10.23 The Pounding Of 11 Group Airfields Continues And The Night Skies Are Busy
10.23 the Pounding of 11 Group airfields Continues and the night skies busy.



August the 30th

Day; Feint raids on shipping, then heavy attacks on south-eastern airfield. Raid on Luton.

Night; Main target Liverpool. Single raids over wide area.

Weather; Fair. Channel and Straits clear. (1)



Reverting to earlier practice the first raid of the day was on shipping in the Thames Estuary, however this was a feint to draw of fighter cover. At ten thirty a major formation was detected over Cap Gris Nez, flying at fourteen thousand feet, three waves flew over at half hour intervals and totalled over one hundred aircraft. Despite the GCI/PPI stations at Willesborough and Langtoft tracking the raids as they left the French Coast above the cloud cover, that was currently at seven thousand feet, the eleven group controllers at Uxbridge were slow to identify that rather than joining the attack on the shipping in the Thames Estuary the targets were the sector stations in Surrey and Kent.

To counter this no less than sixteen squadrons were scramble with some squadrons from Twelve Group to the north of London being tasked to provide cover for Biggin Hill, Kenely and Croyden. Due to an error by Uxbridge the squadron guarding Biggin Hill was below the cloud layer at seven thousand feet whilst the bombers high above found a gap and managed to hit the air field sowing the landing ground with delayed action bombs. Even as this raid disappeared back to France another mass attack was observed building to the west of Calais, as this formation of over fifty aircraft crossed the channel it split up into smaller elements to attack a number of airfields at Biggin Hill, Shoreham, Tangmere and Kenley.

Eight squadrons were tasked to oppose these attacks and most of the bombers were intercepted and driven off before their targets were bombed. Purely by happenstance damage to a main power distribution station had cut the power the CH and CHL stations at Beachy Head, Whitstable, Fairlight, Foreness, Rye, Pevensey and Dover. These stations unlike the GCI/PPI stations did not have their own generators and a huge gap was created in the long range detection system at a crucial time. The GCI/PPI stations and those Coastal Defence RDF stations that had been modified could continue to detect raids but as their range was less than half that of the CH/CHL stations the warning times were much shorter and the task of intercepting before the targets were bombed became far more difficult.

As this latest round of raids faded from the screens around half past four in the afternoon yet another raid crossed the coast at Dover, several waves of aircraft headed to attack Kenley, North Weald, Slough (Hawkers at Langley being the probable target), Oxford and Biggin Hill yet again. Over forty bombs hit the airfield at Detling causing major damage by destroying buildings, setting fire to fuel stores and cratering the runways. The estimate was that the airfield could be made operational again by the following morning. The worst attack of the day came on the back of this raid when around six o’clock a small raid of ten bombers out foxed the defences by flying low up the Thames Estuary before cutting south to carry out a low level bombing attack on Biggin Hill. Compared to the attacks suffered by this station over the previous days this one was small but its effects were disastrous. The one thousand pound bombs destroyed the armoury, hangers, stores, barracks and workshops The met office was blown to pieces and the water, power and gas lines all cut, the telecommunications line were also cut in three different locations on or north of the airfield. Casualties were high, with thirty nine killed and a further twenty six injured. Despite all of this damage Biggin Hill continued to land, service and send aircraft off.

As the sun sunk below the horizon in the west Fighter command started to count the cost of the days endeavours. The RAF had again flown over one thousand defensive sorties whilst recording over fourteen hundred enemy ones. The RAF losses were twenty five aircraft whilst the Luftwaffe lost forty. The ratio was not high enough in favour of the RAF and Dowding and the other commanders were aware of this, the only saving grace was that of the twenty five RAF pilots shot down no less than seventeen of the pilots had survived.

As the darkness deepened the aircraft of Luftflotte three took to the night sky again with Liverpool as their primary target. Tonight’s raids headed north crossing the coast to the west of the Isle of Wight. If the leaders of Luftflotte Three thought there would be a weaker defence to the west of London they were mistaken, though there was still a gap in the GCI/PPI RDF coverage in mid-Wales the bombers heading for Liverpool again had to contend with night fighters under the control of no less than ten GCI/PPI stations. Single aircraft on diversionary missions meant that far more stations than this had an active night. It was quickly noted early in the night that single or pairs of aircraft were attacking those airfields already targeted during the daylight raids. Over night, Calshot, Rochfort, Northweald, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, Thorny Island, Debden and Detling all had unwanted visitors these raids had the hall marks of nuisance raids intended to wear out the defendants as well as delay and disrupt the repair and recovery work.


August the 31st

Day; Fighter Commands Heaviest losses. South-east and eastern air fields again main targets.

Night; Heavy raid on Liverpool. Light attacks from north-east coast to Portsmouth.

Weather; Mainly fair. Haze in Estuary and Straits. (1)

If the previous day had seemed a hard struggle then today would prove the lie, from eight in the morning the attacks came in never ending waves. The day started with a sweep of Me 109’s destroying all the balloons at Dover. This Attack by Me 109’s was followed by waves of bombers with heavy fighter escorts once again targeting airfields when Duxford and Debden and North Weald were the principle targets. Despite the four PAC squadrons engaging both the escort and bombers with their now customary total disregard for danger or convention, still over one hundred bombs struck Debden causing major damage. Whilst the PAC was thus engaged Duxford was saved from a similar fate by the timely intervention of 137 Squadrons from Wittering in twelve Group who swooped into the attack from altitude, diving through the high escort, only firing at targets of opportunity before slashing through the bomber force and climbing hard for a second pass.

Within the hour another one hundred plus aircraft raid crossed from Calais attacking Eastchurch again and also heavily strafing Detling as well. Just after noon a third attack was detected approaching Dungeness, consisting again of one hundred plus aircraft this raid split into two separate components as it crossed the English coast. Half headed for Biggin Hill and Croydon. Biggin hill was bombed from high altitude, once again the airfield was heavily hit and much of the repairs carried out since the previous days raid negated. To split the defences the simultaneous raid on Croydon was carried out at less than two thousand feet by a dozen bombers, doing considerable further damage. Again Biggin Hill lost all it’s communications as the lines were cut once more.

The second half of the raid had headed for Hornchurch, all three squadrons at Hornchurch had been scrambled, both 602 and 74 squadron were able to get off in time but 152 squadron were still refuelling and rearming. The last flight of four spitfire were caught on the ground as the bombs began to fall and all the aircraft written off, fortunately despite some hair raising experiences, including one spitfire being blown upside down as it took off and another having a wing sheered cleanly off on it’s take off run, all the pilots survived relatively unscathed. Under the cover of these two major attacks the Luftwaffe made opportunistic attacks on the Coastal RDF stations between the Thames Estuary and the Isle of Wight. Damage was done to the stations at Whitstable, Foreness, Dunkirk, Rye, Beachy Head and Pevensey. Having effectively punched a hole through the CH and CHL lines these attacks were not followed up and all the stations were returned to service by the following morning.

Through necessity the entire spectrum of RDF systems developed so far were being adapted and utilised to give redundancy and flexibility within the tracking system. Both AA Command and the Coastal Defences were now reporting air activity to the filter rooms as a matter of routine and their operators were getting as skilled in reading their scopes as their RAF counterparts.

The days activity was not yet concluded at five thirty a further raid consisting of Ju 88’s accompanied by bomb carrying Me 110’s swept in at low level to hit the south eastern airfields yet again. Among the airfields targeted were both Biggin Hill and Hornchurch, where despite further damage being added to that inflicted earlier both airfields were declared operational by the following morning.

Nightfall did not bring an end to the onslaught just a change in the modus operandi. Nuisance raids of one to three aircraft were wide spread and the majority of the GCI/PPI stations south of the Scottish border had a busy night. For the fourth consecutive night Birkenhead and Liverpool were the principle targets. For the first time the Fourteen Group Night Fighters based at Banff were staged south to join the Thirteen Group Night Fighters in interdicting aircraft north of a line between Liverpool and London. This was the first time that every available night fighter in the UK flew at least one sortie, a select few actually flew more than one, usually this was because they had to either rearm of refuel.

One Bisley NF from Ten Group had been scrambled at dusk from Bicester to intercept an intruder from a Luftflotte three base on the Cotin Peninsular approaching the coast at Studland in Dorset. This Bisley was vectored to intercept what was probably a weather fight for the subsequent raids on Liverpool and gave chase from the coast all the way to Liverpool being passed from GCI/PPI station to station along the track. The pursuit was continued as the aircraft turned west across the Irish sea and was only broken off when the enemy aircraft flew beyond the range of the GCI/PPI station at Trewan sands. Despite the Biseley having gained an RDF contact on the intruder it became clear that it was heading for Irish airspace so the pursuit was broken off and the Bisley direct to RAF St Valley to refuel and rearm. The target had been fired at, at long range in an inconclusive engagement. The Bisley crew took off as soon as their aircraft was ready and were vectored onto enemy aircraft over Liverpool. An RDF contact was achieved and the crew began to stalk the intruder as this time it flew east. Managing to maintain contact as the enemy aircraft crossed the Pennine gap in the GCI/PPI network. The enemy aircraft was flying at a speed almost equal to that of the Bisley and eventually the chase was abandoned as the intruder left the RDF coverage of the East Anglian coast.

Having turned back towards land the Bisley and it’s crew were directed on to another intruder approaching the Essex coast by the GCI/PPI station at Trimley Heath, this enemy aircraft appeared to be heading for London and the plot actually showed that it’s tract would take it directly over Fighter Command headquarters at Stanmore. Once more the Bisley crew obtained an RDF contact and pursuit was joined at full power as the Night Fighter slowly gained on the target aircraft. As the intruder approached Stanmore the Night Fighter Pilot being made aware by the GCI/PPI station at Bourscombe of their location and track decide to engage as soon as the target was in rage so as to interrupt a possible bombing attack. Tracer flashing past the intruders cockpit appeared to have the desired effect at it dived away and threw of the night fighter in contact. Despite losing RDF, the GCI/PPI controller patiently guide the Bisley pilot to regain contact by cutting across the enemy aircrafts curving track, having gained contact again the pursuit continued but this time the Luftwaffe pilot had his throttles fully open and was running for home at a speed the Bisley could hardly match. As the pursuit crossed the coast near the Durrington GCI/PPI station the pursuit was called of and the Bisley Night Fighter instructed to return to base at Bicester.

On route Near Reading another RDF contact was made and after talking to the GCI/PPI station controller at Boarsombe again the pursuit was on as no IDF signal was forthcoming from the suspect contact. Once more pursuit was joined this time to the south west. Just to the west of the Isle of Wight and south of the Bristol Channel there was a cluster of four overlapping GCI/PPI stations that had spent the entire night tracking the coming and goings of Luftflotte Three as those aircraft headed from their bases in France north to Liverpool and thence south again to France. Now from the East came one intruder hotly pursued by a very frustrated and tired Bisley Night Fighter crew. Despite having no less than four Night Fighters already active in their coverage zone the GCI/PPI station at Cricklade quickly passed those Night Fighters covered by the adjacent stations to the south and west of them, off to those controllers so that Boarscombe could hand their contact and pursuit to them. This event was the culmination of hours of practice and practical experience gained in the proceeding weeks. The coordination between plots required was only possible due to the dedicated open line telephone network installed between all the GCI stations and the sector control rooms.

On this occasion the transition between stations and continued tracking of the pursuit was achieved but once more the intruder turned towards the coast and ran for home. Frustratingly as the target overflew Bournemouth the range began to open despite the Bisley’s throttles and engines being pushed to the limit. With no other option the Bisley pilot expended his remaining ammunition in a long, long range burst of fire at the receding enemy aircraft. Even as the escaping air from the charging system announced that the Bisley’s ammunition was exhausted, a growing orange glow appeared in the direction of the enemy aircraft. With his engine temperature dangerously high and rising the Bisley pilot throttled back and turned towards the coast. Having landed at Warmwell to refuel, full throttle pursuit really does consume a lot of fuel in a short period the pilot and his RDF operator took off once more to return to their home base at Bicester, arriving there as the sun rose. For all the efforts of the ground controllers, ground crews and the aircrew themselves, a long nights work had resulted in the simple statement, “three enemy aircraft pursued, two engaged, one damaged” and that Bisley crews aircraft carrying the name the ‘Weary Wanderer” painted on the nose from that day on.

All through the night work had gone on to restore as many of the Eleven group airfields to operational status as possible after the days attack, craters were filled in, fires extinguished and communications restore once more. typical of the unsung heroism of this work was the fate of an unexploded delayed action five hundred pound bomb that had landed on the field at Duxford. This eminent danger was dealt with, with out fuss by connection a one hundred yard long tow rope around the fins of the bomb and using the Concrete encased Armadillo truck to tow the bomb to a secluded part of the airfield boundary where it was quietly left to determine the time of own demise. So August 1940 ended most definitely with a bang and not a whimper in the minds of all at Duxford and indeed within Fighter Command as a whole.

(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
 
Urf the RAF's taking a hammering, this, I assume is roughly in accordance with what happened as per OTL? I do recall the Germans bombed London and we bombed Berlin back, but there's not yet been the shift of focus from a furious Hitler, or is that still to come?
And, as always, excellent stuff, simply superb writing!
 
Foe those who might be interested, I have left the RAF aircraft losses roughly as OTL. But due to better armour, self sealing fuels tanks fewer pilots are killed and seriously injured. With the better Air Sea Rescue service more RAF pilots are being recovered and more Luftwaffe crew captured. Luftwaffe dat Losses are up by about 10 percent, night losses ITTL are several hundred percent higher!!!! ITTL the battle is still close run but the Luftwaffe are taking more of a beating. As to the night blitz the British defenses are at least one year in advance of OTL. However ITTL centimetric radar will not be fielded any earlier than OTL because the Magnetron was not developed any earlier. On the overhand 25 centimeter valve radars are much further advance and that will have repercussions later.
 
10.24 The Air Ministry Never Sleeps
10.24. The Air Ministry never Sleeps.

Early morning on the first of September found Sir Philip sitting at his Air Ministry desk faced with piles of correspondence, reports, official dockets and myriad other documents. With a cup of tea (lemon, no milk, no sugar) by his righthand Sir Phillip began his mornings work, relying on his sectary and staff to have prioritised the documents for his perusal. Urgent ones requiring signature or alterations all bore red tags as usual.
Even as he had entered the Air Ministry in the early morning light the pall of smoke down river, hanging over the docks and London’s east end was clearly visible. The bald report and statistics on his desk did little to illustrate the true import of the current battle. Only the previous evening he had had a discussion with the Prime Minister about the conduct of the air defence under Sir Hugh Dowding’s control. Was it being as effective as it could be and were we winning were the two most important questions as far as the Prime Minister was concerned.
Sir Philip was not sure that Winston had been reassured by his response. Where he basically said that if you believed the German figures then we were losing and they would have air superiority in days not weeks. If the analysis by the Air Ministry and intelligence service was correct then the battle was balanced on a knife edge. If the attacks on the sector stations and the CH/CHL site continued at there current level the defence could just about be sustained. If the Germans avoided attacking airfields of the other Commands and concentrated on the sector stations in the south east, or on the RDF sites alone then Dowding’s carefully crafted system might fail. If pilot losses rose any further then air superiority over the south coast might be lost. Or if any of the major aircraft factories were destroyed then the defence might also be compromised.

Churchill had asked for a simple explanation as to these conclusions. Sir Philip had explained by stating that.

Currently, Fighter production and repair was just keeping ahead of the losses.

Pilot replacements were just about keeping up with current losses but whilst doing so quantitively, quality wise Fighter Command was losing ground as experienced pilots lost were replace by under trained novices.

Our losses of aircraft and pilots was quantified, those of the Germans were not accurately known. The losses admitted to by the Germans was the lowest known figure. Claims by RAF Pilots were the highest estimate. According to the statisticians the real figure was some where in between and by best statistical estimates was around half of those claimed. Wreck counting and kills confimed by other witnesses where no wreck was available gave figures for German losses greater than those admitted to by German sources and were normally less than but close to half of those claimed. Based on those figures and the estimated Luftwaffe order of battle, then the Luftwaffe losses were judged to be nearing a critical level, only time would tell how long the Luftwaffe could and would sustain both the current level of operations and losses. Sir Phillip had stated quite clearly to the Prime minister that it was not really important that Fighter Command win the current battle it just must not lose it and at this juncture by a slim margin that was being achieved. On the basis that by late September a cross channel invasion would be impractical until the spring Sir Philip had suggested to the Prime Minister that now was the time to set the policy of the Government regarding the prosecution of the Air War for the next six months and longer.

With those decisions in mind Sir Phillip had been canvassing opinions and expert advice as to the way ahead within the Air Ministry and the RAF. Sir Philip had formed a firm opinion in his own mind as to who should be, at least in the short term appointed as the new CAS and was seeking to build a consensus around that choice.

Putting those thoughts aside Sir Phillip turned to the file marked RAF Radio Counter Measures Unit. This unit had been formed in early June to bring the airborne electronic intelligence gathering original undertaken by R.V. Jones and other scientists from Bawdsey research station under formal RAF control with RAF serving personnel.

The officer chosen to command this new unit was Wing Commander Edward Addison, a Great War veteran who had subsequently studied at both Cambridge and the Ecole Superieure d’Electricite in Paris. Before taking on the task of forming RCM Unit Addison had been working as one of the founding officers of No 60 Signals Group that had been formed in March of 1940 as the mother unit of the rapidly expanding RDF systems.
Amongst the reports was one marked “Secret” this detailed how the use of signals intelligence had identified the Luftwaffe’s KG 100 as a specialised navigation unit using the Knickesbien radio navigation system for night bombing sorties which had been recently diverted onto daylight raids. An aircraft from this unit had been shot down during a raid on Croydon on the 18th of August and though it’s specialised electronic equipment was badly damaged the scientists working at RCMU based in Cheltenham were at least able to identify the use of the equipment and it’s purpose. It was evident that this unit was being used to bomb precision targets through the cloud cover using their Knickesbien system. Later, on the afternoon of the 25th of August another He 111 from KG 100 was shot down during a raid on Pembroke. This time the aircraft was crash landed and the crew were captured before they could destroy any of the electronic equipment. It was the findings of the report By Dr Robert Cockburn, the lead scientist at the TRE in Cheltenham for the RCMU that formed the body of the document Sir Phillip was reading. R.V Jones had added his own notations on the possibility of not just jamming the radio signals used by the Knickesbien system but that a more subtle counter measure it might be possible by broadcasting a synthetic signal that they could lead the Knickesbien using units astray. This idea had been described as “bending the Beams”, the apparatus for doing this was called ‘Aspirin’ as it was seen as a remedy for ‘headache’ which was the code name given to the Knickesbien system. The report ended with a summation of the equipment, both electronic and aircraft, required by the RCMU to continue their shadow war against the Luftwaffe. Sir Phillip drafted a short apedom to be written up for the file with a list of those organisation such as MAP and the MoS who would need to be chivvied up to provide the necessary material and resources.

Next was a summary from AA command forwarded by Dowding at Fighter Command showing the dispositions of AA guns as of the twenty first of August, also shown were the dispositions of the guns as of the eleventh of July so the changes were easily apparent. Quickly turning to the Fourth AA Division which covered the midlands and the black country Sir Phillip noted that Liverpool currently had fifty six heavy AA guns a rise of four since July. Scanning down the other divisions and districts he could see that only London and Birmingham had a higher number of guns, so there could be no claims that Liverpool was being treated unfairly or left undefended. However asinine it might seem to Sir Phillip as an experienced MP and member of the Government he was only to well aware of the sort of reaction the recent intense nightly attacks on Merseyside could provoke.
He did notice that Coventry had lost fully one quarter of its AA guns in the same period and noted that the reasoning behind that decision should be checked as he was well aware of how important an arms manufacturing centre the town was. Also it’s proximity to Birmingham, another major industrial target, would seem to be a factor. Birmingham gaining an additional five guns in the same period, a gain of around seven percent, even if these guns were emplaced on the Coventry side of Birmingham, say Solihull and that area it still would not balance the loss over in Coventry. Sir Phillip was well aware that there simply were not enough AA guns to meet the defensive requirements of the country and that this had been exacerbated by the loss of so many 3.7 inch AA guns with the BEF in France. One advantage the Home Defence AA guns had was that not only were they now getting Gun Ranging RDF systems but also they were being linked by telephone to the GCI/PPI station so that they could be given real time tracking on incoming raids, this also helped the GCI/PPI stations as the GR/RDF sets of the AA sites could give them accurate heights of the intruder aircraft. This continued integration of the diverse individual cogs of the air defence system was a process that Sir Phillip though was very important as it crossed interservice boundaries at all levels and helped make everyone feel part of the battle. Well might Winston as Prime Minister eulogise what he called “the Few’ but for Sir Phillip the crux of the current battle would be the performance of the many unsung heroes quietly working in the background.

Sir Phillip’s work on the papers was disrupted by his customary morning briefing call from Sir High Dowding at Bentley Priory. They quickly covered the events of the pervious day and any actions and changes that were being made, as usual the weather was discussed at length and they both concluded that under the prevailing conditions in all likelyhood today would again see mass attacks from across the channel. The changing tactics and targeting by the Luftwaffe was quickly covered with Sir Phillip being briefed on the latest thinking from Sir Keith Parks in Eleven Group. The call was concluded by a necessarily brief discussion on the progress of the night fighter campaign, especially with regards to the continuing heavy assault on Merseyside.
 
Excellent stuff and a superb way of hightling whats going on and the casualty rates and countermeasures. I had to look up what the Bisley was from the night fighter one, i'd never heard of that aircraft before so learned something new there :D https://www.baesystems.com/en/heritage/bristol-160-blenheim-v-and-bisley

I can't remember the date when the Germans switched targets at Hitlers urgings, the pounding of the airfields seems to be going on a bit longer in this TL with the big raids within the last few days seeming to be almost a creshendo.
 

Driftless

Donor
With the Luftwaffe at a 10%(?) higher plane loss, they're likely losing a comparable number of pilots and crew as well. That loss has to be approaching a critical point soon for them. They're replacing "experten" or at least veterans with rookies as well.
 
I can't remember the date when the Germans switched targets at Hitlers urgings, the pounding of the airfields seems to be going on a bit longer in this TL with the big raids within the last few days seeming to be almost a crescendo.

With RAF losses being similar to OTL, the switch to London will come at about the same time. Possibly slightly sooner, if the Luftwaffe is getting worried about its own losses, or possibly slightly later, if Hitler needs a little more time to think about withdrawing the London ban.

Wikipedia is all I can do...

The reference is Overy's The Bombing War.

So plans for attacks on London were distributed in July. Overy states that these plans were made in response to British bombing of civilian throughout the winter and spring, although what Germany thought were deliberate attacks on civilians were really just BC being barely able to find the right country. However, the Luftwaffe had already shown itself very happy to attack economic/industrial targets without such an excuse, so I do not believe that these plans would not have been made had BC's attacks not happened.

On 3rd-ish Sept, a Luftwaffe conference discussed the next stage of the battle. Kesselring thought that FC was beaten and that there was no obstacle to attacking London; Sperrle disagreed, but the higher politics favoured the attacks on London. Hence, I suspect that the attack on London was always coming and the Berlin raid only influenced its precise timing.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Continuing to enjoy this, but please no further references to Sir Keith Parks, it's distracting! _Park_ got his first knighthood (for Malta) in 1942 :)
 
With the Luftwaffe at a 10%(?) higher plane loss, they're likely losing a comparable number of pilots and crew as well. That loss has to be approaching a critical point soon for them. They're replacing "experten" or at least veterans with rookies as well.

I suspect the number of bombers either spending much longer in the workshops to repair cannon damage or being written off and broken for spares will also serve to reduce sortie rates slightly.
 
10.25 Does The Enemy Ever Sleep?
10.25, Does the Enemy ever sleep?

September 1st

Day: Four Main Attacks on Fighter Command airfields. Heavy Damage

Night: Liverpool again, Diversions in Midland and South Wales.

Weather: Fair with cloud patches in Morning. Fine afternoon. (1)



The tension at in the underground headquarters at Bentley Priory that morning was evident in all who were present. The waiting for the first plots to appear on the large map tables was almost unbearable. All present were aware of the battering the Eleven Group sector fields had been taken and how fragile the lines of communication were. It was not until nearly ten thirty that morning the activity over the channel was observed and plotted. Initially twenty plus were plotted, then a further thirty plus followed quickly by another plot of over a dozen as the enemy raider gathered. By the time this armada approached Dover it numbered over one hundred and twenty aircraft flying in eleven distinct formations. In response, Park’s controllers at Uxbridge had scrambled no less than fourteen squadrons to intercept. The problems for the Eleven Group Controllers were many fold, if the Germans followed their normal pattern this big formation would fragment as it crossed the coast with individual elements heading for separate targets spread all over south east England. If the enemy formation was not attacked before it scattered then there was a good chance that some elements would avoid interception and have a clear run at their targets.

This was a like a huge three dimensional game of chess, with move and counter move. In recent days a problem had become evident to Parks, in that due to having had to make so many interceptions at a height disadvantage sector controllers were tending to add a couple of thousand feet to the heights that Uxbridge was giving them for instructing the squadrons to intercept, then on top of this for the same reasoning the squadron formation leaders were themselves adding a couple of thousand feet to the height given to them. This was resulting in delays in aircraft getting to their interception locations and in many cases these delays caused a complete failure to intercept at all. This morning proved a case in point, of the fourteen squadrons vectored onto the large enemy formation approaching Dover only half managed to intercept before the enemy formations split to fly to their assigned targets.

The seven squadrons that did intercept became embroiled in a series of dogfights with the heavy close escort of Me 109’s and very few got through to the bombers. Now the controllers at Uxbridge were left scrambling to intercept the individual raid elements before they dropped their bombs on target. Here the four GCI/PPI stations in the south east really showed their mettle, Uxbridge handing direct control of all seven un-engaged squadrons to the GCI/PPI controllers whilst the sector controllers continued to co-ordinate the seven squadrons already in contact. The German formations were tracked by the GCI/PPI stations as they headed for their targets which quickly became apparent as being, Biggin Hill, Eastchurch, Tilbury docks and Detling.

Despite their best efforts once more Biggin Hill was heavily bombed by a formation of Dorniers flying at twelve thousand feet, which were only intercepted after they had completed their bombing run, At Tilbury the Poles faired better arriving in time for the two squadrons from Duxford to attack the German bombers head on, having dived down on them with both height and speed. The German formation scattered in disarray doing little damage to the docks. Detling was not so fortunate, the two Polish squadrons from Debden only arriving as the bombs fell, however the attackers paid a heavy price for their presumption as one squadron of Polish spitfires tackled the escorting Me109’s, who were operating near the limit of their range and the other Polish squadron fell gleefully on the now exposed bombers and harassed them all the way back to France.

Amongst the Squadrons sent to counter the attack on Tilbury docks was 242 Squadron once more with Douglass Bader leading them. With Park’s last warning still burning fresh in his ears he implicitly followed the instructions he was receiving from the GCI/PPI controller at Foulness. This WRAF controller, not a day over twenty one, calmly gave instruction to Dogs Body (Bader’s call Sign) to bring his squadron into the fray at altitude and up sun of the bombers. In this instant the head of the GCI/PPI station had realised that a direct approach to intercept the raid would not get there in time for 242 squadron to engage the enemy before they dropped their bombs so by leaving that task to a squadron based closer it was possible to give 242 squadron a chance to attack with advantage of both position and height. Acting as instructed Bader and 242 Squadron dived on the bomber and hit no less than six of them on their first pass. This morning raid was the sixth to target Biggin Hill in three days and once again the landing field was so badly cratered that thirty two Squadron in their Hurricanes had to be diverted to Croydon on returning from their sortie.

There was a short break in the assault until one pm. When once again the RDF stations started to pick activity behind Calais. Both the GL/RDF at Dover and the CH stations reporting contacts. Soon the CH Low was report a raid of one hundred plus departing Cap Gris Ness following the same track as the mornings raid. This time nine squadrons were scrambled and the enemy formation was engaged as it made land fall. Spitfire squadrons sent to higher altitudes managed to occupy the attention of the high escort whilst several squadrons of Hurricanes and Defiants took on the close escort and the bombers. Later intelligence reports, from both RAF pilots and interrogation of captured Luftwaffe aircrew would emphasise the difficulty of differentiating visually between the Hurricane MkII and the Defiant. Hurricane pilots noted how on this occasion as soon as Defiants had been identified both enemy fighters and bomber immediately took violent evasive action, this was ascribed to fearing the destructive power of the Defiants four cannons. Conversely the Defiant pilots reported a notably greater reluctance on this occasion for Me 109 pilots to engage in dogfighting, the conclusion was that they were ascribing to the Defiant the same manoeuvrability and dog fighting prowess as the Hurricane. Quite unintentionally the controllers had tactically given both types an edge in this engagement and the casualties reflected this but would likely not easily repeated.

This attack never reached it’s objectives as bomber and fighter alike broke and ran for France. It would seem that sometimes even the Luftwaffe consider ‘discretion the better part of Valour’. Back at Bentley Priory the quick repulsion of this raid raised concerns that it was merely a feint and another attack was coming elsewhere but for the time being the RDF screen remained blank and the plotting table clear. Some thing was brewing and everybody at Fighter Command new it and by late afternoon their concerns were realised.

Simultaneously two formations crossed the Channel making the third and fourth large scale raids of the day. One formation of fifty aircraft being a mix of both fighters and bombers attacked Hawkenge and Lympne airfields whilst the other raid also of fifty plus aircraft targeted Detling whilst some fighters amused themselves by yet again attacking the Dover balloon barrage. Several small formations split of in the now common tactic used by the Luftwaffe. One of these formations consisting of Dorniers now delivered the customary six o’clock attack on Biggin Hill. This attack not only cratered the runway but at long last achieved what Dowding and Parks had long feared, that was a direct hit on the operations centre, this reduced the control room to a complete shambles and a five hundred pound bomb despite not detonating caused serious damage to the Defence Teleprinter Network room when it careened of a steel safe. Once again the main telephone and Teleprinter lines were cut.

So ended the daylight attacks for the day but the night would prove a little less busy than for the previous week. In total between sun set at around nine pm. and the first gleam of daylight at four am on the second of September there had been around one hundred incursions and raids by single aircraft but no concerted assault on a single target. These attacks had ranged from Ashford and Gillingham in the south east, Hull and Grimsby on the east coast, via Burton-on-Trent, Stafford and Sheffield in the heart of England to Sealand and Birkenhead in the west. Once more a busy night for the Nightfighter force with nearly one hundred sorties flown and over a dozen firm contacts, of those there were three confirmed kills, three probable’s and three damaged. All three probable’s were categorised as such because there was no proof that the aircraft had been downed as they flew out to sea. (later by various sources two of these would be confirmed as destroyed, one falling into the seas short of Le Havre and the other crashing even as it approached it’s base in France) Even at the time it was regarded as a very successful night, to engage almost the percent of the enemy night intruders was remarkable and a engagement ratio per sortie flown by the RAF of around nine percent boded well for the future.

The losses reported for the first of September and the night of the first to second of September when they were relayed by neutrals to the British seemed incredibly low. If believed these figure would make the loses about on par with those of the RAF and would mean that RAF pilots had been over claiming by at least five to one. On examining the wreck count from the enemy aircraft intelligence section the lie was given to the German propaganda as the number of wrecks found was for once considerably greater than the Luftwaffe’s admitted losses. The significance of these figure and the meaning it had for the continuing battle would cause much discussion within certain circles of the Air Ministry and RAF. Fighter Command had flown in excess of seven hundred daylight sources and had lost fifteen aircraft from which nine pilots had been recovered.

(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster



September 2nd.

Day: Once again four main phases of airfield attacks.

Night: Scattered raids: Liverpool, mid lands and South Wales.

Weather: continuing fine and warm. Early-morning mist and fog patches. (1)





Though to fighter Command it hardly seemed possible but today the Luftwaffe would actually up the tempo of their operations again, obviously seeking to knock out the southern defences prior to their much vaunted invasion. The pattern of four main raids through the day was repeated again and was now a recognised modus operandi as a means of trying to stretch out and even over match the resources of Eleven Group (or maybe in the thinking of the Luftwaffe High Command the entirety of Fighter Command) and gain air superiority. Unlike other mornings that started with a series of reconnaissance incursions, to day saw the first large raid building over France before seven o’clock. Conforming to the now established Luftwaffe tactic this raid of some forty bombers with sixty escorting fighters spred to cross the English coast between Dover and Folkstone, where in broke up into it’s separate entities to attack various targets. This morning these included Biggin Hill (yet Again), Rochford, Eastchurch and North Weald. Many of these raids descending to low level to sweep across their targets.

This happened to Biggin hill that morning and not for the first time while the air defences and the observer corps were absorbed with dealing with several high flying formations a low level attack swept in unopposed and plastered the station with bombs once again.

The days second attack came in just after midday and was larger than the morning raid numbering some two hundred and fifty fighters and bombers. Though tracked throughout it’s approach via the isle of Sheppy and the Thames Estuary and attacked by squadrons of RAF fighters one element of the raid managed an accurate and damaging attack on the Debden air base. Both Polish squadrons based there were engaged elsewhere fighting other elements of same attack. Unfortunately the covering fighters from Twelve Group were initially vectored to cover both Debden and Duxford and ended up being caught between two stools and actually defending neither.

Shortly after three in the afternoon even as the last fighters scrambled for the previous raid were landing short of fuel and in most cases ammunition the next raid was detected forming up over France. This was another large raid of over two hundred and fifty aircraft that spread out over much of Kent having again crossed the coast at Dover. For the Germans this raid had mixed results, whilst one section succeeded in attacking Brookland, Kenly and Biggin Hill another section attacking Detling, Eastchurch and Hornchurch were to the most part broken up and scattering their bomb loads widely over the Kentish countryside.. At Hornchurch the surrounding fields were pocked marked by over one hundred new craters, whilst only half dozen bombs fell within the perimeter fence.

The last daylight raid for the day was mounted at five thirty when another large raid this time with several small diversionary attacks was again mounted mainly against air fields. This time the attacks were slightly further west with the attacker making landfall at Dungenes but once more Biggin Hill was given its customary six o’clock calling card. As this final daylight assault receded back across the Channel the RAF and the people of the southern counties could take stock of the damage. Detling had been hard hit with hangers and other building destroyed and the runways unusable for several hours. The two attacks on Eastchurch had destroyed The N.A.A.F.I. and administrive buildings as well as a bomb store holding dozens of two hundred and fifty pound bombs, who’s recovery much complicated the repair work. Restoring communications was once again the very highest priority unexploded ordnance or not.

Throughout the day Eleven Group alone had flown over seven hundred and fifty sorties in defence of it’s own fields and today had suffered the largest single days loss of the battle, some thirty one aircraft, fortunately only eight pilots had been killed and seven wounded. Some Luftwaffe units had also suffered badly with Erprobungs Gruppe 210 flying Me 110’s losing no less than eight of their number.

The night activity was split into two distinct parts with low altitude mine laying off East Anglia and a series of raids on Western England and Wales by aircraft of Luftflotte Three. Of the seventy five recorded tracks, eight contacts were made by Night Fighters and five targets engaged with three confirmed as downed and two damaged one judged as probable but no aircraft wreck had yet been found.

(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster





September 3rd.

Day: Heavy attacks on airfields. losses equal

Night: Main Attack Liverpool. Harassing raids on South Wales and South East.

Weather: Fine and warm. Some Cloud and drizzle in North. Haze in channel and straits. (1)



The new pattern of attack was continued today with the first raid of the day being observed building over France by eight o’clock that morning. Once again the GL as well as CH stations were tracking the aircraft. This mornings targets eventually turned out to be North Weald, Hornchurch and Debden. This attack was met with a rolling series of interceptions by both single and two squadron strength formations. The RAF fighter controls were working tactically to force thew Escorting german fighter to butrn fuel, drawing the top cover down bt attacking the top cover then forcing it to climb to meet the next threat. Meanwhile thw close cover is kept occupied by multiple thretts atcking from different axis. Any defending fighter that turns to follow an attacking fighter finds it’s self being led away from the bomber formation and towards another RAF formation. The Instructions to the RAF fighter pilots had been explicit, to avoid dogfighting at odds and only do so to burn the enemies fuel. Broadly these tactical innovations, only really viable when the Me 109’s were tasked with escorting the bombers to the very limit of their range, were this morning to a greater extent successful. The raid components heading for Hornchurch and Debden were both turned back before they reached their targets, however some thirty Dornier bombers in a single formation managed to bomb North Weald. Hangers were destroyed along with the motor pool. Despite a direct hit, the new protected sector operations block was not seriously damaged and once the VHF radio aerials were reconnected operations could resume as normal. So despite the landing field being strewn with delayed action and unexploded bombs the airfield was open for daylight operations.

It was early afternoon before the next attack developed and appeared on the plotting tables to be heading for the same targets. As with the earlier morning raid this was intercepted by multiple squadrons and failed to reach its targets. Once again 306 and 308 Squadrons of the PAC were in the thick of the action and completely broke up one bomber formation with their head on attacks and scattered it along with its close escort of Me 109’s.

It was apparent that the Luftwaffe was still making tactical changes and was using both the stepped formations of bombers covered by fighters and the mixed formation with a close fighter escort. On some occasions both had been encountered on the same interception. Once again today the Luftwaffe achieved parity in fighter losses but the additional loss of bombers swung the balance in favour of the RAF. Though todays the loss of sixteen RAF fighters with half the pilots killed was still a heavy blow.

Following the recent pattern the major raid of the night was against Liverpool with the main bomber force from Luftflotte three crossing in a steady stream from the Cotin Peninsular. Due to weather and other factors tonight there was no concentration of bombs dropped on the target and in fact bombs fell on towns all over Cheshire. The Night fighters once again were out in force and took a steady toll of the bombers.

(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster







September 4th.

Day: Succession of air field raids in two main phases. Serious damage at Vickers Works at Brooklands.

Night: Further raids on Liverpool. Harassing Attacks.

Weather” Fine and warm. Occasional rain and strong winds in north. Haze in Estuary, Channel and Straits. (1)

Today saw a variation in the targeting of the Luftwaffe, for the first time aircraft production factories were put on the priority target list along with the RAF bases. This change would only become apparent later when the days raids were analysed.

The first large raid of the day actually conformed to the previous tactic of targeting the RAF stations this time in the area of the Thames Estuary. Once again the Balloon Barrage at Dover was shot up as was the airfield at Lympne. The principle target was again Eastchurch where stores were damaged and half dozen new craters made in the landing field.

The second attack arrive shortly after noon with mixed force of some three hundred fighters and bombers crossing the English coast at various points between Beachy Head and Dover. Fourteen Fighter Command Squadrons were scrambled to face this attack and nine of them intercepted successfully. The other five tended to be either orbiting potential targets that placed them to far from the actual raid to intercept or were scrambled to late. The ensuing air battle filled the sky from Gillford in the west to Ashford in the east. With the PPI screens full of ‘Maggots’ and the plot table covered in multiple tracks a formation of fourteen bomb carrying Me 110’s slipped though at low level to attack the Vickers works at Brooklands.

They found their target by the simple expedient of flying up the Southern Railway line from the coast via Guildford till they reach their target. This lowlevel navigation by using the railway lines was euphemistically called “doing a Bradshaw” by the RAF after the eponymous railway guide of that name. Despite the factory defence guns managing to shoot down two of the raiders and 501 Squadron from Middle Wallop in Ten Group intercepting and causing several Me 110’s to scatter their bombs over the countryside. Those Fighter bombers that did make runs on the target did so with devastating effect. The machine shops and the main erecting shop were hit by just six bombe but they killed some eighty eight people within the works and injured another six hundred with many being buried under the rubble and steel work of the buildings.

Despite this only four days of production were lost before Wellington bombers once more started to flow from the factory. At Rochester the Shorts factory was again targeted but the defences held and the target was left undamaged. The raids also hit Reigate, Shoeburyness, Canterbury, East church and Faversham. Though comprising only two main raids the fierce fight still saw Fighter Command put up over seven hundred sorties. Todays losses were once more favourable to the RAF with seventeen fighters lost and six pilots killed, against a publicly proclaimed score of sixty one enemy aircraft destroyed. In realty the RAF considered that they had actually downed a combined thirty one German bombers and fighters. Post war analysis of German quartermaster returns would actually show that, including aircraft that returned to France the loses totalled twenty nine Aircraft.

Following the pattern of previous nights multiple incursions by single aircraft or small formations kept the entire night fighter force in England and Wales active through the night. The major targets were, for Luftflotte three again Liverpool, Bristol and South Wales.



(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster



September 5th.

Day: airfield attacks in two phases. Park orders special fighter cover for fighter production facilities.

Night: Continuous activity over most of England.

Weather: Again fine and Warm, cloud developing later. Channel and Straits fine. (1)

Tactically no great innovation by the Luftwaffe on this day, two main raids that split up after crossing the coast to attack a variety of targets. In the south and east of the country. The first raid occurring at around ten Am. To the west attacks were made on Biggin Hill and Croydon whilst further east North Weald, Eastchurch and Lymphe were attacked again. The raid on Biggin Hill failed to reach its target as the two resident squadrons were today kept back in its defence, whist 603 in their Spitfires went for the escort 32 Squadron in their Hurricanes attempted with considerable success to concentrate on the bombers. In total fourteen squadrons had been scrambled in the mornings actions.

As on earlier days shortly after noon a second raid was plotted massing over France. This attack came in very high and proved difficult to counter due to the short flying time to get to altitude available to the defending fighters. Both Detling and Biggin Hill were showered with bombe once again. In a slight tactical variation large enemy fighter formations were plotted patrolling over the channel as the attacking force returned. This was assumed by the RAF controllers to be a counter to the RAF fighters pursing straggling or damaged bombers and shooting them down into the Channel.

The nights activity was almost predictable with Liverpool being bombed along with London and Manchester. If fact when the bomb fall maps were drawn up in the morning no less than forty towns and cities had been hit, mostly by single aircraft. After a busy night the Night Fighter force could add another half dozen to their accumulated tally. The OR teams were spending much time analysing each nights operations to look for means of increasing the number of successful contact and the number of resulting engagements.



(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster



September 6th.

Day: Three main attacks, largely broken up.

Night: less activity. Harassing raids only.

Weather: Fine, but cooler, Haze in Straits and Estuary. (1)

The apparent change in targeting policy by the Luftwaffe was confirmed this morning when Luftflotte two staged a major attempt to attack the Hawker works at Kingston on Thames where currently half of all Hurricane production was based. Los of this production facility would have been a major blow to the Raf defensive capability and it’s targeting by the Luftwaffe bore out the correctness of Park’s instruction that aircraft and engine factories were to be a defence priority. Despite their considerable efforts Luftflotte two were thwarted in their attack and the multiple squadrons scrambled, some working in pairs broke up the raid and dispersed it before the target was reached. This was the first of three major air assaults launched by the Luftwaffe that day aimed at RAF basis and at aircraft production sites.

The first attack was detected forming over France at eight thirty in the morning and as well as aiming for the Hawker plant at Kingston the sector stations to the south of London were also threatened. The second attack at around lunchtime followed the same pattern but attacking those stations to the south and east of London whilst the last attack starting late in the afternoon returned to attack the sector satiations to the south and west of London. As was becoming traditional Biggin Hill was once again attacked at six pm. The defending fighters managing to scatter the bombers who unloaded the bulk of their ordinance along the Westerham road once again cutting the main communications cables. A fortuitous gift for the RAF was an intact example of the latest version of the Me 109 that ran out of fuel during air combat and landed intact at RAF Hawkinge.

All set for another night of non stop activity the GCI/PPI RDF crews sat and stared at screens that remained on the whole strangely empty. Those intruders that were detected seemed half hearted and ran for home at the slightest hint of pursuit. There was just sufficient activity to keep the air raids sirens warbling and cause disruption and sleepless nights for many. The RAF intelligence sections when asked if they had any idea what had caused the respite suggested that the high tempo of operations over previous nights had caught up with the Lutfwaffe units and the sortie rate had to be reduced. It was however noted a at this stage that this was just an assumption.





(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
 
Superb as always, correct me if i'm wrong but the Defiant in TTL is a cannon armed hurricane at its core right? The RAF's taking a hammering but the German losses are going to be getting worse too and it seems the night fighters are really earning their pay and the money invested in them.
 
Nearly there. Just a fortnight to the peak of the Battle (15th OTL). Things might even come to a head sooner. I'm wondering about aircraft dropped at the prototype stage that soaked up production OTL and how appointments have changed too.
If the Germans are losing 10% more pilots than OTL, then they are really hurting by now , channel flu or whatever they called it will be becoming a major issue, I'd expect an earlier peak as they already will have lost more planes/pilots than by OTL 15th.

The Defiants have proved what cannon can do so things may change in terms of what the RAF want, conversely the heavier losses may push the Germans into trying to get the FW190 in service earlier and retiring some of the old bomber types. However given the mess that the German aircraft industry/policy was in with much infighting and many prototypes, it might not change much from OTL
 
It is quantifying the differences the losses make and how that could change history that I find so difficult to work out and write. Hence the slowness of updates. Ten percent more losses may sound high, bot when you are losing 22 instead of 20 aircraft out of 1000 engaged then it is not that big a problem. When losses go from 20 to 22 of three hundred engaged then the problem of losses are far more significant. The balance here in the PAM has tilted in favour of the RAF but it is only just tipping the balance, there is no wank like curb stomp. The PAM Defiant is a single seat four cannon fighter that trades a little speed and maneuverability for hitting power and endurance. The significance of this combination is not being lost on either the RAF or the Luftwaffe. Hence the Luftwaffe bomber pilots becoming very leery of anything that even looks like a Defiant. As we enter September the significance of Castle Bromwich reaching serious production levels one year earlier ITTL wanes as OTL production rose. What is more significant is that both Hurricanes and Spitfires have two cannons each and as soon as conditions permit new marks with four cannons will be forth coming. Also their is a bit of storm waiting in the wings!
 
When you are a minister in charge of the airline flying to Neutral Portugal and you also have an airbase on Gibraltar, I think a regular supply of lemons might somehow magically occur!
 
Top