AHC: Plausibility

The sack of Rome in 410 was not very practically significant, the manpower was low. It wasn't even the capital (Mediolanum?). The central government loss a lot of legitimacy, which made it harder to enforce the law and taxes... while barbarians were still pouring in. What's missing from that story isn't about the practicality of survival, but the restoration of legitimacy so that people don't think following your orders is staying on a sinking ship.
 
The sack of Rome in 410 was not very practically significant, the manpower was low. It wasn't even the capital (Mediolanum?). The central government lost a lot of legitimacy, which made it harder to enforce the law and taxes... while barbarians were still pouring in. What's missing from that story isn't about the practicality of survival, but the restoration of legitimacy so that people don't think following your orders is staying on a sinking ship.
How much did you read?
 
@Avalon

It's not plausible, and largely ignores the causes of the fall of the Roman state in the west or its political background, at the benefit of accumulating "bad rulers vs. good rulers" clichés on Late Roman history and platitudes on Barbarians.
It's not badly written to be honest, but I lost any pretence of interest at the fifth chapter and Odoacer's victory.

The late Vth century was certainly too late to save the WRE as a distinct state, with the Roman state already collapsing (or collapsed) in western Romania, being more or less smotthly succeeded by Barbarian states, inheriting most of its structures (altough it would arguably be parachieved in the late Vth and early VIth century).

Not that a survival of WRE is impossible, but you might want an early Vth century PoD : having a survival of the Theodosian dynasty (either by Honorius or Valentinian siring an heir, for exemple) could be a basic asset, would it be only because it would avoid the huge political instability of the mid-Vth and the dominance of Romano-Barbarians magister militii, allowing the dynastic principle to reinforce imperial institutions.
You could get rid of the Theodosian dynasty, admittedly, and a victory of Constantine III in Valentia with bringing a competent emperor, but it would be less easy to maintain on the long run.

Honorius, which gets a partially underserved bad reputation (not to say he was a skilled emperor) and at least understood that the problem was less, at this point, about territorial losses than political, hegemonic losses : as long as foederati manage to crush rebellious Barbarians, while not being an obvious threat to Roman hegemony, WRE could survive the crisis in more or less good shape.

Better being raided (and not exactly plundered), than loose political legitimacy and coherence. Of course, better not being raided in first place, but by the early Vth, that was the choice you got.
Granted you'd be bound to see foederati gaining a significanty independence and authority in Romania, but that may be an acceptable loss instead of the political instability that would allow Barbarians to crave principalties on their own as IOTL) anyway.

Roman civil rule would probably be impopular with such changes so I'd understand why someone would prefer toppling Honorius as a PoD : but it wouldn't be unconsequential especially if it involves an anti-Barbarian faction being too powerful in Rome.
It worked, while not immensely, later in Constantinople because they had the ressources to : but in the west it would rather be a sign that Romano-Barbariand loyal (more or less) generals wouldn't be really acknowledged or prized for their service, when they were more and more important in the military part and military administration.

Anything later than the 430's or 440's is, IMO, far too late to have such effect (altough a late PoD could arguably lead to WRE being swallowed up by ERE, rather than collapsing).
 
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@LSCatilina

The WRE surviving as a rump state with the defeat of immediate threats does help in its survival. While the cliché of good and bad emperors is a simplification a good one in the 470s would aid the West's fortunes and prolong it. While it would be late it would not be impossible. In the timeline, most of the empire had been lost anyway so there would be few rebellious barbarians with Odoacer and his people being part of the few tribes within remaining within Roman territory so the defeat of the Heruli would go a way to securing the WRE.

While the decay of Roman systems within the WRE would be the main issue for any emperor a reform of the system wouldn't be impossible but you're right that such a reform gets harder the further the century gets. Narius' appeal though seems to be carrying him as the saviour of Rome and restorer of pride in the eyes of the plebians and the assassination attempt of some senatorial and their resulting tightening of power would be a major boon towards aiding any projects whether military or economic.
 
The WRE surviving as a rump state with the defeat of immediate threats does help in its survival.
WRE at this point was not a rump state anymore, not even this : since the 450's, the only only military forces it could count on were either foederati or eastern Roman; both having little to no interest supporting it. The question was how it was going to be eaten, not if it could avoid it.

In the timeline, most of the empire had been lost anyway so there would be few rebellious barbarians with Odoacer and his people being part of the few tribes within remaining within Roman territory so the defeat of the Heruli would go a way to securing the WRE.
Considering the foederati as "rebellious tribes" having no relations with Rome (as the territories were "lost anyway") is a big mistake (The author made a line about how Barbarians apparently wanted to replace Romans in the administration because something about tribes). Foedi were, for all that matter, post-imperial Roman states, with a strong dynamic with Roman institutions they were integrated within (more or less strongly, arguably : Franks or Goths from one hand and Alamans or Gepidae from another represent two ends of the line) : while it asked for the collapse of the Roman state to see the transmission of political and civic power, what happened in Rome wasn't moot (hence why the Gothic takeover of Italy, and more importantly Theodoric recieving imperial regalia in 497 reinforced his position of "primus inter pares" in western Romania).

At some point, having a legitim and strong enough ruler in Rome that wouldn't be considered an usurper or a political weakling wasn't just an happenance.

While the decay of Roman systems within the WRE would be the main issue for any emperor a reform of the system wouldn't be impossible
By the 470's it is : Ravenna lost all real financial capacities, and while Italy remained fairly prosperous by the Vth century, its strategical capacities almost entierly depended from complex alliances with either foederati or Constantinople. What remains of the WRE is under the dependency of whoever can give it troops and subsides : even Aetius or Majorian couldn't do better than playing Barbarians against each others, and they beneficied from way more resources at disposal.
It's why emperor as Anthemius or Nepos were a thing; or why wannabee-emperors as Arvandus or Olybrius were largely under the dependence of foederati or "independent" mitilias masters (respectively)

Narius' appeal though seems to be carrying him as the saviour of Rome and restorer of pride in the eyes of the plebians
Plebeian/Patrician social distinction was irrelevant even since the late Republic. It's worth noting that humilores were still participating to political life, but it tended to be mostly civic (in the strictest sense) especially with the deligitimization conga of the western emperors.
 
WRE at this point was not a rump state anymore, not even this : since the 450's, the only only military forces it could count on were either foederati or eastern Roman; both having little to no interest supporting it. The question was how it was going to be eaten, not if it could avoid it.

While I agree that WRE was living on a borrowed time at least since Aetius wouldn't reconquest of Africa solve a lot of its problems? It would both remove threat of Vandal maritime raids over Italy and grant WRE emperors a very substantial source of income and even more importantly a safe haven. Now of course Africa wouldn’t at once solve the problems that were crippling WRE but it could give WRE some resources and time for maneuvering.

Obviously reconquest of Africa is not an easy task but IOTL there were two attempts at doing so (as you undoubtedly know). While I don’t really believe in Majorian’s chances, Basliscus’s expedition of 468 was much better prepared. IMHO it requires a pretty minor PoD to have a much better chances of succeeding ( like for instance Basiliscus falling ill on Sicily and Marcellinus taking overall command).

So while your concerns about WRE surviving after 450s are very valid, at least this classical PoDin late 460s increases survival chances greatly ( which is of course by no means my idea and which was discussed many times on this board as well as in other places).
 

Thomas1195

Banned
You need to go back to Adrianople. Either have Valens waiting for Gratian before engaging in battle, or have the fighting being a siege of Adrianople (an easy win for Valens) if it was a walled city.

We should have a sufficiently early POD that change Roman war doctrine towards avoiding field battles and prioritizing fortifications. Such strategy would avoid huge manpower losses, and things like Adrianople would be averted if the Romans fought the barbarians behind walls of stone. Remember that generally you need a 3:1 ratio in number to win a direct siege.

This would be similar to OTL Medieval era, when most wars were decided via sieges, not decisive battles.
 
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While I agree that WRE was living on a borrowed time at least since Aetius wouldn't reconquest of Africa solve a lot of its problems?
It would certainly solve problems for Roman Italy, but not for WRE : Roman campaigns in Africa in the mid and late Vth century were essentially bound to Eastern Roman interests and capacities, and any Roman "reconquest", besides being incomplete (you'd likely have a reduced Vandal foedus either in Mauretania or in Africa, depending on the situation), would have been dependent to happen and to maintain from ressources outside WRE (either Barbarians or Eastern Romans).
At best, you could see Roman Africa turn into smaller military-civil commands (as in Tarraconensis or Gaul) technically (let's remember that WRE badly controlling Mauretania and Africa did provoked the Vandalic takeover) obeying Ravenna, but I doubt it : either Vandals would make a go for it, and if they don't, then ERE that would probably swallow up as they did to Dalmatia (first in facts, then legally) : WRE have no real way to maintain a direct rule over it, as long it is deprived of a serious fleet.

Obviously reconquest of Africa is not an easy task but IOTL there were two attempts at doing so.
I don't think these expeditions were doomed to fail, (altough 468's expedition certainly had more chance to succeed, I entierly agree, than 460's) : but what were their strategical objectives?
It was mostly about curbing down Vandalic thalassocracy, and you might see a Vandalic foedus in Africa (Mauretania at worst), while WRE-Dalmatian ensemble wouldn't have much say besides the islands. I could see, at best, some sort of condominium in Africa that would quickly turn into an ERE dominance, especially with the ongoing mess in Italy between various influent leaders (Ricimer, Marcellinus, Phoebus Severus, etc.) to say nothing of the situation North and West of Alps, where Anthemius had to deal with Euric and Gothic expansion all over the western provinces (he did have supports in Gaul, that acknowledged imperial authority as Sidonius Appolinaris, but these were already greatly autonomous, as Marcellinus was and Gallo-Romans had a tendency to prefer an agreement with Barbarians, closer, than an undying loyalty to the imperial hot seat).

I don't think, however, that a successful 468's expedition would be unconsequential : but the consequences (while important for the Vth and VIth history) might be more pushing for an ERE becoming the sole ERE differently than IOTL (with captation of Africa and possibly Italy at term), and a better VIth century for Italy and Africa than the Justinian reconquest provoked.


You need to go back to Adrianople. Either have Valens waiting for Gratian before engaging in battle, or have the fighting being a siege of Adrianople (an easy win for Valens) if it was a walled city.
Adrianople tends to be slightly overrated for its macrohistorical importance : what Valens wanted to do was a demonstration of strength before Goths, his scouts badly informed it of the situation, and the emperor temporized before Goths still unwilling to fight.
The problem was that some of his scutarii were unwilling to wait for hours if not days under the sun, and decided to charge and the rest is History.

That said, immediate strategical consequences were minimal : Goths were unable to takeover the region, and were forced to a status quo ante bellum agreement as Romans reorganized their forces. What was an issue was that a large (if not that unified) Roman army was defeated, giving Goths confidence they could anew impose themselves, and giving them enough prestige among the various groups.

I don't think the problem was about numbers, but about Valens being undecisive up to the last minute. Would Gratian's precence have that much helped?
If not, it could even have made the situation worse if he died on the field (causing particularily important succession issues). Heck, even a victory at Adrianople could have negative conqequences for Romans, as it would have mean no replacement of a not-that-skilled emperor (Valens) by an actually competent one (Theodosius) in Constantinople.

On the sides of the benefits, it could mean Goths remain scattered in three or four groups, and with more pro-Roman stances, at least in a first time : without being "the Barbarians that defeated Rome" that probably served them well in matter of power build-up, instead of having roughly unified political-military ensemble, with a lasting distinction around various chiefs or petty-kings lines (not unlike, even if it would differ significantly, how Frankish federates ended up).

We should have a sufficiently early POD that change Roman war doctrine towards avoiding field battles and prioritizing fortifications.
I'm really unsure about it : neither Solicinium or Argentovaria provoked a strategical change, in spite of being more or less pre-renditions of Adrianople.

The main featureabout a siege warfare, as how it appeared in the late IXth century, was that it was based on a whole network of private fortifications associated with fragmentation of armies from thousands to hundreds. Armies involved in the Late Antiquity were definitely too large to really undergo this (would it be only trough a logistical angle), and the cost of fortificating whole regions in Romania would have been tremendous if they want to avoid a really efficient scorched earth tactic from Barbarians.
 
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