10.09 Serious damage and real concern for the future.
Of all the days that Winston Churchill in his combined roll as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence could have chosen to visit the Headquarters of Fighter Command, he had to chose this day; when the Luftwaffe had mounted it’s largest aerial assault yet to test and try the air defences of Great Britain. As Air Minister and War Cabinet member, Sir Phillip had also been in attendance at Fighter Command headquarters for the day. His primary concern, other than managing Churchill’s expectations, was to ensure as little interference into the daily operations of the command as possible. Sholto Douglass also took the opportunity to make his presence felt as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, a post he had only held since April, prior to which he had been assistant CAS and before that had been Director of Staff Duties. It was whilst Sholto Douglass was the Director of Staff Duties, that he and Sir Phillip had first locked horns in the period of 1936 through to 1938, over the treatment of Sir Hugh Dowding and his impending retirement from the active RAF. Sholto Douglas had not actually held an operational post since the Great War and had become the consummate staff officer and civil service manipulator. Now with Newall basically invisible and ineffective, as assistant CAS Sholto was out to promote his own prowess and this certainly did not impress Sir Phillip one jot.
On the other hand, the quiet competence of Sir Douglas Claude Strathern Evill as Dowding’s Senior Staff Officer had always met with Sir Phillips appreciation, as had his working relationship with both of the Dowding brothers in forging a good working relationship with the FAA at the highest level. As an ex-RN officer, he was one of a handful of senior RAF officers who had transferred from the RNAS when the RAF had been formed in 1918 and had remained interested in naval aviation.
As the evening wore on and more and more reports were received at the Air Ministry, Sir Phillip’s concerns increased, for the day’s action had spread far and wide over the Fighter Command Groups. The only Group not to engage in major combat was 14 Group, who’s commander was voicing his dismay that his group had only been faced with the occasional high flying intruder bent on stealing a photographic look at a place of interest. In the South, Eleven Group had been hard pressed at times and for a short period in the afternoon had every single operational squadron under its command committed to the fray. Here the co-operation and interdependency of the Groups as well as the handling of the ‘Bigger Picture’ by the Fighter Command headquarters at Bentley Priory really illustrated the strengths and adaptability the system devised and built under Sir Hugh Dowding’s stewardship.
Sir Phillip and Strathern Evill had quietly explained the strategic thinking and the operational tactics being used by Sir Hugh Dowding to frustrate the Luftwaffe. Two salient points in the day became apparent to the Prime Minister: these were, firstly that Dowding through Sir Keith Park, along with the other Group commanders was determined to oppose every attack before it reached its target and thereby not give the Luftwaffe bombers any easy missions. Secondly’ that it was essential not to over commit forces against any single raid and thereby leave insufficient squadrons to oppose another assault separated by either geography, time or a combination of these. The perils of this situation arising was clearly illustrated during the afternoon when Luftflotte three had attacked the north of England whilst the other German Luftflottes stretched Eleven Group to the absolute limit of its resources. The coordination and cooperation between the Groups was a component of the days conflict that had a marked impression upon Churchill.
The importance of the combined information from the GCI stations giving accurate almost real time plotting of both enemy and friendly aircraft over the bulk of the British Isle, joined with the ability of the Observer Corps to advise on the type and number of aircraft in any given raid, weather and time permitting of course, was today made self-evident. The subsequent analysis of the day’s actions by both operational research at Bentley Priory and the Air Ministry linked with the Intelligence and after action reports meant much would be learnt.
However, all of that would take time and time was something Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh were playing for as they knew that they had only a few precious hours to prepare for the next onslaught by the Luftwaffe, expected the following day. The intelligence services were striving as hard as they could to see beyond ‘the hill’ and divine the enemies’ intentions but at the moment there was precious little hard information that they could give. Signal intelligence from the Y Station intercepts by the still hush hush process of Signal Analysis was the most useful single source of information to Dowding’s planning staff at the current time.
Of the day’s events, several were causing Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh Dowding particular angst. This was primarily the attack on the RDF sites and on the sector stations. Damage to these though disruptive had not yet become critical. Though if the Luftwaffe continued to hit the vulnerable south coast RDF stations and concentrated on the vital sector stations, the situation could quickly deteriorate. In an attempt to lessen the impact that the loss of a sector station would have, Sir Keith Park had been having Eleven Group controllers practicing using the CGI stations to control fighters directly as an alternative to giving instructions via the sector stations. One unintended consequence of these trials had been the realisation that the GCI stations could actually handle more squadrons and guide them in real time to interceptions than the sector station controllers were able to do.
Recently, Sir Phillip had discussions with Sir Hugh and agreed that placing the sector control rooms actually at the sector stations had proven to be a mistake and that as soon as possible they would be moved off the RAF stations to dedicated hardened locations. Though of course this was rather a case of shutting the stable door.
The other factor really exercising the Air Ministry and RAF Fighter Command at this juncture of the current battle was the situation regarding fighter pilots. Whilst the flying schools and OTU’s were doing their utmost to produce the necessary replacement pilots, the quality of the pilots was inevitably decreasing as the more experienced pre-war cadre was whittled away. Sir Phillip daily counted the reports of pilots saved from death and debilitating injury by the armour plate and self-sealing fuel tanks that were now factory fitted in every new fighter. Adding to this was the increasing number of pilots plucked from the waters around the shores of Britain and he daily gave thanks to the Air Sea Rescue Service and others who were returning so many pilots to the battle.
In fact, that evening Sir Phillip had the pleasant personal task of signing an Official Air Ministry Letter of Commendation and thanks to a certain Miss Prince, who on the early morning of the fourteenth of August had sallied forth in a small canoe into the Channel to rescue one of the crew of a Bomber Command Blenheim that had ditched as it returned from the raid on Turin. Fortunately, a fishing boat had also managed to rescue the other two crew members. Whilst approving of the efforts of Miss Prince, the same could not be said of the current head of Bomber Command. As far as Sir Phillip was concerned, Portal was getting his priorities all wrong, sending a handful of Blenheim bombers carrying an insignificant bombload all the way to Italy to attack what were currently irrelevant aircraft factories. This was in Sir Phillip’s view a gross error of judgement whilst there were invasion barges and Luftwaffe airfields just across the channel to be attacked that were at this juncture far more important targets for Britain’s survival. So it was mixed thoughts that Sir Phillip finally left the Air Ministry for the night. On one hand hew was impatient to read the more detailed reports of the days air fighting and to look at the analysis provided by his tame boffins. On the other hand he was very concerned that if tomorrow brought the Luftwaffe in such force again, especially against Eleven Group then the system might break. With Churchill intending to visit Sir Keith Park at his Group Headquarters the next day it would only add to the pressure.