AHC: Post-war Germany having nuclear weapons

the German military were very ager to get the Bomb.
consider in that time as ultimate (nuclear) deterrence against a soviet invasion.

What make me worry is that Franz Joseph Strauß advisors propagate for strike first policy.
means in a crisis like Berlin Wall and Cuba missile crisis
the Bundeswehr would make a preventive nuclear attack on Soviet base in Communist Germany...

the US was not happy about it, after advice of Henry Kissinger, President Kennedy gave order,
to secure austere the US Nuclear bomb depot's in Germany, against attack of the Bundeswehr !
here the story in german (use Google translator)
http://einestages.spiegel.de/s/tb/26801/kalter-krieg-als-die-us-armee-gegen-strauss-mobilmachte.html


So had the Bundeswehr nuclear weapons in 1960, the world today would still recover from nuclear World War 3
 
Although I heavily doubt that there are actually contingency plans for the case that the FRG suddenly needs nuclear weapons, I also assume that we would be capable to become a member of the nuclear club within less than a year, if necessary.

Although we probably would be unable to test the thing anywhere...

IIRC, a few years ago, Sarkozy came up with the idea to "share" the French nuclear forces with Germany. I highly doubt the seriousness of the offer or whether Monsieur le Président has given much detail to the details, but it was, unsurprisingly, declined by Berlin anyways.

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deuts...y-bot-deutschland-atomwaffen-an-a-505887.html
 
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IIRC, a few years ago, Sarkozy came up with the idea to "share" the French nuclear forces with Germany. I highly doubt the seriousness of the offer or whether Monsieur le Président has given much detail to the details, but it was, unsurprisingly, declined by Berlin anyways.

He should have offered it to Poland instead. we're always eager for such things.
 
But in 1956/57, Adenauer and his Secr. of Defense Franz Josef Strauß were very keen on arming the brand-new Bundeswehr with "nuklearer Artillerie". [...]
The plan was dead as soon as NATO, France and the US all moved away from plans to proliferate nuclear weapons through the Western European Allies.
Umm, Germany did possess nuclear artillery and nuclear weapons in all other shapes, sizes and forms (except for nuclear depth charges).

By the mid-80s, the Bundeswehr fielded:

  • 24 ready platoons to deploy nuclear 155mm shells tactically (brigade level)
  • 12 ready platoons to deploy nuclear 203mm shells tactically (division level)
  • 24 platoons equipped with a nuclear-tipped Lance launcher (corps level)
  • ca 40 nuclear-tipped Nike Hercules in ready positions with ground-to-ground targeting
  • 72 Pershing 1A with 18 in 24/7 ready-to-fire positions
  • 4 nuclear strike wings with ca 144 aircraft using free-fall bombs


By the late 80s the Nike Hercules were cut, by the mid-90s the above was cut to two nuclear strike wings in the air force, by the late 90s it was cut to a single nuclear strike wing that still persists today in the mid-10s and is in pretty much the primary reason Germany isn't getting rid of the Tornado.

The caveat with NATO nuclear sharing, of course, was that Germany never took possession of nuclear warheads in a legal sense. Warheads would at all time have remained in the possession of an accompanying US guard, to the point that these would even push the shell on the loading tray of the howitzers. The German crew would then ram it, target it and pull the firing rope.
 
The caveat with NATO nuclear sharing, of course, was that Germany never took possession of nuclear warheads in a legal sense. Warheads would at all time have remained in the possession of an accompanying US guard, to the point that these would even push the shell on the loading tray of the howitzers. The German crew would then ram it, target it and pull the firing rope.

Yes, I am aware of such arrangements. Thank you for sharing the details, this is very interesting and it completes the picture.

In some near-ASB event of the FRG trying to get their hands on nukes asap, this might play a role, but in OTL, they had no political/strategic value as they represented a planting of US weapons in "auxiliarii"-units in order to improve the deployment of nukes across the potential German theatre of war. I also wonder how long such arrangements would have lasted in case of renewed German nuclear ambitions.

They possessed only a tiny relevance for the planning of the few minutes, during which Central Europe was to be completely destroyed.
 
In some near-ASB event of the FRG trying to get their hands on nukes asap, this might play a role
Doesn't need to go all that ASB. During and after the Cuba Crisis, US forces in Germany were very aware of Strauss' ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons. In the sense that the alert level at storage sites was heightened, depots were secretly shifted around etc. The feeling at the time was that if necessary Strauss wouldn't resort to building nuclear weapons. He'd resort to taking them.

This only ebbed after Strauss' career was destroyed by the Spiegel Affair after FALLEX 62, NATO began transitioning to Flexible Response over the next few years and the US stance on tactical nuclear weapon use itself became a bit more controlled with the introduction of ROAD.

They possessed only a tiny relevance for the planning of the few minutes, during which Central Europe was to be completely destroyed.
Actually nearly half of all nuclear weapons in Europe on NATO sides were assigned to be deployed by German "carriers".

Kampf dem Atomtod, despite Heinemann becoming President ten years later, ultimately failed completely.
 
Doesn't need to go all that ASB.

http://einestages.spiegel.de/s/tb/26801/kalter-krieg-als-die-us-armee-gegen-strauss-mobilmachte.html ("When the US Army mobilized against Strauss")

Even the US officer who related the story to Der Spiegel found the alert highly exaggerated. Apparently, Kissinger was the source of heightened concern opposite Strauss after a meeting with him. Anybody who remembers Strauss can imagine that his persona and his insistence on the importance of a German nuclear deterrence came over a bit threateningly (sort of a "Johnson-treatment").

Even in the case of FJS, I argue that it is almostASB that he would acquire nukes for the Federal Republic (or for the Freistaat Bayern) Blofeld-style; i.e. by snatching them from US forces.

FJS was a ruthless politician, a cold warrior, an arch-conservative, probably a little corrupt and prone to think outside of the box. But he wouldn't go that far.

Just think of the political fallout. I can hardly imagine the Soviet Union not to react strongly to such a move (especially during or directly after the Cuba-crisis). The US would be put in doubt about the wisdom of any promise to defend West-Germany; NATO-membership and re-armament of West-Germany would instantly become an issue in Western Europe.

Ultimately, FJS would get stopped on one of these levels:
-insubordination within the Bundeswehr
-instant sacking of FJS by Bundeskanzler Adenauer
-if either doesn't happen and the raid has been carried out, with a very high probability, the FDP-ministers would resign and leave the coalition (as they actually did due to the "Spiegel-Affäre" on Nov 19th, 1962 in order to force Adenauer to fire Strauss), then a vote-of-no-confidence against Adenauer in the Bundestag and a Social-Liberal coalition comes to power 7 years early.
-which is unless Strauss and Adenauer now overthrow the Grundgesetz and enact a political/military putsch - and THAT is the latest point at which the Soviet Union would openly threaten a pre-emptive strike against the neo-fascist regime in Bonn
-BUT, if not even earlier, I am certain that the US/UK/France would revoke the FRG souvereignty as granted in the treaty of Paris 1955 and declare a state of emergency before the international situation spirals out of control (in case of such a state of emergency, it was until 1968 still the legal situation that the executive power would be in the hands of the US/UK/French-ambassadors acting in the sense of the former High Commisioners; however, legally only the German government could declare the state of emergency).

I hardly see a chance for the FRG to obtain nuclear weapons by going rogue on the United States.


Kampf dem Atomtod, despite Heinemann becoming President ten years later, ultimately failed completely.

As it was bound to do, as the "Atomtod" was not to be decided in Bonn...
 
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