After the February revolution, the Provisional government, including figures like Lvov, Milyukov, and Kerensky kept Russia loyal to its diplomatic commitment to the Entente, which would result in the eventual destruction of the Republic. Why did the ruling government ignored the mass desertions, mutinies, and unrest caused by the war ? How could’ve the Russian Republic exited the Great War ? What changes would be necessary ?
AHC: Russian Republic signs a separate peace.
- Thread starter Kaiser of Brazil
- Start date
Nitpick: Technically speaking, Russia was not declared a republic until September. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Republic (This may seem trivial but is symptomatic of the Provisional Government's slowness. Important decisions, including those on form of government, were delayed, often supposedly until they could be decided by the Constituent Assembly--the elections for which were also delayed...)
More important: What people often fail to realize is that no significant political group in Russia in 1917 openly advocated a separate peace with Germany--which, it was assumed, would lead to a German victory (the Yanks were not coming for many months) which would undo all the gains of the Revolution. And that includes the Bolsheviks--their argument was not that there should be a separate peace with the Kaiser, but that a real socialist revolution in Russia would lead to a similar revolution in Germany and elsewhere--so that peace could be made with the "German workers and soldiers," not with the Kaiser. If Kerensky had tried to pull a Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks would be the first to scream "Treason!" and "sell-out to German imperialism!"
I'll quote two historians here:
(1) Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution, p. 255: "In 1917, the liberal and moderate socialist parties all joined the provisional government and supported its commitment to remaining in the war. Their stance was reasonable. To make a separate peace with Germany-—the only peace that was ever actually going to be on offer-—risked placing the fate of Europe and of the Russian Revolution in the kaiser's hands. With the Russian masses increasingly hostile to the war, the moderate socialists' position nevertheless allowed the only organized party outside the government—the Bolsheviks—to mobilize grassroots support. If the Bolsheviks in 1917 had openly advocated a separate peace with Germany, then their cause would have been ruined. By arguing-—even often believing—-that they could end the war without making a separate peace with Berlin, they avoided this trap." https://books.google.com/books?id=nqGvDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA355
(2) Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks, pp. 334-5: "Following its overthrow, the Provisional Government did not lack excellent advice as to what steps it might have taken to preserve democracy in Russia. The usual criticism concerns its failure to make peace and thus to remove the most persuasive element of the Bolsheviks' propaganda. But to argue this is to misunderstand the situation of Russia right after the February Revolution. As was natural in a country that had suffered so many casualties, Russia longed for peace. To an overwhelming majority of politicians and, as we have seen, to the masses of population and soldiers as well, the only way to a speedy peace was defeat of Germany. From the perspective of two world wars such resolution looks foolish and suicidal. But to the average Russian of 1917 a separate peace with Germany and Austria meant only one thing: a victory of the Central Powers and Europe's domination by Imperial Germany. Russia undoubtedly could have gotten a better peace then than subsequently at Brest Litovsk. But who could conceive of the Western Allies, then barely holding out, being capable of withstanding the assault of all Germany's armies? And in a German-dominated Europe would Russia be allowed to preserve her territorial integrity, or her newly won republican and democratic freedoms? Thus it was not only the notions of honor and of loyalty to the allies that made the generals and politicians believe that a victorious prosecution of war was a matter of life and death for Russia, and especially democratic Russia.
"But the criticism overlooks an even more basic fact. Had it believed it necessary and beneficial, the Provisional Government and the General Staff still could not have concluded a separate peace. Its severest critics, the "internationalist Mensheviks" and the Bolsheviks, all pleaded for peace, but one to be concluded with the "German workers and soldiers" after they had overthrown their Emperor and generals. Had the Provisional Government at any point shown the slightest inclination to do what the Bolsheviks subsequently did at Brest Litovsk, it immediately would have been denounced for selling out to the Kaiser, for betraying the Revolution and the international proletariat. And Lenin's voice would have been the most insistent in this denunciation." https://books.google.com/books?id=dN5V8WX5WP0C&pg=PA334 https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA335
(For people who don't believe the Bolsheviks were capable of accusing Kerensky of being too soft on the Germans: In OTL they simultaneously attacked him for being for pro-war...and for planning to abandon Petrograd to the Germans to "decapitate" the Revolution! Note Trotsky's statement of October 11: "The government may flee from Petrograd, but the Petrograd soviet and the revolutionary population will not go away anywhere, they will fight, and, if need be, will die at their posts"--strange words from a supposed "defeatist"! https://web.archive.org/web/20021107232130/http://www.scottreid.com/lenin.htm)
Anyway, let's even ignore what the reaction of the Bolsheviks would be. Kerensky was dependent on the moderate socialists and the liberals, and they were totally against the idea of a separate peace.
First, to look at the socialists: In the case of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, one should remember that hostility to Germany was a major theme of Russian Populism--the official bureaucracy of Russia since the time of Peter the Great was seen as the product of German influence. As for the Mensheviks, their orthodox-Marxist belief that backward Russia was not ready for socialism and that there could be nothing more than a bourgeois democratic revolution made them insistent on coalition with the strongly pro-war Kadets. Here I'll recycle something I wrote some time ago about the extraordinary tenacity of Russia's moderate socialists on the war:
***
"In December 1917 the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries held its Fourth Congress. The extreme left of the party had already defected to form the Left SR Party but there were still people of quite left-wing views at the Congress. One of them, Kogan-Bernstein, proposed that the forthcoming Constituent Assembly summon the Allies to begin peace talks without delay, and in the event of their refusal or failure to reply within a specified time limit, Russia would have a free hand. The resolution did not say how this freedom would be used, but it did at least imply separate action if not a separate peace. The resolution was voted down 72-52 with 32 abstentions. (Oliver Radkey, *The Sickle under the Hammer: the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, p. 192.) And this was after not only the disastrous summer offensive but the October insurrection! Yet *even then*, only one-third of the mainstream SRs were willing to demand tangible progress toward peace, even at the cost of breaking with the Allies. So how likely were they (or their similarly-minded Menshevik comrades) to do so several months earlier?
"If there was anyone who just might have filled this role, it could have been Victor Chernov, leader of the left-center of the SRs, a man who had resigned from the PG protesting its dilatoriness on the issues of peace and land reform, and a man who was very popular in the Russian village. If only Chernov's faction of the SRs had either gained control of the party or formed their own party; if the Constituent Assembly elections had been held months earlier; if Chernov's backers had won; and if the Assembly had made Chernov Prime Minister of Russia, the country would at least have had a leader of greater legitimacy than Kerensky and perhaps more willing to confront the Allies. Chernov later claimed that while he had opposed a separate peace in 1917 he would have been willing to consider one as a last resort if the struggle for a general settlement had meant the immolation of Russia on the altar of the Allied cause. Unfortunately, Chernov's actual conduct during 1917--including during the Fourth Congress--was marked by constant compromising with the pro-war right-center of his party, and as Radkey remarks "if he could not see signs of immolation in the situation of December, 1917, then he would never see them." (p. 190)" https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...if-he-withdrew-from-wwi.450550/#post-17506152
***
As for the Kadets and other forces to the right of Kerensky, it is sufficient to cite the words of Kornilov: "The Provisional Government, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets, acts in full agreement with the plans of the German General Staff . . . I cannot betray Russia into the hands of its historic enemy, the German tribe, and make the Russian people slaves of the Germans." https://books.google.com/books?id=kdQFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA107
Kerensky should have avoided the summer offensive. But to make a separate peace was just not possible, and if he tried he would have lost power immediately instead of in October. (In particular, in the weeks following the February Revolution, the mood in the country would be violently against it. Sukhanov, a left-wing "Zimmerwaldist" Menshevik wrote with regret that "During the first weeks the soldiers of Petrograd not only would not listen, but would not permit any talk of peace. They were ready to lift up on their bayonets any uncautious 'traitor' or exponent of 'opening the front to the enemy.'" (Quoted in Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks, p. 325. https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA325; see https://books.google.com/books?id=6-D_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA202 for a slightly different translation. No doubt by summer the mood of the country had changed but there was still no political support for a separate peace.)
More important: What people often fail to realize is that no significant political group in Russia in 1917 openly advocated a separate peace with Germany--which, it was assumed, would lead to a German victory (the Yanks were not coming for many months) which would undo all the gains of the Revolution. And that includes the Bolsheviks--their argument was not that there should be a separate peace with the Kaiser, but that a real socialist revolution in Russia would lead to a similar revolution in Germany and elsewhere--so that peace could be made with the "German workers and soldiers," not with the Kaiser. If Kerensky had tried to pull a Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks would be the first to scream "Treason!" and "sell-out to German imperialism!"
I'll quote two historians here:
(1) Dominic Lieven, The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution, p. 255: "In 1917, the liberal and moderate socialist parties all joined the provisional government and supported its commitment to remaining in the war. Their stance was reasonable. To make a separate peace with Germany-—the only peace that was ever actually going to be on offer-—risked placing the fate of Europe and of the Russian Revolution in the kaiser's hands. With the Russian masses increasingly hostile to the war, the moderate socialists' position nevertheless allowed the only organized party outside the government—the Bolsheviks—to mobilize grassroots support. If the Bolsheviks in 1917 had openly advocated a separate peace with Germany, then their cause would have been ruined. By arguing-—even often believing—-that they could end the war without making a separate peace with Berlin, they avoided this trap." https://books.google.com/books?id=nqGvDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA355
(2) Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks, pp. 334-5: "Following its overthrow, the Provisional Government did not lack excellent advice as to what steps it might have taken to preserve democracy in Russia. The usual criticism concerns its failure to make peace and thus to remove the most persuasive element of the Bolsheviks' propaganda. But to argue this is to misunderstand the situation of Russia right after the February Revolution. As was natural in a country that had suffered so many casualties, Russia longed for peace. To an overwhelming majority of politicians and, as we have seen, to the masses of population and soldiers as well, the only way to a speedy peace was defeat of Germany. From the perspective of two world wars such resolution looks foolish and suicidal. But to the average Russian of 1917 a separate peace with Germany and Austria meant only one thing: a victory of the Central Powers and Europe's domination by Imperial Germany. Russia undoubtedly could have gotten a better peace then than subsequently at Brest Litovsk. But who could conceive of the Western Allies, then barely holding out, being capable of withstanding the assault of all Germany's armies? And in a German-dominated Europe would Russia be allowed to preserve her territorial integrity, or her newly won republican and democratic freedoms? Thus it was not only the notions of honor and of loyalty to the allies that made the generals and politicians believe that a victorious prosecution of war was a matter of life and death for Russia, and especially democratic Russia.
"But the criticism overlooks an even more basic fact. Had it believed it necessary and beneficial, the Provisional Government and the General Staff still could not have concluded a separate peace. Its severest critics, the "internationalist Mensheviks" and the Bolsheviks, all pleaded for peace, but one to be concluded with the "German workers and soldiers" after they had overthrown their Emperor and generals. Had the Provisional Government at any point shown the slightest inclination to do what the Bolsheviks subsequently did at Brest Litovsk, it immediately would have been denounced for selling out to the Kaiser, for betraying the Revolution and the international proletariat. And Lenin's voice would have been the most insistent in this denunciation." https://books.google.com/books?id=dN5V8WX5WP0C&pg=PA334 https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA335
(For people who don't believe the Bolsheviks were capable of accusing Kerensky of being too soft on the Germans: In OTL they simultaneously attacked him for being for pro-war...and for planning to abandon Petrograd to the Germans to "decapitate" the Revolution! Note Trotsky's statement of October 11: "The government may flee from Petrograd, but the Petrograd soviet and the revolutionary population will not go away anywhere, they will fight, and, if need be, will die at their posts"--strange words from a supposed "defeatist"! https://web.archive.org/web/20021107232130/http://www.scottreid.com/lenin.htm)
Anyway, let's even ignore what the reaction of the Bolsheviks would be. Kerensky was dependent on the moderate socialists and the liberals, and they were totally against the idea of a separate peace.
First, to look at the socialists: In the case of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, one should remember that hostility to Germany was a major theme of Russian Populism--the official bureaucracy of Russia since the time of Peter the Great was seen as the product of German influence. As for the Mensheviks, their orthodox-Marxist belief that backward Russia was not ready for socialism and that there could be nothing more than a bourgeois democratic revolution made them insistent on coalition with the strongly pro-war Kadets. Here I'll recycle something I wrote some time ago about the extraordinary tenacity of Russia's moderate socialists on the war:
***
"In December 1917 the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries held its Fourth Congress. The extreme left of the party had already defected to form the Left SR Party but there were still people of quite left-wing views at the Congress. One of them, Kogan-Bernstein, proposed that the forthcoming Constituent Assembly summon the Allies to begin peace talks without delay, and in the event of their refusal or failure to reply within a specified time limit, Russia would have a free hand. The resolution did not say how this freedom would be used, but it did at least imply separate action if not a separate peace. The resolution was voted down 72-52 with 32 abstentions. (Oliver Radkey, *The Sickle under the Hammer: the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, p. 192.) And this was after not only the disastrous summer offensive but the October insurrection! Yet *even then*, only one-third of the mainstream SRs were willing to demand tangible progress toward peace, even at the cost of breaking with the Allies. So how likely were they (or their similarly-minded Menshevik comrades) to do so several months earlier?
"If there was anyone who just might have filled this role, it could have been Victor Chernov, leader of the left-center of the SRs, a man who had resigned from the PG protesting its dilatoriness on the issues of peace and land reform, and a man who was very popular in the Russian village. If only Chernov's faction of the SRs had either gained control of the party or formed their own party; if the Constituent Assembly elections had been held months earlier; if Chernov's backers had won; and if the Assembly had made Chernov Prime Minister of Russia, the country would at least have had a leader of greater legitimacy than Kerensky and perhaps more willing to confront the Allies. Chernov later claimed that while he had opposed a separate peace in 1917 he would have been willing to consider one as a last resort if the struggle for a general settlement had meant the immolation of Russia on the altar of the Allied cause. Unfortunately, Chernov's actual conduct during 1917--including during the Fourth Congress--was marked by constant compromising with the pro-war right-center of his party, and as Radkey remarks "if he could not see signs of immolation in the situation of December, 1917, then he would never see them." (p. 190)" https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...if-he-withdrew-from-wwi.450550/#post-17506152
***
As for the Kadets and other forces to the right of Kerensky, it is sufficient to cite the words of Kornilov: "The Provisional Government, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets, acts in full agreement with the plans of the German General Staff . . . I cannot betray Russia into the hands of its historic enemy, the German tribe, and make the Russian people slaves of the Germans." https://books.google.com/books?id=kdQFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA107
Kerensky should have avoided the summer offensive. But to make a separate peace was just not possible, and if he tried he would have lost power immediately instead of in October. (In particular, in the weeks following the February Revolution, the mood in the country would be violently against it. Sukhanov, a left-wing "Zimmerwaldist" Menshevik wrote with regret that "During the first weeks the soldiers of Petrograd not only would not listen, but would not permit any talk of peace. They were ready to lift up on their bayonets any uncautious 'traitor' or exponent of 'opening the front to the enemy.'" (Quoted in Adam Ulam, The Bolsheviks, p. 325. https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA325; see https://books.google.com/books?id=6-D_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA202 for a slightly different translation. No doubt by summer the mood of the country had changed but there was still no political support for a separate peace.)
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David T has given a lot of valuable information on the topic, as always!
Could the failure of the Kerensky Offensive have been anticipated? Well, yes, it could have. David T's posting could hint at why they didn't.
Which is why in my TL I've chosen not to let Russia exit the war, but also not conduct the Kerensky Offensive, by speeding up the destabilisation and having Russia's leadership left with no choice but to recognise their weak situation, take comparatively more defensive stances, negotiate with the Germans and make transparent why they could not accept the German demands, undertake reforms and use te time to consolidate. Still, that results in Petrograd occupied and attacked with poison gas, and a German puppet government installed there while the elected one has retreated further East. (But in the end, Germany's fall is inevitable in 1918, and Russia's democratically elected government gets to participate with a final offensive, too.)
Russia was militarily in a bad shape in 1917, and the Germans knew that. They knew that the Eastern Front was the only front where gains looked probable at all.
Mass desertions, mutinies etc. multiplied manifold to an uncontrollable extent after the Kerensky Offensive failed.
Could the failure of the Kerensky Offensive have been anticipated? Well, yes, it could have. David T's posting could hint at why they didn't.
A negotiated exit is not only made difficult by the self-deceptions, divisions and weaknesses on the Russian side. It is also made exceedingly difficult by the greed and harshness and self-deception of the German OHL who needed some really impressive gains really badly, or at least they thought so.
Which is why in my TL I've chosen not to let Russia exit the war, but also not conduct the Kerensky Offensive, by speeding up the destabilisation and having Russia's leadership left with no choice but to recognise their weak situation, take comparatively more defensive stances, negotiate with the Germans and make transparent why they could not accept the German demands, undertake reforms and use te time to consolidate. Still, that results in Petrograd occupied and attacked with poison gas, and a German puppet government installed there while the elected one has retreated further East. (But in the end, Germany's fall is inevitable in 1918, and Russia's democratically elected government gets to participate with a final offensive, too.)
Russia was militarily in a bad shape in 1917, and the Germans knew that. They knew that the Eastern Front was the only front where gains looked probable at all.
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Interesting, thanks for your inputs. I’m mostly worried on how to keep Russia in the war while preventing the Bolsheviks and the Petrograd Soviet from taking over. The Kornilov Affair being avoided is already a decisive factor, which could be achieved by avoiding the Kerensky offensive. And because of my timeline I also plan to have Russia eventually losing WWI (Maybe having more successful Central Powers and avoiding America from joining) while not being led by the Soviets.
Well, that is a tough order. And why would you want that? That is two very tall orders at once (CP winning WW1 AND Russia a Republic).
One way (the way I chose in my TL) is to have the COnstituent Assembly elected much earlier. It could provide much more legitimate institutions than both the old Duma, the Provisional Government, the Petrograd Soviet, or the Bolshevik Commission. If its election interferes with the Kerensky Offensive's schedule, then that's even better if it prevents it that way.
You need to strengthen Russia to keep it a democratic republic (hence why my TL is still called "Feeble Constitution"). Losing WW1 and yet developing a stable republican tradition is a tough, tough order indeed.
Here is the thing, I don’t want Russia to remain a Republic for long if this flag gives you an idea.
Lord_Gallicus
Banned
This is impossible, as at this stage only the bolsheviks wanted to leave the war. The sole cause of the mutinies was bolshevik leaflets and propandising at the front. This is why the PG fought on because it hoped it could end this.
David gives a good rundown on why Kerensky couldn't sign a separate peace with Germany. The best possibility of changing this is with a 1916 POD--Germany opts for a renewed offensive in the East instead of the OTL Verdun strategy, which might accelerate the fall of the Tsar and averts the Brusilov Offensive/Romania's entry. There's also the economic factor--Russia was reliant on continued Allied aid and loans that would go away if she pulled out of the war. If the US doesn't enter the war in 1917, Britain and France are teetering on bankruptcy and the Wilson administration won't be offering loans to the Provisional Government either. That one-two punch--an Eastern Front that goes even better for the CPs plus no renewal of USW/no Zimmerman telegram--is probably what it would take for a non-Bolshevik Russia to exit the war in a negotiated peace in 1917.
@David T
That being said, do you not agree that the Bolsheviks had some level of diversity in this situation regarding peace with the German empire? Especially since they had an interest in maintaining the war so as to permit the continuing worsening situation in Russia so as to assume authority. Likewise, Trotsky is not a good person to mention regarding Bolshevik position, no? He was the one accused of attempting to sacrifice the Russian revolution in favor of a German revolution. Even his actions at the treaty conference with Germany, displayed his interest in maintaining war despite the agitation of other members of the party, including Lenin.
That being said, do you not agree that the Bolsheviks had some level of diversity in this situation regarding peace with the German empire? Especially since they had an interest in maintaining the war so as to permit the continuing worsening situation in Russia so as to assume authority. Likewise, Trotsky is not a good person to mention regarding Bolshevik position, no? He was the one accused of attempting to sacrifice the Russian revolution in favor of a German revolution. Even his actions at the treaty conference with Germany, displayed his interest in maintaining war despite the agitation of other members of the party, including Lenin.