Pilsudski wanted to restore the Commonwealth in a modern form. It was probably a doomed cause, however:
"Piłsudski's plan faced opposition from virtually all quarters. The Soviets, whose sphere of influence was directly threatened, worked to thwart the Intermarium agenda.[17] The Allied Powers assumed that Bolshevism was only a temporary threat and did not want to see their important (from the balance-of-power viewpoint) traditional ally, Russia, weakened. They resented Piłsudski's refusal to aid their White allies, viewed Piłsudski with suspicion, saw his plans as unrealistic, and urged Poland to confine itself to areas of clear-cut Polish ethnicity.[32][33][34] The [33][35] Lithuanians, who had re-established their independence in 1918, were unwilling to join; the Ukrainians, similarly seeking independence,[18] likewise feared that Poland might again subjugate them;[33] and the Belarusians, who had little national consciousness, were not interested either in independence or in Pilsudski's proposals of union.[33] The chances for Piłsudski's scheme were not enhanced by a series of post-World War I wars and border conflicts between Poland and its neighbors in disputed territories—the Polish-Soviet War, the Polish-Lithuanian War, the Polish-Ukrainian War, and border conflicts between Poland and Czechoslovakia.
"Piłsudski's concept was opposed within Poland itself, where National Democracy leader Roman Dmowski[36][37] argued for an ethnically purer Poland in which minorities would be Polonized.[38][39] Many Polish politicians, including Dmowski, opposed the idea of a multicultural federation, preferring instead to work for a unitary Polish nation-state.[37] Sanford has described Pilsudski's policies after his resumption of power in 1926 as similarly focusing on the Polonization of the country's Eastern Slavic minorities and on the centralization of power.[31]
"While some scholars accept at face value the democratic principles claimed by Piłsudski for his federative plan,[40] others view such claims with skepticism, pointing out a coup d'état in 1926 when Piłsudski assumed nearly dictatorial powers.[13][41] In particular, his project is viewed unfavorably by most Ukrainian historians, with Oleksandr Derhachov arguing that the federation would have created a greater Poland in which the interests of non-Poles, especially Ukrainians, would have gotten short shrift.[15]
"Some historians hold that Piłsudski, who argued that "There can be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine," may have been more interested in splitting Ukraine from Russia than in assuring Ukrainians' welfare.[42][43] He did not hesitate to use military force to expand Poland's borders to Galicia and Volhynia, crushing a Ukrainian attempt at self-determination in disputed territories east of the Bug River which contained a substantial Polish presence[44] (a Polish majority mainly in cities such as Lwów, surrounded by a rural Ukrainian majority).
"Speaking of Poland's future frontiers, Piłsudski said: "All that we can gain in the west depends on the Entente—on the extent to which it may wish to squeeze Germany," while in the east "there are doors that open and close, and it depends on who forces them open and how far."[45] In the eastern chaos, the Polish forces set out to expand as far as feasible. On the other hand, Poland had no interest in joining the western intervention in the Russian Civil War[44] or in conquering Russia itself.[46]"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermarium