It's not that complicated really. I mean, in theory.
First, a better handling of Dien Bien Phu. During the battle, the Conférence de Genêve was taking place. Now if the the camp doesn't fall/doesn't happen, France is in a much stronger position. You'd have an independant Tonkin, possibly half of Annam and a State of Cochinchine or something similar.
That has two MASSIVE consequences. First the military don't feel cheated by the civilian government and it gives them back a bit of pride after WWII.
It also shows the independentist movement that total victory is out of reach.
More confident, the French government can maybe negotiate better with the autonomist mouvements of Algeria and Africa.
IF (and that's a big if) the Algerians can get some semblance of reconnaissance for their role in WWI and WWII, as full citizenship or a parliament of Algeria or something (maybe full citizenship for veterans? That would be politically acceptable even by the colons), you don't get troubles in Algeria.
You will have autonomist mouvements in Africa and France will oblige (colonies are costly) but that's what they'll be: autonomists, not independantists. Will that change much? It could be argued Francafrique was a form of protectorate but that's another debate.
For the African colonies, autonomy was an option but the Metropole will not want to keep them as full fledged. Even when Gabon wanted to be transformed into a département (actual part of France, probably similar status to Guyana) it was turned down.
Madagascar seems a bit tougher, it's far away and of relatively low value. Lebanon/Syria is dead in the water and will have to go.