The question is what degree of "hindsight" one can apply to US actions starting 12/6/1941. In hindsight, we know that the Japanese carrier fleet was at sea NNW of Hawaii on 12/6/41, and that the Japanese could have been ambushed and destroyed by correctly positioned US carriers. However, Plan Orange and Bywater would not provide that "hindsight".
Plan Orange formed the basis of many of
the USN's fleet problems during the 1920s and 1930s. At least one common feature, was either
a surprise air attack on the Panama Canal;
or Pearl Harbor.
What part of "Starting on 12/6/1941" in the OP did you not read?
Why single me out? Others have speculated as far back PoDs as 1937 in this thread. ^^^^^^^ You don't criticize them. Anyway, if the British whack Thailand on December 8, 1941, it still goes a long way to disrupting the Japanese Malay campaign and it makes the Singapore defense "manageable".
What part of "if the Japanese were kept out of Burma" did you not read? In any case, the Japanese did not conquer Burma through irregular warfare, nor were they kicked out of Burma through "irregular warfare". As to the monsoon season, yes, it shuts down campaigning for a while. So does the rasputitsa in Russia, but it doesn't make the area permanently impassable.
Don't be ridiculous. Your complete lack of knowledge of how the fighting in Burma developed, shows me that you just looked at an Atlas and said AHA! Burma can be used to supply China and a front can be maintained through there.
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Short answer. In 1941, the British Army of India was complacent, poorly officered, city and road bound as to supply and logistics. The Japanese were attacking on a south to north axis, and not as reliant on European style logistics (Asian peasant infantry army), and they were inured to the tough infantry marches that they endured in China. They trekked through the jungle on foot and using bicycles, (yes, bicycles.); a trick the Viet Cong would use decades later in Vietnam. As in Malaya, they outmarched, outflanked, encircled and routed various British or Indian units who tried to form "lines" and make stands. Once the general rout started on the British side, there was no-one with the communications, resources, organizational talent, or MEN to halt the skedaddle. The Japanese only halted when they ran out of supplies and found they could not push supplies forward to their assault units because of the absolutely awful terrain. It took two years for the British to learn how to supply in Burma. (Coast road, capture the Japanese built trail system and most importantly (USAAF) aerial supply drops.)
During that time, the allies sent in
CHINDITS and
Merrill's Marauders. During the allied reconquest, these special forces, with particular emphasis on the Marauders in Stillwell's campaign (Didn't know the Americans and Chinese were involved?) conducted north to south operations to open a single road (all that the terrain and lousy logistics permitted.), between China and India. (Over some sensitive British objections I might add.) This one and a half lane serpentine road was unable to supply more than the eight divisions Stillwell was building from ZERO in southern China. See all those mountains? LOGISTICS... by air bridge. Most of it had to be flown in. That is why no Nationalist Chinese armies beating back the Japanese, or why the B-29 bomber offensive from central China failed.
But really, if Malaya and the Thailand-Burma border are "some of the worst terrain in the world", then how did the Japanese march through both areas in a few weeks in 1941-1942?
See above^^^^^^^^^^^^^
What part of "drive the Japanese out of south China" did you not read? Doing that first would make basing bombers there feasible. In OTL, the US tried it without defeating the Japanese army there - which failed, of course.
Before anyone speaks strategy or operational art,
one should learn the ground, the road net, the weather, the logistics chains back to the supply dumps and what it takes to move 1 tonne of supplies forward.
Otherwise, you would not have made all the errors you made.
Here's a hint. The allies are attempting logistics from west to east, in a country where the natural LOCs are south to north.
If the Allies hold Burma, they have an overland LoC to China. Overland beats over beaches any day of the week, and nearly all Allied land operations in the Pacific were over beaches.
No it doesn't. See the British end around by SEA?
You think that was because they wanted to do supply the HARD way? By ship is still cheaper than by truck or rail... today.