AHC: Save the Doha Round

You could have higher food prices, so high that ag subsidies are cut. Or have them reduced at some point in the past for some reason. Say France somehow finds itself in a debt crisis and their ag subsidies get the ax.
 
I dont understand what it is.

Does the Wikipedia link not help that much? What specifically is your question about the definition given:
Wikipedia said:
The Doha Development Round or Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the current trade-negotiation round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which commenced in November 2001. Its objective is to lower trade barriers around the world, which will help facilitate the increase of global trade. As of 2008, talks have stalled over a divide on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. The most significant differences are between developed nations led by the European Union (EU), the United States (USA), and Japan and the major developing countries led and represented mainly by Brazil, China, India, South Korea, and South Africa. There is also considerable contention against and between the EU and the USA over their maintenance of agricultural subsidies—seen to operate effectively as trade barriers.
 
Incredibly difficult if not almost impossible I'd say. One of the main sticking points seems to have been the agricultural subsidies the EU, US and Japan were giving to their farmers which domestically politically is going to be very hard to get rid of or even just reduce. The best I can think of is if the subsidisers offered some sort of phased withdrawal of the subsidies over a longish time period, but anything fast enough to please the G20 countries is likely to anger the subsidised farmers. Impasse.
 
How badly did (the executives of) any of these developed economies (US, EU, and Japan) want a deal whereby they would, collectively, par down their subsidies? Was Doha important at all to anyone of influence in the Bush Administration?
 
I think the real problem for the US administration is going to be getting it through Congress, especially once the President loses their fast track powers. Thanks to the way the US government is set up it doesn't matter how heavily behind it the White House is if enough members of Congress decide to block things for domestic political considerations.
 
I think the real problem for the US administration is going to be getting it through Congress, especially once the President loses their fast track powers. Thanks to the way the US government is set up it doesn't matter how heavily behind it the White House is if enough members of Congress decide to block things for domestic political considerations.

Could the President sign an agreement, even in the face of a hostile Congress (where ratification looks unlikely)? It could be a symbolic ratification, since obviously the treaty won't go into effect without ratification of all important members, but if Bush is willing to get to that point, the possibility would still be open. Also, if the breakthrough happens in 2008 (when it fell apart OTL), I can see Doha Supporters looking to use the election to their advantage...
 
I got to thinking about this again recently; does anyone have thoughts on when, after negotiations began in November 2001, the trade talks became doomed to failure?
 
How badly did (the executives of) any of these developed economies (US, EU, and Japan) want a deal whereby they would, collectively, par down their subsidies? Was Doha important at all to anyone of influence in the Bush Administration?

The problem in the US is that the subsidies in question are politically difficult to touch for a variety of reasons. The states that benefit most per capita are important in American national elections, and the subsidies at least in North America overwhelmingly are used a profit support program for major agribusinesses, several of which (particularly ADM and Monsanto) are enormous contributors to political campaigns. This combination makes cutting agricultural subsidies politically extremely difficult, which is a problem. Japan has a similar issue, as their agricultural producers hold a considerable amount of political power there as well.
 
The problem in the US is that the subsidies in question are politically difficult to touch for a variety of reasons. The states that benefit most per capita are important in American national elections, and the subsidies at least in North America overwhelmingly are used a profit support program for major agribusinesses, several of which (particularly ADM and Monsanto) are enormous contributors to political campaigns. This combination makes cutting agricultural subsidies politically extremely difficult, which is a problem. Japan has a similar issue, as their agricultural producers hold a considerable amount of political power there as well.

Aside from pointing out the obvious note to the bolded part -- that any breakthrough with a PoD after 2001 would happen in a second Bush term -- I can only say for now that these are some important points, and that any breakthrough on agricultural subsidies in the US (or in Japan for that matter) aren't going to come easy...
 
Farm subsidies/support need desperately to be cut in the US, the EU, Canada and Japan.

The problem is that they are pretty much sacred cows in all 4 places.

Any time eg the us signalled a willingness to budge on subsidy A, theyd make it conditional on the Europeans cutting subsidy B first. But the Europeans demand the us announce full support for said cut, rather than 'we might possibly be interested in opening discussion.....' and vice versa, of course. Or europe says they wont discuss B, but will give ground on C if the US gives on D. Which the us wont do.

As for the rest of the world, theyd given a whole bunch of ground in the previous round, and no way, no how were they going to move further unless the rich countries liberalized on matters they wanted.

If only the US or the EU were being unreasonable, thered be enough pressure theyd have had bend. But with 3 major blocks all pretending they might bend, but never committing to anything, they all could blame each other.

5 year olds in a schoolground is what it looked like.
 

Hoist40

Banned
Good thing that DOHA did not pass

All it would have done is further fuel the takeover of 3rd world farmland by corporations and government. It would not have helped the poor in these countries, in fact many of the poor would have their land taken and given to large scale industrial farming with most of the farmers being forced to slums in the cities, the few left would be just low level employees if they were lucky. It would be a new plantation system.

The rich in the third world would get richer, the rich in the first world would get richer, the bankers and the traders and the mulitnational corporations would get richer, everyone else would get poorer.
 
 
 
Good thing that DOHA did not pass..

This all seems a bold prediction, given we haven't done much to flesh out what a DOHA agreement would look like -- all we really know is that it would involve First World nations lowering their agricultural trade barriers (tarriffs, subsidies). In fact, I can see such an arrangement where the major offenders (the US, Europe, Japan, et el) make the primary agreements with each other, and make little if any demands of the developing nations. So if nothing else, it's a possible scenario -- one where the only (direct) thing DOHA means for the Third World is that the First World's markets are more open to their agricultural products.

Would this be bad for them and their farmers? Well, it would make the farmers' land and output that much more valuable, so I suppose you could say it "fuels their takeover by corporations and government" by making it more appealing to them. And I can see the US, as part of the deal, insisting that Europe not impose any special tariffs on GMO created products, in the hopes that this, in turn, would relieve agricultural exporters of the choice between European markets and use of biotechnology owned by American corporations -- but, at least in this scenario, it would still be a choice made by the developing nations themselves. In either case, yes the governments could screw the farmers out of their livelihood, but they can do that now -- the big difference is, with more open First World markets, they now have more to get screwed out of.

Of course, that's a better case scenario -- it may also be that the First World uses the offer of their markets to pressure Third World governments into privatizing their own agricultural sectors even more. Or it could be some other outcome. All we know, is that a DOHA deal would mean more opportunities for the poorest farmers in the world to sell their products to a truly world market. So yeah, saying "DOHA not passing was a good thing" -- bit of a bold statement.
 

Hoist40

Banned
. Or it could be some other outcome. All we know, is that a DOHA deal would mean more opportunities for the poorest farmers in the world to sell their products to a truly world market. So yeah, saying "DOHA not passing was a good thing" -- bit of a bold statement.

Why would poor farmers have any opportunity at all to sell, they don't have the product, or the machinery or the marketing to engage in a "truly world market".

Was it some poor tailor in China or India who grabbed the market share in clothes or was it the rich, whether Western or Local who became the mass maker of clothes and flooded the truly world market. Was it the third world copper smith pots which got market share or once again was it those who could bring in the machinery and a thousand workers who made the truly world market. In many places in the world the small poor craftsman have been ruined as cheep clothing and other goods have flooded in since they can’t even compete no matter how little they make.

The poor farmer will be overrun by the big money, big machinery, big crony, and big marketing. A few might stay on working for the industrial farm and the rest are pushed off to the slums of the cities.
 
Why would poor farmers have any opportunity at all to sell, they don't have the product, or the machinery or the marketing to engage in a "truly world market".

At the risk of turning this to Chat: the first and the third are things they don't have precisely because of protectionism in First World countries -- they actually have plenty of "product" (the food they already grow), and right now it's mostly precisely because the rich are unfamiliar with it that it's less "marketable". If yams, millet, and what have you were allowed to compete on American and European shelves, then our citizens might find more of a taste for them; this would drive up global demand for those agricultural products, and not just for those that crosses national borders; and in this way, a small-time yam or millet farmer (albeit assuming the government or some other powerful entity steals their land) could charge more for her product, even if her customers remained the same.
 

Hoist40

Banned
If this was true then why hasn’t the poor third world tailor or pot maker been selling their products in the USA or Europe? Instead it was the people who had access to large amounts of money, whether foreigner or local who built the factories in third world countries which drove the small time tailor or pot maker out of business.

Also, at least in the USA, I don’t think that products like millet or yams are either subsidized or have high tariffs, that is for things like wheat, corn, sugar, etc.
 
If this was true then why hasn’t the poor third world tailor or pot maker been selling their products in the USA or Europe?

They don't have to; the local markets for textiles and pottery didn't disappear because of higher global demand. Putting aside that they, if anything, grew as there was now more local demand (a sweatshop worker still has more disposable income, such as it is, than a sustenance farmer) -- my point was that "higher global demand" doesn't just mean "more demand for international trade", but "demand [for said product] everywhere".

Put another way -- what hurt the tailors of China and India in the colonial age wasn't the mere existence of a textile industry, it was that they were forced to accept the West dumping their (protected) goods on them. Once said nations were allowed to set their own industrial policies (most importantly, with Western markets open to their goods) they rebounded. Today, if you actually go to a city in India or China -- as opposed to sitting in the US or Europe, and seeing what they send you -- you won't find a lack of tailors, even as you also find a mass of textile factories.

Also, at least in the USA, I don’t think that products like millet or yams are either subsidized or have high tariffs, that is for things like wheat, corn, sugar, etc.

Likely no direct subsidies, but there are real trade barriers -- pretty sure they have at least the same tariffs as other goods, plus the subsidies to wheat, corn, and what have you give those food products an advantage.

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CONSOLIDATION: Let's see if we can get back to the OP, and try to tie down a PoD; given that the Bush Administration cannot make serious cuts in agriculture protections absent the fast track authority, which was set to expire July 2007, and given he's not going to make said breakthroughs until after he is safely re-elected, that gives us three summits to work with:

1) Paris, May 2005 -- a preliminary session of negotiations for Hong Kong summit; most of the sticking points were small technical issues, making trade negotiators fear that agreement on large politically risky issues will be substantially harder
2) Hong Kong, December 2005, had some modest breakthroughs OTL (setting 2013 as a deadline for the elimination of agricultural export subsidies; notable for making the WTO director-general more optimistic about the prospects of a deal
3) Geneva, July 2006 -- failed to reach any agreement OTL; pretty much signaled the failure of the talks
4) Postdam, June 2007 -- a really, really long shot if this is the PoD

So I'd say the best PoD here would be Paris, leading to higher hopes going into Hong Kong, leading to more tangible results that year; my guess is, the best TTL could plausibly hope for from this would be for Hong Kong to create a strong enough preliminary agreement so that the next summit in the summer of 2006 could formalize a global trade treaty to summit to the nations.

Now to be clear, that's just the PoD -- once a treaty is put together, even with all the work the leaders will do to lay the groundwork, getting it ratified will be a challenge. Even with fast track authority, the US Congress still needs to vote "yes", etc.
 
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Hoist40

Banned
Even with fast track authority, the US Senate still needs to vote "yes", etc.
Actually the US have been pushing through many of these trade deals as agreements not as treaties. So instead of 2/3 vote in the Senate they need a majority in the Senate and House.

NAFTA for example is a agreement not a treaty so it needed a majority in both houses not 2/3 in the Senate.
 
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