AHC: retain independent aircraft development in Europe

FBKampfer

Banned
So throughout the cold war, much of the European aircraft industry atrophied.

From Hawker, Supermarine, Fairey, Short, Avro, Vickers, Westland, De Haviland, Handley Page, Bristol, Armstrong Whitworth, Fokker, Koolhoven, Saab, Junkers, Heinkel, Dornier, Feisler, Focke Wulf, Messerschmitt, Gotha, Blohm & Voss, Reggiane, Fiat, Macchi, Breda, CANT, Caproni, Piaggio, Savoia-Marchetti, IMAM, SNCAC, Amiot, ANF, Arsenal, Belriot, Bloch, Breguet, Caudron, Dewoitine, Hanriot, Loire, SNCASE, SNCAO, Farman, Moraine-Saulnier, Neiuport, Potez, IAR, PZL, Ikarus, Rogozarski, Avia, Letov, Aero, Praga,

And I'm sure im forgetting more.


All of them doing fairly extensive (especially given the size of some of these firms) in-house development and production of military aircraft in WWII.

To my knowledge, we're down to Saab, and Dassault for firms that do ground-up, in-house design, testing, and production of military aircraft.

Now I know there's been a general trend of consolidation and conglomeration (thanks again capitalism). But the US seemed to stay quite comparatively diversified until recently, with Northrup-Grumman, McDonnell-Douglas, Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, General-Dynamics, all either receiving or supporting large contracts at least until the 90's.


So. What happened? How can we stop it? What would the European defense market look like now?



And for fun:
Bonus points if the OTL CEO's, bordmembers, and/or stockholders are financially crippled in the process, or as bystander casualties. Like full on break their monetary kneecaps with a lead pipe. Just go to town.
 
I'd say this is otl.

Gripen, Rafale, and Eurofighter for Europe, vs F18, F35 and F16 for the US, basically.

A400 vs c130

Airbus vs Boeing

Ariane 5 is still selling commercially, where neither Delta or Atlas is. Mind, all the majors will be crushed by SpaceX and Blue Origin.

Sure, there used to be dozens of aircraft manufacturers in Europe. There were lots in the States, too. Increasing cost and complexity forced mergers.
 
The problem is that as aircraft get more complex, the number of man-hours required to do the engineering work to get them into service increases exponentially. In the 1930s you're looking at maybe tens of thousands of engineering man-hours to get an aircraft into service. Modern equivalents are into the tens or hundreds of millions of man-hours to get to the same stage. That gets seriously expensive, and is why the UK (with it's fragmented aircraft industry) dropped out early and only really came back as part of multinational consortiums where the monstrous workload can be shared across multiple sites.
The problem is that Europe can only really support one single aerospace company (Airbus). Even the US can only really support two, most likely Boeing and Lockheed. Everybody else is going to end up going bust or being taken over.
 
Avoid World War 2 and the cold war.The United States built a gigantic aircraft industry and infrastructure that specialized in making lots of high quality aircraft cheaply, giving them an edge.
 
Perhaps be a tad more specific?

Sure.

Britain, despite being a large customer with one of the world biggest air forces and fleet air arms and having multiple large airlines, consistently made poor choices with regard to aircraft research, development and procurement which basically crippled her aviation industry by the 60s. This is despite having the technical and industrial capacity to build world class aircraft and the money to buy such aircraft if developed.

A few examples are.
  • The 1946 decision to abandon the Miles M52 supersonic research aircraft in favour of a remote-controlled, rocket-powered model based on its aerodynamics that cost so much to get working that they could have actually built the manned aircraft and gotten a lot of valuable supersonic research out of it.
  • The 1946-7 decision that no war was for a decade and that aircraft development should aim for 1957 to perfect the most effective aircraft, which lead to a mad scramble for interim jet fighters when Korea broke out and the adoption of some real dud aircraft and buying some 440 Canadair Sabres instead of building British aircraft.
  • The 1957 Defence White Paper which declared that manned combat aircraft would become obsolete, leaving only the EE Lightning and TSR2 under development for the RAF.
  • Decisions surrounding the cancellation of the VC7 which could have been a competitor to the 707 and DC8 and to make the HS Trident too small to compete with the 727 while giving Boeing all HS data on the tri-jet design crippled British airliners in the 60s.
  • The 1961 decision to develop the P1154 supersonic VTOL and further to attempt to make it meet very different RAF and RN requirements, then cancel it completely in favour of the US designed but British modified Phantom.
  • The 1961 decision to pursue development of V/STOL transport aircraft to support the VTOL fighter and then cancelling it to buy the US Hercules, all the while ignoring the British built Shorts Belfast and European aircraft that used British engines.
  • The 1966 decision to cancel the TSR2 at a very late stage of development in favour of the F111K/AFVG/UKVG/MRCA Tornado all of which required large sums on money for development and only the Tornado made it to production.
  • The 70s decision to hand further development of the Harrier to McDonnel Douglas in the US.
All of these decisions carried medium-long term negative consequences for the health of Britain's aerospace sector, leading to the negative closure of some valuable companies and the loss of opportunities for the companies that remained. If quite reasonable changes were made to some or most of these decisions the results would have created a wave for the relevant companies to surf for a while as well as putting the customer in a more favourable position for the next decision point.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
The problem is that as aircraft get more complex, the number of man-hours required to do the engineering work to get them into service increases exponentially. In the 1930s you're looking at maybe tens of thousands of engineering man-hours to get an aircraft into service. Modern equivalents are into the tens or hundreds of millions of man-hours to get to the same stage. That gets seriously expensive, and is why the UK (with it's fragmented aircraft industry) dropped out early and only really came back as part of multinational consortiums where the monstrous workload can be shared across multiple sites.
The problem is that Europe can only really support one single aerospace company (Airbus). Even the US can only really support two, most likely Boeing and Lockheed. Everybody else is going to end up going bust or being taken over.


It seems (to me) more like the procurement cycles have just gotten screwed, which has ballooned costs from apoplexy-inducing but manageable, to simply ludicrous.


I mean look at the F-35. I have no doubt it will be capable, but not outstanding. The problem is we took an excellent base package, crammed a bunch of extra stuff into it, pared that back for two of the three versions, and delivered the damm thing a decade late.

We could have had the F-35A operational by 2009. Is it everything everyone wanted? No, but it's most of what most people wanted. And still had potential to be finished as the individual models are ready.


Maybe the F-35B gets scrapped later on. Who cares? If the other two get delivered on-time, you've already shaved close to a third off the total budget, and can really start cranking them our, reducing production costs, and driving sales.



The development goals have shifted from "flawed but greatly improved over previous models" to "perfect". And nobody is satisfied because we spend an extra ten years trying to get to perfect, and have to settle for good enough at the end anyway.
 
The development goals have shifted from "flawed but greatly improved over previous models" to "perfect". And nobody is satisfied because we spend an extra ten years trying to get to perfect, and have to settle for good enough at the end anyway.

Good enough aircraft get shot down by great aircraft and SAMs, since the early 60s combat aircraft have had service lives of over 20 years, creeping up to 35 years these days. Accepting a 'good enough' aircraft, which is actually code for 'complete piece of shit' means that all the money sunk into development will be pointless because the state of the art will have moved on before the production run ends.

As a taxpayer I don't want to have to replace or drastically upgrade the RAAF F35 fleet at a cost of billions in 10 years because we were too stupid and short sighted to spend a few hundred million extra in the development phase.
 
It seems (to me) more like the procurement cycles have just gotten screwed, which has ballooned costs from apoplexy-inducing but manageable, to simply ludicrous.

I mean look at the F-35. I have no doubt it will be capable, but not outstanding. The problem is we took an excellent base package, crammed a bunch of extra stuff into it, pared that back for two of the three versions, and delivered the damm thing a decade late.

We could have had the F-35A operational by 2009. Is it everything everyone wanted? No, but it's most of what most people wanted. And still had potential to be finished as the individual models are ready.

Maybe the F-35B gets scrapped later on. Who cares? If the other two get delivered on-time, you've already shaved close to a third off the total budget, and can really start cranking them our, reducing production costs, and driving sales.

The development goals have shifted from "flawed but greatly improved over previous models" to "perfect". And nobody is satisfied because we spend an extra ten years trying to get to perfect, and have to settle for good enough at the end anyway.
The problem with the F-35 is that the US needed all three variants. The Marine Corps needed a Harrier replacement, in fact that is the genesis of the program in CALF. The Air Force needed an F-16 replacement and figured CALF without the VTOL would work. And the Navy was dragged in later as Congress would not pay for two separate 5th gen fighter programs

The 35B is probably the most important of the variants, and was the first to enter into service. Harrier production ended in 2003, worst case F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 production is ongoing for the US, plus Eurofighter is still ongoing for European partners. There are alternatives, there are no alternatives for a Harrier replacement, especially as the Harrier goes through airframes faster than conventional aircraft due to being a bitch to fly and having a sky high accident rate

The F-22 cost about half of what the F-35 cost to develop, so the F-35 is actually a pretty good deal, 66% the cost of doing 3 separate programs, you maybe shave 25% of the budget off rather than 33%, and perhaps less

Plus F-35 development time is not too out there, F-35 was 1992 from concept start with CALF to 2018 for all variants in service, 26 years (24 years for the A, 23 for the B). The fastest recent Western Fighter development that isn't a derivative is the Gripen 1979 to 1997, 18 years, Rafale is 23 from 1978 to 2001, Typhoon is 24 1979 to 2003, Raptor is the same 24 years, 1981 to 2005
 
The problem with the F-35 is that the US needed all three variants. The Marine Corps needed a Harrier replacement, in fact that is the genesis of the program in CALF. The Air Force needed an F-16 replacement and figured CALF without the VTOL would work. And the Navy was dragged in later as Congress would not pay for two separate 5th gen fighter programs

The 35B is probably the most important of the variants, and was the first to enter into service. Harrier production ended in 2003, worst case F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 production is ongoing for the US, plus Eurofighter is still ongoing for European partners. There are alternatives, there are no alternatives for a Harrier replacement, especially as the Harrier goes through airframes faster than conventional aircraft due to being a bitch to fly and having a sky high accident rate

The F-22 cost about half of what the F-35 cost to develop, so the F-35 is actually a pretty good deal, 66% the cost of doing 3 separate programs, you maybe shave 25% of the budget off rather than 33%, and perhaps less

Plus F-35 development time is not too out there, F-35 was 1992 from concept start with CALF to 2018 for all variants in service, 26 years (24 years for the A, 23 for the B). The fastest recent Western Fighter development that isn't a derivative is the Gripen 1979 to 1997, 18 years, Rafale is 23 from 1978 to 2001, Typhoon is 24 1979 to 2003, Raptor is the same 24 years, 1981 to 2005


To be fair, a lot of time was wasted during Typhoon development by the Germans wanting to use variants of the US designed GE 404 engines and APG 65 radars in the aircraft, then slowing development to save money (which it never does in the long run) and of course the British insanity of deciding to not fit a cannon and then finding they had to have a cannon just because not having one upset the FCS then wasted time on designing cannon shaped ballast before realising they should just fit a cannon but not fund it. Ultimately they fitted a cannon AND funded it as it was actually useful! Just the German foot dragging wasted about 3-4 years on its own.

To be honest the Germans always wanted something smaller than Typhoon and would likely have been happier with what the Gripen turned into or a Rafale with more German equipment.
 
To be fair, a lot of time was wasted during Typhoon development by the Germans wanting to use variants of the US designed GE 404 engines and APG 65 radars in the aircraft, then slowing development to save money (which it never does in the long run) and of course the British insanity of deciding to not fit a cannon and then finding they had to have a cannon just because not having one upset the FCS then wasted time on designing cannon shaped ballast before realising they should just fit a cannon but not fund it. Ultimately they fitted a cannon AND funded it as it was actually useful! Just the German foot dragging wasted about 3-4 years on its own.

To be honest the Germans always wanted something smaller than Typhoon and would likely have been happier with what the Gripen turned into or a Rafale with more German equipment.
As far as I'm aware, every other fighter but the Gripen had similar issues. The Rafale (and Typhoon) lost time due to the whole attempt at French cooperation, Rafale had a 2 year suspension for political reasons, F-22 had delays from production being spread out to garner support and a cost reduction delay from Cheney, F-35 had hacking requiring a rework and a strike
 
It seems (to me) more like the procurement cycles have just gotten screwed, which has ballooned costs from apoplexy-inducing but manageable, to simply ludicrous.
I mean look at the F-35. I have no doubt it will be capable, but not outstanding. The problem is we took an excellent base package, crammed a bunch of extra stuff into it, pared that back for two of the three versions, and delivered the damm thing a decade late.
Umm... no. The problem is that we've made all the big improvements already, and to make further improvements is very hard. I've just spent the past two years of my life trying to figure out a way to reduce the power consumption of a widebody jet aircraft by a few kilowatts, for instance, with more than a million euros to spend on the project. That’s the sort of work you need to make even minor improvements nowadays.
 
The problem with the F-35 is that the US needed all three variants. The Marine Corps needed a Harrier replacement, in fact that is the genesis of the program in CALF. The Air Force needed an F-16 replacement and figured CALF without the VTOL would work. And the Navy was dragged in later as Congress would not pay for two separate 5th gen fighter programs

But did they? I can accept that the USN needed a "stealthy" multirole aircraft, and that the USAF needed something to take the place of all the retiring A-10s and F-16s (I'm not convinced the F-35 is the right airframe for both roles, but let's leave that aside). However, although I don't know much about the USMC, it's not clear to me why they need a VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft. Situations in which the USMC is operating without access to airbases or USN carriers are vanishingly rare these days, and I can't imagine any in which the USMC is doing that AND needs a 5th generation multi-role fighter instead of, say, a few more SeaCobras or something more like a Gripen.

So what's the logic here? Is it just the USMC being unwilling to give up their own airforce and insisting on VSTOL as a way of keeping that, or is there a genuine reason behind this?
 
Umm... no. The problem is that we've made all the big improvements already, and to make further improvements is very hard. I've just spent the past two years of my life trying to figure out a way to reduce the power consumption of a widebody jet aircraft by a few kilowatts, for instance, with more than a million euros to spend on the project. That’s the sort of work you need to make even minor improvements nowadays.

I agree. I work for a test lab that does both ENV and EMC testing which for getting a product tested to the required standards can easily run into the millions. You make one small change and testing has to be done all over again to get it reapproved. And every single subcontractor that makes something for a plane has to do the testing. Which then gets repeated by Boeing or Airbus or Lockheed and so on.
 
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But did they? I can accept that the USN needed a "stealthy" multirole aircraft, and that the USAF needed something to take the place of all the retiring A-10s and F-16s (I'm not convinced the F-35 is the right airframe for both roles, but let's leave that aside). However, although I don't know much about the USMC, it's not clear to me why they need a VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft. Situations in which the USMC is operating without access to airbases or USN carriers are vanishingly rare these days, and I can't imagine any in which the USMC is doing that AND needs a 5th generation multi-role fighter instead of, say, a few more SeaCobras or something more like a Gripen.

So what's the logic here? Is it just the USMC being unwilling to give up their own airforce and insisting on VSTOL as a way of keeping that, or is there a genuine reason behind this?
Well it allows the Marines to have a fixed wing combat aircraft that can come in on the Big Deck Ampibs and operate from the same places as the helicopters, which is a useful capability in the entry phase before airbases have been secured and doesn't require tying down a CVN unless the opposition is heavy. The Marines haven't done much forced entry, but they still have to prepare for it as it is one of their major roles. It also lets the big deck amphibs be used as psuedo carriers if needed, either ground support or ASW, that don't need to be babysat in mid intensity theaters similar to the small Carriers of the RN, RM and AE, who also need a Harrier replacement

As for 5th gen not being needed, well the issue with the Harrier was that, Falklands performance aside, it wasn't a very good aircraft, being described as similar to an A-4, which the US had long phased out save for aggressor training. The Marines (and others mentioned) wanted a successor that could also handle itself against frontline opposition, and be survivable in a high intensity situation, rather than sit on the sidelines until air superiority had been established and SEAD carried out. Since they couldn't go super high kinematic performance due to VTOL, they needed to use other things to get that, so ended up being 5th gen
 
But did they? I can accept that the USN needed a "stealthy" multirole aircraft, and that the USAF needed something to take the place of all the retiring A-10s and F-16s (I'm not convinced the F-35 is the right airframe for both roles, but let's leave that aside). However, although I don't know much about the USMC, it's not clear to me why they need a VSTOL fixed-wing aircraft. Situations in which the USMC is operating without access to airbases or USN carriers are vanishingly rare these days, and I can't imagine any in which the USMC is doing that AND needs a 5th generation multi-role fighter instead of, say, a few more SeaCobras or something more like a Gripen.

So what's the logic here? Is it just the USMC being unwilling to give up their own airforce and insisting on VSTOL as a way of keeping that, or is there a genuine reason behind this?

Gripen isn't designed to work off (relatively) small amphibious ships so it's not much use for supporting a USMC amphibious operation. SeaCobras aren't as fast as fast jets and don't carry anywhere like the same warload.
 
Well it allows the Marines to have a fixed wing combat aircraft that can come in on the Big Deck Ampibs and operate from the same places as the helicopters, which is a useful capability in the entry phase before airbases have been secured and doesn't require tying down a CVN unless the opposition is heavy. The Marines haven't done much forced entry, but they still have to prepare for it as it is one of their major roles. It also lets the big deck amphibs be used as psuedo carriers if needed, either ground support or ASW, that don't need to be babysat in mid intensity theaters similar to the small Carriers of the RN, RM and AE, who also need a Harrier replacement

As for 5th gen not being needed, well the issue with the Harrier was that, Falklands performance aside, it wasn't a very good aircraft, being described as similar to an A-4, which the US had long phased out save for aggressor training. The Marines (and others mentioned) wanted a successor that could also handle itself against frontline opposition, and be survivable in a high intensity situation, rather than sit on the sidelines until air superiority had been established and SEAD carried out. Since they couldn't go super high kinematic performance due to VTOL, they needed to use other things to get that, so ended up being 5th gen

Thanks for explaining that, I feel like I have a better idea of the thought process now. I agree that the Harrier was never particularly great, which is why the idea of replacing it seemed strange to me. Even for other navies with small carriers it was a distinctly second-best solution, viable only due to there being no practical alternative. Hard to imagine the F-35 being used for ASW, though - can it even carry the sensors and weapons needed?

It sounds like the VSTOL version of the F-35 is based on three assumptions: 1) The USMC will be engaging in high-intensity operations and/or forced entry operations; 2) these operations will be conducted against peer or near-peer opposition; and 3) the USN & USAF will not be providing support. The first and second of these are not-unreasonable planning assumptions - if they're wrong you end up with something more capable than you need, which is a safer side to err on. But the third assumption just seems weird: under what circumstances would the USMC be engaged in forced-entry operations against a peer-level opponent, but the USN isn't involved? Don't the Marines travel on USN ships?
 
Thanks for explaining that, I feel like I have a better idea of the thought process now. I agree that the Harrier was never particularly great, which is why the idea of replacing it seemed strange to me. Even for other navies with small carriers it was a distinctly second-best solution, viable only due to there being no practical alternative. Hard to imagine the F-35 being used for ASW, though - can it even carry the sensors and weapons needed?

It sounds like the VSTOL version of the F-35 is based on three assumptions: 1) The USMC will be engaging in high-intensity operations and/or forced entry operations; 2) these operations will be conducted against peer or near-peer opposition; and 3) the USN & USAF will not be providing support. The first and second of these are not-unreasonable planning assumptions - if they're wrong you end up with something more capable than you need, which is a safer side to err on. But the third assumption just seems weird: under what circumstances would the USMC be engaged in forced-entry operations against a peer-level opponent, but the USN isn't involved? Don't the Marines travel on USN ships?
It isn't meant for ASW itself, but it is there to protect the carrier full of ASW Helicopters and swat any MPAs that are spotting for the submarines

The VSTOL version is the original version of the F-35, no VSTOL version, no F-35, and we get next 5th gen US aircraft from another program than CALF, NATF, MRF or A/F-XX

The Assumption is not that the USAF and USN will not be providing support, but rather that they will be working alongside them, in the case of the CALF it was to do short ranged attack, CAS, and Helicopter Escort so that the USN and USAF did not have to. This requires that Marine aircraft be able to perform their missions in high intensity environments, as they will not necessarily be able to wait until absolute air supremacy and total suppression of enemy air defenses is achieved. One could probably get away with less than 5th gen, given that 4+ gen aircraft could be expected to survive, but VTOL adds a penalty so you basically would need a 4.5+ gen aircraft, which is but a small step to 5th gen. In any case once the Navy got shoved in to CALF and it became JSF it became 5th gen, and the price differential isn't worth developing a new aircraft and adding a new training, maintenance and logistics pipeline for only 340 units
 
It isn't meant for ASW itself

I wouldn't be so certain, as strange as it may seem.

One of the things the RAAF is excited about with the F35 is the all the cool secondary things that it can do with its networked sensor fusion while undertaking primary missions. They already have a list of stuff they want to try net year when the Validation and Testing programme begins, like using it as a stealthy off-board sensor for which the P8 was specifically mentioned as well as the Wedgetail AEW&C and Jindalee OTHR.

The analogous story is that when the Pave Tack was fitted to the F111C the RAAF found that it could find targets for the SAS to investigate while it was flying in the process of flying unrelated strike missions. The RAAF didn't anticipate this when Pave Tack was introduced, but it soon became an important side-mission for the F111C fleet and enhanced the combat effectiveness of both the RAAF and the SAS.

The RAAF doesn't know how this will play out in service, but are like giddy schoolkids waiting to ride their new bike they're getting for their birthday.
 
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