One he should have been cashiered for rather than being handed a medical discharge. They probably thought he'd been punished enough for his own stupidity.
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
formion
Banned
@sonofpegasus did the butterflies in PAM have caused any divergence:
a) In AA production. While the focus is currently on Britain, I wonder if there are any changes in Malta's defences that in OTL were inadequate.
b) With the earlier Castle Bromwich production are currently (summer 1940) any plans for Hurricanes to be sent in Malta and Egypt?
a) In AA production. While the focus is currently on Britain, I wonder if there are any changes in Malta's defences that in OTL were inadequate.
b) With the earlier Castle Bromwich production are currently (summer 1940) any plans for Hurricanes to be sent in Malta and Egypt?
Yes there are Butterflies, Mk 1, Spitfires and Hurricanes, surplus to training requirements, have as already posted been sent to Malta and other eastern bases. What happens over the winter ITTL still has to be written.
Different times, a different world, the accident rates for normal flying were horrendous by todays standards.
Well let's hope someone was smart enough to move one of the largest floating drydocks in the world from were it was located at Malta (which had virtually no air defences and was definitely in range of a pretty hostile Italy)to Alexandria...how the heck that wasn't done the second WW2 started I will never know.
OTL AFD No 8 was bombed and sunk on the 20th of June 1940. ITTL we are passed that date, despite there being better fighters stationed at Malta, there is in the PAM no integrated RDF fighter interception at this date. The UK defence and making up the losses from the fall of France means that no units have been sent out to Malta yet. OTL the Italians bombed the dock at night. In the PAM there is no driver to change this, the dock was still sunk on the 20th June. ITTL the daylight raids are being handled more roughly by the RAF but reinforcements are urgently required.
RI interfered for a time, unplanned trip abroad! So I hope to have some more installments up next week. Hopefully these will stir up some discussion.
formion
Banned
Around this time (August-September) according to "Malta and British Strategic Policy, 1925-1943" the governor of Malta and ABC Cunningham were setting their requirements for the defence of Malta. The plan that they supported was almost the same at the 1939 plans. Specifically involved these steps in developing first defensive and then offensive capabilities:
a) Reach 172 AA guns
b) 4 Hurricane squadrons
c) At least 1 full squadron of Marylands for reconnaissance
c) 1 Beaufort torpedo-bomber squadron
d) 24 Wellingtons operating from Malta even temporarily before moving to Egypt.
The aforementioned requirements are not ASB plans to make Malta but the minimum requirements to be able to protect itself and exert some limited offensive capability. in OTL by the end of 1940 there were <20 Hurricanes and 3-4 Marylands operating. The only offensive tool against the italian convoys was 830 FAA squadron. Lastly, I think canon armed fighters arrived only in Q4 1942.
ITTL RAF started has started with >750 fighters more than OTL. Canon-armed fighters mind you. Beaufort production I think is also ahead, since in OTL there was only one operating squadron in UK by the end of 1940. Therefore, a commitment of the RAF- AM to supply and maintain the squadrons needed to Malta, will produce interesting butterflies even by the onset of Compass, with more to come by the time of the Greek Campaign and the arrival of X. Fliegerkorps in Sicily.
Edit: The first radar in Malta was established in March and was supplemented by a second in July, while a third, low-level set was installed in December. It seems to me that an intergrated defence is plausible to be established even before 1940 ends. I think in TTL there are 2 fighter squadrons already in Malta. This will made the growing of RAF in Malta quite a bit smoother than in OTL.
a) Reach 172 AA guns
b) 4 Hurricane squadrons
c) At least 1 full squadron of Marylands for reconnaissance
c) 1 Beaufort torpedo-bomber squadron
d) 24 Wellingtons operating from Malta even temporarily before moving to Egypt.
The aforementioned requirements are not ASB plans to make Malta but the minimum requirements to be able to protect itself and exert some limited offensive capability. in OTL by the end of 1940 there were <20 Hurricanes and 3-4 Marylands operating. The only offensive tool against the italian convoys was 830 FAA squadron. Lastly, I think canon armed fighters arrived only in Q4 1942.
ITTL RAF started has started with >750 fighters more than OTL. Canon-armed fighters mind you. Beaufort production I think is also ahead, since in OTL there was only one operating squadron in UK by the end of 1940. Therefore, a commitment of the RAF- AM to supply and maintain the squadrons needed to Malta, will produce interesting butterflies even by the onset of Compass, with more to come by the time of the Greek Campaign and the arrival of X. Fliegerkorps in Sicily.
Edit: The first radar in Malta was established in March and was supplemented by a second in July, while a third, low-level set was installed in December. It seems to me that an intergrated defence is plausible to be established even before 1940 ends. I think in TTL there are 2 fighter squadrons already in Malta. This will made the growing of RAF in Malta quite a bit smoother than in OTL.
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With more common sense at the top of the Air Ministry and Fighter Command there might hopefully be less wastage of valuable aircraft and much more importantly trained pilots over France on ridiculous "sweeps" and the resources sent where they are actually needed, Malta included.
Sigh such a waste, I do wonder what the heck the RN was thinking in leaving such a valuable asset within harms way for no apparent gain.
Perhaps they didn't think italy would enter the war, plus they needed that dry dock in the Med and Malta was arguably more secure and far better set up as a naval base than Alexandria was. Also re the fighter sweeps I think Sir Phillip will smack down hard on any suggestions of these.
formion
Banned
Unfortunately since spring 1940 the British were expecting Italy to enter the war. In the franco-british talks of late May, the British were the most negative regarding the possibility of staying the hand of Mussolini with concessions. Also, everybody in both RN and RAF knew that Malta was lacking the needed complement of AA guns and fighter cover. Since the mid-30s RAF officers were even overestimating the efficiency of RA bombers. I remember that I read that even in 1923 an officer claimed that even a single bomb may be end of the floating dock. So, not moving it to Alexandria under these conditions was quite idiotic.
Maybe they didn't have enough tugs available to move it? That's really the only reason I can think of why AFD8 wasn't moved. This is what happened to the large floating drydock at Singapore in late 1941, which sadly meant it could not be moved and thus despite efforts to scuttle it, was later salvaged and used by the Japanese
Also they could only move the blasted thing along at 3 knots. So they needed a month or so to move it. Which they could have done in April without risk.
In Late 1939 there had been a plan to tow AFD to Alexandria but I have yet to find a reason why this was not done. A plan to flood down the dock to make her less prominent and a harder target did not happen either. Either of these actions could have saved her and have made the maintenance of large ships in the Med in 1941 onwards much easier. That however is nor the doing of the PAM.
Well unless they point blank tell the Admiralty that for the time being Malta will not have adequate air defences and that moves the Admiralty to order ADF8 moved to Alexandria
Not strictly canon, but I sketched up a four engine Fairey Hendon with a DeHavilland airfoil and four engines.
N Blackburn should know about the link: http://aviadejavu.ru/Site/Crafts/Craft26448.htm
That is where I found the Hendon inspiraton pic. The off centreline canopy means that left seat can see well to taxi, right seat is on the centreline for flight.
It was going to be a two engine update of their 1936 prototype, to be called the Hendon II. Recent heavy bomber bids of about 99ft wingspan, but AVRO cheated on wingspan and number of engines, so a mid wing plug adding an engine and 11ft to each wing was adopted quickly.
Initially 600hp RR Kestrel engines. Upgraded to Merlins as these became widely available.
N Blackburn should know about the link: http://aviadejavu.ru/Site/Crafts/Craft26448.htm
That is where I found the Hendon inspiraton pic. The off centreline canopy means that left seat can see well to taxi, right seat is on the centreline for flight.
It was going to be a two engine update of their 1936 prototype, to be called the Hendon II. Recent heavy bomber bids of about 99ft wingspan, but AVRO cheated on wingspan and number of engines, so a mid wing plug adding an engine and 11ft to each wing was adopted quickly.
Initially 600hp RR Kestrel engines. Upgraded to Merlins as these became widely available.
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PG, I like it! do you have a date for your Fairey Hendon? In the PAM Fairey are building the Monarch H24 2,000Hp engine, how would this aircraft look with two of those a sort of earlier Manchester I think!
Thanks!
I see it competing for the same orders as the Manchester. Rather than rebuild the 1931 prototype, they look at the Whitley (March 1936 Hapsburg chin) and decide to do better.
Sometime mid-war the Hendon IV mk 2 comes out:
It's got to stop. Barnes Wallis just fainted.
The standardised power egg offers a wheel that doesn't poke out as much when the undercarriage is up. You can't be fairly pregnant, you can be a Fairey "Gravid". The para-door is for emergency evacuation, although it does offer some use for Transport Command.
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ITTL, Mr Barnes Wallace at Vickers is busy sketching big bombers using his geodetic construction method. So the AM could well be very interested in another bomber capable of carrying large bombs! the PAM time line actually starts in 1935 so I think this aircraft might predate that.
10.22 The Battle Becomes A Test Of Resources And Tactics
10.22, The battle Becomes a Test of Resources and Tatics
Day; Airfield attacks, Kent, Essex and Suffolk in three phases.
Night; First Major attack Wednesday August the 28th
on Liverpool. 150 bombers. Harassing attacks Midlands, north-east coast and London.
Weather; Fine and fair. Cold. Cloud in Dover Straits. (1)
Down in the underground control rooms at both Uxbridge and Stanmore the days activity started earlier than on some other days when enemy formations were detected over Cap Gris Nez at eight thirty in the morning. The RDF stations were soon reporting one hundred plus aircraft in the raid. As it approached Dover the raid split and headed for two separate targets, one was the fighter airfield at Rochford and the other was the Maritime Command airfield at Eastchurch. Four fighter squadrons were scrambled by Eleven Group to intercept these raids. It was only as the two raids were sighted by the fighters that it became apparent that with just ten bombers heading for Eastchurch and twenty seven heading for Rochford that the bulk of the raid consisted of the Me 109s. Fighting at odds the four fighter squadrons were unable to get past the defending Me 109’s and the bombers managed to hit both targets. At East Church Maritime Command lost two De Haviland Flamingo Maritime Patrol Aircraft on the ground to bomb damage and once again the airfield was cratered but remained operational. Even as the last remains of this raid retreated off the edge of the plot table another raid was forming over Calais.
Once again the target was the airfield at Rochford near Southend. Thirteen squadrons were scrambled to counter this attack. The observer corps had reported the formation was again composed of more fighters than bombers. Despite the commitment of so many aircraft by Fighter Command comparably few fighters broke through the escort to get to the bombers. Over thirty bombs hit the airfield but once again no serious damage was done and the airfield though battered remained open.
The next attack was in the form of large fighter sweeps coming in over Kent and the Thames Estuary. Here there was a breakdown in communication and Parks instruction that combat with enemy fighter formations was to be avoided was not followed and all the seven squadron sent to counter the attack suffered casualties. That brought the days confrontations to an end with the RAF losses of twenty fighters only being two less than the Luftwaffe losses of Me 109’s. This loss ratio was improved by the fourteen enemy bombers that failed to return safely to their bases.
The night saw the first concerted large scale attack on the docks at Liverpool. Some one hundred and fifty bomber aircraft were involved in this attack, whilst diversionary attacks, often of only a single bomber were made against Birmingham, Sheffield, London, Coventry, Manchester and Derby. No 80 wing aircraft flying that evening had detected the German navigation beams but this could only give the axis of the attack as they crossed several potential targets. However it did enable the Night Fighter force to concentrate on the track of the main raid. No less than twelve of the GCI/PPI stations were able to direct fighters into the main attack.
Here the Fighter Command plot table at Bentley Priory became vital in coordinating the various sorties so that the RAF Night Fighters did not clash with their own. At one time so many night fighters were in the area covered by the PPI station at Rack Green that the IFF signals almost blanked out the screens. This was due to aircraft under the control of the neighbouring PPI sites at Trewan Sands, St Annes and Conberton also being in the area covered by Rack Green. Whilst this situation lasted a very short period it raised some very important questions for the Operational research teams. Slightly earlier the four Coastal GCI/PPI stations between Bournemouth and Dover had ceased directing individual night fighters but had instructed them use their RDF 1.5 sets to get close enough to the bomber stream for their RDF.2 sets to get a return. The four coastal stations giving a running commentary to the fighters on their frequencies as to the height location and speed of the main enemy formations. The afteraction analysis of this approach to countering mass night attacks would go a long way to formulating fighter commands response to a large scale night assault. Despite this being the largest night fighter effort to date Liverpool and Birkenhead were badly bombed. With the increased number of GCI/PPI stations now operational the air raid warning system run from Fighter Command HQ was no longer so dependant on the Observer Corps for tracking raids. air raid warnings were issued to indicate three levels of threat from Yellow as a preliminary, Purple, raid approaching douse all working lights etc. Red, Sound Sirens. The Issuing of Purple alerts was very disrupting to the works of docks and marshalling yards that really did require task lighting. So getting the threat level right and issuing timely warning was an important task, now made easier by the almost real time tracking of the bombing raids across the country achieved by the GCI/PPI network.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
August the 29th
Day; Quiet morning. Airfield attacks in south and south-east in afternoon.
Night; Liverpool again attacked; diversions in the midlands.
Weather; showers and bright interval. Channel and Straits cloudy. (1)
The lack of air activity in the morning was a welcome respite after such a busy and frenzied night. At mid-afternoon as the day brightened Luftflotte Two put up three large fighter sweeps, starting to cross the channel from Cape Gris Ness, Boulogne and the mouth of the Somme. The response to these large formations was again the scrambling of thirteen squadrons from Eleven Group. However to day the Squadrons largely obeyed the instructions issued by Parks on the 19th of August that combat should not be engaged solely with fighter formations. The sense of this instruction becomes apparent when later the Luftwaffe records became available it was shown that these sweeps comprised some five hundred and sixty four Me 109’s with an additional one hundred and fifty nine Me 110’s also taking part, this was some what greater that the RAF estimates of four hundred and fifty given on the day. The RAF figure meant that the thirteen squadrons from Eleven Group were facing more than twice their number whilst in reality the odds were actually over three to one. This refusal to engage large enemy fighter formations was in some quarters seen as yielding air superiority to the enemy.
With the coming of the night Luftflotte Three carried out their second consecutive night of major raids on Liverpool with some one hundred and thirty aircraft bombing the docks and city. The night fighter response was much the same as the previous night but with concerted efforts not to swamp any single GCI/PPI station. Once more the coastal stations used the passive RDF 1.5 sets on the night fighters to try and intercept the raids as they approached the coast. Tonight the stations at Salcombe, Exminster and Sturminster Newton to the west of Bournemouth also employed this tactic.
The restraint showed by Eleven Group in countering the large enemy fight formations was reflected in the losses for the day. Whilst the RAF losses were restricted to nine aircraft with only three pilots killed the Luftwaffe lost twenty seven aircraft most of which were Me 109’s and 110’s.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
Day; Airfield attacks, Kent, Essex and Suffolk in three phases.
Night; First Major attack Wednesday August the 28th
on Liverpool. 150 bombers. Harassing attacks Midlands, north-east coast and London.
Weather; Fine and fair. Cold. Cloud in Dover Straits. (1)
Down in the underground control rooms at both Uxbridge and Stanmore the days activity started earlier than on some other days when enemy formations were detected over Cap Gris Nez at eight thirty in the morning. The RDF stations were soon reporting one hundred plus aircraft in the raid. As it approached Dover the raid split and headed for two separate targets, one was the fighter airfield at Rochford and the other was the Maritime Command airfield at Eastchurch. Four fighter squadrons were scrambled by Eleven Group to intercept these raids. It was only as the two raids were sighted by the fighters that it became apparent that with just ten bombers heading for Eastchurch and twenty seven heading for Rochford that the bulk of the raid consisted of the Me 109s. Fighting at odds the four fighter squadrons were unable to get past the defending Me 109’s and the bombers managed to hit both targets. At East Church Maritime Command lost two De Haviland Flamingo Maritime Patrol Aircraft on the ground to bomb damage and once again the airfield was cratered but remained operational. Even as the last remains of this raid retreated off the edge of the plot table another raid was forming over Calais.
Once again the target was the airfield at Rochford near Southend. Thirteen squadrons were scrambled to counter this attack. The observer corps had reported the formation was again composed of more fighters than bombers. Despite the commitment of so many aircraft by Fighter Command comparably few fighters broke through the escort to get to the bombers. Over thirty bombs hit the airfield but once again no serious damage was done and the airfield though battered remained open.
The next attack was in the form of large fighter sweeps coming in over Kent and the Thames Estuary. Here there was a breakdown in communication and Parks instruction that combat with enemy fighter formations was to be avoided was not followed and all the seven squadron sent to counter the attack suffered casualties. That brought the days confrontations to an end with the RAF losses of twenty fighters only being two less than the Luftwaffe losses of Me 109’s. This loss ratio was improved by the fourteen enemy bombers that failed to return safely to their bases.
The night saw the first concerted large scale attack on the docks at Liverpool. Some one hundred and fifty bomber aircraft were involved in this attack, whilst diversionary attacks, often of only a single bomber were made against Birmingham, Sheffield, London, Coventry, Manchester and Derby. No 80 wing aircraft flying that evening had detected the German navigation beams but this could only give the axis of the attack as they crossed several potential targets. However it did enable the Night Fighter force to concentrate on the track of the main raid. No less than twelve of the GCI/PPI stations were able to direct fighters into the main attack.
Here the Fighter Command plot table at Bentley Priory became vital in coordinating the various sorties so that the RAF Night Fighters did not clash with their own. At one time so many night fighters were in the area covered by the PPI station at Rack Green that the IFF signals almost blanked out the screens. This was due to aircraft under the control of the neighbouring PPI sites at Trewan Sands, St Annes and Conberton also being in the area covered by Rack Green. Whilst this situation lasted a very short period it raised some very important questions for the Operational research teams. Slightly earlier the four Coastal GCI/PPI stations between Bournemouth and Dover had ceased directing individual night fighters but had instructed them use their RDF 1.5 sets to get close enough to the bomber stream for their RDF.2 sets to get a return. The four coastal stations giving a running commentary to the fighters on their frequencies as to the height location and speed of the main enemy formations. The afteraction analysis of this approach to countering mass night attacks would go a long way to formulating fighter commands response to a large scale night assault. Despite this being the largest night fighter effort to date Liverpool and Birkenhead were badly bombed. With the increased number of GCI/PPI stations now operational the air raid warning system run from Fighter Command HQ was no longer so dependant on the Observer Corps for tracking raids. air raid warnings were issued to indicate three levels of threat from Yellow as a preliminary, Purple, raid approaching douse all working lights etc. Red, Sound Sirens. The Issuing of Purple alerts was very disrupting to the works of docks and marshalling yards that really did require task lighting. So getting the threat level right and issuing timely warning was an important task, now made easier by the almost real time tracking of the bombing raids across the country achieved by the GCI/PPI network.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
August the 29th
Day; Quiet morning. Airfield attacks in south and south-east in afternoon.
Night; Liverpool again attacked; diversions in the midlands.
Weather; showers and bright interval. Channel and Straits cloudy. (1)
The lack of air activity in the morning was a welcome respite after such a busy and frenzied night. At mid-afternoon as the day brightened Luftflotte Two put up three large fighter sweeps, starting to cross the channel from Cape Gris Ness, Boulogne and the mouth of the Somme. The response to these large formations was again the scrambling of thirteen squadrons from Eleven Group. However to day the Squadrons largely obeyed the instructions issued by Parks on the 19th of August that combat should not be engaged solely with fighter formations. The sense of this instruction becomes apparent when later the Luftwaffe records became available it was shown that these sweeps comprised some five hundred and sixty four Me 109’s with an additional one hundred and fifty nine Me 110’s also taking part, this was some what greater that the RAF estimates of four hundred and fifty given on the day. The RAF figure meant that the thirteen squadrons from Eleven Group were facing more than twice their number whilst in reality the odds were actually over three to one. This refusal to engage large enemy fighter formations was in some quarters seen as yielding air superiority to the enemy.
With the coming of the night Luftflotte Three carried out their second consecutive night of major raids on Liverpool with some one hundred and thirty aircraft bombing the docks and city. The night fighter response was much the same as the previous night but with concerted efforts not to swamp any single GCI/PPI station. Once more the coastal stations used the passive RDF 1.5 sets on the night fighters to try and intercept the raids as they approached the coast. Tonight the stations at Salcombe, Exminster and Sturminster Newton to the west of Bournemouth also employed this tactic.
The restraint showed by Eleven Group in countering the large enemy fight formations was reflected in the losses for the day. Whilst the RAF losses were restricted to nine aircraft with only three pilots killed the Luftwaffe lost twenty seven aircraft most of which were Me 109’s and 110’s.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster