AHC: Quickly Defeat Japan in WW2

"what actions could the United States have taken"?

Then we have no control of British actions.
Realistically would GB and the Dutch not do anything that the US told them if it was part of a joint plan to defend the far east, GB/D wanted and needed US support to defend the far east and LL supplies in Europe so anything that binds them together will be accepted. For example in OTL they accepted the oil embargo and sanctions that the US wanted.

The only way you are going to knock Japan out without nukes is to isolate them from external supplies. Rubber, oil, etc. That means submarines.
No if we are allowed to start early December 6th, 1941 could the US not order the Asiatic fleet/Army engineers to sail/fly south immediately and burn/destroy the oil wells before they fall into Japanese hands?

What would be the effect of a properly organized destruction of DEI Oil facilities in the first week of the war?
 
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Probably not much. The Dutch did a rather good job of it themselves, yet the Japanese were able to repair damage and have the fields pumping in six months.
 
Wildcat ended up pretty well vs. Zero, problem was that Wildcat was very dependant on correct placing of one or more flights/squadrons with regard to the altitude, direction and bearing of incoming bombers, since it was slow-ish and didn't climb well.
F4F-3
Initial rate of climb with 110 gallons of fuel 3300 ft/min
Time to 10,000 3.5 minutes 20,000 7.6 minutes. top speed 326 at 19,000
4.5 hour endurance, 880 miles@160mph

yeah, it looks bad vs the Zero, but that F4F not far off the stats of the Spitfire II, excepting Range, that the F4F wipes the floor with the Spit, even more so when all fuel tanks are filled to 147 gallons, that gives 1280@165mph, but that changes initial climb 3070fpm, and4.2min to 10k and 8.4min to 20k
 
F4F-3
Initial rate of climb with 110 gallons of fuel 3300 ft/min
Time to 10,000 3.5 minutes 20,000 7.6 minutes. top speed 326 at 19,000
4.5 hour endurance, 880 miles@160mph

Unfortunately, USN figures state much lower values than Grumman figures - around 2500 ft/min best RoC at 6269 lms (= fuel tank not full), and ~2050 ft/min with full tank and max ammo at 7300 lbs. (data sheet, tests)

yeah, it looks bad vs the Zero, but that F4F not far off the stats of the Spitfire II, excepting Range, that the F4F wipes the floor with the Spit, even more so when all fuel tanks are filled to 147 gallons, that gives 1280@165mph, but that changes initial climb 3070fpm, and4.2min to 10k and 8.4min to 20k

Influence of weight is cruel to the RoC, being draggy also does not help. F4F ticked both of those boxes, and it could not climb with either Spitfire, Zero or even Hurricane. Neither -3 nor -4 were able to meet some of Grumman's guarantees of performance by a visible margin.
The F4F-4 worsened this, due to increase in weight and drag. The best RoC sunk to 1900 ft/min, even the speed was lower by 10 mph. 1200 HP engine simply won't cut it in 1942 aboard a heavy and draggy fighter.
Immediately after Midway, USN admirals were even asking whether the Army's P-40F can be quickly navalized.
 
Realistically would GB and the Dutch not do anything that the US told them if it was part of a joint plan to defend the far east, GB/D wanted and needed US support to defend the far east and LL supplies in Europe so anything that binds them together will be accepted. For example in OTL they accepted the oil embargo and sanctions that the US wanted.

Arguably the US had dropped the Western Pacific like a hot potato after the WT and left nothing there (bases etc) to allow them to get back quickly. Then the US expected all the other parties to dance to their tune.

In a lot of ways the UK is the senior Allied party onsite in 1941. They have the bases and infrastructure. They had the body to fight the war, but not the arms. The US had the arms but not the body. What I have no idea what, perhaps they had some kind of plan for the US and the US was institutionally capable of listening something could have been organized? ASB airy fairy stuff, I have no idea if anything could be achieved along those lines. Even if it is stop pushing Japan into a corner (and I am sure Japan would have kept pushing itself further into said corner anyway).
 
Unfortunately, USN figures state much lower values than Grumman figures - around 2500 ft/min best RoC at 6269 lms (= fuel tank not full), and ~2050 ft/min with full tank and max ammo at 7300 lbs. (data sheet, tests)
Going from Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
Report No. 1469A
August 12, 1941
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f.html the same link you linked under test formal Navy acceptance was in January 1941

I expect they did all the tricks, pulled a good example from production, polished skin, tuned up,no life raft or wing flotation bags, low ammo loadout etc, but seems to be the (4) .50 loadout than the prototype with no cockpit armor and (2) .30 and (2) .50
f4f-header.jpg

Note paint and still has spinner. The later production units got heavy, just like how the Buffalo started out a nimble fighter, and turned out an overweight slug in service, except in Finnish service, where they flew closer to the early machines with a lot of the extra navy gear removed, as even the USN did eventually, like deleting the raft and wing bags. The above test shows what the design was capable of with a R-1830-86.
My Spitfire number are from http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-II.html
And yes, the F4F-4 got much, much worse. The extra guns did not help, among other things
 
Arguably the US had dropped the Western Pacific like a hot potato after the WT and left nothing there (bases etc) to allow them to get back quickly. Then the US expected all the other parties to dance to their tune.

NQF. The Japanese gov'ts at the time of the WNT were a lot more reasonable and "liberal" than the later militarists who took over after the financial crash. The Japanese did not violate the 9 Powers and WNT in earnest until after the Marco Polo bridge (1937). And to be honest, the US gov't. was not happy about British actions at the time.

In a lot of ways the UK is the senior Allied party onsite in 1941. They have the bases and infrastructure. They had the body to fight the war, but not the arms. The US had the arms but not the body. What I have no idea what, perhaps they had some kind of plan for the US and the US was institutionally capable of listening something could have been organized? ASB airy fairy stuff, I have no idea if anything could be achieved along those lines. Even if it is stop pushing Japan into a corner (and I am sure Japan would have kept pushing itself further into said corner anyway).

Nope. It's 1941 and Whitehall has torqued a lot of people off in region. Once you get past the Malacca Straits and factor in the badly damaged (ANZAC) politics, the British were a big fat zero in the West Pac.

And then there is King, who hated the RN's guts.

It's not a happy state of affairs in the Pacific. Not at all.

Best bet is for the UK to patch up political misunderstandings in Australia, whack Thailand (as mentioned^^^^^^^^^^^^) and do something about Singapore. Urge the Americans to help defend Rabaul and maybe replace Somerville, Percival and whoever else is mucking things up in Malaysia and Burma. There was nothing wrong with the troops. PLENTY wrong with the leadership. Much like MacArthur and the Hawaii command setup. Rot at the top.
 
A lot of interesting details here, but my position is the only realistic way is if the US starts major preparations for a Pacific war in late 1937. Essentially 2.5 years earlier than OTL. Everything that was ready in the late summer or autumn of 1943 is on line in latter 1941, Essex class carriers joining the fleet, six spanking new battleships, a fleet of specialized logistics ships and amphib transports, a naval/army air force of 15,000+ aircraft, 200,000 men in offensive ready ground combat units & another 1,200,000 in a support trail leading back to the interior of the US...

Yes, better British leadership and preparations are very helpful, but a offensive capability striking from that direction does not seem as practical. Some how I don't see the US shifting the wherewithal for its Central Pacific offensive around to the Indian Ocean & launching WP ORANGE from a intact Maylasia.
 
Why would you want any western Allied troops in China when there area already plenty of Chinese pinning down huge numbers of IJA. China is basically a sink hole for troops from either side. Better Japanese troops than western.

You don't win a war by pinning down the enemy's forces. You win by destroying the enemy's forces. The main body of the Japanese army was in China. OTL, the Allies couldn't get at it.

Also, providing adequate supply to the Chinese army and stiffening it with a modest US force would greatly improve the combat power of this very large force.

Advancing though Thailand into Malaya and Indochina basically means a walk though some of the worst terrain on earth.
Compared to what? The Kokoda Trail in New Guinea? The Solomon Islands?

Thailand, Malaya, and Indochina were not trackless junlgle or impassable mountains. These were settled, inhabited countries, with roads and villages. Yes, there are wilderness areas. There are wilderness areas in New York state (the Adirondacks). Does that make the region impassable?
 
The Plan Orange assumptions and Hector Bywater makes prediction rather easy. Now the scale and speed may be a bit astonishing.

The question is what degree of "hindsight" one can apply to US actions starting 12/6/1941. In hindsight, we know that the Japanese carrier fleet was at sea NNW of Hawaii on 12/6/41, and that the Japanese could have been ambushed and destroyed by correctly positioned US carriers. However, Plan Orange and Bywater would not provide that "hindsight".

Then defeat Thailand preemptively as the British Empire and do so decisively in 1940, before the Japanese get organized in French Indochina.

What part of "Starting on 12/6/1941" in the OP did you not read?

Burma is worse than Vietnam when it comes to terrain and irregular warfare. No established LOCs aside from the coasts. And add a Monsoon season when tactical movement = zero.

What part of "if the Japanese were kept out of Burma" did you not read? In any case, the Japanese did not conquer Burma through irregular warfare, nor were they kicked out of Burma through "irregular warfare". As to the monsoon season, yes, it shuts down campaigning for a while. So does the rasputitsa in Russia, but it doesn't make the area permanently impassable.

But really, if Malaya and the Thailand-Burma border are "some of the worst terrain in the world", then how did the Japanese march through both areas in a few weeks in 1941-1942?

The US tried this RTL. The result was Ichi-Go.

What part of "drive the Japanese out of south China" did you not read? Doing that first would make basing bombers there feasible. In OTL, the US tried it without defeating the Japanese army there - which failed, of course.

No infrastructure. No logistics pathways. No way.

If the Allies hold Burma, they have an overland LoC to China. Overland beats over beaches any day of the week, and nearly all Allied land operations in the Pacific were over beaches.
 
Yes, better British leadership and preparations are very helpful, but a offensive capability striking from that direction does not seem as practical. Some how I don't see the US shifting the wherewithal for its Central Pacific offensive around to the Indian Ocean & launching WP ORANGE from a intact Maylasia.

It is not the Indian Ocean. It is the South China Sea. Control that and Japan can't get the resources to fight a war (Oil, rubber, tin, etc). From the Philippines or Singapore you can fill the SCS with subs and aircraft. The challenge is holding the Philippines or Singapore with what is available in 1941.

You don't win a war by pinning down the enemy's forces. You win by destroying the enemy's forces. The main body of the Japanese army was in China. OTL, the Allies couldn't get at it.

I am imagining two fat men flapping at each other's hands.

You win a war by destroying an enemy's ability to wage war. Sure that can mean destroying an enemy's army in the field.

But take the Japanese in China example. Why is it a bad thing that the majority of the Japanese army is pinned down in China where the Allies can't get at it? It means less Japanese soldiers to kill Allied soldiers when they are attacking actual useful targets.
Japan gains no benefit from fighting in China. It is an open sore and drain on resources. Yet they must remain in China. It is the reason they attacked the Allies. Japan is not going to win there. So why get involved.

Instead do what they did in the OTL. Go after the Home Islands. Destroy Japan's ability to fight a war. And all those troops will wither on the vine in China without a shot being fired at them.

If the Allies hold Burma, they have an overland LoC to China. Overland beats over beaches any day of the week, and nearly all Allied land operations in the Pacific were over beaches.

Sea beats land every day. Especially in the 1940s. Remember the Bridge Over the River Kwai? They were building that railway for a reason. You can shift a lot more, a lot more cheaply by sea than land. Especially in a place like SEA where infrastructure is minimal.

The overland LoC to China is called the Hump. It is basically walking over a mountain range. As it existed they could barely supply some heavy bombers. They are not going to be supplying a western style army by that route.
 
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The question is what degree of "hindsight" one can apply to US actions starting 12/6/1941. In hindsight, we know that the Japanese carrier fleet was at sea NNW of Hawaii on 12/6/41, and that the Japanese could have been ambushed and destroyed by correctly positioned US carriers. However, Plan Orange and Bywater would not provide that "hindsight".

Plan Orange formed the basis of many of the USN's fleet problems during the 1920s and 1930s. At least one common feature, was either a surprise air attack on the Panama Canal; or Pearl Harbor.

What part of "Starting on 12/6/1941" in the OP did you not read?

Why single me out? Others have speculated as far back PoDs as 1937 in this thread. ^^^^^^^ You don't criticize them. Anyway, if the British whack Thailand on December 8, 1941, it still goes a long way to disrupting the Japanese Malay campaign and it makes the Singapore defense "manageable".

What part of "if the Japanese were kept out of Burma" did you not read? In any case, the Japanese did not conquer Burma through irregular warfare, nor were they kicked out of Burma through "irregular warfare". As to the monsoon season, yes, it shuts down campaigning for a while. So does the rasputitsa in Russia, but it doesn't make the area permanently impassable.

Don't be ridiculous. Your complete lack of knowledge of how the fighting in Burma developed, shows me that you just looked at an Atlas and said AHA! Burma can be used to supply China and a front can be maintained through there.

Here.

and

Here.

physical-map-of-burma-shaded-relief-outside.jpg


and

japanese-conquest-of-burma-1942.jpg


and

RAF-3-16-5.jpg


Short answer. In 1941, the British Army of India was complacent, poorly officered, city and road bound as to supply and logistics. The Japanese were attacking on a south to north axis, and not as reliant on European style logistics (Asian peasant infantry army), and they were inured to the tough infantry marches that they endured in China. They trekked through the jungle on foot and using bicycles, (yes, bicycles.); a trick the Viet Cong would use decades later in Vietnam. As in Malaya, they outmarched, outflanked, encircled and routed various British or Indian units who tried to form "lines" and make stands. Once the general rout started on the British side, there was no-one with the communications, resources, organizational talent, or MEN to halt the skedaddle. The Japanese only halted when they ran out of supplies and found they could not push supplies forward to their assault units because of the absolutely awful terrain. It took two years for the British to learn how to supply in Burma. (Coast road, capture the Japanese built trail system and most importantly (USAAF) aerial supply drops.)

During that time, the allies sent in CHINDITS and Merrill's Marauders. During the allied reconquest, these special forces, with particular emphasis on the Marauders in Stillwell's campaign (Didn't know the Americans and Chinese were involved?) conducted north to south operations to open a single road (all that the terrain and lousy logistics permitted.), between China and India. (Over some sensitive British objections I might add.) This one and a half lane serpentine road was unable to supply more than the eight divisions Stillwell was building from ZERO in southern China. See all those mountains? LOGISTICS... by air bridge. Most of it had to be flown in. That is why no Nationalist Chinese armies beating back the Japanese, or why the B-29 bomber offensive from central China failed.

But really, if Malaya and the Thailand-Burma border are "some of the worst terrain in the world", then how did the Japanese march through both areas in a few weeks in 1941-1942?

See above^^^^^^^^^^^^^

What part of "drive the Japanese out of south China" did you not read? Doing that first would make basing bombers there feasible. In OTL, the US tried it without defeating the Japanese army there - which failed, of course.

Before anyone speaks strategy or operational art, one should learn the ground, the road net, the weather, the logistics chains back to the supply dumps and what it takes to move 1 tonne of supplies forward.

Otherwise, you would not have made all the errors you made.

Here's a hint. The allies are attempting logistics from west to east, in a country where the natural LOCs are south to north.

If the Allies hold Burma, they have an overland LoC to China. Overland beats over beaches any day of the week, and nearly all Allied land operations in the Pacific were over beaches.

No it doesn't. See the British end around by SEA? You think that was because they wanted to do supply the HARD way? By ship is still cheaper than by truck or rail... today.
 
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