With any plausible PODs, prevent Imperial Japan from taking the path of militarism - or at least less militaristic than OTL - without seriously affecting its rise as major power.
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Perhaps have Japan get more involved in WWI. Having soldiers in the meatgrinder of the western front might create a kind of backlash to militarism.
They were busy seizing German assets in China, and I don't think they had the ability to ship divisions to Europe yet.
Actually they probably did. They could have relatively easily sent troops to France via the Suez canal, landing at Toulon or Marseille and joining the western front. Or, in theory at least, they could have sent troops along the Siberian railway to the eastern front, though both Japan and Russia would probably sooner surrender to Germany at this point then work together.
As in Germany it was the depression which did it. I wouldn't at all agree it was inevitable post Meiji. As it's position in the world became ever more secure and it's population more educated Japan was heading down a path of steady liberalization.
Japanese militarism is the byproduct of japanese culture, history, traditions and religion. You cannot butterfly away militarism while keeping centuries of samurai tradition, shintoism, a divine emperor and all this stuff.
I think so, yes, but that question is far more complicated than the preceding one, and I'm also certainly not the most qualified even on this forum to answer it.
But I'd say after 1931, quite unlikely, without significant upheaval, before...1925 for a certainty, but certainly possible up until 1931 to lessening degrees, preventing the gain in influence by the militarists is quite possible. The Manchurian incident really changed the Japanese political landscape in a lot of ways, from legitimizing the use of force as a substitute for diplomacy in Japan's foreign policy, to granting the military a great deal of prestige, and by extension, flexibility to act as it so wished. It's also important to note the great damage it did to Japan's international relations, especially by poisoning relations with China completely.
Complicating the question as well is that it's hard to really say at which point Imperial Japan metamorphosed into Militarist Japan. Imperial Japan was never a particularly liberal democracy (most states weren't at this time), but at the same time, the Diet still, unlike in Nazi Germany, never stopped functioning throughout the entire militarist period, though it's influence only lessened over this time period (a particularly useful historical point in this regard was the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in 1940, effectively turning Japan into a one-party state. However, the cementation of militarist influence long predates the IRAA). One also certainly can't ignore the fact that the gradual rising tensions in China culminating in the explosion of a full but undeclared state of war in 1937 also was accompanied by the usual gradual reductions in civil rights and increases in militarist influence.
Japan's political system had a decades long tradition of meddling by military officers, and the military was especially but gradually radicalized during the 20s thanks to a combination of rising Japanese exceptionalist/nationalist thought and anti-Communist backlash, but the 1931 Manchuria incident provides a very clear 'cut-off point' between when the military 'sparred' on largely equal terms with their political opponents and when the military simply began to run roughshod over their political opponents. Of course, one mushy ignore the fact that as early as 1925, pro-democracy sentiment was being snuffed out by the rising tide of anti-communism and nationalist sentiment supporting a wave of repressive laws, such as the 1925 Peace Preservation Law, which, while on its own was not particularly notable by the standards of the time, would later legitimize further rollbacks in personal liberties and rational foreign policy.
Finally, I should note that while I have referred frequently to 'the militarists' in the above paragraphs, that in discussing Showa Japan, such large generic blocs are neither accurate nor useful. The military, for example, was divided into factions of its own, such as the Kodoha and Toseiha, who had their own disagreements on policy and ideology. A very simple (and honestly too general and I fear not all that accurate summation) is the that while both were fairly nationalist, the former was responsible for much of the radicalization of Japan and introduction of militarist ultranationalists thought during this period, while the latter, despite eventually sidelining the Kodoha, effectively inherited the mess they had created and felt not only obliged to use force to clean up their mess and 'double down' so to speak on Japan's gambles during this period, but also to take advantage of the groundwork of ultranationalist, to some degree Pan-Asia is thought the Kodoha had widely disseminated, not to mention their gradual introduction (and on the part of the Toseiha, further extension) of totalitarian rule.
(Similar caveats apply to discussion of any large generic groups in this period of Japanese history, such as 'civilian politicians', 'big business', etc.)
(A final fun fact: Hideki Tojo was considered to have been a member of the relatively moderate Toseiha faction during this time period, which is another useful caveat to keep in mind when discussing 'moderates' during this time period)