OTL the Manchester was also horribly unreliable and the Monarch was overly complex and broke down a lot.
AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
OTL the Manchester was also horribly unreliable and the Monarch was overly complex and broke down a lot.
OTL the Monarch lacked development due to partly due to Richard Fairey's previous history with the AM and Engines. ITTL the Monarch is maturing as a specialised engine and is in late 1940 capable of a max power of 2,200hp on 100 octane fuel. ITTL due to demand for the Monarch for the Blackburn B-20, Hawker Tornado and the Short Stirling, all competing with the Manchester Chadwick is working on the four engine Manchester as Merlin production is being increased as in OTL.
As to Bomber Command becoming an all Lancaster force ITTL, that is unlikely in the circumstances.
As to Bomber Command becoming an all Lancaster force ITTL, that is unlikely in the circumstances.
Why? If they are aiming for a smaller force the argument to keep the Halifax in production because the switchover would cost too much time, which was weak in OTL is even weaker and in OTL the RAF eventually recognised that the Stirling wasn't viable over Germany. That leaves Mosquito's for the Pathfinders and Lancs for the heavy squadrons.
ITTL The Bomber Command Version of the Stirling is a very capable aircraft and certainly up to 1942/43 will be evry bit as effective as the Lancaster. The OTL Stirling also had the disadvantage of having a longitudinally divided bomb bay that artificially limited the diameter of bomb that could be carried. ITTL the Stirling an open Bombay capable of carrying OTL 4000, 8,000 and even the giant 12,000Lb cookie. Even the PAM does not always through a double six first time!
11.06 Operation MB8: Whose Mare Nostrum Is It?
Operation MB8. Who’s ‘Mare Nostrum’ is it?
When Sir Hugh and Sir Philip sat down to discuss the naval operation MB8, Sir Hugh ventured that the Naval plan seemed very complicated if not overly so. Would adding the resupply of Hurricanes to Malta the final straw? A conference was quickly organised at the Admiralty to finalise the RAF part of the plan. At the start of the briefing Admiral Sir Arthur Dowding explained the objectives of all the interlinked operations and how they formed a diversion or smoke screen for the main objective, of an attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto.
The plan had originated during the Abyssinian crisis of the mid nineteen thirties and had been regularly updated. The aircraft carrier Glorious and her air group of Fairey Swordfish had trained and practised for the attack in 1939. Since the entry of Italy into the war in Late June the RN had been preparing to carry out the plan. With the Italians sending regular supply convoys to Italian North Africa the Italian fleet based in Taranto had been reinforced and was acting as a ‘fleet in being’ and thus tying down valuable RN resources that were needed elseware. With Operation Compass being planned to start in December the time to strike would be in the correct moon phase in mid November. As part of the deception plan the Navy were keen to do a major aircraft re supply run to Malta. Three aircraft carriers seen filling their decks with land planes in Gibraltar, by the Germans Spanish friends meant they were highly unlikely to be part of an attack on the Italian fleet!
Aircraft resupply trips into the Mediterranean had become known as ‘Club Runs’ and this was planned to be the largest yet. With Glorious, Courageous and Furious all participating in what was known as Operation White. This would deliver some eighty four Hurricanes in one go. Courageous and Glorious would carry their full complement of Folland Fighters and Fairey Albacores. Furious would retain only six of her Follond falcon fighters for self defence and they would only be usable once all the Hurricanes had flown off.
Operation MB8 would now consist of seven interlink elements, these being,
Operation White, Glorious, Courageous and Furious, delivering aircraft to Malta.
Operation Coat, reinforcement convoy to Malta. The convoy includes the battleship HMS Barham and the heavy cruisers HMS Glasgow and Berwick. They are accompanied by HMS Ark Royal.
Convoy MW 3 Three empty merchant men bound for Malta then sailed on the 4th November arriving 10th November escort including cruiser HMS Coventry
Convoy ME 3 Four Merchant ships in ballast with heavy escort, Including Battleship HMS Ramillies and HMS Coventry Sails on the 11th November from Malta arrives Alexandria 13th November
Convoy AN6 Four slow tankers to Greece escort includes Cruisers HMS Ajax and HMAS Sydney as force B delivering materials and men to Crete. HMS Orion a light cruiser carrying RAF personnel to Greece forms Force C, on the night 11/12 November force B and C will combine as force X and make an offensive foray into the Otranto Strait.
Operation Crack, Aircraft from HMS Courageous, HMS Glorious and HMS Furious Attack airfields and Facilities around Cagliari on Sardinia as they return to Gibraltar form operation White
Operation Judgement. Consisting of the carrier HMS Illustrious, with the battleships HMS Warspite, Valiant and Malay were to be joined by the battleship HMS Ramallies from convoy ME 3 and the heavy cruisers HMS Glouster and York plus three destroyers from Convoy MW 3. The final element of the operation Judgement force would be the Aircraft Carrier HMS Ark Royal joining from operation Coat.
The Three aircraft carriers taking part in operation White would leave Gibraltar after the Operation Coat Convoy and catch up with it before Cape Bone. Here it would come under the protection of aircraft from Ark Royal whilst the RAF fighters were flown off to Malta. Once their decks were clear Furious, Courageous and Glorious would provide air cover for the Operation Coat Convoy until Malta based aircraft could take over.
This would permit Ark Royal to team south and east around Malta to join operation Judgement.
Furious would cross deck some Fairey Albacores from both Courageous and Glorious so that when they had finished providing air cover to Operation Coat they could launch bigger strike more quickly to hit the airfield and other facilities at Cagilari on Sicily. To further cause the Italians confusion the Aircraft attacking Cagilari would bear squadrons codes for HMS, Ark Royal, Courageous, and Glorious.
Despite the maritime ballet required and the complication of movement each element served a purpose and made the core of the entire enterprise, the attack on Taranto possible.
That attack would be undertaken by Twenty four albacores flying from HMS Invincible and a further twenty four from Ark Royal. Twelve aircraft from each carrier would comprise the first wave. Six would carry torpedoes , two would carry flares and four bombs of 250lb each. The final four would carry one fifteen hundred pound ‘longbow bomb’. This long thin bomb that fits in place of an 18 inch torpedo and had an explosive content of fifty percent. Though not designed to be armoured piercing it has a relatively thick nose casing and has dual fusing, having both time delay and solvent fuses. In operation Judgement it was intended that with the shallow sea bed a near miss with a ‘Longbow’ would do nearly as much damage as a direct hit by stoving in the hull. Ark Royal’s torpedo aircraft would attack from the northwest of the harbour and Invincible, aircraft from the south west. The latest photographic reconnaissance picture showed all six Italian Battles ships anchored in a group in the Mar Grand close to Taranto town with three heavy cruises lying together further offshore.
Flares would be dropped on the east of the Mar Grand. The flare droppers then using their two hundred and fifty bound bombs to attack the oil storage tanks. The eight other bomb carrying aircraft were detailed to attack the heavy cruisers in the Mar Grand and Mar Piccilo First wave torpedo aircraft were instructed to attack the six battle ships in the Mar Grand as their primary target. Each pair was assigned a ship to attack identified by its location from the latest reconnaissance photographs.
The second wave scheduled to arrive half an hour later had the same composition but slightly different instructions. Their primary target s were any undamaged Battle ships, secondary targets were the heavy cruisers. The flare dropping aircraft had the same instructions as the first wave. The four aircraft from each carrier carrying ‘Longbow’ bombs were given the destroyer and light cruiser trots in the Mar Piccolo as their primary target and the docks as their secondary one.
Discussing all this with Sir Arthur , Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip asked what the navy wanted from the RAF. Sir Arthur suggested that an attack by the RAF Wellingtons dropping Aerial mines commencing just as the flare dropping air craft completed their runs could very well distract the Italians enough to improve the chances of the torpedo carrying aircraft. . There had been some discussion over whether the Aerial mine was the best ordinance for the job, whilst in its sea mine mode it could do serious damage to a battleship, the chances of one being triggered was slight and the falling mines might not really be noticed by the Italians and therefore provide little or no distraction. Sir Hugh suggested that the Wellingtons could carry two standard fifteen hundred pound Mk I-IV mines and that if half the bombers in each squadron carried a full load of mixed AP and HC bombs this would enhance the distraction and might obscure the location of the mines when dropped, this was agreed in principle with a second wave of two squadrons timed to arrive with the second wave of FAA aircraft carrying the same ordinance load.
The final decision was that the first RAF attack would use two thirds of the aircraft carrying five hundred pound bombs and the other four using Aerial Mines. The second wave would carry Aerial Mines only, with eight being tasked with mining the Mar Grand and the other four tasked with hitting the Mar Piccolo and the dock yard.
There had been some discussion as to whether the first two operational squadrons of RAF Bomber Command Stirlings could also make a worthwhile contribution. They had the range to do a shuttle attack from the UK to Egypt via Taranto and could deliver eight thousand pounds of ordinance. Whilst very tempting as an idea Sir Hugh, ventured that the Squadrons were not yet operationaly mature enough to carry out such a mission, even with the best navigation training and the use of the brand new mark fourteen bomb site the chance that they would hit anything of importance would be unlikely. Basically the potential losses were not proportional to the probable damage to the enemy.
Sir Arthur noted at this point that some FAA officers were predicting losses of around fifty percent in this attack. However he was of the opinion that two squadrons of Wellingtons flying from Malta and two squadrons flying from bases in Egypt would be a significant addition to the alarm and despondency caused the Italian Navy by this operation. The attack on Taranto had originally been planned for Trafalgar day on the twenty first of October but the entire operation had been delayed due to problems with the dropping of torpedoes in such shallow water using the Albacore aircraft. When the attack was first muted the FAA torpedo aircraft was the Swordfish, the torpedoes had been modified for dropping from the Swordfish. When the Albacore replaced it and new tests on shallow water torpedo dropping had been carried out on a live torpedo training run the majority of the torpedoes struck bottom causing a hasty redesign of the additional appendages used for shallow water drops and an enforced delay of the attack date.
Both Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip had followed the opening gambits of Operation MB8 with great interest and some trepidation. When the bulk of the Hurricanes arrived safely on Malta there were audible sighs of relieve.
On the Morning of the twelve of November Sir Hugh was relieved to get the casualty returns from the four squadrons involved in operation Judgement, Only two aircraft had been lost on the operation. One had aborted on the way to the target due to engine problems and one other been written off in a bad landing on Malta. Stone walls and Wellington bombers do not make for a good ending. All in all not as bad as Sir Hugh had thought probable. As to the FAA He had not yet heard from the Admiralty and the reconnaissance Maryland from Malta had not yet returned.
Late on the twelve Sir Hugh Dowding was informed of the triumph of the navy at Taranto. Basically the heavy units of the Italian navy had been wiped out as a fighting force for some time. Initial analysis of the reconnaissance photographs from Malta had indicated that of the six battle ships anchored in the Mar Grand at Taranto, One was capsized, one was awash and listing heavily to port. Another was heavily down by the bow and aground. Of the other three two were surrounded by large oil slicks and appeared either to be bottomed by counter flooding or riding very deep. The last one appeared to be undamaged though the photo interpretation people were waiting for prints to arrive in the UK as they were intrigued by the shadows cast by this ship in the early morning light. Off the three heavy cruisers in the outer harbour, one showed serious bomb damage aft and another one was listing to starboard, the third appeared untouched. In the Mar Piccolo damage assessment was made difficult by palls of smoke rising from the dock yard and the vicinity of the Destroyer trots. In any event it was an amazing result and no doubt Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip would hear the full story in due course. Sir Hugh had enquired of his brother how bad the losses were, with an audible smile in his voice Sir Arthur replied that only five aircraft of the forty five that actually took part in the raid had been lost and there was a good chance that some of the fifteen missing airman had survived.
The icing on the cake was that force X had intercepted an Italian convoy in the straits of Otranto and had sunk all four of the merchant ships in it and one of the escort without receiving any significant damage in response.
Later intelligence analysis would clarify just how much damage the Italian ships had suffered but on an initial perusal, the photographs led the Admiralty to the conclusion that they had total superiority in the Mediterranean for a least three to four months and that as many convoys as possible should be pushed though to both supply Malta and to transit the Mediterranean so as to hurry supplies and materials to Egypt to support operation Compass.
Analysing the effectiveness of the four Wellington Squadrons was more difficult. However in Both Malta and Egypt senior FAA officers visited the Squadrons involved with sufficient naval rum for enough tots to well and truly splice the Main Brace.
When Sir Hugh and Sir Philip sat down to discuss the naval operation MB8, Sir Hugh ventured that the Naval plan seemed very complicated if not overly so. Would adding the resupply of Hurricanes to Malta the final straw? A conference was quickly organised at the Admiralty to finalise the RAF part of the plan. At the start of the briefing Admiral Sir Arthur Dowding explained the objectives of all the interlinked operations and how they formed a diversion or smoke screen for the main objective, of an attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto.
The plan had originated during the Abyssinian crisis of the mid nineteen thirties and had been regularly updated. The aircraft carrier Glorious and her air group of Fairey Swordfish had trained and practised for the attack in 1939. Since the entry of Italy into the war in Late June the RN had been preparing to carry out the plan. With the Italians sending regular supply convoys to Italian North Africa the Italian fleet based in Taranto had been reinforced and was acting as a ‘fleet in being’ and thus tying down valuable RN resources that were needed elseware. With Operation Compass being planned to start in December the time to strike would be in the correct moon phase in mid November. As part of the deception plan the Navy were keen to do a major aircraft re supply run to Malta. Three aircraft carriers seen filling their decks with land planes in Gibraltar, by the Germans Spanish friends meant they were highly unlikely to be part of an attack on the Italian fleet!
Aircraft resupply trips into the Mediterranean had become known as ‘Club Runs’ and this was planned to be the largest yet. With Glorious, Courageous and Furious all participating in what was known as Operation White. This would deliver some eighty four Hurricanes in one go. Courageous and Glorious would carry their full complement of Folland Fighters and Fairey Albacores. Furious would retain only six of her Follond falcon fighters for self defence and they would only be usable once all the Hurricanes had flown off.
Operation MB8 would now consist of seven interlink elements, these being,
Operation White, Glorious, Courageous and Furious, delivering aircraft to Malta.
Operation Coat, reinforcement convoy to Malta. The convoy includes the battleship HMS Barham and the heavy cruisers HMS Glasgow and Berwick. They are accompanied by HMS Ark Royal.
Convoy MW 3 Three empty merchant men bound for Malta then sailed on the 4th November arriving 10th November escort including cruiser HMS Coventry
Convoy ME 3 Four Merchant ships in ballast with heavy escort, Including Battleship HMS Ramillies and HMS Coventry Sails on the 11th November from Malta arrives Alexandria 13th November
Convoy AN6 Four slow tankers to Greece escort includes Cruisers HMS Ajax and HMAS Sydney as force B delivering materials and men to Crete. HMS Orion a light cruiser carrying RAF personnel to Greece forms Force C, on the night 11/12 November force B and C will combine as force X and make an offensive foray into the Otranto Strait.
Operation Crack, Aircraft from HMS Courageous, HMS Glorious and HMS Furious Attack airfields and Facilities around Cagliari on Sardinia as they return to Gibraltar form operation White
Operation Judgement. Consisting of the carrier HMS Illustrious, with the battleships HMS Warspite, Valiant and Malay were to be joined by the battleship HMS Ramallies from convoy ME 3 and the heavy cruisers HMS Glouster and York plus three destroyers from Convoy MW 3. The final element of the operation Judgement force would be the Aircraft Carrier HMS Ark Royal joining from operation Coat.
The Three aircraft carriers taking part in operation White would leave Gibraltar after the Operation Coat Convoy and catch up with it before Cape Bone. Here it would come under the protection of aircraft from Ark Royal whilst the RAF fighters were flown off to Malta. Once their decks were clear Furious, Courageous and Glorious would provide air cover for the Operation Coat Convoy until Malta based aircraft could take over.
This would permit Ark Royal to team south and east around Malta to join operation Judgement.
Furious would cross deck some Fairey Albacores from both Courageous and Glorious so that when they had finished providing air cover to Operation Coat they could launch bigger strike more quickly to hit the airfield and other facilities at Cagilari on Sicily. To further cause the Italians confusion the Aircraft attacking Cagilari would bear squadrons codes for HMS, Ark Royal, Courageous, and Glorious.
Despite the maritime ballet required and the complication of movement each element served a purpose and made the core of the entire enterprise, the attack on Taranto possible.
That attack would be undertaken by Twenty four albacores flying from HMS Invincible and a further twenty four from Ark Royal. Twelve aircraft from each carrier would comprise the first wave. Six would carry torpedoes , two would carry flares and four bombs of 250lb each. The final four would carry one fifteen hundred pound ‘longbow bomb’. This long thin bomb that fits in place of an 18 inch torpedo and had an explosive content of fifty percent. Though not designed to be armoured piercing it has a relatively thick nose casing and has dual fusing, having both time delay and solvent fuses. In operation Judgement it was intended that with the shallow sea bed a near miss with a ‘Longbow’ would do nearly as much damage as a direct hit by stoving in the hull. Ark Royal’s torpedo aircraft would attack from the northwest of the harbour and Invincible, aircraft from the south west. The latest photographic reconnaissance picture showed all six Italian Battles ships anchored in a group in the Mar Grand close to Taranto town with three heavy cruises lying together further offshore.
Flares would be dropped on the east of the Mar Grand. The flare droppers then using their two hundred and fifty bound bombs to attack the oil storage tanks. The eight other bomb carrying aircraft were detailed to attack the heavy cruisers in the Mar Grand and Mar Piccilo First wave torpedo aircraft were instructed to attack the six battle ships in the Mar Grand as their primary target. Each pair was assigned a ship to attack identified by its location from the latest reconnaissance photographs.
The second wave scheduled to arrive half an hour later had the same composition but slightly different instructions. Their primary target s were any undamaged Battle ships, secondary targets were the heavy cruisers. The flare dropping aircraft had the same instructions as the first wave. The four aircraft from each carrier carrying ‘Longbow’ bombs were given the destroyer and light cruiser trots in the Mar Piccolo as their primary target and the docks as their secondary one.
Discussing all this with Sir Arthur , Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip asked what the navy wanted from the RAF. Sir Arthur suggested that an attack by the RAF Wellingtons dropping Aerial mines commencing just as the flare dropping air craft completed their runs could very well distract the Italians enough to improve the chances of the torpedo carrying aircraft. . There had been some discussion over whether the Aerial mine was the best ordinance for the job, whilst in its sea mine mode it could do serious damage to a battleship, the chances of one being triggered was slight and the falling mines might not really be noticed by the Italians and therefore provide little or no distraction. Sir Hugh suggested that the Wellingtons could carry two standard fifteen hundred pound Mk I-IV mines and that if half the bombers in each squadron carried a full load of mixed AP and HC bombs this would enhance the distraction and might obscure the location of the mines when dropped, this was agreed in principle with a second wave of two squadrons timed to arrive with the second wave of FAA aircraft carrying the same ordinance load.
The final decision was that the first RAF attack would use two thirds of the aircraft carrying five hundred pound bombs and the other four using Aerial Mines. The second wave would carry Aerial Mines only, with eight being tasked with mining the Mar Grand and the other four tasked with hitting the Mar Piccolo and the dock yard.
There had been some discussion as to whether the first two operational squadrons of RAF Bomber Command Stirlings could also make a worthwhile contribution. They had the range to do a shuttle attack from the UK to Egypt via Taranto and could deliver eight thousand pounds of ordinance. Whilst very tempting as an idea Sir Hugh, ventured that the Squadrons were not yet operationaly mature enough to carry out such a mission, even with the best navigation training and the use of the brand new mark fourteen bomb site the chance that they would hit anything of importance would be unlikely. Basically the potential losses were not proportional to the probable damage to the enemy.
Sir Arthur noted at this point that some FAA officers were predicting losses of around fifty percent in this attack. However he was of the opinion that two squadrons of Wellingtons flying from Malta and two squadrons flying from bases in Egypt would be a significant addition to the alarm and despondency caused the Italian Navy by this operation. The attack on Taranto had originally been planned for Trafalgar day on the twenty first of October but the entire operation had been delayed due to problems with the dropping of torpedoes in such shallow water using the Albacore aircraft. When the attack was first muted the FAA torpedo aircraft was the Swordfish, the torpedoes had been modified for dropping from the Swordfish. When the Albacore replaced it and new tests on shallow water torpedo dropping had been carried out on a live torpedo training run the majority of the torpedoes struck bottom causing a hasty redesign of the additional appendages used for shallow water drops and an enforced delay of the attack date.
Both Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip had followed the opening gambits of Operation MB8 with great interest and some trepidation. When the bulk of the Hurricanes arrived safely on Malta there were audible sighs of relieve.
On the Morning of the twelve of November Sir Hugh was relieved to get the casualty returns from the four squadrons involved in operation Judgement, Only two aircraft had been lost on the operation. One had aborted on the way to the target due to engine problems and one other been written off in a bad landing on Malta. Stone walls and Wellington bombers do not make for a good ending. All in all not as bad as Sir Hugh had thought probable. As to the FAA He had not yet heard from the Admiralty and the reconnaissance Maryland from Malta had not yet returned.
Late on the twelve Sir Hugh Dowding was informed of the triumph of the navy at Taranto. Basically the heavy units of the Italian navy had been wiped out as a fighting force for some time. Initial analysis of the reconnaissance photographs from Malta had indicated that of the six battle ships anchored in the Mar Grand at Taranto, One was capsized, one was awash and listing heavily to port. Another was heavily down by the bow and aground. Of the other three two were surrounded by large oil slicks and appeared either to be bottomed by counter flooding or riding very deep. The last one appeared to be undamaged though the photo interpretation people were waiting for prints to arrive in the UK as they were intrigued by the shadows cast by this ship in the early morning light. Off the three heavy cruisers in the outer harbour, one showed serious bomb damage aft and another one was listing to starboard, the third appeared untouched. In the Mar Piccolo damage assessment was made difficult by palls of smoke rising from the dock yard and the vicinity of the Destroyer trots. In any event it was an amazing result and no doubt Sir Hugh and Sir Phillip would hear the full story in due course. Sir Hugh had enquired of his brother how bad the losses were, with an audible smile in his voice Sir Arthur replied that only five aircraft of the forty five that actually took part in the raid had been lost and there was a good chance that some of the fifteen missing airman had survived.
The icing on the cake was that force X had intercepted an Italian convoy in the straits of Otranto and had sunk all four of the merchant ships in it and one of the escort without receiving any significant damage in response.
Later intelligence analysis would clarify just how much damage the Italian ships had suffered but on an initial perusal, the photographs led the Admiralty to the conclusion that they had total superiority in the Mediterranean for a least three to four months and that as many convoys as possible should be pushed though to both supply Malta and to transit the Mediterranean so as to hurry supplies and materials to Egypt to support operation Compass.
Analysing the effectiveness of the four Wellington Squadrons was more difficult. However in Both Malta and Egypt senior FAA officers visited the Squadrons involved with sufficient naval rum for enough tots to well and truly splice the Main Brace.
Nice.
Good to see this continuing, and this version of Taranto helped fill in the hole left by The Whale Has Wings.
Well this has gone better than OTL with five battleships damaged rather than three the RN has free reign over the Med for at least 6 months. That means the North Africa campaign and the Afrika Korps is butterflied as the Axis can't send reinforcement convoys across a hostile sea. After Compass there won't be enough Italians in theatre to stop the British short of the Tunisia.
Wouldn't Invincible be carrying Sea Harriers?
What damage did Courageous, Glorious and Furious do in the end with Operation Crack....
The Folond Falcon is a development of Follond's F5/34 monoplane fighter designed and built at Gloster Aircraft. However from the start the Follond Falcon had a 1000hp Alvis Pelides engine and four 20mm cannons. The latest version now has 1200hp.
The Raid by aircraft from Courageous, Glorious and Furious was intended primarily as diversion. aircraft, runways, hangers and other airfield facilities were targeted. Basically though air operations would be resumed within 24 hours the operational capacity on Sardinia will be reduced for some time as runways etc take time to fully repair.
The Raid by aircraft from Courageous, Glorious and Furious was intended primarily as diversion. aircraft, runways, hangers and other airfield facilities were targeted. Basically though air operations would be resumed within 24 hours the operational capacity on Sardinia will be reduced for some time as runways etc take time to fully repair.
11.07 Defence and Offence (two sides of war)
11.07. Defence and Offence, two side, of war.
As the recent raid on Taranto had shown it was not just the weight of bombs dropped and where you dropped them that mattered, it was also important to have available the right ordinance to do the most damage to the specific target . Under the auspices of the CSSOAO a number of sub committees had been set up. The Bombsight Committee was chaired by Patrick Blackett, the Bomb Damage Assessment committee, The Bomb Fusing committee and several others were all working on making Bomber Command more effective, whilst some of the Committees analysed enemy action for lessons learnt, others examined practical and scientific opportunities fo improvement, The secret minutes of these committees were circulated to the chairs of all the committees, in this way cross pollination of both thought and effort was maintained. A scientific mind completely dissociated with the problem under consideration often came up with a crucial insight. This kind of cooperate analysis had been a corner stone of the work at AMRE Bawdsey Manor, from the start of the RAF research effort in Cheltenham what had become, the Telecommunications Research Establishment, continued that ethos which had been epitomised by the ‘Sunday Soviets’ and discussions on and around the boundary during cricket matches at AMRS Bawdsey Manor. Upon arrival in Cheltenham in the late summer of nineteen thirty nine ‘Taffy’ Bowen and others had been delighted to be invited to play cricket on the College Fields.
In the summer evenings of 1940 it was not uncommon to see one or two games in progress in front of the school cricket pavillion with casual observers walking past having no inkling of the secracy of the discusions taking place on the boundry, Here a group might include Alec Harley Reeves, “ Frank “ Edgar Jones, Ronald Victor Jones, discussing Nickerbine and radio navigation, whilst nearby Bernard Lovell, Joan Elizebeth Curran, Samuel Crowe, James Sayers, ”Mark” Olithant and others. Who might be discussing magnatrons, proximity fuses or a myrid other related technicsl subjects. When Sir Phillip visited the TRE, He was unfailingly impressed with the intelectuall talent that had been mobalised from the scientific community . Now in late autumn as the days grew shorter the work on perfecting many of these new systems continued with a quite intensity.
Shortly after becoming CAS, Sir Hugh had been whisked off to Cheltenham to attend a number of presentations on the work being done at the TRE. Later behind locked doors Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh sat in the office of ‘Taffy Bowen’ whilst R.V. Jones, passed his transcript of the ‘Oslow’ letters to Sir Hugh to read. Having read them Sir Hugh had enquired as to the veracity of their content, Here Sir Phillip stated, was the problem, within certain circles of the British intelligence community, the ‘Oslow Letters’ were seem as being too detailed and wide ranging in their scientific detail of Nazi research and development to be true, these people had therefore dismissed the letters as a plant to mislead the British into wasting time and effort chasing phantom projects.
R.V. Jones countered by saying that he had as a scientist come to the opposite conclusion. In that the science within the letters, particularly on RDF and other electronics was fundamentally sound. Further all the scientific information was consistent with working practices and methodology of known German scientists and institutions. Summarising the letters R.V. Jones said that the British had been given by a disaffected German scientist a snapshot of German electronic secret research as of early 1940 and that it was being officially ignored by the Intelligence community. In the TRE however it certainly was not being ignored it was informing a lot of the work carried out by 80 wing and at same time the PRU were when possibly try to get photographic confirmation of the activity at some of the sites noted in the letter. As Sir Phillip commented in a war of ‘move and counter move’ having a crib sheet of your opponents moves could be invaluable.
R.V. Jones concluded, that in his capacity as the Goverments Advisor on Scientific Intellegence it was issential that as the, CAS, Sir Hugh should fully appraised of the contents of the Oslo Letters and the importance of this information, hence the briefing. The discussion then turned to use, by the Luftwaffe of Lorence based electronic bombing aids, these were known as ‘The Beams’ so far the scientists working at TRE and the RAF flying in 80 Wing had managed to identify the frequencies used and had worked out the methodology and expected accuracy. The crudest counter measure available was to simply jamb the tramitters with electronic noise. This would only serve to alert the Gremans to the fact that their wave lengths had been compromised,
The more sophisticated counter measure was to ‘spoof’ or bend the beams. The beam system known to the Germans as Knickerbien utilised a track beam with its transmitter near Kleve and a cross beam transmitted from Stollberg near the Danish border. By sending a series of dots synchronised to the original German signals it was possible to widen the track beam to such an extent that bombers would fail to lock on and wander on a curve away from the track. As Knickerbien was known as ‘headache’ to the British the counter broadcast system was code named ‘Asprin’.
The Oslo letter had contained details of a newer and more accurate guidance systems and the scientists at TRE and 80 Wing had been urgently seeking evidence of this new system that bore the name X-Gerat (X-Aperatus). The first use of X-Gerat had been on December 20th 1939 and since then much data had been collected, the new beam frequency had been found at 1500/2000Mhz, this was much higher than the original Knickerbein system at 60 Mhz, therefore giving a far more accurate and narrower beam. Intellegencce intercepts had confirmed that this new beam from a transmitter near Cherbourg had the code name Wesser, with the three cross beams being also named after rivers, namely the Rhine, Oder and Elbe. The Rhine cross beam was the preparety warning line approxemetly thirty kilometres before beam Oder, which was the clock setting line, five kilometres later was the Elbe beam line wich was the clock rundown start line and five kilometres later was the automatic bomb release point. Unlike Knickerbein, X-Gerat was not fitted in every bomber and top secret traffic analysis had confirmed that a bomber unit called KGR 100 was a specialised bomber Kampfgruppe set up to use this system for precision bombing of targets and to mark targets for following bombing waves. By early November much intelligence had been gained, a analysis of a raid by KGR 100 on Birmingham had shown that the majority of the bombs had fallen within a band one hundred meters wide centered on the Wesser Beam with a length spread of just over a furlong, accuracy almost unobtainable by the RAF even in daylight. This came as a shock and revelation to the RAF.
Having located the guide beams transmitter near Cherbourg the RAF and AM intelligence analysed the band variance for major targets in the midlands. Francis Chichester had made the point that spoofing X-Gerat during attacks on easily located targets such as Liverpool and the Whirrel on the coast would be pointless, but attacks on the industrial complexes around. Wolverhampton. Birmingham, Coventry and Castle Bromwich could be more easily spoofed convincingly by using decoy fires and flares. A number of sites to the south of these targets were selected and quickly prepared as decoys utilising the same equipment and methods as the already existing QF sites for decoy airfields, The spoofing system used to counter X-Gerrat, was to broadcast an artificial and early Elbe signal Only one kilometre after the Oder signal and hence causing the bombs to be automatically dropped some eight kilometres short of the target. For the British the biggest problem here was the Luftwaffe had learnt from the successful jamming of the Knickerbien system, due to how early it was turned on, and were now delaying the transmission of the Rhine, Oder and Elbe lines as long as possible. This therefore gave the counter measure teams a very short time to identify the true Elbe line and Spoof it.
On the 6th of November the RAF had an intelligence coup, a bomber from KGR 100 was brought down by a night fighter and crash landed on the beach at West Bay near Bridport. Despite the wrecked aircraft being submerged by the rising tide an RAF intelligence recovery team managed to salvage the X-Gerrat equipment. Examination of the apparatus at the TRE quickly confirmed that the working frequency was filtered to precisely 2000Mhz and any jamming signal had to ne very accurately tuned.
To counter the use of X-Gerrat during the next major raid on the midlands a comprehensive defense scheme had been planned. As soon as intelligence, being signals analysis or intercepts’, indicated that KGR100 were preparing for a raid and the Wesser transmition was detected in the Birmingham target area then the plan would be activated. The Night fighters would be concentrated on the lead element of the raid, this was to intended to disrupt KGR 100 and inflict casualties on it.
General Pyle at AA command had concentrated as many guns as possible south of the Birmingham Target area to help convince the German bomb aimers that they were truly approaching their designated target, Guns to the north would remain silent unless the true target area was breached. The next phase was general jamming on the 2000Mhz frequency to disrupt the X-Gerrat signal and make accurate bombing more difficult. This Jamming would hopefully also disguise the false Elbe signal and make it harder to counter. Finally false flares, fires and explosions on the ground under the false target point would be set off in a further attempt to convince the following attacking bomber waves to attack the decoy target. The last two kilometres of the bombing run would be on a known track along the beam at a constant altitude. General Pyle organised all the AA guns in the area of the spoof target with the range to engage aircraft on the track to do so. These guns would be director controlled using the new 25cm tacking and ranging RDF systems with their distinctive parabolic aerials designed by Bernard Lovell and his team.
Sometimes in warfare there is a synchronicity of events that if wtitten in a novel would be decried as unbelievable, the bomber raid on Coventry was one such event. The plan to spoof X-Gerrat had only been finalised on the eigth of of November. All of the various elements already existed and the recovery of a complete X-gerat unit two days earler was the icing on the cake.
So it was that the raid on Coventry on the night of the eleventh and twelve of November would see the next major confrontation it what had become known at the TRE and in the AM as ‘The Battle of the Beams’
As the recent raid on Taranto had shown it was not just the weight of bombs dropped and where you dropped them that mattered, it was also important to have available the right ordinance to do the most damage to the specific target . Under the auspices of the CSSOAO a number of sub committees had been set up. The Bombsight Committee was chaired by Patrick Blackett, the Bomb Damage Assessment committee, The Bomb Fusing committee and several others were all working on making Bomber Command more effective, whilst some of the Committees analysed enemy action for lessons learnt, others examined practical and scientific opportunities fo improvement, The secret minutes of these committees were circulated to the chairs of all the committees, in this way cross pollination of both thought and effort was maintained. A scientific mind completely dissociated with the problem under consideration often came up with a crucial insight. This kind of cooperate analysis had been a corner stone of the work at AMRE Bawdsey Manor, from the start of the RAF research effort in Cheltenham what had become, the Telecommunications Research Establishment, continued that ethos which had been epitomised by the ‘Sunday Soviets’ and discussions on and around the boundary during cricket matches at AMRS Bawdsey Manor. Upon arrival in Cheltenham in the late summer of nineteen thirty nine ‘Taffy’ Bowen and others had been delighted to be invited to play cricket on the College Fields.
In the summer evenings of 1940 it was not uncommon to see one or two games in progress in front of the school cricket pavillion with casual observers walking past having no inkling of the secracy of the discusions taking place on the boundry, Here a group might include Alec Harley Reeves, “ Frank “ Edgar Jones, Ronald Victor Jones, discussing Nickerbine and radio navigation, whilst nearby Bernard Lovell, Joan Elizebeth Curran, Samuel Crowe, James Sayers, ”Mark” Olithant and others. Who might be discussing magnatrons, proximity fuses or a myrid other related technicsl subjects. When Sir Phillip visited the TRE, He was unfailingly impressed with the intelectuall talent that had been mobalised from the scientific community . Now in late autumn as the days grew shorter the work on perfecting many of these new systems continued with a quite intensity.
Shortly after becoming CAS, Sir Hugh had been whisked off to Cheltenham to attend a number of presentations on the work being done at the TRE. Later behind locked doors Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh sat in the office of ‘Taffy Bowen’ whilst R.V. Jones, passed his transcript of the ‘Oslow’ letters to Sir Hugh to read. Having read them Sir Hugh had enquired as to the veracity of their content, Here Sir Phillip stated, was the problem, within certain circles of the British intelligence community, the ‘Oslow Letters’ were seem as being too detailed and wide ranging in their scientific detail of Nazi research and development to be true, these people had therefore dismissed the letters as a plant to mislead the British into wasting time and effort chasing phantom projects.
R.V. Jones countered by saying that he had as a scientist come to the opposite conclusion. In that the science within the letters, particularly on RDF and other electronics was fundamentally sound. Further all the scientific information was consistent with working practices and methodology of known German scientists and institutions. Summarising the letters R.V. Jones said that the British had been given by a disaffected German scientist a snapshot of German electronic secret research as of early 1940 and that it was being officially ignored by the Intelligence community. In the TRE however it certainly was not being ignored it was informing a lot of the work carried out by 80 wing and at same time the PRU were when possibly try to get photographic confirmation of the activity at some of the sites noted in the letter. As Sir Phillip commented in a war of ‘move and counter move’ having a crib sheet of your opponents moves could be invaluable.
R.V. Jones concluded, that in his capacity as the Goverments Advisor on Scientific Intellegence it was issential that as the, CAS, Sir Hugh should fully appraised of the contents of the Oslo Letters and the importance of this information, hence the briefing. The discussion then turned to use, by the Luftwaffe of Lorence based electronic bombing aids, these were known as ‘The Beams’ so far the scientists working at TRE and the RAF flying in 80 Wing had managed to identify the frequencies used and had worked out the methodology and expected accuracy. The crudest counter measure available was to simply jamb the tramitters with electronic noise. This would only serve to alert the Gremans to the fact that their wave lengths had been compromised,
The more sophisticated counter measure was to ‘spoof’ or bend the beams. The beam system known to the Germans as Knickerbien utilised a track beam with its transmitter near Kleve and a cross beam transmitted from Stollberg near the Danish border. By sending a series of dots synchronised to the original German signals it was possible to widen the track beam to such an extent that bombers would fail to lock on and wander on a curve away from the track. As Knickerbien was known as ‘headache’ to the British the counter broadcast system was code named ‘Asprin’.
The Oslo letter had contained details of a newer and more accurate guidance systems and the scientists at TRE and 80 Wing had been urgently seeking evidence of this new system that bore the name X-Gerat (X-Aperatus). The first use of X-Gerat had been on December 20th 1939 and since then much data had been collected, the new beam frequency had been found at 1500/2000Mhz, this was much higher than the original Knickerbein system at 60 Mhz, therefore giving a far more accurate and narrower beam. Intellegencce intercepts had confirmed that this new beam from a transmitter near Cherbourg had the code name Wesser, with the three cross beams being also named after rivers, namely the Rhine, Oder and Elbe. The Rhine cross beam was the preparety warning line approxemetly thirty kilometres before beam Oder, which was the clock setting line, five kilometres later was the Elbe beam line wich was the clock rundown start line and five kilometres later was the automatic bomb release point. Unlike Knickerbein, X-Gerat was not fitted in every bomber and top secret traffic analysis had confirmed that a bomber unit called KGR 100 was a specialised bomber Kampfgruppe set up to use this system for precision bombing of targets and to mark targets for following bombing waves. By early November much intelligence had been gained, a analysis of a raid by KGR 100 on Birmingham had shown that the majority of the bombs had fallen within a band one hundred meters wide centered on the Wesser Beam with a length spread of just over a furlong, accuracy almost unobtainable by the RAF even in daylight. This came as a shock and revelation to the RAF.
Having located the guide beams transmitter near Cherbourg the RAF and AM intelligence analysed the band variance for major targets in the midlands. Francis Chichester had made the point that spoofing X-Gerat during attacks on easily located targets such as Liverpool and the Whirrel on the coast would be pointless, but attacks on the industrial complexes around. Wolverhampton. Birmingham, Coventry and Castle Bromwich could be more easily spoofed convincingly by using decoy fires and flares. A number of sites to the south of these targets were selected and quickly prepared as decoys utilising the same equipment and methods as the already existing QF sites for decoy airfields, The spoofing system used to counter X-Gerrat, was to broadcast an artificial and early Elbe signal Only one kilometre after the Oder signal and hence causing the bombs to be automatically dropped some eight kilometres short of the target. For the British the biggest problem here was the Luftwaffe had learnt from the successful jamming of the Knickerbien system, due to how early it was turned on, and were now delaying the transmission of the Rhine, Oder and Elbe lines as long as possible. This therefore gave the counter measure teams a very short time to identify the true Elbe line and Spoof it.
On the 6th of November the RAF had an intelligence coup, a bomber from KGR 100 was brought down by a night fighter and crash landed on the beach at West Bay near Bridport. Despite the wrecked aircraft being submerged by the rising tide an RAF intelligence recovery team managed to salvage the X-Gerrat equipment. Examination of the apparatus at the TRE quickly confirmed that the working frequency was filtered to precisely 2000Mhz and any jamming signal had to ne very accurately tuned.
To counter the use of X-Gerrat during the next major raid on the midlands a comprehensive defense scheme had been planned. As soon as intelligence, being signals analysis or intercepts’, indicated that KGR100 were preparing for a raid and the Wesser transmition was detected in the Birmingham target area then the plan would be activated. The Night fighters would be concentrated on the lead element of the raid, this was to intended to disrupt KGR 100 and inflict casualties on it.
General Pyle at AA command had concentrated as many guns as possible south of the Birmingham Target area to help convince the German bomb aimers that they were truly approaching their designated target, Guns to the north would remain silent unless the true target area was breached. The next phase was general jamming on the 2000Mhz frequency to disrupt the X-Gerrat signal and make accurate bombing more difficult. This Jamming would hopefully also disguise the false Elbe signal and make it harder to counter. Finally false flares, fires and explosions on the ground under the false target point would be set off in a further attempt to convince the following attacking bomber waves to attack the decoy target. The last two kilometres of the bombing run would be on a known track along the beam at a constant altitude. General Pyle organised all the AA guns in the area of the spoof target with the range to engage aircraft on the track to do so. These guns would be director controlled using the new 25cm tacking and ranging RDF systems with their distinctive parabolic aerials designed by Bernard Lovell and his team.
Sometimes in warfare there is a synchronicity of events that if wtitten in a novel would be decried as unbelievable, the bomber raid on Coventry was one such event. The plan to spoof X-Gerrat had only been finalised on the eigth of of November. All of the various elements already existed and the recovery of a complete X-gerat unit two days earler was the icing on the cake.
So it was that the raid on Coventry on the night of the eleventh and twelve of November would see the next major confrontation it what had become known at the TRE and in the AM as ‘The Battle of the Beams’
From what i've read OTL this aircraft was actaully landed intact on the beach where it became the centre of a battle between the RN and the Army as to who 'owned' it with the Navy actually towing it out into deeper water for salvage but the rope snapped and the aircraft sank resulting in extra damage over what might have been, thankfully not terminal damage.
This is the PAM, There is a tight relationship between the FAA and RAF tinged with friendly rivalry. ITTL the combined presence of the RAF and RN make sure that the Army do as they are told! Also TRE are on site and they can pull the security card and trump the lot!!
11.08 Springing a trap
11.08 Springing a trap
It was eight pm on the 14th of November that a Flamingo of Eighty Wing flying up the channel from Lyme Regis to the Needles got a fix on a Wesser beam just east of Swanage , turning north and centering on the beam the team on the Flamingo gathered their data and plotted the aircrafts track, looking at the air chart the navigator was quickly able to strike off a lot of potential targets, the course of four degrees east of true north missed all potential targets until it crossed slap over the middle of the industrial town of Coventry. Unfortunately the beam also crossed the middle of Derby some miles further north. Flying north the Flamingo crew transmitted their findings to it’s controller. Hoping all the time that the Germans would turn on the Rhine , Wesser and Elbe beams early so that they could confirm the target. At fighter Command Keith Park alerted the defences for both cities and started preparing their defense. Eighty Wing tasked two more Flamingoes to patrol lines east of Coventry and Derby to search for the timeing beams so as to try and get as much warning as possible.
As the location of the Wesser Transmitter was fixed, taking a line from the centre of any potential target bach to the transmitter location would provide the RAF with the attack track for any given target. By using these known tracks RAF QF sites had in the previous weeks been moved so that there was one on the track line of most the principle targets identified. The QF site for Coventry was just a couple of miles north of Warick and the one for Derby was in the Trent Vally to the East of Burton on Trent. Bentley Priory had sent a reddiness message to all RDF stations and night fighter units. Signals intelligence had enambled the location of the airbase from which KGR 100 was operating to be found and the RDF station at Ventnor was tasked with watching for activity at that location. A little after eight pm the Y service reported interception of radio transmitions from AGR 100 aircraft on a bearing consistant with their air field in France. By quarter past eight CH Ventnor was reporting a raid of twenty plus building over the Bay of Sein.
The two GCI stations at Sopley and Sturminster Newton promply vectored the four night fighters each was controlling to the southern boundry of their RDF coverage over the channel. The intention was to get as many of the night fighters as possible in amongst the AGR 100 aircraft. Park had considered that the biggest problem would be the fear of frataside by the RAF night fighters and clear instructions had been given to positively identify the target aircraft before engaging.
To the north Cricklade GCI station also moved their four night fighters south to orbit the southern GCI stations. Generally those GCI stationtrs close to the Wesser beam but not having coverage over it prepared to send their fightesr south to feed in behind the initial interceptors as they moved north. Co ordinating no less than eight night fighters via two GCI stations onto a single twenty aircraft formation was a daunting task. A method had been worked out and practiced beforehand. Sopley would feed in it’s first fighter from the East of the target track, Sturminster Newton would then feed in it’s first fighter from the west one minute later, then another minute later Sopley would feed in it’s second fighter from the east, So in the space of eight minutes all the fighters would be closing on the enemy formation. However if the enemy formation was making around two hundred and forty miles an hour (a fast cruising speed for an HE 111) they would be crossing the GCI station area at some four miles a minute, with an average cover of one hundred and twenty miles diameter, this gave the GCI operator at most half an hour to achieve interception or hand the night fighter onto the adjacent GCI unit.
The Fighter Command OR had also been working hard with the GCI operators to devise the most effient way to feed new fighters into an attack on a single formation of a bomber stream. Tonight the initial assault was being treated tactically as a single unit attack but the follow on bombers coming in behind KGR100 would be attacked as a bomber stream. This would be a test of these new operational procedures. As in the daylight battle park was willing to innovate in the field in order to gain advantage.
Back at Bentley Priory Sir Keith Park was sitting on the gallery watching the attack unfold on the big plotting table map below and occasionally making comments for one of his aides to either make a note of, or pass on to someone else. Within twent ymiutes the first bombers in KGR 100 were approaching the Cricklade GCI boundry. One fighter fom Sturminster Newton was in contact with an He 111 and preparing to open fire, just a litte to the east a flash of cannon fire showed where a Sopely controlled NF was engaging, a second Sopley fighter was being handed off t Cricklade control as it closed onto its assigned contact. The third Sopely controlled NF had broken of it’s attack when it’s IR transponder malfunctioned and a Sturminster Newton NF started stalking them instead off the He111 it was being vectored onto. Luckily the lack of IR response from the Sopley controlled fighter was noted quickly enough by the GCI operators there to warn both crews to disengage.
As KGR 100 entered the area controlled by Cricklade GCI there was a flurry of activity at Bentley Priory as tapes were stretched across the plotting table from the German ground station emitting the cross track beams. One of the Eighty Wing Flamingoes had got the scent and with the second one vectored south to confirm the beam bearings, they were now being plotted on the situation map at Bentley Priory. The newly plotted beams crossed the bomber track to the south of Coventry indicating that that city was the target. On Park’s instruction the relevant radio units of Eighty Wing began their part of the nights operation by broadcasting their fake cross track beams. Meanwhile the QF sites near Warwick were alerted ready to respond to bombs dropping in their vicinity.
Here there had been a disagreement within Fighter Command as to the right tactic to employ if none of the KGR 100 aircraft bombed on the false beams, were the QF sites to activate any way to try and confuse the following bomber stream. One school of thought was that the QF site in these circumstances should wait until KGR 100 did drop their flares and bombs, as then the QF sites would be able to mimic the flare colours. There was the risk that this delay would mean that the first of the bomber stream aircraft had already past the Q sites before the decoys were activated. Keith Park at Bentley Priory had listened to the arguments and had decided that unless he gave the order based on the track plot being kept at Bentley Priory the QF Sites would only activate if KGR 100 dropped on the spoof beams. If only part of KGR 100 dropped on decoy site then the QF site would Mimic the flares and keep them burning.
Sir Hugh and Sir Keith were keenly aware that the concerted effort to baulk this raid would almost invariably cause the Luftwaffe to realize that, like Nickerbein, X-Geriat had been discovered and countermeasures taken. In keeping with Sir Hugh’s long held dictum that ‘the bomber must not get through’ Sir Kieth Park was committing all the resources of Fighter Command including Eighty Wing and the development flight of TRE into the nights operations.
It was eight pm on the 14th of November that a Flamingo of Eighty Wing flying up the channel from Lyme Regis to the Needles got a fix on a Wesser beam just east of Swanage , turning north and centering on the beam the team on the Flamingo gathered their data and plotted the aircrafts track, looking at the air chart the navigator was quickly able to strike off a lot of potential targets, the course of four degrees east of true north missed all potential targets until it crossed slap over the middle of the industrial town of Coventry. Unfortunately the beam also crossed the middle of Derby some miles further north. Flying north the Flamingo crew transmitted their findings to it’s controller. Hoping all the time that the Germans would turn on the Rhine , Wesser and Elbe beams early so that they could confirm the target. At fighter Command Keith Park alerted the defences for both cities and started preparing their defense. Eighty Wing tasked two more Flamingoes to patrol lines east of Coventry and Derby to search for the timeing beams so as to try and get as much warning as possible.
As the location of the Wesser Transmitter was fixed, taking a line from the centre of any potential target bach to the transmitter location would provide the RAF with the attack track for any given target. By using these known tracks RAF QF sites had in the previous weeks been moved so that there was one on the track line of most the principle targets identified. The QF site for Coventry was just a couple of miles north of Warick and the one for Derby was in the Trent Vally to the East of Burton on Trent. Bentley Priory had sent a reddiness message to all RDF stations and night fighter units. Signals intelligence had enambled the location of the airbase from which KGR 100 was operating to be found and the RDF station at Ventnor was tasked with watching for activity at that location. A little after eight pm the Y service reported interception of radio transmitions from AGR 100 aircraft on a bearing consistant with their air field in France. By quarter past eight CH Ventnor was reporting a raid of twenty plus building over the Bay of Sein.
The two GCI stations at Sopley and Sturminster Newton promply vectored the four night fighters each was controlling to the southern boundry of their RDF coverage over the channel. The intention was to get as many of the night fighters as possible in amongst the AGR 100 aircraft. Park had considered that the biggest problem would be the fear of frataside by the RAF night fighters and clear instructions had been given to positively identify the target aircraft before engaging.
To the north Cricklade GCI station also moved their four night fighters south to orbit the southern GCI stations. Generally those GCI stationtrs close to the Wesser beam but not having coverage over it prepared to send their fightesr south to feed in behind the initial interceptors as they moved north. Co ordinating no less than eight night fighters via two GCI stations onto a single twenty aircraft formation was a daunting task. A method had been worked out and practiced beforehand. Sopley would feed in it’s first fighter from the East of the target track, Sturminster Newton would then feed in it’s first fighter from the west one minute later, then another minute later Sopley would feed in it’s second fighter from the east, So in the space of eight minutes all the fighters would be closing on the enemy formation. However if the enemy formation was making around two hundred and forty miles an hour (a fast cruising speed for an HE 111) they would be crossing the GCI station area at some four miles a minute, with an average cover of one hundred and twenty miles diameter, this gave the GCI operator at most half an hour to achieve interception or hand the night fighter onto the adjacent GCI unit.
The Fighter Command OR had also been working hard with the GCI operators to devise the most effient way to feed new fighters into an attack on a single formation of a bomber stream. Tonight the initial assault was being treated tactically as a single unit attack but the follow on bombers coming in behind KGR100 would be attacked as a bomber stream. This would be a test of these new operational procedures. As in the daylight battle park was willing to innovate in the field in order to gain advantage.
Back at Bentley Priory Sir Keith Park was sitting on the gallery watching the attack unfold on the big plotting table map below and occasionally making comments for one of his aides to either make a note of, or pass on to someone else. Within twent ymiutes the first bombers in KGR 100 were approaching the Cricklade GCI boundry. One fighter fom Sturminster Newton was in contact with an He 111 and preparing to open fire, just a litte to the east a flash of cannon fire showed where a Sopely controlled NF was engaging, a second Sopley fighter was being handed off t Cricklade control as it closed onto its assigned contact. The third Sopely controlled NF had broken of it’s attack when it’s IR transponder malfunctioned and a Sturminster Newton NF started stalking them instead off the He111 it was being vectored onto. Luckily the lack of IR response from the Sopley controlled fighter was noted quickly enough by the GCI operators there to warn both crews to disengage.
As KGR 100 entered the area controlled by Cricklade GCI there was a flurry of activity at Bentley Priory as tapes were stretched across the plotting table from the German ground station emitting the cross track beams. One of the Eighty Wing Flamingoes had got the scent and with the second one vectored south to confirm the beam bearings, they were now being plotted on the situation map at Bentley Priory. The newly plotted beams crossed the bomber track to the south of Coventry indicating that that city was the target. On Park’s instruction the relevant radio units of Eighty Wing began their part of the nights operation by broadcasting their fake cross track beams. Meanwhile the QF sites near Warwick were alerted ready to respond to bombs dropping in their vicinity.
Here there had been a disagreement within Fighter Command as to the right tactic to employ if none of the KGR 100 aircraft bombed on the false beams, were the QF sites to activate any way to try and confuse the following bomber stream. One school of thought was that the QF site in these circumstances should wait until KGR 100 did drop their flares and bombs, as then the QF sites would be able to mimic the flare colours. There was the risk that this delay would mean that the first of the bomber stream aircraft had already past the Q sites before the decoys were activated. Keith Park at Bentley Priory had listened to the arguments and had decided that unless he gave the order based on the track plot being kept at Bentley Priory the QF Sites would only activate if KGR 100 dropped on the spoof beams. If only part of KGR 100 dropped on decoy site then the QF site would Mimic the flares and keep them burning.
Sir Hugh and Sir Keith were keenly aware that the concerted effort to baulk this raid would almost invariably cause the Luftwaffe to realize that, like Nickerbein, X-Geriat had been discovered and countermeasures taken. In keeping with Sir Hugh’s long held dictum that ‘the bomber must not get through’ Sir Kieth Park was committing all the resources of Fighter Command including Eighty Wing and the development flight of TRE into the nights operations.
So Coventry's ancient centre is spared from the Luftwaffe's bombs only to fall in the 1950's and 60's to the pencils of the city planner and traffic engineer.
My father always said that the Luftwaffe failed in 1940 to tear the heart out of Southampton but planners did after the war,
The Same could certainly be said for Plymouth and other towns.
The Same could certainly be said for Plymouth and other towns.