AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
Don't know if I've missed it from an earlier post, but what are German production figures? That is, what is their replacement rate per medium bombers, Stukas, twin-engine fighters, and single-engine fighters?
Compared with OTL their losses must be higher, and their damaged beyond repair also higher.
Compared with OTL their losses must be higher, and their damaged beyond repair also higher.
yes The Luftwaffe losses are higher, by a margin. This means that the pressure to get results whilst they still have the means is rising fast.
I have been changing the aircraft losses for the Luftwaffe by an average of plus ten percent. The RAF fighter losses I have only reduced by a percentage point or so. However the RAF fighter Pilot losses I have reduced by around fifteen percent slit in the following manner. Ten percent surviving unharmed or lightly injured and able to return to combat within seven days. Five percent hors de combat for at least seven days, some for longer or even permanently. When you start analyzing such changes the effects really start to multiply. It is these effects that I find quite difficult to imagine and write up, also I'm a lousy planner!
Those that are "hors de combat for at least seven days, some for longer or even permanently", is this only for flying duties? If so, it would mean there are more highly trained "old school" RAF officers for desk jobs etc.
Exactly, those who cannot be returned to active flying even in a training role could as in OTL become 'controllers' or fulfill other ground based command functions where their operational experience will be an asset. ITTL three butterflies are really flying (pun intended) to reduce RAF pilot casulaties in Fighter Command, these are self sealing tanks, Armour and an efficient Air Sea Rescue service. If you read the OTL BoB casualty returns, the number of RAF pilots who drowned, were captured after ditching or are simply missing presumed killed over the channel accounts for more than 10% of total casualties.
formion
Banned
I m looking forward to what direction sir Philip would take thge RAF after the BoB. Would the disastrous fighter sweeps over France be avoided? If so, it would be a butterfly huger than this more successful BoB. Spits then could be released firstly for Malta and at a later stage, Egypt. Such butterfly effects may end up in a very different Med and Malaya campaigns. Just think of it guys: Beaufighters over the invasion fleet at Kota Bharu.
I m looking forward to the developments of the timeline!
I m looking forward to the developments of the timeline!
10.15 Called “The Hardest Day”
10.15.This has been called “the Hardest Day”
Sunday August the 18th
Day, Massed Formations return. Airfields in south and south-east attacked. Luftflotte 3 against Sussex and Hampshire.
Night, Light bombing, Bristol, East Anglia and South Wales. Minelaying.
Weather, Fine and fair early, rest of day cloudy. (1)
At Bentley Priory and Uxbridge the plotting tables remained clear as the staff prayed that the lull would last giving time for the newly transferred squadrons to settle and give everybody else a respite. Parks and Dowding had discussed whether to transfer the PAC squadrons on block or to drip feed them into Eleven Group. The decision had been made to do an emblock switch of all four Spitfire Squadrons to the two airfields at Duxford and at Debden.
This was accomplished late in the afternoon of the 17th August. It was a pre-planned move and an advance party from the PAC had been in place at both airfields for some days, it was merely a matter of choosing the day. After the heavy fighting of the 16th the 17th had been chosen and fortuitously the day had seen a lull in the action. The PAC liaison officer at Uxbridge now became the PAC assistant controller in the ops room working with the duty control officers to ensure that all interception instruction were clearly understood by the sector controllers who would be directing PAC squadrons.
After a slow start that Sundays, action finally commenced around noon when significant formations attacked airfields to the south east and south of London. Targets included West Malling, Biggin Hill, Croydon and Kenley.
Two raids hit Kenley, one at high level of nearly fiftyDo17’s with ME 109’s as escort and a low level raid of some ten Do 17’s. all three of the squadrons controlled by Kenley were committed to stopping this raid. 64 and 505 Squadrons were sent to intercept the high level attack whilst 111 Squadron took off from Croydon and were vectored to intercept the low level raid, this proved problematical due to the very low level of the attack and 111 squadron only got a couple of inconclusive attacks in before having to break of as they approached Kenely’s low level defence perimeter.
Here the four 40mm Bofors guns protecting the southern side of the station proved their worth by inflicting damage on several enemy aircraft two of which subsequently crashed before reaching the coast. The fate of the other damaged aircraft was at the time unknown. This incident did much to show the effectiveness of the Bofor’s Gun in airfield defence. The other surprise was just how effective the PAC (parachute and cable) device was in disrupting the low level attacks. Meanwhile the high level raid was intercepted by both 615 and 64 squadrons who exacted their own toll from the attackers. Despite these success over one hundred bombs impacted within the station perimeter causing extensive damage. Many camp buildings were damaged or destroyed but the wrecking of ten hangers and a dozen or so assorted aircraft was the biggest loss. With all the communications circuits cut and the operations room damaged Kenley was for a time out of action.
Despite this 64 Squadron landed back at Kenley on a safe strip of grass between the craters and unexploded bombs marked out with flags. With a dozen dead and a similar number injured the efforts of the ground staff to maintain an operational status was seen as the very embodiment of the Fighter Command Spirit.
Croydon had again been hit but was able to turn 111 squadron around, refuelled and rearmed is under a quarter of an hour. This attack was followed by KG76 attacking Biggin Hill. The attack was planned as a coordinated assault by a high level formation of Ju 88’s and a low level raid of Do 17’s, due to a timing cockup the low level raid of Do 17’s arrived some minutes before the Ju 88’s, a combination of the observer corps and the PPI/RDF stations at Durrington, Wartling and Willesborough reporting directly to Biggin Hill as the sector station, enabled the Station Commander on his own authority to launch both 603 Squadrons Spitfires and 32 Squadrons Hurricanes before the raid arrived despite the Group and HQ plotting tables being congested with plots to the point that the raid warning arrived even as did the attackers commenced their bomb runs. With 32 Squadrons Hurricanes chasing the low level Do 17’s 603 Squadron in their Spitfires were clawing for altitude towards the high level attack. Despite the fighters intervention once more the airfield was peppered with fresh craters but no greater damage than that was done. In retribution five Ju 88’s and seven Do 17’s were shot down before the remnants of KG 76 made it back across the channel.
So ended the morning assault, at around two thirty, the afternoons attacks commenced with Luftflotte 3 send formations to attack airfields and RDF stations in West Sussex and Hampshire. JU 88’s in three groups of seven bombe Gosport dive bombing workshops and motor transport. Meanwhile two dozen Ju 87’s escorted by a flight of Me 109’s attacked the 16 Group airfield at Thorney Island, a couple of air craft and two hangers being wrecked or damaged. The Fleet Air Arm airfield had Ford was also attacked causing major fuel tank fires and destroying several hangers.
All this came at a cost to the Luftwaffe, with the Hurricanes of 43 and 145 squadrons flying out of Tangmere shooting down no less than fourteen Ju 87’s, a further two being downed over Thorney island by a Reaper of 263 squadron from Filton in 10 Group. The loss of so many Ju 87’s mostly from St.G77 was to force the Luftwaffe to rethink the use of the dive bomber within the campaign.
The daylight finale was when Croydon was again attacked this time by aircraft from Lufteflotte 2 which approached from over London having flown up the Thames estuary through the gap in the AA defences that this provided. As a Diversion twelve Me 109’s carrying bombs swept across the channel at low level and attacked Manston again, injuring fifteen and killing one whilst damaging two spitfires.
Through the night further raids were carried out on Bristol, South Wales and across East Anglia whilst mining took place in the Thames Estuary and the Bristol Channel.
When the sun set and there was time to draw breath and the reports started to arrive at Bentley Priory allowing the days reckoning to take place. Working late in his office Dowding grimly waited to receive the days toll of young flesh and blood shed by “his Chicks”. The figures were not good, having flown some seven hundred and eighty eight sorties Fighter Command had lost twenty five fighters destroyed with eight pilots killed. On the positive side from Fighter Commands perspective there were seventy six confirmed Luftwaffe aircraft downed, this included at least Eleven Me 110’s, Twenty JU 87’s and thirty seven other bombers of various types the balance being Me 109’s. Though of course, the combined claims from the Squadrons were somewhat higher and the figures released for public consumption higher still. The analysis of the days fighting would continue right through the night and Dowding would hold his usual conference call in the morning with his Group Commanders to discuss the results and issue his instructions.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
Sunday August the 18th
Day, Massed Formations return. Airfields in south and south-east attacked. Luftflotte 3 against Sussex and Hampshire.
Night, Light bombing, Bristol, East Anglia and South Wales. Minelaying.
Weather, Fine and fair early, rest of day cloudy. (1)
At Bentley Priory and Uxbridge the plotting tables remained clear as the staff prayed that the lull would last giving time for the newly transferred squadrons to settle and give everybody else a respite. Parks and Dowding had discussed whether to transfer the PAC squadrons on block or to drip feed them into Eleven Group. The decision had been made to do an emblock switch of all four Spitfire Squadrons to the two airfields at Duxford and at Debden.
This was accomplished late in the afternoon of the 17th August. It was a pre-planned move and an advance party from the PAC had been in place at both airfields for some days, it was merely a matter of choosing the day. After the heavy fighting of the 16th the 17th had been chosen and fortuitously the day had seen a lull in the action. The PAC liaison officer at Uxbridge now became the PAC assistant controller in the ops room working with the duty control officers to ensure that all interception instruction were clearly understood by the sector controllers who would be directing PAC squadrons.
After a slow start that Sundays, action finally commenced around noon when significant formations attacked airfields to the south east and south of London. Targets included West Malling, Biggin Hill, Croydon and Kenley.
Two raids hit Kenley, one at high level of nearly fiftyDo17’s with ME 109’s as escort and a low level raid of some ten Do 17’s. all three of the squadrons controlled by Kenley were committed to stopping this raid. 64 and 505 Squadrons were sent to intercept the high level attack whilst 111 Squadron took off from Croydon and were vectored to intercept the low level raid, this proved problematical due to the very low level of the attack and 111 squadron only got a couple of inconclusive attacks in before having to break of as they approached Kenely’s low level defence perimeter.
Here the four 40mm Bofors guns protecting the southern side of the station proved their worth by inflicting damage on several enemy aircraft two of which subsequently crashed before reaching the coast. The fate of the other damaged aircraft was at the time unknown. This incident did much to show the effectiveness of the Bofor’s Gun in airfield defence. The other surprise was just how effective the PAC (parachute and cable) device was in disrupting the low level attacks. Meanwhile the high level raid was intercepted by both 615 and 64 squadrons who exacted their own toll from the attackers. Despite these success over one hundred bombs impacted within the station perimeter causing extensive damage. Many camp buildings were damaged or destroyed but the wrecking of ten hangers and a dozen or so assorted aircraft was the biggest loss. With all the communications circuits cut and the operations room damaged Kenley was for a time out of action.
Despite this 64 Squadron landed back at Kenley on a safe strip of grass between the craters and unexploded bombs marked out with flags. With a dozen dead and a similar number injured the efforts of the ground staff to maintain an operational status was seen as the very embodiment of the Fighter Command Spirit.
Croydon had again been hit but was able to turn 111 squadron around, refuelled and rearmed is under a quarter of an hour. This attack was followed by KG76 attacking Biggin Hill. The attack was planned as a coordinated assault by a high level formation of Ju 88’s and a low level raid of Do 17’s, due to a timing cockup the low level raid of Do 17’s arrived some minutes before the Ju 88’s, a combination of the observer corps and the PPI/RDF stations at Durrington, Wartling and Willesborough reporting directly to Biggin Hill as the sector station, enabled the Station Commander on his own authority to launch both 603 Squadrons Spitfires and 32 Squadrons Hurricanes before the raid arrived despite the Group and HQ plotting tables being congested with plots to the point that the raid warning arrived even as did the attackers commenced their bomb runs. With 32 Squadrons Hurricanes chasing the low level Do 17’s 603 Squadron in their Spitfires were clawing for altitude towards the high level attack. Despite the fighters intervention once more the airfield was peppered with fresh craters but no greater damage than that was done. In retribution five Ju 88’s and seven Do 17’s were shot down before the remnants of KG 76 made it back across the channel.
So ended the morning assault, at around two thirty, the afternoons attacks commenced with Luftflotte 3 send formations to attack airfields and RDF stations in West Sussex and Hampshire. JU 88’s in three groups of seven bombe Gosport dive bombing workshops and motor transport. Meanwhile two dozen Ju 87’s escorted by a flight of Me 109’s attacked the 16 Group airfield at Thorney Island, a couple of air craft and two hangers being wrecked or damaged. The Fleet Air Arm airfield had Ford was also attacked causing major fuel tank fires and destroying several hangers.
All this came at a cost to the Luftwaffe, with the Hurricanes of 43 and 145 squadrons flying out of Tangmere shooting down no less than fourteen Ju 87’s, a further two being downed over Thorney island by a Reaper of 263 squadron from Filton in 10 Group. The loss of so many Ju 87’s mostly from St.G77 was to force the Luftwaffe to rethink the use of the dive bomber within the campaign.
The daylight finale was when Croydon was again attacked this time by aircraft from Lufteflotte 2 which approached from over London having flown up the Thames estuary through the gap in the AA defences that this provided. As a Diversion twelve Me 109’s carrying bombs swept across the channel at low level and attacked Manston again, injuring fifteen and killing one whilst damaging two spitfires.
Through the night further raids were carried out on Bristol, South Wales and across East Anglia whilst mining took place in the Thames Estuary and the Bristol Channel.
When the sun set and there was time to draw breath and the reports started to arrive at Bentley Priory allowing the days reckoning to take place. Working late in his office Dowding grimly waited to receive the days toll of young flesh and blood shed by “his Chicks”. The figures were not good, having flown some seven hundred and eighty eight sorties Fighter Command had lost twenty five fighters destroyed with eight pilots killed. On the positive side from Fighter Commands perspective there were seventy six confirmed Luftwaffe aircraft downed, this included at least Eleven Me 110’s, Twenty JU 87’s and thirty seven other bombers of various types the balance being Me 109’s. Though of course, the combined claims from the Squadrons were somewhat higher and the figures released for public consumption higher still. The analysis of the days fighting would continue right through the night and Dowding would hold his usual conference call in the morning with his Group Commanders to discuss the results and issue his instructions.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
Today by my reckoning is the First anniversary of me posting the PAM story, it is now rapidly approaching 100,000 words!
Anacronyms can get confusing at times - especially when one applies to two!
That was one reason why I put The explanation in brackets! in this TL there is the Polish Air Contingent and there is also the Parachute and Cable device (OTL known as the PAC) Perhaps on this TL the Parachute and Cable device should be known by the Anacronym PACD.
Sorry I'm late to thread mark. I've been a bit low. On the upswing now, like the RAF.
Thanks, I hope to post some new material this weekend RL permitting.
Would anybody be interested in a bibliography for this time line!
Would anybody be interested in a bibliography for this time line!
Ok, having been proposed and seconded I will sort out the Bibliography, would the forum prefer me to PM to those interested or post it?
10.16 August 19th-23rd
Monday August the 19th.
Day Goring again confers. Isolated Raids on Britain, Heavy Reconnaissance activity.
Night Widespread harassing Raids. Minelaying
Weather Mainly Cloudy. Occasional showers in the East. (1)
After the massive efforts of the previous day coupled with the cloudy weather turning to rain later the day started quietly with the activity being confined to Luftwaffe photographic reconnaissance flights. Due to the cloud cover many of these sorties had to come in at a lower than optimum altitude resulting in a cat and mouse games as the RAF fighters were guide towards interceptions as the enemy aircraft dodged in and out of the clouds. One again the PPI/RDF system came to the fore demonstrating how director control of the fighters by the RDF operator cot out all the time lag of the Group and sector systems. So despite the cloud several Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft were hunted down and destroyed that morning. The high level photographic flights were also not getting away scot free as specially prepared Spitfires and Reapers challenged them at ever higher altitudes with some success.
Shortly after noon RDF detected some sixty or more hostile aircraft flying over the channel between North Foreland and Dungeness at 20,000 feet. Just before one O’clock a force of some fifty further aircraft left Calais to attack Dover. The majority of this formation were Me 1009’s which escort some bombers as far as the southern suburbs of London. This set the pattern for the rest of the day with feints and probes covering attacks. The raids often numbering fifty or more aircraft were not pressed home and little damage was done.
The night times activities was a continuation of the Luftwaffe’s dislocation campaign, where wide spread penny packet raids caused at times for over seventy five percent of the country to at yellow or red air raid status.
Having flown some four hundred sorties through the day Fighter Command accounted for eight enemy aircraft for the loss of three of their own aircraft whilst one pilot was killed, one wounded and the other escaping unhurt.
Tuesday August the 20th
Day Scattered raids in morning. Kent and Essex airfields attacked in afternoon.
Night Negligible activity. One or two raids in south-west.
Weather Cloudy Generally, rain spreading from north. Channel mainly fine. (1)
Due to the distinctly autumnal weather there was little Luftwaffe activity in the morning, though pin prick raids were made on Cheltenham, Southwold and Oxford. Of more significance, as far as Dowding, Park and their Staffs were concerned were the reconnaissance flights that visited no less than six of Eleven Groups air fields covering the full arc around north London. The stations overflown were, Northolt in the west of London, Hatfield and Duxford to the north, Debden and North Weald to the north east and finally Hornchurch to the east. Once again the still smoking oil tanks at Pembroke Docks attracted yet more bombs. Despite the poor weather the balloon barrage at Dover was once more attacked as were the airfields at West Malling, Manston and East church. Even with a dozen fighter squadrons being scrambled few conclusive engagements took place, Despite flying a total of over four hundred sorties, on what was considered by the controllers a quite day only eight enemy aircraft were destroyed for the loss of two.
The night was one of the quietest for a long time with just a few single intruders off the south west coast. Here the PPI/RDF stations at Newford, Tkeleaver, Salcombe and Exminster working with the Beufighter NF’s based at Filton finally manged to vector several fighters onto any intruder that strayed high enough to appear above the ground/sea clutter on the PPI screens. Of the three successful interceptions that night one was confirmed as a kill when the burning enemy aircraft was observed to hit the sea off Start Point light house, the other two could only be listed as a probable and a damaged.
Wednesday August the 21st. (1)
Day Small raids in the east and south. Targets airfields.
Night Slight activity, some in Scotland.
Weather Cloudy, Occasional rain.
The continuing inclement weather precluded the Luftwaffe from staging any large scale attacks but nuisance raids of single aircraft or small formations were staged. Principle targets airfields in a swath from Cornwall all the way round the south and south-east England as far north as Coltishall in East Anglia. Concurrently feints or raids were also wide spread with Pembroke in west wales being the most north-westerly target and Grimsby being the furthest north-east. These divers raids in the prevailing weather conditions were extremely difficult to counter but during the day Fighter Command downed no less than sixteen enemy aircraft for the loss on one in a total of around six hundred sorties.
The night saw relatively few intrusions or attacks by the Luftwaffe.
Thursday August the 22nd
Day Shipping reconnaissance and attacks on two channel convoys.
Night Increased activity. Industrial Targets in Midlands, north and west. Minelaying
Weather Cloudy and squally. (1)
The convoy ‘Totem’ in the Dover Straits reported being bomb at nine o’clock, this turned out however to be shell fire from the newly established German batteries at Cape Gris Nez. In an hour and twenty minutes a hundred rounds were observed without a single hit or in fact any material damage to the convoy. With the guns proving ineffectual the Luftwaffe had a go at the convoy around one o’clock. Eleven group responded with two squadrons that successfully drove the attackers off. The rest of the day was quite until the early evening Dover and Manston were again struck by low level hit and run attacks.
Once again despite the inclement weather Fighter Command flew over five hundred sorties with disappointing results only down six enemy aircraft whilst losing four of their own.
The night sky was busy with Luftwaffe bomber flying their now familiar nuisance and diversion raids. Filton was attacked and the Bristol works damaged. The night fighters despite the difficult conditions continue to exact a slow but steady toll of the raiders.
Friday August the 23rd
Day Single raids in the south. Reconnaissance.
Night Main Targets South Wales.
Weather Showers and bright intervals. Cloud in Straits, Channel and Estuary.(1)
With the continuing rain and cloud air activity was confined to small scale but wide spread attacks. Several attacks were made on metropolitan London with some of the raiders being forced to jettison their bomb loads over the suburbs as they tried to escape attack from RAF fighters. Once again Fighter Command flew almost five hundred sorties, definitely destroying six enemy aircraft and damaging a dozen more. This low level od success of only about one percent of sorties resulting in the destruction of an enemy aircraft with maybe a further two percent of sorties resulting in damage to the enemy might seam very low to the casual observer, or those hunkered down in a shelter but was actually a remarkable achievement in the prevailing conditions.
The night again saw the Luftwaffe once more attacking South Wales and the midlands. As on the previous night the night-fighters managed to score a few success despite the conditions favouring the intruders.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
Day Goring again confers. Isolated Raids on Britain, Heavy Reconnaissance activity.
Night Widespread harassing Raids. Minelaying
Weather Mainly Cloudy. Occasional showers in the East. (1)
After the massive efforts of the previous day coupled with the cloudy weather turning to rain later the day started quietly with the activity being confined to Luftwaffe photographic reconnaissance flights. Due to the cloud cover many of these sorties had to come in at a lower than optimum altitude resulting in a cat and mouse games as the RAF fighters were guide towards interceptions as the enemy aircraft dodged in and out of the clouds. One again the PPI/RDF system came to the fore demonstrating how director control of the fighters by the RDF operator cot out all the time lag of the Group and sector systems. So despite the cloud several Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft were hunted down and destroyed that morning. The high level photographic flights were also not getting away scot free as specially prepared Spitfires and Reapers challenged them at ever higher altitudes with some success.
Shortly after noon RDF detected some sixty or more hostile aircraft flying over the channel between North Foreland and Dungeness at 20,000 feet. Just before one O’clock a force of some fifty further aircraft left Calais to attack Dover. The majority of this formation were Me 1009’s which escort some bombers as far as the southern suburbs of London. This set the pattern for the rest of the day with feints and probes covering attacks. The raids often numbering fifty or more aircraft were not pressed home and little damage was done.
The night times activities was a continuation of the Luftwaffe’s dislocation campaign, where wide spread penny packet raids caused at times for over seventy five percent of the country to at yellow or red air raid status.
Having flown some four hundred sorties through the day Fighter Command accounted for eight enemy aircraft for the loss of three of their own aircraft whilst one pilot was killed, one wounded and the other escaping unhurt.
Tuesday August the 20th
Day Scattered raids in morning. Kent and Essex airfields attacked in afternoon.
Night Negligible activity. One or two raids in south-west.
Weather Cloudy Generally, rain spreading from north. Channel mainly fine. (1)
Due to the distinctly autumnal weather there was little Luftwaffe activity in the morning, though pin prick raids were made on Cheltenham, Southwold and Oxford. Of more significance, as far as Dowding, Park and their Staffs were concerned were the reconnaissance flights that visited no less than six of Eleven Groups air fields covering the full arc around north London. The stations overflown were, Northolt in the west of London, Hatfield and Duxford to the north, Debden and North Weald to the north east and finally Hornchurch to the east. Once again the still smoking oil tanks at Pembroke Docks attracted yet more bombs. Despite the poor weather the balloon barrage at Dover was once more attacked as were the airfields at West Malling, Manston and East church. Even with a dozen fighter squadrons being scrambled few conclusive engagements took place, Despite flying a total of over four hundred sorties, on what was considered by the controllers a quite day only eight enemy aircraft were destroyed for the loss of two.
The night was one of the quietest for a long time with just a few single intruders off the south west coast. Here the PPI/RDF stations at Newford, Tkeleaver, Salcombe and Exminster working with the Beufighter NF’s based at Filton finally manged to vector several fighters onto any intruder that strayed high enough to appear above the ground/sea clutter on the PPI screens. Of the three successful interceptions that night one was confirmed as a kill when the burning enemy aircraft was observed to hit the sea off Start Point light house, the other two could only be listed as a probable and a damaged.
Wednesday August the 21st. (1)
Day Small raids in the east and south. Targets airfields.
Night Slight activity, some in Scotland.
Weather Cloudy, Occasional rain.
The continuing inclement weather precluded the Luftwaffe from staging any large scale attacks but nuisance raids of single aircraft or small formations were staged. Principle targets airfields in a swath from Cornwall all the way round the south and south-east England as far north as Coltishall in East Anglia. Concurrently feints or raids were also wide spread with Pembroke in west wales being the most north-westerly target and Grimsby being the furthest north-east. These divers raids in the prevailing weather conditions were extremely difficult to counter but during the day Fighter Command downed no less than sixteen enemy aircraft for the loss on one in a total of around six hundred sorties.
The night saw relatively few intrusions or attacks by the Luftwaffe.
Thursday August the 22nd
Day Shipping reconnaissance and attacks on two channel convoys.
Night Increased activity. Industrial Targets in Midlands, north and west. Minelaying
Weather Cloudy and squally. (1)
The convoy ‘Totem’ in the Dover Straits reported being bomb at nine o’clock, this turned out however to be shell fire from the newly established German batteries at Cape Gris Nez. In an hour and twenty minutes a hundred rounds were observed without a single hit or in fact any material damage to the convoy. With the guns proving ineffectual the Luftwaffe had a go at the convoy around one o’clock. Eleven group responded with two squadrons that successfully drove the attackers off. The rest of the day was quite until the early evening Dover and Manston were again struck by low level hit and run attacks.
Once again despite the inclement weather Fighter Command flew over five hundred sorties with disappointing results only down six enemy aircraft whilst losing four of their own.
The night sky was busy with Luftwaffe bomber flying their now familiar nuisance and diversion raids. Filton was attacked and the Bristol works damaged. The night fighters despite the difficult conditions continue to exact a slow but steady toll of the raiders.
Friday August the 23rd
Day Single raids in the south. Reconnaissance.
Night Main Targets South Wales.
Weather Showers and bright intervals. Cloud in Straits, Channel and Estuary.(1)
With the continuing rain and cloud air activity was confined to small scale but wide spread attacks. Several attacks were made on metropolitan London with some of the raiders being forced to jettison their bomb loads over the suburbs as they tried to escape attack from RAF fighters. Once again Fighter Command flew almost five hundred sorties, definitely destroying six enemy aircraft and damaging a dozen more. This low level od success of only about one percent of sorties resulting in the destruction of an enemy aircraft with maybe a further two percent of sorties resulting in damage to the enemy might seam very low to the casual observer, or those hunkered down in a shelter but was actually a remarkable achievement in the prevailing conditions.
The night again saw the Luftwaffe once more attacking South Wales and the midlands. As on the previous night the night-fighters managed to score a few success despite the conditions favouring the intruders.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
10.17 More Noise Off (and Conflict On) The Ground
10. 17 More noise of and conflict on the ground.
On the ‘other side of the Hill’ the Luftwaffe was taking stock. Goering had reason to be concerned despite what the propaganda might say in the period from and including the 15th to 18th of August had lost no less than 200 aircraft and crew. That was an average of fifty a day, a loss level that could not be sustained for long. The estimates of the losses to the RAF particularly in fighters was predicting a collapse in the defence with just one more big push. On the 19th of August Goering had held another conference at Karinhall.
At this meeting of the Fighter leaders Goring made the following statement regarding the Luftwaffes intentions:
‘Until further notice the main task of the Luftflotten 2 and 3 will be to inflict the Utmost Damage possible on the enemy fighter forces. With this are to be combined attacks on the ground organisation of the enemy bombers conducted, however, in such a manner as to avoid all unnecessary losses’ (1)
Goering blamed the rising bomber losses on a ‘lack of offensive spirit’ on behalf of the fighter escorts. This ignored the failure of the Me 110 in the escort role (in fact the Me110’s needed their own fighter escort) and the severe limitations put on the escorting Me 109’s by their very restricted range. Once again Goering was laying the blame on the operational units rather than the Luftwaffe higher command and their planning staff. To counter this dressing down Goering promoted two of the new generation of ‘Ace’ pilots to each command a fighter Gruppe. So it was that Molders and Galland would return to France with even more weight on their shoulders. With the remains of Luftflotte five arriving in France from Scandinavia, the decision was taken to move all the short range fighters currently with Luftflotte 2 into the Pas de Calais. To increase the pressure on the RAF when conditions were suitable single aircraft would carryout hit and run disruption attacks on both airfields and aircraft production facilities.
Near midnight on Friday the 23rd of August Sir Phillip had returned to the Air Ministry from a late sitting in the House (of Parliament) in a foul mood, having a Squadron Leader disobeying the instruction of the sector controller was bad enough but for Sir Phillip to be bearded on the matter in the lobby of parliament by an MP was just to much. The MP was a serving officer in the RAF and happened to be the Squadron Adjutant of the Squadron Leader in question and that he should presume that he could use his privileged position as an MP to influence the outcome of a possible court-martial was beyond the pale. The fact that Flight Leader Peter Macdonald, the MP in question had worked with Sir Phillip as his parliamentary private secretary for over a year in the late 1920’s just made the presumption worse.
As if this was not bad enough, to add insult to injury Sir Philip had spotted Peter Macdonald in deep discussion with another MP in the lobby of the House, a certain Harold Balfour, who as the Under-Secretary of State for Air should have owed his loyalty to Sir Phillip and the Air Ministry, and not be conspiring to undermine the discipline of the RAF by supporting a fellow MP in trying to protect a mutinous officer.
Well Sir Phillip had informed Peter Macdonald in no uncertain terms that the charges faced by the Squadron Leader were a matter for his commanding officer and Sir Phillip had no mandate to interfere. The fact that Balfour was playing politics at this time of national crises had really got Sir Phillip riled. Even with the needs to keep the peace within the Wartime Coalition government a quick word in Churchills ear as they sat on the front bench in the House had sufficed and Balfour would be out of the AM by the morning.
As for Peter Macdonald, who’s nick name of ‘Boozey Mac’ was well earned , well there was a requirement for good administrators and squadron officers in the far east at the moment. A quick word with the chief whip had got Peter Macdonald paired with another MP from the Labour party who was also being sent overseas so that particular problem had been resolved. Now it was up to Sir Keith Parks and Sir Hugh Dowding to deal with Squadron leader Bader.
Here the Commanders of Fighter Command had a dilemma, The whole defence system constructed by Fighter Command was dependant upon the fighting formations following the instructions of the controllers, That was why it was called ‘Ground Controlled Interception’ and the fighting of the previous weeks had shown beyond all doubt that the system worked. Simple comparison of the outcome of air engagements since the war began where the defending fighters did not have such a system, Poland, The Netherlands, Belguim and France for instance, with the current performance of Fighter Command clearly showed that the system was working. So the breaking of the discipline required for the system to work was a major concern. However was a Court-martial of a charismatic and inspirational Squadron leader in the best interest of the service and the nation.
Nobody could deny Bader’s fighting spirit and that he had revitalised 242 Squadron since he had taken command. Removing their commanding Officers and court-martialling him would in all likelihood shatter that squadrons moral and render it a liability rather than an asset to Fighter Command which would be counter productive. At this point in the battle every squadron and every skilled pilot was invaluable. So what to do, that was a question that had been vexing Sir Keith Park as Bader’s Group Commander. His solution was simple, after Bader was given a dressing down at Uxbridge which had rattled the windows in Stanmore, he was temporarily assigned to be an assistant controller at Eleven Group's underground control room. Sir Keith hoped that looking at the other side of the mirror might give Bader a chance to reflect and reform his views on modern fighter combat. Hopefully when he returned to Squadron service he would follow orders. If not Sir Keith had made it quite clear that Douglass Bader would face full weight of a wartime court-martial. Meanwhile 242 squadron were assigned another commanding officer.
Park did not need distractions like bloody Bader, he had enough problems trying to preserve his command and the defeat the German attacks to that end with the weather lull Sir Keith took the opportunity to issue his instruction number four to his controllers to take account of the changing situation. This instruction was intended to reinforce the policy that every attack from the Luftwaffe would be opposed and no target would be bombed with impunity so it read:
(A) Despatch fighters to engage large enemy formations over land or within gliding distance of the coast. During the next two or three weks we cannot afford to lose pilots through forced landings in the sea. (Protection of all convoys and shipping in the Thames Estuary are excluded from this paragraph.)
(B) Avoid sending fighters over the sea to chase reconnaissance aircraft or small formations of enemy fighters.
(C) Despatch pairs of fighters under PPI/GC to intercept single reconnaissance aircraft that come inland. If clouds are favourable, put a patrol of one or two fighters over an aerodrome which the enemy aircraft are approaching in clouds.
(D) Against mass attacks coming inland despatch a minimum number of squadrons to engage enemy fighters. Our main object is to engage enemy bombers, particularly those approaching under the lowest cloud layer.
(E) If all our squadrons around London are off the ground engaging enemy mass attacks, ask No. 12 Group or command controllers to provide squadrons to patrol aerodromes, Duxford, Debden, North Weald, Hornchurch.
(F) If heavy attacks have crossed the coast and are proceeding towards aerodromes, put a squadron, or even the sector training flight, to patrol under clods over each sector aerodrome.(2)
These instructions were intended to afford as much protection as was possible to the vital sector stations and to account for the changing enemy tactics. If the Luftwaffe changed its operations again then Park would have to adapt his defence to counter them. What the Luftwaffe would do next once the weather cleared was a major concern for all.
(1) Quoted verbatim from OTL as in ‘The Narrow Margin’ page 177.
(2) Adapted from OTL as in the ‘Narrow Margin’.
On the ‘other side of the Hill’ the Luftwaffe was taking stock. Goering had reason to be concerned despite what the propaganda might say in the period from and including the 15th to 18th of August had lost no less than 200 aircraft and crew. That was an average of fifty a day, a loss level that could not be sustained for long. The estimates of the losses to the RAF particularly in fighters was predicting a collapse in the defence with just one more big push. On the 19th of August Goering had held another conference at Karinhall.
At this meeting of the Fighter leaders Goring made the following statement regarding the Luftwaffes intentions:
‘Until further notice the main task of the Luftflotten 2 and 3 will be to inflict the Utmost Damage possible on the enemy fighter forces. With this are to be combined attacks on the ground organisation of the enemy bombers conducted, however, in such a manner as to avoid all unnecessary losses’ (1)
Goering blamed the rising bomber losses on a ‘lack of offensive spirit’ on behalf of the fighter escorts. This ignored the failure of the Me 110 in the escort role (in fact the Me110’s needed their own fighter escort) and the severe limitations put on the escorting Me 109’s by their very restricted range. Once again Goering was laying the blame on the operational units rather than the Luftwaffe higher command and their planning staff. To counter this dressing down Goering promoted two of the new generation of ‘Ace’ pilots to each command a fighter Gruppe. So it was that Molders and Galland would return to France with even more weight on their shoulders. With the remains of Luftflotte five arriving in France from Scandinavia, the decision was taken to move all the short range fighters currently with Luftflotte 2 into the Pas de Calais. To increase the pressure on the RAF when conditions were suitable single aircraft would carryout hit and run disruption attacks on both airfields and aircraft production facilities.
Near midnight on Friday the 23rd of August Sir Phillip had returned to the Air Ministry from a late sitting in the House (of Parliament) in a foul mood, having a Squadron Leader disobeying the instruction of the sector controller was bad enough but for Sir Phillip to be bearded on the matter in the lobby of parliament by an MP was just to much. The MP was a serving officer in the RAF and happened to be the Squadron Adjutant of the Squadron Leader in question and that he should presume that he could use his privileged position as an MP to influence the outcome of a possible court-martial was beyond the pale. The fact that Flight Leader Peter Macdonald, the MP in question had worked with Sir Phillip as his parliamentary private secretary for over a year in the late 1920’s just made the presumption worse.
As if this was not bad enough, to add insult to injury Sir Philip had spotted Peter Macdonald in deep discussion with another MP in the lobby of the House, a certain Harold Balfour, who as the Under-Secretary of State for Air should have owed his loyalty to Sir Phillip and the Air Ministry, and not be conspiring to undermine the discipline of the RAF by supporting a fellow MP in trying to protect a mutinous officer.
Well Sir Phillip had informed Peter Macdonald in no uncertain terms that the charges faced by the Squadron Leader were a matter for his commanding officer and Sir Phillip had no mandate to interfere. The fact that Balfour was playing politics at this time of national crises had really got Sir Phillip riled. Even with the needs to keep the peace within the Wartime Coalition government a quick word in Churchills ear as they sat on the front bench in the House had sufficed and Balfour would be out of the AM by the morning.
As for Peter Macdonald, who’s nick name of ‘Boozey Mac’ was well earned , well there was a requirement for good administrators and squadron officers in the far east at the moment. A quick word with the chief whip had got Peter Macdonald paired with another MP from the Labour party who was also being sent overseas so that particular problem had been resolved. Now it was up to Sir Keith Parks and Sir Hugh Dowding to deal with Squadron leader Bader.
Here the Commanders of Fighter Command had a dilemma, The whole defence system constructed by Fighter Command was dependant upon the fighting formations following the instructions of the controllers, That was why it was called ‘Ground Controlled Interception’ and the fighting of the previous weeks had shown beyond all doubt that the system worked. Simple comparison of the outcome of air engagements since the war began where the defending fighters did not have such a system, Poland, The Netherlands, Belguim and France for instance, with the current performance of Fighter Command clearly showed that the system was working. So the breaking of the discipline required for the system to work was a major concern. However was a Court-martial of a charismatic and inspirational Squadron leader in the best interest of the service and the nation.
Nobody could deny Bader’s fighting spirit and that he had revitalised 242 Squadron since he had taken command. Removing their commanding Officers and court-martialling him would in all likelihood shatter that squadrons moral and render it a liability rather than an asset to Fighter Command which would be counter productive. At this point in the battle every squadron and every skilled pilot was invaluable. So what to do, that was a question that had been vexing Sir Keith Park as Bader’s Group Commander. His solution was simple, after Bader was given a dressing down at Uxbridge which had rattled the windows in Stanmore, he was temporarily assigned to be an assistant controller at Eleven Group's underground control room. Sir Keith hoped that looking at the other side of the mirror might give Bader a chance to reflect and reform his views on modern fighter combat. Hopefully when he returned to Squadron service he would follow orders. If not Sir Keith had made it quite clear that Douglass Bader would face full weight of a wartime court-martial. Meanwhile 242 squadron were assigned another commanding officer.
Park did not need distractions like bloody Bader, he had enough problems trying to preserve his command and the defeat the German attacks to that end with the weather lull Sir Keith took the opportunity to issue his instruction number four to his controllers to take account of the changing situation. This instruction was intended to reinforce the policy that every attack from the Luftwaffe would be opposed and no target would be bombed with impunity so it read:
(A) Despatch fighters to engage large enemy formations over land or within gliding distance of the coast. During the next two or three weks we cannot afford to lose pilots through forced landings in the sea. (Protection of all convoys and shipping in the Thames Estuary are excluded from this paragraph.)
(B) Avoid sending fighters over the sea to chase reconnaissance aircraft or small formations of enemy fighters.
(C) Despatch pairs of fighters under PPI/GC to intercept single reconnaissance aircraft that come inland. If clouds are favourable, put a patrol of one or two fighters over an aerodrome which the enemy aircraft are approaching in clouds.
(D) Against mass attacks coming inland despatch a minimum number of squadrons to engage enemy fighters. Our main object is to engage enemy bombers, particularly those approaching under the lowest cloud layer.
(E) If all our squadrons around London are off the ground engaging enemy mass attacks, ask No. 12 Group or command controllers to provide squadrons to patrol aerodromes, Duxford, Debden, North Weald, Hornchurch.
(F) If heavy attacks have crossed the coast and are proceeding towards aerodromes, put a squadron, or even the sector training flight, to patrol under clods over each sector aerodrome.(2)
These instructions were intended to afford as much protection as was possible to the vital sector stations and to account for the changing enemy tactics. If the Luftwaffe changed its operations again then Park would have to adapt his defence to counter them. What the Luftwaffe would do next once the weather cleared was a major concern for all.
(1) Quoted verbatim from OTL as in ‘The Narrow Margin’ page 177.
(2) Adapted from OTL as in the ‘Narrow Margin’.