AHC: Peerless Air Ministry

[sonofpegasus]

Bibliography

For those who might be interested, here is the Bibliography of books used so far for the PAM time line in the last year. For brevity I have left out, published articles, and archive references I have had access to. I should mention that I have 99% of these publications in my personal collection due to previous academic endeavors.



Books Alphabetically by Author



Ashmore, E.B. Air Defence. (London: Longmans Green, 1929)



Barclay, G. Battle of Britain Pilot, Self Portrait of an RAF Fighter Pilot and Escaper (Sparkford: J. H. Hayne, 2012 originaly publisd, 1976)



Bialer U. The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-39 (London: Royal Historical Society Studies in History,1980)



Biddle,D. T. Rhetoric and Reality in Strategic Air Warfare: The Evolution and Reality of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).



Bishop P. Wings, 100 Years of British Aerial Warfare. ( London: Atlantic, 2012)

- Day by day Chronicle (London: Quercus, 2010)

Black J. Avoiding Armageddon, From the great war to the Fall of France,1918-40. (London: Bloomsbury, 2012)

Bond B. British Military Policy between the World Wars (Oxford: 1980)

Bowen, E. G. Radar Days. (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1987)

Brown, E. Cpt. Wings of the Navy. (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1987)

Wings on My Sleeve. (London, Orian, 2006.)

Wings of the Weird and Wonderful. (London Airlife, 1983.Reprint by Hikoki 2012)

Brown. P. Sqd ldr Honour Restored, The Battle of Britain, Dowding and the Fight for Freedom. (Staplehurst: Spellmount. 2005)

Bungay, S. The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain. (London: Arum, 2000.)

Butler.T. British Experimental Combat Aircraft Of World War Two. (Manchester: Hikoki, 2012)

‘Cato’. Guilty Men (London: paper back addition, Faber & Faber 2010, First published London 1940.)

Chambers. M. A. Building the Supermarine Spitfire, Speed in the Sky. (Stroud:The History Press, 2016)

Churchill W.S. The Second World War Volume 1 The Gathering Storm. (London: Cassell, 1948)

Churchill W.S. Never Give In! The best of Winston Churchill’s Speeches. (London: Pimlico, 2003)

Clark R. Tizard (London: Methuen, 1965).

Collier B. Leader of the few : the authorised biography of Air Chief Marshal, the Lord Dowding of Bentley Priory, GCB, GCVO, CMG (London: 1957)

Collier R. Eagle Day, The Battle of Britain (London: Cassell, 1966)

- Defence of the United Kingdom: History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series: Official Campaign History, Volume I Uckfield: Naval and Military Press. 2004. Originally published 1954

Cowling, M. The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933–1940 (Chicago , University of Chicago, 1977).

Cumming, A.J. The Royal Navy and the Battle Of Britain. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010)

Dean, M., The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars (London: Cassell, 1979).

Deighton, L. . Fighter. The True story of the Battle of Britain. (London: Book Club Associates, 1978.)

- Battle of Britain. (London: Jonathan Cape.1980.)

Dixon, J. E. G. Dowding and Churchill: The Dark Side of the Battle of Britain. (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2009.)

Dobson, C. Building Radar, Forging Britain’s Early-Warning Chain, 1935-1945. (London: Methuen, 2010)

Dowding, H. Twelve legions of angels ( London: Jarrolds, 1946)

Edgerton, D. England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation (London: Macmillan, 1991).

Fisher, D.E. A Summer Bright and Terrible : Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding, Radar, and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain (New York: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005);

Flint, P. Dowding and Headquarters Fighter Command (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1996)

Fort, A. Prof; The Life Of Frederick Lindemann. ( London: Jonathan Cape, 2003)

Gibbs N. H. Grand Strategy, vol. I: Rearmament Policy (London: HMSO, 1976)

Glancey, J. Spitfire, The Illustrated Biograpy (London: Atlantic Books, 2008)

Golt. I, Secret Location.A Witness to the Birth of Radar and its Postwar Influence (Stroud; The History Press, 2010)

Greenwood, S. Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for the Coordination of Defence, 1936-1939. In: Smith, P., ed. Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856-1990. (London: Hambledon,1996)

Hartcup. G, Effect of Science on the Second World War. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)

Hastings. M. Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph,1979)

Higham. R. Two Roads to War; The French & British Air Arms from Versailles to Dunkirk. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012.)

- The Military Intellectuals in Britain,1918-1938 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1966)

Hillery, R. The Last Enemy (London: Burford Press, 1942)

Howard M. The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972)

Hough, R. and Richards, D. The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War 11(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1989)

Hyde M. H. British Air Policy between the Wars (London: Heinemann, 1976),

James. J. The Paladins. A Social History Of The RAF Up To The Second World War. (London; Futura Press,1991)

James T.C.G.edited by Sebastian Cox. The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940 (London: Frank Cass, 2002)

Jenkins. R. Churchill (London: Pan, 2001)

Jullien. M. The Battle of Britain. ( ‘La Bataille D’Agleterre’ Paris; press De La Cite 1967, translation, Jonathan Cape, London 1967)

Kirby .M.W. Operational Research in War & Peace, The British Experience from 1930’s -1970’s UK Operational Research Society. (London: Imperial College Press, 2003)

Korda, Michael. With Wings Like Eagles. (New York: Harper and Collins, 2009.)

Lane ,B. Spitfire (London: Amberly, 2009)

Latham. C & Stobbs. A. Radar, A Wartime Miracle Recalled. (Stroud; Sutton Publishing, 1996)

Lloyd. I. Sir & Pugh. P. Hives and the Merlin. (Cambridge; Icon Books, 2004)

Llyll, G. ‘Dowding’ in Carver, M. (ed) The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976

McDonough F. Neville Chamberlain, appeasement and the British Road to war. (Manchester: Manchester University Press.1998)

Mckay. S. The Secret Life of Fighter Command (London; Aurum Press, 2015)

McKee. A. Strike from the Sky, The story of the battle of Britain. (London; Souvenir Press,1960)

McKinstry. L. Hurricane, Victor of the Battle Of Britain. (London; Hachette, 2010)

Meekcoms K.J. and Morgan E.B. The British Aircraft Specification File. (Tonbridge: Air-Britain, 1994)

Meilinger. P. S. Airwar Theory and Practice. (London: Frank Cass, 2003)

Monday. D. British Aircraft of World War II. (London; Hamlyn/ Aerospace, 1982)

North R. The Many not the Few, The Stolen History Of the Battle Of Britain.(New York: Bloomsbury, 2012)

Olson.L & Cloud.S For Your Counties Freedom and Ours, The Kosciuszko Squadron. (London; Arrow Books, 2004)

Orange V. Dowding of Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain. (London: Grub Street, 2008.)

- Park, The Biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Kieth Park, GCB, KBE, MC, DFC, DCL. (London: Grub Street, 2001)

Overy R. The Battle of Britain, Myth and Reality. ( London: Penguin edition, 2010)

Palliser, T. They Gave me a Hurricane (London: Fighting High, 2012)

Paris, M. Winged Warfare: The Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain, 1859-1917. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991)

Parker R. A. C. Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (Basingstoke; Palgrave Mcmillan, 2003 First published by Macmillan in 1993)

Peden G.C. British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939 (Edinburgh; Scottish Academic Press, 1979)

- Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2007)

Posen B. R. The Sources of Military Doctrine. France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. (Ihaca: Cornell paperbacks 1986)

Postan,M.M, Hay, D and Scott, J.D. Design and Development of Weapons (London; HMSO, 1964).

Powers B. D. Strategy Without Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy 1914-1939. (London: Croom Helm,1976.)

Price A. Battle of Britain: The Hardest Day 18 August 1940. (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1979)

Spitfire, a complete fighting History (first publish as two books 1974/85,. Reprinted by Bookmark.1991)

Probart, Air Commodore H. and Cox S. ed. The Battle Re-Thought, A Symposium on the Battle of Britain. ( Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1991)

Quill. J. Spifire, A test Pilots Story. (London: Arrow, 1983)

Ray J. The Battle of Britain : Dowding and the first victory 1940 (London: Cassell Military paperbacks, 2001. First published by Arms and Armour 1994);

Ray J. The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives-Behind the Scenes of the Great Air War. (London: Brockhampton Press, 1999. First published by Arms and Armour, 1994)

Rice R.R. The Politics of Air Power From Confrontation to Cooperation in Army Aviation Civil-Military Relations (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 2004)

Richards D. The Royal Air Force 1939-45, Volume I, The Fight at Odds (London HMSO, 1953)

Richards D. and St George Saunders H. The Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Volume II, The Fight Avails. (London: HMSO 1954)

Richey P. Fighter Pilot. (London: Cassel Military Press, 2004. First published by B.T. Batsford,1941)


Robinson. A. Night Fighter, A Concise history of Nightfighting since 1914. (Shepperton; Ian Allan ltd, 1988)

RAF. Fighter Squadrons in the Battle of Britain. (London; Arms and Armour Press, 1987)

Robinson. D. Invasion, 1940 (London: Constable, 2005)

Shay R. P. British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)

Sinnott C. The RAF and Aircraft Design 1923-1939; Air staff Operational Requirements. (London: Frank Cass, 2001)

Slessor Sir J. Airpower and Armies. (London: Oxford University Press,1936)

Smith, M. British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).


St G Saunders H. The Royal air Force 1939-1945 Volume III The Fight Is Won. (London: HMSO, 1954).

Sutton B. Fighter Boys (Stroud: Amberly, 2011)

Taylor. A.J.P. Origins of the Second World War. (London; Hamish Hamilton,1961)

Terraine J. The Right of the line, The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985)

Ward. A. A Nation Alone,The Battle of Britain-1940 (London; Osprey, 1989)

Watson. R. C. Radar Origins Worldwide: History of its Evolution in 13 Nations through World War 2. (Victoria; Moss Trafford, 2009)

Wellum, G. First Light (London: Penguin Books, 2003)

Wells H. G. First and Last Things: a confession of Faith and a Rule of Life (New York: G P Putman and Sons, 1908)

White. H. The History of Air Interception Radar & the British Nightfighter 1935-1959. (Barnesly; Pen & Sword, 2007)

Wood, D. and Dempster, D. Narrow Margin, The Battle Of Britain and The Rise of Air Power 1930-1949 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2003, First published by Hutchinson and Company, 1961)

Wood D. The Battle Re-Thought, A Symposium on the Battle of Britain. Ed, Air Commodore H. Probert and S. Cox (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1991)

Target England, The Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain. (London; Jane’s, 1980)

Wright R. Dowding and the Battle of Britain (London:Corgi edition, 1970. First published by Macdonald and Company, 1969)

Zimmerman D. Britain’s Shield, Radar and the Defeat of the Luftwaffe. (Stroud: Amberly 2010, first published 2001)

 

[r1ncewind]

I wonder if the soviets will not gain the most from increased luftwaffe losses in the end..

 

[Driftless]

Sending MacDonald to the East will help remove some of the back-seat driving for Dowding. I wonder what the impact will be in the East, or would MacDonald be chastised enough where he plays within the lines?

I doubt Bader's assignment to the radar control unit changes his opinions much, but that change of venue, along with his political connections being notably reduced; another note of background criticism is lessened.

Do those POD's contribute to Hugh Dowding remaining as a high level commander after the BoB? Along with the minor element of crippling the Luftwaffe.....

 

[perfectgeneral]

Thanks for the Gibbs citation. https://archive.org/details/GrandStrategyVolumeIRearmamentPolicy

Yoink!

 

[savemase]

I just want me say that I am loving all of the detail that you are putting in your timeline and that you are making it as realistic as possible. I really appreciate all of the work and revision you have had to do

Personally I think that this is the best ww2 timeline i have read since 'and they shall reap the whirlwind'. Dare I say that your timeline is it's equal?

 

[sonofpegasus]

No way, TSRTW is a fantastically well told story, the PAM has been thrown together without any real planning by a novice writer and it shows. However I thank you all greatly for your support. More will be coming. I do seem to have got a bit bogged down in the BoB but as in OTL, in this TL it is the most decisive air battle fought up to that time in history and the first against an integrated radar based defence system.

 

[sonofpegasus]

10.18. working to keep a step ahead.

There was no way that Sir Phillip could keep up with everything happening in the AM and the RAF, that is why he had a trusted staff who drew his attention to certain items and quietly dealt with others. The work being done by the RDF Boffins was a case in point. Getting the information from the CH, CHL and now the CHUL as well as the PPI/GCI stations through the filter room at Stanmore and out to the Group HQ plotting rooms had become a problem and had been recognised as such, the first fix to this overloading problem additional Filter rooms at Group level and to have data sent directly to a group filter room at their Headquarters, leaving Stanmore to only handle the big picture. With the plotting table at each of the group head quarters being linked on an open line to the Stanmore plotting room information could flow both ways keeping every bodies plots up to date and synchronised.

Even with this diversification the Group filter rooms could be swamped by the mass of observations coming in and the spoofing and feinting of the enemy formations. Here the GCI/PPI had come into their own. With the advent in mid 1940 of the ‘Skiatron’, this being a horizontal plan position indicator scope with a glass plotting screen on top mounted in a table. This permitted several operators clustered around it to read information of the screen in real time and to china graph tracks straight on to the ‘table’ thereby providing much faster plots to the control rooms. Unfortunately height find was very difficult with the early GCI system due to the small size of the antenna in relationship to the wavelength limiting the sensitivity in the vertical plane. This would not be solved until the advent of centric wavelength systems but was mitigated by the introduction of height finding receiver aerials on some sites.

Inter service co-operation with all three service separate research centres, the A M’s Air Defence Research and Development Establishment at Cheltenham being the host centre with the Armies Telecommunications Research Establishment at Worthy Down and the Royal Naval Signal School at Gosport was fundamental to maximising the advantages of all the diverse developments. A case in point here was the integration of a RN aerial system with the Coast Defence RDF installation to form a back up system to CH and CH L. When Ventnor CH was virtually destroyed by dive bombing it left the potential of a critical gap in the southern defence line covering the RN naval base and dock yard at Portsmouth, despite the chain home low stations at Bembridge and Freshwater Highdown . Some bright spark at the RNSS at Gosport realised that the use of the new shipboard air search aerial that had just finish trials, linked to the send and receiving set of the coastal defence surface search and ranging RDF unit adapted for the purpose could quickly give an RDF system capable of detecting targets up to seventy miles at medium and high altitudes. Aerial systems were quickly fabricated and transported to the Coastal Batteries at Culver and the Needles where a simple input lead switch permitted changing from the air search aerial to the sea search aerial if required. Later each battery would get two separate sets for simultaneous operation. It was at Culver that the CD/RDF system now named, Chain Home High/Low Mobile (mobile in so far as it needed no huge masts and could in theory be dismantled and moved to a new location) was first used with a PPI display to successfully track a mine laying aircraft though both range and height finding were limited by the ground clutter inherent in the use of the 1.5m wave length.

With the advent of the Magnatron there was the prospect of centimetric wavelength RDF systems which would have the definition to cut through and mitigate ground clutter. Unfortunately such sets were at least a couple of years in the future in the summer of 1940 and a system capable of tracking a Ultra low level was required not late but now. So in keeping with Watson Watt’s old maxim of ‘second best now’ the boffins had cast around all the available kit to see what could be produced quickly and perform better than the current systems. This was a continuation of the process that had so quickly produced the 1.5m wave band short range CH H/L M detailed above.

What was causing excitement in the RDF research community was the performance of GEC’s 0.25m band system. Two scientists with the TRE, Dr Bernard Lovell recruited from Manchester University and Alan Hodgkin a marine biologist, from Cambridge university had since early 190 been working on a 25cm version of the GEC 50cm RDF system and had been using this 25cm set to investigate Horn and parabolic type transmition and receiver aerials for use in a compact AI system. These very short wave lengths were being generated not by one of the new top secret Magnatrons but by using a specially modified form of the then new VT90 Micropup valve (the spacing between the valves electrodes had been reduced amongst other tweaks) working in pairs in push-pull mode had been developed until it was produce several kWs of transmition power. Using horn aerials about a yard long (unsuitable of aircraft use, but valuable for development of the system) Lovel’s team had a demonstrated a viable 25cm set with a capability of detecting aircraft at altitudes less than two hundred feet and ranges up to fifteen miles. In June Lovel’s team had received the first parabolic aerial of spun aluminium and with the advent of the magnatron had moved on to working on 10cm AI system.

However Lovel had discussed with Bowen and others the use of the 25cm RDF set and Horn aerials as an ultra low level GCI set. By using one horn in the vertical plain for height finding and another Horizontal one for direction. A team was set up and attached to Lovel’s AI team to develop the 25cm set into a viable UL GCI system with the specific task of tracking mine laying aircraft and detecting low level raiders approaching from seaward. One of the Frist actions of this new team was to canvas all the other teams working on Naval and Army projects, such as gun control RDF, for developments that might help their solve their particular problems. This led in early August to a number of demonstrations of the existing 25cm unit. It was a short summary of the report of these events that finally found it’s way on to Sir Phillip’s desk and kept him reading late into the night. His conclusion was that Fighter Command, using operational research was adapting to the technical challenges posed by the enemy whilst at the same time the scientific community were not only reacting to the needs of the services but trying where possible to be pro-active in proposing new equipment.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Fighter Command, Strengths and Locations of Units by Sector as of 6pm on 18th August 1940
Sector stations marked *

Summary of Squadrons

There were also 5 Operational Training Units (4 RAF and one Polish)

@sonofpegasus provided the information and asked me to put it into MS Paint.
​

 

[sonofpegasus]

Thanks to NOMISYRRUC for tabulating the updated order of battle for Fighter Command on the 1th of August, The movement of squadrons reflects the changing intensity of the battle and Dowding' response to both the performance pf individual Squadrons and their response to the losses suffered. Due to the continuing perceived threat to the Northern Groups at this stage Dowding has to maintain the number of squadrons within the Northern groups.

 

[Marquis]

Has anyone got absolute totals for British and Imperial air strength as of 04/09/39?

Just a bit of info I was interested in for a timeline a while back.

 

[perfectgeneral]

10.18. working to keep a step ahead.
<snip>
This led in early August to a number of demonstrations of the existing 25cm unit. It was a short summary of the report of these events that finally found it’s way on to Sir Phillip’s desk and kept him reading late into the night. His conclusion was that Fighter Command, using operational research was adapting to the technical challenges posed by the enemy whilst at the same time the scientific community were not only reacting to the needs of the services but trying where possible to be pro-active in proposing new equipment.

All prototypes and no large scale manufacturing results in bleeding out on the cutting edge. I only hope that the manufacturers are being just as proactive.

 

[sonofpegasus]

The early recruitment ITTL of EMI, PIE and GEC into the development of RDF systems is quantum change from OTL. Having the EMI and PIE television receiver chassis work available to Bowen a whole two years earlier than OTL advances the introduction of AI by a year ITTL and instead of the sets being hand built by boffins they are being built on PIE's production line. The production expertise ITTL in August 1940 is equivalent to late 1941/2 in OTL only without centimetric radar as the Magnetron was not butterflied in earlier than OTL. Hence in the PAM the GEC 0.25m RDF system is of interest as it is production ready whereas 10cm sets will only be weeks or maybe months earlier than OTL.
As I said in the last post 'Second Best now'.
If there are any radar technicians reading this I could really do with some help quantifying the real life use and parameters of 25cm radar.

 

[perfectgeneral]

The early recruitment ITTL of EMI, PIE and GEC into the development of RDF systems is quantum change from OTL.

PYE not PIE. I know that once you get down to 1.5cm the weather starts to get in the way. You have discovered weather radar. I know nothing about 25cm radar except that it counts as decimetric rather than centimetric. I'd look at history of radar sites. Some get quite anecdotal

 

[sonofpegasus]

10.19. battle is not only in the air,

Others might speak with awe of how a small number of pilots were fighting to protect the country but Sir Phillip and Sir Archibald Sinclair at MAP were responsible for the tens of thousands who toiled daily to produce and preserve the tools required to fight.

The efforts of the maintenance personnel to keep the aircraft flying through the battle was remarkable and Sir Phillip was keen that their efforts were marked and appreciated. Therefore the RAF film unit and the news reel cameras of the Pathe Company were encourage to document their work.

Also station Commanders were encouraged to commend ground personnel for their efforts and accelerate promotion where deserved. The work of the Civilian Repair Organisation was also of great importance in maintaining the supply of aircraft to the fighting Squadrons. Ferrying the aircraft to and from the active airfields was the task of the Air Transport Axillaries (ATS). This civilian organisation utilised pilots who for various reasons, of age, gender, disability or possible all three, who were not eligible for service in the armed forces. This remarkable group of pilots who turned the initials ATA into two alternatives titles of “Ancient and Tattered Airmen” due to their physical attributes and alternatively “Any Thing Anywhere” because they flew unarmed aircraft often without radios or navigation aids through all kinds of weather and into sectors where raids were still in progress. Again recording and publicising the work of the ATA had been undertaken to boost moral and to show the general public the efforts being made in their defence by the whole spectrum of society.

The necessity of the work of all these services had been neatly summed up by the record setting history of a single Spitfire Mk II on the 18th of August. This Aircraft No X4110 was picked up factory fresh that morning by the ATS and flown down Westhampnett near Chichester where it was taken on charge by 602 Squadron. That afternoon in combat over Bognor Regis the aircraft was struck by at least three twenty millimetre cannon shells on the portside between the cockpit and the tail. Whilst the armour plate did its work the Pilot Flight Lieutenant Dunlop Urie still suffered splinter wounds to both feet. Breaking off combat, Urie nursed his crippled spitfire back to Westhamonett where he made a safe, if heavy, landing on the grass runway.

Upon examination by the Base Maintenance Officer it was found that the cannon shells expotion and splinters had so damage and weakened the Spitfire fuselage that it had broken it’s back on landing and was therefore a structural right off. The Erks were quickly set to stripping the aircraft of all useful and salvageable equipment. This was then inventoried and added to the stock of spares to be used to effect repairs to damaged aircraft that could be done quickly by the Base Maintenance Unit (BMU RAF Tangmere) .

X4110 now had the unenviable record of the shortest service life of a combat aircraft in the RAF of just twenty five minutes.

Making sure that there were sufficient replacement aircraft coming from the factories and repair depots was the responsibilities of the MAP under Sir Archibald Sinclair, deciding what aircraft were required in the future was a task for the Air Ministry and the RAF in line with the policies of the Government in the prosecution of their war aims. After the fall of France the MAP was instructed to concentrate on the production of fighters and other aircraft, as to the priorities laid out by the War Cabinet. There had been much angst about the delay to new aircraft types and Sir Phillip had fought hard in the War Cabinet to keep development moving forward. As a direct result of that lobbying not only were the first Avro Manchesters now entering squadron service, the first pre-production Halifax having flown a week earlier despite Bristol’s earlier problems with the Hercules, meaning that a second four engine bomber would be in service by the long winter nights. One conundrum was sorting out the priorities for the available engines. The Tornedo fighter completing preproduction unit trails meant that soon the demand for the Fairey Monarch engine would increase, especially as the FAA’s new Barracuda aircraft used the same engine. So with the Stirling taking four Monarchs and the Manchester two for each aircraft, at the current levels of production their would by the spring be a shortage of engines and a backlog of airframes of all types. Whist the MAP and Fairey Aviation were working to increase engine supplies, other solutions would need to be found. One possible solution had come from Avro’s where Roy Chadwick and his team had been working on a four Merlin engine development of the Manchester. Hives at Rolls Royce had discussed this with both Avro’s and the Air Ministry and reassured them that with the new production capacity flowing from the factories at Crew and Glasgow there would be sufficient Merlin engines for this new aircraft. Four Merlin X’s had been provided for the prototype and the MAP had sanctioned the start of construction of the protype of what was now being called the Lancaster

One of the prime arguments had been settled by results of the fighter battles that were still ongoing and that was which fighters were to be continued in production and which replaced by newer designs. Whilst the Spitfire could hold it’s own with even the latest marks of the Me 109, both the Hurricane and the Defiant were struggling in the dogfights and there was not much more performance that could be wrung out of them. Therefore in the near future they would both need to be replaced, at least in Fighter Command. Whilst the newest Spitfire type with the latest Merlin developments would suffice the replacements for the other two types would need to enter production as soon as practicable. At this moment the Hawker Factory at Langely whilst churning out Hurricanes as fast as possible was also finalising and fabricating the jigs for mass production of the Tornedo. These were being used by those who would spearhead the production teams to learn how to build the aircraft. Whilst the wings of the new aircraft were not that different in construction to the all metal wings of the Hurricane the all metal fuselage was completely different. The Tornedo fuselage construction was of alloy frames with a stressed metal skin rather than the tubular skeleton and canvas covered construction of the Hurricanes and so new skills and methods had to be learnt. Those Tornedos so far completed to service standard were being held at Langley and used for trials, testing and training purposes, so that when the Tornado entered squadron service it would be a mature aircraft with as many flying and maintenance bugs worked out as possible.


Both the prototype of the new De Haviland twin engined wooden bomber and the top secret Whittle engined version of the Westland fighter had flown for the first time in recent weeks. Both occasions that Sir Phillip had missed but he had subsequently witnessed the two aircraft in flight. Both off them had left a deep impression on Sir Phillip and had suprised him with not only there performance but also their sheer beauty in flight. He had thought to himself that if they fought half as well as they flew then the RAF had a couple of aircraft coming along which would set the standard for years to come.

 

[lgkmas]

Minor quibble. ATA was the ferry organisation, which included female pilots, ATS was the women's Army, (Auxiliary Territorial Service). They manned AA guns drove vehicles etc but did not fly.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Got My initials mixed up ATA it is, By the way in the summer of 1940 Female pilots were only permitted to fly training aircraft. of course as the war progressed that changed.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Just noticed the PAM has passed another land mark! 100,000 words plus.

 

[sonofpegasus]

10.20. The Luftwaffe pile in the pressure. Targeting more sector stations.

August the 24th

Day Airfield Attacks in south-east. Heavy Raid on Portsmouth. Manston evacuated.

Night Heavier attacks, widely spaced targets. Minelaying.

Weather Fine and clear in south. Drizzle in north. (1)

The Weather forecasters had promised an improvement in the weather for the morning and as the sun rose they were proved correct and in the Headquarters and Group control rooms the entire staff braced themselves for the onslaught they expected to commence any moment. They did not have long to wait, by nine in the morning the cathode ray tubes at the southern CH stations were starting to dance with electronic echoes. Flying in steps from twelve to twenty four thousand feet this first raid comprising over ono hundred aircraft left Cap Gris Nez on course for dover a little over twenty miles away. Two sub formations broke off to attack Dover itself from the North. The Uxbridge controllers committed no less than eleven of Eleven Groups squadrons to oppose the raid, by eleven Am the last of the raiders were flying or fleeing towards France.

There was a short respite, just enough time for Eleven Group aircraft to land, refuel and re-arm in what the pilots were calling a ‘Grand Prix Pit Stop’ before the next German raid appeared. At one o’clock this next raid headed for Manston again with a number of feints to try and draw of the RAF fighters. Today it was the turn of 152 Squadron from Hornchurch to be forward based at Manston and they had barely finished their pitstop when they were scrambled again only just clearing the field before bombs were exploding across it once more. However 603 Squadron from Biggin Hill, already airborne had been vectored over to the raid and had managed to engage the defensive escort of Me109’s. Unmolested by fighters 152 Squadron clawed for height and started to engage the bombers. Despite the interceptions by several Squadrons, with the heavy escort of Me109’s, they had been unable to prevent the bombers form attacking their targets. In exchange for more serious damage to Manston the Germans were driven back with the loss of six bomber and three fighters. The RAF lost one aircraft with it’s pilot safe and several other fighters damages with one of those pilots suffering superficial wounds.

By three thirty another raid was observed forming up over Le Havre. Once again this large raid was destined to bomb Manston and Ramsgate. Manston having suffered loss of communications after the morning raid was basically devastated with hardly an intact building left standing, services wrecked and the airfield strewed with a deadly combination of craters and unexploded bombs.

After the morning raid 152 Squadron had been recalled to Hawkinge so after their lucky escape were spared the carnage of the afternoon attack. Part of the attacking force had broken off and targeted the small grass landing field at nearby Ramsgate. More damage was done to the town than the airfield. As ever plumes of smoke and swaying parachutes marked the battle area as attackers withdrew across the channel and RAF controllers urgently recalled eager young fighter pilots determined to finish of their fleeing targets.

Whilst Eleven Group were engrossed in defending the Kentish coast. Another bomber formation skirted around the air battel over Kent and used the defensive gap provided by the Thanes Estuary to attack Hornchurch sector station just to the north of the river. Scrambled hastily once more 152 squadron clawed for height. Help was on its way. Whilst 242 Squadron from Twelve Group at Coltishall was scrambled with explicit instructions to orbit over Debden and protect the sector station. The four PAC squadrons at Duxford and Debden had been scrambled on mass to defend Hornchurch. 306 and 308 squadron taking off from Debden simply climbed straight into an attack on the bomber formation. Taking on the close escort and tempting the high escort to dive in.

Flying from Duxford 302 and 303 Squadrons had a little more room to manoeuvre in hand to gain height before joining the fray. 302 Squadron went for the remains of the high escort whilst 303 squadron joyously dived after those Me 109’s of the top escort who had been lured down. Soon the whole area around Hornchurch was one massive dog fight as 152 Squadron were directed over the Thames estuary to cut of the German formations line of retreat.

Squadron Leader Kellet flying with 302 Squadron would describe in awe the ferociousness of the Polish pilots who would fly in so close to the enemy that they could not miss and their cannons would tear the enemy aircraft apart. This tactic whilst ensuring a kill did result in a large number of the Polish aircraft being damaged by the defensive fire of the bombers. Under this onslaught the German formation beat a retreat toward the airfields in France and Holland running the gauntlet of the spitfires of 152 squadron waiting to pounce over the Thames Estuary. Despite this onslaught a section of the German formation consisting of nearly fifty Dorniers and He 111’s with an escort of Me 110’s managed to bomb North Weald sector station, nearly two hundred bombs descended onto the station causing considerable damage and casualties. The relief in Squadron Leader Douglas Bader’s voice when he as the controller had sent 252 squadron in to defend North Weald was almost discernible over the radio, though he would later complain that he should have been able to get them there earlier. Whilst London again heard the wail of the air raid sirens as the Eleven Group sector stations to the east were attacked yet another Luftwaffe attack was on its way.

Flying form their bases north of the Somme over one hundred aircraft from Luftflotte Three formed up and headed north west towards Sellsey Bill and Spithead. With Ventnor CH still out of action the detection in this sector was reliant upon the Poling CH station to the east and the CHL at St Boniface Down with the extemporised CD/Navy RDF units at Culver and the Needles that were still working up to provide better coverage to the east and west of the island. Whether by luck or design this raid manage to hit the long range detection gap to the west of Poling CH and was not identified as a significant raid until it was quite close to the coast. Later operational research would subscribe to the theory that at the time the filter room and plotting table at Uxbridge were suffering from an overload of information as well as concentrating on the attacks to eastern part of the Groups area of operations. Whatever the root cause might have been the result was that the fighter squadrons were scrambled to late to make an effective interception. 601 Squadron were still climbing to the attack from Westhampnett as the raiding aircraft enter the Portsmouth AA box. Despite this the Hurricane continued their attack to try and disrupt the bombers. This assault resulted in the bombers scattering their loads all over the city rather than obtaining a concentrated attack on the naval dock yard. There were over one hundred civilian casualties in the city. This overwhelmed the cities hospitals and some casualties were ferried by naval pinnaces and launches to the Royal Naval Hospital at Haslar on the Gosport side of the Harbour. 1 RCAF Squadron sent from Middle Wallop in Ten Group arrived just in time to harass the bombers as they turned south over the Isle of Wight to return to their bases.

In the battle on this crucial day Fighter Command flew over one thousand daylight sorties, principally in the southern region covered by Ten, Eleven and Twelve Groups. Twenty two fighters were lost by Fighter Command during these sorties whilst over one hundred and twenty enemy aircraft were claimed (post war records would show that the Luftwaffe actually lost fifty six aircraft in the day time battle that day)

In keeping with the day time effort that night saw over one hundred intruders ranging widely all over the country. On one occasion during the night every one of the twenty eight mainland GCI stations south of the border with Scotland was simultaneously actively engaged in at least one interception. Between dusk and dawn no less than twenty one kills were claimed by the night fighter force. Later no less than thirteen of these were confirmed beyond any doubt by the location of wreckage. This amounted to eight percent of the intruder force and represented the highest kill ratio yet. The ten active night fighter squadrons in Fighter Command had for the first time flown one hundred sorties in a single night.

Not since the end of the Gotha raids in 1918 had the City of London been hit by bombs but tonight fires burn in the city and many of the surrounding boroughs.

(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster

 

[Schlock]

With the growing effectiveness of the Nightfighter squadrons, Dowding's opponents aren't going to be anywhere near as successful with their white anting.

 

[steamboy]

Excellent if bloody stuff. But a major sector base has finally been knoced out and the Brits barely maintained a 2-1 ratio during this very busy day. But the rise in skill of the night fighters is going to be notable and it will help when/if the Blitz comes to london and other cities.