you have to understand the pragmatic underpinnings here.

I do. They were sort of implied in my post. I was just saying that all this doesn't do the US local repute any good.
And, to be clear, I am no particular fan of Morsi. While I am under the impression that his track-record in human rights could be marginally better than the military's, I strongly doubt that this is because any particular commitment to that. And it's even questionable that he ever had a real majority to back up his "tyranny" (that is, the tyrannical aspects of his rule). As repeatedly stated above, support for Morsi dwindled fairly quickly after his election.
 
Technically, you could save him by agreeing to a deal where he gives up more of his de facto power to the military in exchange for being allowed to complete his term, and said deal holds.
 
I do. They were sort of implied in my post. I was just saying that all this doesn't do the US local repute any good.
And, to be clear, I am no particular fan of Morsi. While I am under the impression that his track-record in human rights could be marginally better than the military's, I strongly doubt that this is because any particular commitment to that. And it's even questionable that he ever had a real majority to back up his "tyranny" (that is, the tyrannical aspects of his rule). As repeatedly stated above, support for Morsi dwindled fairly quickly after his election.

The issue with Morsi is he was rapidly acquiring institutional powers for the Presidency that go beyond even what Mubarak had. As long as he had enforcers (be that the Police, Military, or MB Paramilitary) on his side, he could've enforved his rule.

I'm not saying that some kind of more earnest involvement in the Arab Spring wouldn't have improved our standing with the average Arab citizen; I just don't think it matters to the US all that much, if at all.

Frankly if we wanted Democracy to flourish we should have taken a harder line against Mubarak to begin with. But we were constantly making fuck ups like Biden's "I don't think Mubarak is a dictator" comment. By the time of Morsi's election we'd pretty much lost the PR campaign.
 
Frankly if we wanted Democracy to flourish we should have taken a harder line against Mubarak to begin with. But we were constantly making fuck ups like Biden's "I don't think Mubarak is a dictator" comment. By the time of Morsi's election we'd pretty much lost the PR campaign.

Well, OK, everyone knows that democracy abroad isn't top priority for Washington, anywhere. But in the Middle East, usually it is not even pretending.
 
Here were some of the things I thought could help him survive his term:

  • Avoid the constitutional crisis at all costs.
  • Pardon Mubarak. It would anger many Egyptians and his base, for obvious reasons, but it could be seen as enough of an olive branch to the military to give him the benefit of the doubt.
  • When (and if) Syria starts to spiral out of control, become strong supporters of the FSA, even as ISIL starts to emerge. This would give him some much needed support from the United States, who would see Egyptian support for the FSA as the life preserver that is keeping the moderate Syrian rebels afloat. As a result they, like the Egyptian military, would give Morsi more benefit of the doubt.

With that being said, I wonder if Morsi would survive reelection if he did these things (in particular pardon Mubarak). But it could be enough to lay the foundation for democracy in Egypt for the long term.
 

Realpolitik

Banned
Well, OK, everyone knows that democracy abroad isn't top priority for Washington, anywhere. But in the Middle East, usually it is not even pretending.

I should goddamn well think we shouldn't pretend. It leads to enough disasters elsewhere.

Not that this stops the State Department and the papers from suffering bouts of insanity.
 
I remember seeing The Square, coming to the view that the chief obstacle to Egyptian Democracy and chief economic burden is the military. I've wondered, since then, if what Egypt needed was for the "liberals" and Islamists (or at least the MB) to see the military faction as their common enemy. And I've tried to imagine President Morsi making a gamble of getting out from under the thumb of the generals by making such an appeal. But maybe I'm just being naive here.
 
Here were some of the things I thought could help him survive his term:

  • Avoid the constitutional crisis at all costs.
  • Pardon Mubarak. It would anger many Egyptians and his base, for obvious reasons, but it could be seen as enough of an olive branch to the military to give him the benefit of the doubt.
  • When (and if) Syria starts to spiral out of control, become strong supporters of the FSA, even as ISIL starts to emerge. This would give him some much needed support from the United States, who would see Egyptian support for the FSA as the life preserver that is keeping the moderate Syrian rebels afloat. As a result they, like the Egyptian military, would give Morsi more benefit of the doubt.

With that being said, I wonder if Morsi would survive reelection if he did these things (in particular pardon Mubarak). But it could be enough to lay the foundation for democracy in Egypt for the long term.

The problem with Pt. 3 is that the Egyptian Military is generally pro-Assad. Morsi's outspoken opposition to Assad was one of the things that scared the military about keeping Morsi in power.
 
Except it calls BS on pretty much everything Obama has been trying to say about democracy, human rights and respect among religions, particularly in a very famous speech he gave in Cairo.
Not that the average Arab has not already ample basis to feel that the US have a hypocritical policy anyway, so perhaps it does not matter much. Still, backing the Army in Egypt certainly does not bring the cause of democracy, accountable governance, or basic human rights in the Middle East forward a millimeter.
Why? The anti-Morsi uprising wasn't that different from the Ukrainian one in 2014 and the only ones who see events in Ukraine as "sign of US hypocracy" or "threat to democracy" is Russia and co. The difference in Egypt is that there the military came to the support of the protesters whereas in Ukraine it remained more or less neutral.

My person opinion on Morsi's and Muslim Brotherhood's overthrow can be summed up as "good riddance to bad rubbish".
 
The U.S. has to get more involved in Egyptian politics and also get the Saudis to economically back Morsi if we weren't going to loan Egypt money. Basically the WH had the view at the time the U.S. shouldn't be in the business of advising relatively new ME democracies. If that was the right or wrong decision is irrelevant, but without someone giving Morsi better advice and without more money for Egypt after the revolution the military just had to wait.

At that point we are talking about mistakes of 2012 and 2013 which was the low point of U.S. engagement in the Middle East of the modern era and arguable since before WW2.
 
Why? The anti-Morsi uprising wasn't that different from the Ukrainian one in 2014 and the only ones who see events in Ukraine as "sign of US hypocracy" or "threat to democracy" is Russia and co. The difference in Egypt is that there the military came to the support of the protesters whereas in Ukraine it remained more or less neutral.

My person opinion on Morsi's and Muslim Brotherhood's overthrow can be summed up as "good riddance to bad rubbish".

Morsi was a disaster, no question, but he still represented Egyptian democracy. He was a democratically elected leader, and had he been able to stay in office, even if he continued to be a disaster of a president, it would have had a long term positive impact on Egypt in that it could have helped foster democracy. Looking at Tunisia, I think that if there was a fair election in 2012, and had Morsi been able to stumble through a full term, he would have lost his reelection bid. This, in my opinion, was probably the best case scenario for Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood loses some appeal with everyday Egyptians and democracy in Egypt starts to take root...even if just barely.

I am curious to know if he could have at least survived a term (even if he was deeply unpopular) as that would have had helped plant the seeds of democracy in Egypt. Or was his entire presidency doomed from the moment he won the election? Was the military giving him just enough rope to hang himself with and waiting for the moment to oust him? Keep in mind that in Algeria when the military ruled the election null and void it led to a deadly civil war in the 1990s. Perhaps the Egyptian military knew that to prevent Morsi from taking office would possibly lead to civil war, and decided the better option was to see if Morsi would screw up so bad that they could remove him without major incident (hint: he did).
 
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