Here is an old soc.history.what-if post of mine on the subject:
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Russia Gets Galicia in 1772 or 1813-15
I have recently been reading Andrew Wilson's *The Ukrainians: Unexpected
Nation* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 2000). In chapter 7
he has an interesting discussion of what would have happened to the idea of
a Ukrainian nation if Russia had seized Galicia (or at least predominantly
Ukrainian eastern Galicia) either in 1772, when Austria annexed the region
after the first partition of Poland, or in 1813-15, when Alexander I
attempted to secure it before and during the Congress of Vienna.
Solzhenitsyn in particular has criticized Alexander I for failing to press
home Russia's advantage after the defeat of Napoleon in 1812:
"Was [Alexander] seeking territorial rewards for Russia after such a bloody
and victorious war? No, he did not put forward any preconditions whatever
for aiding Austria and Prussia in 1813. The single wise move he could have
made was to *return* [my emphasis--DT] Galicia to Russia, thus uniting the
Eastern Slavs (and from what disastrous problems would he have rid our
future history!) Austria was not particularly bent on retaining Galicia at
the time, seeking rather to regain Silesia, annex Belgrade and Moldo-
Wallachia--thus stretching herself between the Black and Adriatic Seas.
But Alexander did not make use of this opportunity, although it was then
easily within his grasp." *The Russian Question at the End of the 20th
Century* (1995)
According to Solzhenitsyn, Alexander only compounded the mistake by seeking
instead the "rebellious nest" of Poland (i.e., the Grand Duchy of Warsaw),
"not seeing if only through Austria's example, how harmful it is for the
dominant nation in a state to create a multiethnic empire." In other
words, to Solzhenitsyn, as to many other Russians, "returning" Ukrainians
to Russia (unlike annexing Grand Duchy Poland) would *not* have made Russia
more multiethnic. Essentially, this view sees Russia as the successor to
Kievan Rus', and the Ukrainians and Belarusians as Russians who had been
artificially cut off from their fellow Russians by the Mongolian invasions
and subsequent Lithuanian/Polish conquest. According to this point of
view, it is unfortunate that the Ruthenes of Galicia and Bukovina were left
outside the Russian sphere when all the other East Slavs (such as the
Dnieper Ukrainians and the Belarusians) had been "reunited" with their
Russian brethren in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Wilson thinks it conceivable that if eastern Galicia had been absorbed into
Russia in 1772 or 1815, "modern Ukraine might then have become more like
modern Belarus, with a much weaker sense of national identity." (p. xii)
It is certainly true that Ukrainian nationalism had far greater opportunity
to develop in Galicia and Bukovina than in "Dnieper Ukraine." This is not
due simply to Austria (eventually) having much greater freedom than Russia;
Vienna actually had an interest in utilizing Ukrainian nationalism as a
counterbalance to Polish nationalism in Galicia, and also to discourage the
Russophile orientation among the East Slavs of Galicia (in 1882 there was a
major treason trial of Russophile leaders). When Ukrainian nationalists
were persecuted in Kiev, they could find refuge in Lemberg/Lwow/Lviv; when
printing in the Ukrainian language was banned in Russia, Ukrainian-language
books were smuggled in from Galicia. Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia
viewed Galicia as the "Piedmont" of a future free and united Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the Russophile orientation was in decline; in the 1907 elections
to the Vienna parliament the Russophiles won only five seats to 22 for the
Ukrainophiles.
To be sure, in 1914-15, when Russia did occupy most of Galicia and
Bukovina, it viewed it as a golden opportunity to Russify the area. But by
then it was too late. If Tsarist Russia had won the war and annexed
Galicia, by that time it would indeed have been a "poisoned gift"--the
higher Ukrainian consciousness of the area would exercise a pernicious
(from the viewpoint of Russia's leaders) influence on Dnieper Ukraine--just
as it did after 1945. (As Durnovo said in his famous memorandum warning
Nicholas II against a war with Germany: "It is obviously disadvantageous
for us to annex, in the interests of national sentimentalism, a territory
[Galicia] that has lost every vital connection with our fatherland. For,
together with a negligible handful of Galicians, Russian in spirit, how
many Poles, Jews, and Ukrainized Uniates we would receive! The so-called
Ukrainian, or Mazeppist, movement is not a menace to us at present, but we
should not enable it to expand by increasing the number of turbulent
Ukrainian elements, for in this movement undoubtedly lies the seed of an
extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism which, under favorable
conditions, may assume quite unexpected proportions.")
As Wilson says, all this does not mean that one has to accept
Solzhenitsyn's views about avoiding Russia's "disastrous problems" with
Ukraine if only Galicia had been annexed in 1815. This assumes that there
were no significant differences to eradicate in 1815, whereas in fact there
were already plenty. "Nevertheless, with nearly all significant Ukrainian
territory under Russian control, Ukraine might have been in the same
situation as Belarus and any nineteenth-century Ukrainian national
'revival' might have looked more like its much weaker north-western
counterpart. The Greek Catholic Church would have been almost completely,
rather than only partially, abolished in 1839, apart from some tiny
remnants (assuming its other outpost in Transcarpathia was also under
Russian control). On the other hand, in the Ukrainian territories already
under the Tsars...there was already a much stronger national tradition than
in Belarus. The nineteenth-century Ukrainian national movement began in
Kharkiv. It would have had to stay there rather than transfer to Galicia,
so it would have developed differently. But it would still have existed."
(p. 121)
It has btw even been argued that Russia might have secured Galicia during
the diplomatic maneuverings at the Congress of Berlin in 1876. I don't
know how realistic that was, but 1772 or 1813-15 were real possibilities:
Russian armies occupied Lviv (or however you want to spell it...) in 1769-
72 and part of Ternopil was temporarily annexed between 1809 and 1815.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/pWnV0G7EIEc/h-JYd7P_pogJ