AHC: post-1942 Luftwaffe 'sanity options'

[Garrison]

In all seriousness:

1) More and better-trained pilots. Granted fuel is going to be a problem.
2) More fuel.
3) Standardize on a few types, but research and development need to continue.
4) Try for a knock-out blow on Allied bombers to gain some breathing time.

Jets cannot get into service much earlier, a month or two earlier possibly but NOT a year earlier. The Me-163 Komet is not really a bomber-killer unless fitted with photo-optic cells which allow 50mm shells mounted in the wingroots to fire directly up into a B-17 or B-24,

If you have enough well-trained pilots then something like the He-162 Volksjager might help a lot, if quality control can be obtained (hard to do with slave labor).

2) is pretty much impossible after Barbarossa, the synthetic fuel program was directly competing for resources with the immediate needs of the Wehrmacht and they made easy targets for Allied bombers.

3)Is what they did essentially, problem was that long series production meant concentrating on models that were increasingly obsolete.

4) Again they sort of did this against the 8th Airforce, unfortunately it directly led to the P-51 being introduced as an escort, at which point the Luftwaffe was screwed.

The Me-163 is a complete waste of resources and the He-162 only came into being much later as a desperation measure. Post war testing suggested it was an effective plane, but only in the hands of a highly skilled pilot. Slave labour is pretty much a given for Luftwaffe production after 1942, there is no other source of labour.

The reality is that by the end of the war Germany had hundreds of advanced jet fighters just sitting in the tunnels at Nordhausen with neither the pilots nor the fuel to fly them. Technical tweaks in aircraft production are not going to save the 3rd Reich. The 'best' you might do is postpone the end of the war long enough for the A-Bomb to be used on Germany.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

"On operational issues, night fighters are a waste. We must bomb the enemy bomber bases instead."

"On fuel use, in this war we must train pilots like infantryman, as apprenticeship job. Just complete basic training and send them to units to act as wingmen. Their National Socialist values are superior to our enemies."

"To destroy RAF morale, let's challenge them over Britain and show them what the National Socialists are worth."

"In Eastern front, all effort should be spent on close air support to shatter Soviet morale. While bombing logistical nodes might be efficient in terms of statistics, we must strike the Judeo-Bolshevist morale at front lines for maximum moral efficiency to show our Frontkampfern what the Luftwaffe is all about."

Love the sarcasm

 

[JohnBull]

Without going into details, I guess making anything other than fighters to counter Anglo-American the always growing supremacy or ground-attack aircrafts to help out on the Eastern Front is a waste. I don't see why Luftwaffe would need any bomber by 1942.

 

[tomo pauk]

Guns: the capacity for prop guns need to be used up as good as possible. The MG 151/20 is not that a destructive gun, MK 101 will not fit and has to low RoF, the MK 103 also won't fit until the redesign, the MK 108 has a low MV that made hit probability one half of what MK 103 was capable for per German tests. So I'd go with something of that is in-between the MK 103 and 108: MV of ~750 m/s for a M-shell of 300g, weights around 100 kg, 500 rds/min. Such gun will also come in handy once jets are around.
For something of lower power & smaller size (for wings of BF 109, turrets), I'd propose using a belt-fed MG FFM (OTL piece, used on Do 217 night fighters), with RoF improved a bit.
With Fw 190 having 3-4 cannons, and Bf 109 having 3 of them, delete fuselage MGs.
Computing sights are also needed.
BTW - Luftwaffe also operated most of the Flak pieces, those will also need a rehash.

Without going into details, I guess making anything other than fighters to counter Anglo-American the always growing supremacy or ground-attack aircrafts to help out on the Eastern Front is a waste. I don't see why Luftwaffe would need any bomber by 1942.

Soviet factories, refineries and marshaling yards were refusing to autodestruct.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Redux edition of this https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-1935-42-luftwaffe-sanity-options.433685/

POD: You are at Udet's funeral, 17th of November 1941.
During the wake, Hitler comes to you and ask "My Luftwaffe has been destroyed but these treacherous Generals! You are my most trusted advisor, you must give me the best solution for our air war problems! Don't care of Goering and Milch, they are a problem of mine!
General: what is to be done?"

General: There is only one thing we can do Mein Fuhrer - only one thing....more camera teams....

Hitler: Not er some super aircraft, weapon or other advanced technil..?

General: No Mein Fuhrer - (smacks fist into hand) more camera teams - make lots of films showing our peoples the dashing and beautiful young ACE superstars of our Jagdgeschwader

Hitler: (Turns around the room looking for some form of support) ....yes ummm.....but I still think.....

General: Have films of them at rest

Hitler: ...At rest.....Herr General?

General: ...at play...oh yes at play...young men froliking around in a swimming pool....maybe one or two young ladies for sure partially dressing up in their tunics and wearing their caps at jaunty angles giving incorrect left handed salutes....but mostly young men....

Hitler: Young men Froliking...Herr General?

General: (Slaps own thigh) Ho Ho yes...and but more importantly AT WAR Mein Fuhrer....lots of gun camera footage of them winning the war...shooting enemy planes down in glorious single combat...(forms hands into imaginary planes dogfighting) neeewwoooowwww dakakakakakakaka rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrwwwwwww KRAAAASSHHHHHH!!!!

Hitler: (sighs)...but they are not winning...Herr General.

General: (Eye twitches - hands stopped in mid dog fight and whispers in conspiratorial fashion)......the peoples do not have to know that Mein Fuhrer....

Hitler: (Hitler turns his gaze to somewhere only he can see) Ahhhhaaa - I see where you are coming from Herr General we show the people we are winning the war in the air, reassured they return to their factories and their farms and work all that much harder for the glory of the inevitable assured victory of national socialism

General: Err yes something along those lines...(he nods) Propaganda

Hitler: (Turns sharply a looks furiously at the General...his silly little mustache twitching with rage...and it's now the Generals turn to look around the room forlornly for help) ....Herr General.....it is not Propaganda when we do it....!

 

[JohnBull]

Soviet factories, refineries and marshaling yards were refusing to autodestruct.

Stopping (or making a bit harder) the levelling of German cities are a much pressing issue than pretending you can stop Russian production with a couple of medium-sized bombers. Not Even the powerful RAF Bomber Command managed to affect the German war production, it wasn't Luftwaffe that would make a difference trying to destroy factories scattered all over Russia.

 

[tomo pauk]

Stopping (or making a bit harder) the levelling of German cities are a much pressing issue than pretending you can stop Russian production with a couple of medium-sized bombers. Not Even the powerful RAF Bomber Command managed to affect the German war production, it wasn't Luftwaffe that would make a difference trying to destroy factories scattered all over Russia.

Nobody is leveling German cities in 1942. Bomber Command was powerful, but wildly innacurate in 1939-42. Nobody suggests using a cuple of medium-sized bombers to destroy Soviet industry. Attack on factories, scattered or not, was a job for air force.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Stopping (or making a bit harder) the levelling of German cities are a much pressing issue than pretending you can stop Russian production with a couple of medium-sized bombers. Not Even the powerful RAF Bomber Command managed to affect the German war production, it wasn't Luftwaffe that would make a difference trying to destroy factories scattered all over Russia.

It certainly affected German war production! It didn't stop it but German efforts to massively increase production was severely dented.

I seem to recall (might have been Tooze?) that the German tanks, artillery and aircraft 'not built' as a result of the damage and disruption of the Ruhr campaign exceeded those lost in combat during the same period on the Eastern front.

Edit : Granted that was 43!

 

[JohnBull]

Nobody is leveling German cities in 1942. Bomber Command was powerful, but wildly innacurate in 1939-42. Nobody suggests using a cuple of medium-sized bombers to destroy Soviet industry. Attack on factories, scattered or not, was a job for air force.

That's precisely the reason Luftwaffe should make fighters, to prevent RAF Bomber Command to become what it has eventually became.

It certainly affected German war production! It didn't stop it but German efforts to massively increase production was severely dented.

I seem to recall (might have been Tooze?) that the German tanks, artillery and aircraft 'not built' as a result of the damage and disruption of the Ruhr campaign exceeded those lost in combat during the same period on the Eastern front.

Edit : Granted that was 43!

If I'm not mistaken, German war production peaked in the mid-1944 despite all the destruction. Carpet bombing proved quite ineffective to this task. It was mostly a tool to terrorize civilian population, destroying their homes.

In fact, for their disappointment, they find out after war that the bombing campaign didn't even kill as many people they were hoping for.

 

[tomo pauk]

That's precisely the reason Luftwaffe should make fighters, to prevent RAF Bomber Command to become what it has eventually became.

Agreed all the way; some quotes from post #15 here:
Press on with jet-powered aircraft designs, mostly 1-engined fighters and 2- 3- 4- engined bombers, also 2-engined night jet fighters.
Until jet-powered aircraft are availaable in good numbers, improve the 'classics'.
Night fighter force also needs improvement both in quality and quantity.

 

[eltf177]

You're absolutely right Garrison, the war is lost. Anything done is just a stopgap...

 

[Cryhavoc101]

That's precisely the reason Luftwaffe should make fighters, to prevent RAF Bomber Command to become what it has eventually became.



If I'm not mistaken, German war production peaked in the mid-1944 despite all the destruction. Carpet bombing proved quite ineffective to this task. It was mostly a tool to terrorize civilian population, destroying their homes.

In fact, for their disappointment, they find out after war that the bombing campaign didn't even kill as many people they were hoping for.

Germany attempted to improve its war industry just like everyone else did and while its production did peak as you say in 1944 had they not been bombed to hell said production would have been far far higher and as a result never reached anywhere near the levels the Nazi leadership had planned for.

German production did not reach the levels it did 'in spite' of the bombing campaign

It only reached those levels 'because' of the bombing campaign

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
If I'm not mistaken, German war production peaked in the mid-1944 despite all the destruction. Carpet bombing proved quite ineffective to this task. It was mostly a tool to terrorize civilian population, destroying their homes.

In fact, for their disappointment, they find out after war that the bombing campaign didn't even kill as many people they were hoping for.

I'd recommend a look at John Ellis 'Brute Force'. Theres a chapter that isvery good summary of the results of the RAF & US Bombing campaigns over five years. Plenty of graphs and charts drawn from assorted German records and the USSBS study that people claim showed disappointing results. Comparing input of resources into industry, losses from bombing, and remaining output its clear the bombing attacks were of marginal value in 1942, had some effect in 1943, and seriously damaged production in 1944. The peak in production occurred in the third & fourth quarter of 1944 & was plummeting before the end of the year. In the first quarter of 1945 production, or more accurate delivery of material to the factories, and of finished items to the combat units crashed. Its clear that the weight of bombs had reached a critical mass in the second half of 1944. Ellis charts refer to the RAF Bomber Command & the US strategic or heavy bomber Air Forces, the 8th & 15th AF. However data for the 2dd Tactical AF, 9th AF, & related bombers groups is not included, distorting the analysis. Both the 2dTacAF & 9th AF equipped with shorter ranged aircraft advanced their bases to France in August-October 1944, and their targets became predominately in Germany. In raw weight of bombs the increase falling in targets in the Reich was not a large increase, but the targets were significant. Both AF had been the principles in the Transportation Plan, the isolation of the Normandy battlefield in the first half of 1944. Since mid 1943 they had been increasingly focused on destroying railway operations, and bridges of all types. This ultimately became very effective in France and the German 7th Army with its Panzer corps collapsed in late July from lack of supply. When the local depots ran out the trickle getting through the air blockade, about 10% of requirements, could not sustain the defense.

In the second half of 1944 the 2d TAF & 9th started similar operations vs the German transportation in the western half of the Reich. Weather interfered but the damage accumulated & in January the cumulative effects of dropped bridges, wrecked marshaling yards, wrecked locomotives and derailed cars, & damaged repair shops started creating a crisis in delivery. This only became worse in February & in March delivery of anything had effectively ceased.

there were other factors of course. One was improve accuracy. Folks like to prattle on about how large the scatter patterns were for the 8th AF heavy bombers. Thats all correct for 1943. The wreckage of the ballbearing factories was attributed to 5% or 105 of the bombs dropped. But, experience, improved techniques, and better equipment, and yes training, had their effect. Scatter radiuses shrank and shrank again and again. The sort of swift restoration of the Schwienfurt plants possible I'm October 1943 was not practical in October 1944.

...
German production did not reach the levels it did 'in spite' of the bombing campaign

It only reached those levels 'because' of the bombing campaign

Amen

 

[Decatur]

R.M. Meluch wrote a story about this called "Vati" https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0153EW8I4/ref=cm_sw_r_cp_apa_i_1Kj4DbPQ3V6C1

 

[Zheng He]

I'd recommend a look at John Ellis 'Brute Force'. Theres a chapter that isvery good summary of the results of the RAF & US Bombing campaigns over five years. Plenty of graphs and charts drawn from assorted German records and the USSBS study that people claim showed disappointing results. Comparing input of resources into industry, losses from bombing, and remaining output its clear the bombing attacks were of marginal value in 1942, had some effect in 1943, and seriously damaged production in 1944. The peak in production occurred in the third & fourth quarter of 1944 & was plummeting before the end of the year. In the first quarter of 1945 production, or more accurate delivery of material to the factories, and of finished items to the combat units crashed. Its clear that the weight of bombs had reached a critical mass in the second half of 1944. Ellis charts refer to the RAF Bomber Command & the US strategic or heavy bomber Air Forces, the 8th & 15th AF. However data for the 2dd Tactical AF, 9th AF, & related bombers groups is not included, distorting the analysis. Both the 2dTacAF & 9th AF equipped with shorter ranged aircraft advanced their bases to France in August-October 1944, and their targets became predominately in Germany. In raw weight of bombs the increase falling in targets in the Reich was not a large increase, but the targets were significant. Both AF had been the principles in the Transportation Plan, the isolation of the Normandy battlefield in the first half of 1944. Since mid 1943 they had been increasingly focused on destroying railway operations, and bridges of all types. This ultimately became very effective in France and the German 7th Army with its Panzer corps collapsed in late July from lack of supply. When the local depots ran out the trickle getting through the air blockade, about 10% of requirements, could not sustain the defense.

In the second half of 1944 the 2d TAF & 9th started similar operations vs the German transportation in the western half of the Reich. Weather interfered but the damage accumulated & in January the cumulative effects of dropped bridges, wrecked marshaling yards, wrecked locomotives and derailed cars, & damaged repair shops started creating a crisis in delivery. This only became worse in February & in March delivery of anything had effectively ceased.

there were other factors of course. One was improve accuracy. Folks like to prattle on about how large the scatter patterns were for the 8th AF heavy bombers. Thats all correct for 1943. The wreckage of the ballbearing factories was attributed to 5% or 105 of the bombs dropped. But, experience, improved techniques, and better equipment, and yes training, had their effect. Scatter radiuses shrank and shrank again and again. The sort of swift restoration of the Schwienfurt plants possible I'm October 1943 was not practical in October 1944.



Amen

The other issue is that evaluating the success or failure of the CBO based on German production levels does not tell the entire story. At least according to some sources Albert Speer estimated in 1944 that 30 percent of artillery, 20 percent of heavy ammunition, and over 50 percent of electronics production were dedicated to air defense - https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530394.pdf

The point is that when you look at what the Germans devoted to air defense in terms of personnel, equipment, and industrial base it is clear the CBO was a legitimate second front and second front activity in whatever its form was one of the WALLIES primary contributions to victory (the other being the sustainment of global lines of communication).

 

[marathag]

So I'd go with something of that is in-between the MK 103 and 108: MV of ~750 m/s for a M-shell of 300g, weights around 100 kg, 500 rds/min

Japanese Ho-155 I 1943
30mmx115 235g 716m/s 450rpm 50kg

Ho-155 middle gun

Last,
Japanese Ho-204 1945
37mmx144 475g 710m/s 400 rpm 130kg
Final development of the IJA Browning short recoil expansion, for the Ki-46 III Dinah, as anti B-29 weapon

 

[Karelian]

Spoiler: This thread in pictures

 

[Michele]

Uhm...yeah, of course, but...how?
Do pilots train with gliders?

Yes, basic training. They did OTL.
Then you need the real things.

 

[Michele]

"On operational issues, night fighters are a waste. We must bomb the enemy bomber bases instead."

"On fuel use, in this war we must train pilots like infantryman, as apprenticeship job. Just complete basic training and send them to units to act as wingmen. Their National Socialist values are superior to our enemies."

"To destroy RAF morale, let's challenge them over Britain and show them what the National Socialists are worth."

"In Eastern front, all effort should be spent on close air support to shatter Soviet morale. While bombing logistical nodes might be efficient in terms of statistics, we must strike the Judeo-Bolshevist morale at front lines for maximum moral efficiency to show our Frontkampfern what the Luftwaffe is all about."

This would be sane?

 

[Michele]

If I'm not mistaken, German war production peaked in the mid-1944 despite all the destruction. Carpet bombing proved quite ineffective to this task. It was mostly a tool to terrorize civilian population, destroying their homes.

You're not mistaken that German production peaked in 1944, even though not as much as Speer's massaged statistics would make you believe.
You are mistaken that area bombing did not curb production. Without it, it would have peaked at a higher level.
And, for more dangerous products.

Even leaving aside the data that could be provided as to damage done, just think of the very proposals made here: build more fighters, train more pilots, expend more costly and difficult-to-produce high-octane fuel on fighters and training, build more AA, research guided missiles. That's all money, manpower, raw materials and production line time that does NOT go into winning the war, but merely into trying to survive. And that's what the Germans indeed were investing in, in OTL. Every gallon of avgas for a purely defensive fighter is ten gallons of lower-quality fuel less for a defensive and offensive tank in the USSR. Every 88 firing at night, largely uselessly, at a cloudy sky over the Ruhr is one 88 less firing at T-34s. Etc.