Cold War China through the 50s, 60s and part of the 70s had a military doctrine and strategy of "luring the enemy in deep" that assumed the loss of large amounts of border territory, the "first front" and "second front" and thus concentrated for much of the 1960s and until Mao's death on building up the "Third Front", in China's southwest: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Front_(China)
This was an attempt to build a complete industrial system in the Chinese interior to continue fighting an early, complete and nuclear war from that region, and led to a lot of sacrifice and non-economical investment, much of which fell into disuse when China opened up its economy at the end of the 70s.
It is remarkable how much Mao's approach was conditioned on the expectation that in a war he would lose vast border territories to the adversary and that China would make its comeback fighting from the ""big third front" in the interior and the "little third fronts" in rural areas of exterior provinces to wear down the enemy and eventually switch over to the counteroffensive to defeat the enemy.
Ironically, since the full formulation of the strategy and the major investments (there was a huge move to emphasize this in 1964) came after the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War, this was *not* a case of "fighting the last war". Those two wars had been fought out beyond China's border or at the border.
As it turned out, after more than a decade of investment in the "third front" project, the next war China fought, against Vietnam in 1979, was also merely fought beyond China's borders.
Rather, Mao's planning premises were based on "fighting the war from before the last war", taking inspiration from experiences in both the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. [It seems to me the "little third fronts" embedded in the 1st line and 2nd line provinces are most reminiscent of Mao's guerrilla base areas during both those wars, while the "big third front" hinging on Sichuan took inspiration from the KMT' strategy against Japan].
Although after 1969 (and maybe as early as 1968 after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) the PRC thought about the third front coming into a play in case of an all-out Soviet attack, when the concept was first launched the primary *military* threat was considered to come from Taiwan supported by America.
So bringing this back to what ifs, the alternate history challenge is to have a scenario where the Chinese fall back to the third front and accept at least temporary loss of their first and second line of provinces on the border.
This seems rather difficult. It seems to give the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan far more credit for being able to invade and conquer territory on the mainland than any of us would give it from today's perspective, and that any but the most ideologically committed "China Lobby" enthusiasts would have even given the ChiNats even during the 50s and 60s. Most American and third country observers even back then would not rate the chances of Taiwanese forces not being quickly thrown off the mainland if they invaded as rather low.
It also seems to be a case where Mao did not take much comfort from US restraints during the Korean War, as essentially he was still refining a strategy in the 1960s premised on the Americans adopting all the proposals of MacArthur during the war, and more.
So, the challenge is to bring about a scenario where *any* adversary plausibly invades and occupies China's first and second line provinces, forcing China to rely on the "third front".
This was an attempt to build a complete industrial system in the Chinese interior to continue fighting an early, complete and nuclear war from that region, and led to a lot of sacrifice and non-economical investment, much of which fell into disuse when China opened up its economy at the end of the 70s.
It is remarkable how much Mao's approach was conditioned on the expectation that in a war he would lose vast border territories to the adversary and that China would make its comeback fighting from the ""big third front" in the interior and the "little third fronts" in rural areas of exterior provinces to wear down the enemy and eventually switch over to the counteroffensive to defeat the enemy.
Ironically, since the full formulation of the strategy and the major investments (there was a huge move to emphasize this in 1964) came after the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War, this was *not* a case of "fighting the last war". Those two wars had been fought out beyond China's border or at the border.
As it turned out, after more than a decade of investment in the "third front" project, the next war China fought, against Vietnam in 1979, was also merely fought beyond China's borders.
Rather, Mao's planning premises were based on "fighting the war from before the last war", taking inspiration from experiences in both the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. [It seems to me the "little third fronts" embedded in the 1st line and 2nd line provinces are most reminiscent of Mao's guerrilla base areas during both those wars, while the "big third front" hinging on Sichuan took inspiration from the KMT' strategy against Japan].
Although after 1969 (and maybe as early as 1968 after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) the PRC thought about the third front coming into a play in case of an all-out Soviet attack, when the concept was first launched the primary *military* threat was considered to come from Taiwan supported by America.
So bringing this back to what ifs, the alternate history challenge is to have a scenario where the Chinese fall back to the third front and accept at least temporary loss of their first and second line of provinces on the border.
This seems rather difficult. It seems to give the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan far more credit for being able to invade and conquer territory on the mainland than any of us would give it from today's perspective, and that any but the most ideologically committed "China Lobby" enthusiasts would have even given the ChiNats even during the 50s and 60s. Most American and third country observers even back then would not rate the chances of Taiwanese forces not being quickly thrown off the mainland if they invaded as rather low.
It also seems to be a case where Mao did not take much comfort from US restraints during the Korean War, as essentially he was still refining a strategy in the 1960s premised on the Americans adopting all the proposals of MacArthur during the war, and more.
So, the challenge is to bring about a scenario where *any* adversary plausibly invades and occupies China's first and second line provinces, forcing China to rely on the "third front".
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