AHC: Prevent the Philippines from falling to the Japanese during WWII

Whether its reinforcing the PI early in the war, deploying more B-17s, or at least more USN submarines in the region,

How will these prevent the Japanese conquest of the Philippines?
 
Whether its reinforcing the PI early in the war, deploying more B-17s, or at least more USN submarines in the region,

How will these prevent the Japanese conquest of the Philippines?
Give the US another year before they get involved in the War and have MacArthur fall down a flight of stairs and the Philippines have a better than even chance of holding
 

Geon

Donor
Unless the U.S. radically changes its Pacific strategy I don't see the Philippines being held against a Japanese attack. War Plan Orange specifically said in the event of a war with Japan the Philippines was expendable. Even assuming the aftermath of Pearl Harbor was not as severe the U.S. did not have the ships or the logistics at that time to support an ongoing campaign in Philippines.
 
Macarthur correctly follows the army procedures and uses his bombers to attack Formosa as he is instructed. He then follows pre war plans correctly and holds out until the navy arrives.
 
Macarthur correctly follows the army procedures and uses his bombers to attack Formosa as he is instructed. He then follows pre war plans correctly and holds out until the navy arrives.
You're going good to need a failed pearl harbour to have a navy that can decisively impact Philippines. Perhaps a functional British Pacific Fleet would also be needed to split Japanese attension.
 
You're going good to need a failed pearl harbour to have a navy that can decisively impact Philippines. Perhaps a functional British Pacific Fleet would also be needed to split Japanese attension.
The need for a decent fleet train to be built up screws over any attempt to have the USN save the Philippines until 1943 at the earliest
 

SwampTiger

Banned
Several small, relatively, changes can provide large advantages for the US based defense. One is the issue of torpedoes. Fix the d*****d warheads and guidance systems. Spread the supply of warheads to more bases further south, build bases further south. Build more bomber capable airfields in southern Luzon and other islands in the chain. Separate the command system into Luzon, a central and southern command. Bring the growth and training of the Philippine Scout force forward and increase numbers of reservists. Send sufficient guns, supplies and equipment to the islands to at least partially equip Philippine forces. Why were they still using P-26's when P-36's were being phased out of USAAC. Scatter aircraft before a war warning. Agreed on the fleet train. A good New Deal program. A lightened .276 Pedersen M1917 conversion would certainly help the Phillippino grunts.

These are things possible with or without Mac.
 
The U.S. didn't anticipate being to hold Luzon (The main Island where Manila is). The plan was to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and wait for the fleet to arrive. It was planned that Mindinao (the large southern island) would be held allowing air forces to be available to support the reconquest. The problem was that MacArthur decided to fight it out on the beaches and did not properly equip Bataan and Corregidor for the seige
 
As has been noted:
  1. Fix the damn torpedoes! It's such a simple fucking oversight, too.
  2. MacArthur gets some STD from one of his mistresses, dies, and is replaced by somebody who knows how to follow orders, isn't an egomaniacal martinet, and can enforce discipline in his men.
  3. More modern supplies (e.g. Warhawks, probably).
Just fixing the torpedoes effectively throws a wrench into the Japanese invasion plans and significantly reduces the pressure early on. Having someone halfway competent in charge of the garrison means that air support out of Taiwan isn't coming for the IJA in the early days, fortify Bataan, fighting retreat to there to buy time.

Most of the islands will certainly be lost, temporarily, but just those three items would seriously blunt the Japanese advance into the region.

Oh, and if MacArthur doesn't die before the invasion and manages to fuck it up like OTL, he should be cashiered or shot for his incompetence and to save more trouble later on.
 

marathag

Banned
A lightened .276 Pedersen M1917 conversion would certainly help the Phillippino grunts.
30-40 Krags would be fine too, as an obsolete rifle is better than no rifle, where many guerillas were armed with homemade shotguns that were little more than oversized zip guns made from plumbing pipe
 
Considering the havoc one PT-Boat Squadron without properly functioning torpedos did in the Philippines in otl imagine the chaos if at least dozen of them are stationed in the Philippines with properly working torpedoes. Oh and you might as well install the autocannons PT-boats got later in the war. Another good idea would to be lay minefields near likely invasion locations and declare them when you get the war warnings.
 
Since I'm the OP, I thank you all for your contributions:
- So we have the USN actually develop earlier torpedoes for their subs and PT boats
- P-40s given to the Philippine Commonwealth Army Air Corps
- Use the B-17s in Clark Field and Nichols Field to bomb the Japanese invasion force in Formosa (in OTL, they actually missed)
- Start sending more M1 Garands to the Philippine Commonwealth Army as early as 1939-40. (At this period, the PCA still used M1917 Enflieds and M1903 Springfields. Garands were not issued en massed. The shipment of Garands never made it to the islands).
 

SwampTiger

Banned
Gillan1220
Use the B-17s in Clark Field and Nichols Field to bomb the Japanese invasion force in Formosa (in OTL, they actually missed)

- Start sending more M1 Garands to the Philippine Commonwealth Army as early as 1939-40. (At this period, the PCA still used M1917 Enflieds and M1903 Springfields. Garands were not issued en massed. The shipment of Garands never made it to the islands).


P-40s given to the Philippine Commonwealth Army Air Corps

1: The B-17 was useless against moving shipping. It wasn't much better against anchored ships. The targets were harbors and airfields.
2: The US Army did not have enough Garands for its own troops and the newly forming units. How can it send them to the Philippines?
3: P-40s were still replacing P-35s and P-36s in the USAAF. Send the P-35s, done OTL, and P-36s to the Philippines to replace P-26s.
 
Last edited:

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Ah, the never-ending tension between those who want to talk more about the necessity for the fleet building and fleet train to come online and those who want to talk about MacArthur.
 

Deleted member 9338

- So we have the USN actually develop earlier torpedoes for their subs and PT boats

It is not so much develop as having detonator that work.
 
1: The B-17 was useless against moving shipping. It wasn't much better against anchored ships. The targets were harbors and airfields.
The problem, I think, is that at the time they didn't know it yet. This is why they send those B-17 to Midway. So maybe we could add to all that has been proposed above something like this.

The USAF has a very embarrassing exercise using actual moving target ships for their B-17 bombers to drop bombs on. They realise that the flying fortress would be better used against things that do not move (harbours, airfields, factories and the like). Then they realise that they already have a plane that happens to produce good results against moving targets at sea. They call it A-24 Banshee (those guys in the navy call it Dauntless but who cares) and so, in a show of common sense, the decision is taken to train their pilots in dive bombing ships.

Then someone notices that the the Germans and Italians are giving a hard time to the Mediterranean Fleet using a combination of dive bombers and torpedo bombers (and since itl we have a working torpedo) so medium bombers are used to carry torpedoes.
 
More important than anything else - mobilize the Philippine Commonwealth Army alongside the National Guard in September of 1940. Historically, this was contemplated, but it was decided that this would be too provocative towards Japan - never-mind that the Two Ocean Navy Act was exponentially more of a threat towards Japan than the activation of a few light infantry divisions.

The PCA was a force built around its reserves - it had a standing strength of around 4,000 men (plus several thousand men in the Philippine Constabulary), and reserves of approximately 126,000. The training status of these forces was abysmal - only around 10% had ever participated in field training, and no exercises larger than a company level had been carried out. The reserve officer corps was in especially dire shape, with most officers having undergone a crash three to five month part-time course of instruction, with their subsequent reserve officer rank (ranging from third lieutenant to major) determined by their social rank in civilian life.

By the time the PCA was called to the colors in late 1941, it was too late - the first wave of mobilized reservists only received a few weeks of training, and the third and final wave was activated concurrently to the Japanese invasion. Simply having over a year to train, hold field exercises up to a divisional level, and sort out the worst reserve officers while improving skills in the best that remain would result in a far more capable force come December 1941, even without significant improvements in arms and equipment.

Also - the US government had been holding several hundred million dollars derived from excise taxes in trust for the Philippines, intended to handed over to the newly independent government in 1946 to smooth over the expected budget troubles that would come separation from the US. In the late thirties, the Commonwealth government made several requests to tap into this fund to help pay for national defense efforts, but were rebuffed each time. Allowing them access will go a long way to helping the PCA.

Send sufficient guns, supplies and equipment to the islands to at least partially equip Philippine forces.

With what? The US Army of the time barely had enough to meet its own requirements upon mobilization - and after the British withdrawal from continental Europe, they didn't have even that. The US hastily rushed the arms and equipment to organize ten infantry divisions to Britain, which left a gaping hole in their stocks which couldn't be readily filled.
 
Last edited:

SwampTiger

Banned
LC The target better be radio controlled, for any tow vessel will be in grave danger. I doubt the target vessel will be terribly bothered.

ALAMO I agree completely. Which is why I suggested conversion of existing weapons both in the Philippines and any future supplies of weapon to 276 Pedersen. Re-lining barrels is a gunsmith's job, as is shortening barrels, changing sights, modifying stocks and similar tasks. Use existing gunsmiths and armourers. Train locals. Although, this is another task the US Army will ignore due to other constraints.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
More important than anything else - mobilize the Philippine Commonwealth Army alongside the National Guard in September of 1940. Historically, this was contemplated, but it was decided that this would be too provocative towards Japan - never-mind that the Two Ocean Navy Act was exponentially more of a threat towards Japan than the activation of a few light infantry divisions.

The PCA was a force built around its reserves - it had a standing strength of around 4,000 men (plus several thousand men in the Philippine Constabulary), and reserves of approximately 126,000. The training status of these forces was abysmal - only around 10% had ever participated in field training, and no exercises larger than a company level had been carried out. The reserve officer corps was in especially dire shape, with most officers having undergone a crash three to five month part-time course of instruction, with their subsequent reserve officer rank (ranging from third lieutenant to major) determined by their social rank in civilian life.

By the time the PCA was called to the colors in late 1941, it was too late - the first wave of mobilized reservists only received a few weeks of training, and the third and final wave was activated concurrently to the Japanese invasion. Simply having over a year to train, hold field exercises up to a divisional level, and sort out the worst reserve officers while improving skills in the best that remain would result in a far more capable force come December 1941, even without significant improvements in arms and equipment.

Also - the US government had been holding several hundred million dollars derived from excise taxes in trust for the Philippines, intended to handed over to the newly independent government in 1946 to smooth over the expected budget troubles that would come separation from the US. In the late thirties, the Commonwealth government made several requests to tap into this fund to help pay for national defense efforts, but were rebuffed each time. Allowing them access will go a long way to helping the PCA.



With what? The US Army of the time barely had enough to meet its own requirements upon mobilization - and after the British withdrawal from continental Europe, they didn't have even that. The US hastily rushed the arms and equipment to organize ten infantry divisions to Britain, which left a gaping hole in their stocks which couldn't be readily filled.

So train them to fight with what equipment they had, whatever it was.

Could Japan try to attack earlier as a result?
 
Top