AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
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Congratulations! I loved every bit of this TL thus far.
Will you be covering other theaters and the knock-on effects that affect the RN and other services? Once the BOB is over, I imagine the main areas of interest will be night fighters, Coastal Command (is it still under RAF control?), and the African Theater until the Japanese show up.
Will you be covering other theaters and the knock-on effects that affect the RN and other services? Once the BOB is over, I imagine the main areas of interest will be night fighters, Coastal Command (is it still under RAF control?), and the African Theater until the Japanese show up.
I am still tallying that up. but as an estimate, Luftwaffe up by 10/15%. RAF aircraft down 5/10% but pilot fatalities down by 10%+, due to better armour and self sealing fuel tanks, oh, and there also be a decent, dedicated ASR service.
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
Congratulations. An excellent TL. I hope you enjoyed writing it as much as I have enjoyed reading it, and that the creative spark can set off the next part.
Errolwi
Monthly Donor
Excellent TL, thank you.
Haven't seen anything to derail Conningham, so likely quite a 'Colonial Club' high up at the RAF!
Likely not so long before there is a statue to Park in his home town (OTL April 2019).
Sir Keith Park by Errol Cavit, on Flickr
Haven't seen anything to derail Conningham, so likely quite a 'Colonial Club' high up at the RAF!
Likely not so long before there is a statue to Park in his home town (OTL April 2019).
Sir Keith Park by Errol Cavit, on Flickrformion
Banned
Well done @sonofpegasus, it was a thoroughly enjoyable tale, that made me read more on the BoB and thus educated me. Is this the end of the timeline or you plan to continue it ?
As hinted earlier, I hope soon to put up a series of posts covering various aspects of the PAM, from November 1940 to around Easter 1941. To keep the TL fresh I intend to introduce a few other POV characters to flesh out the story and highlight the changes from OTL. Also as posted earlier Ideas and speculation are very welcome. Inspiration from others is in my humble view the lifeblood of curiosity and discovery.
The biggest butterfly is of course Dowding.
I very much doubt he will have any truck with 'leaning into Europe' and wasting valuable planes and pilots in fighter sweeps.
Not that there wont be some attacking, but it will be much better organised and laid out with a view to minimising RAF losses while maximising German ones.
But this butterfly has implications in North Africa. More planes available (they aren't all being wasted in fighter sweeps), and even more due to a better BoB. The Africa Corps may well have no effective air support after a short while.
Once the Butt report comes out I can see Dowding going nuclear on the Bomber Barons as well - again, looking at maximising efficiency and minimising losses.
I very much doubt he will have any truck with 'leaning into Europe' and wasting valuable planes and pilots in fighter sweeps.
Not that there wont be some attacking, but it will be much better organised and laid out with a view to minimising RAF losses while maximising German ones.
But this butterfly has implications in North Africa. More planes available (they aren't all being wasted in fighter sweeps), and even more due to a better BoB. The Africa Corps may well have no effective air support after a short while.
Once the Butt report comes out I can see Dowding going nuclear on the Bomber Barons as well - again, looking at maximising efficiency and minimising losses.
Sorry, no Butt report ITTL, it will not be needed. Navigation logs, point of aim photographs and subsequent photographic reconnaissance pictures have all ready laid bare the ineffectiveness of Bomber Command raids. In the PAM much has been done to improve navigation, Francis Chichester etc, so more bomber are actually arriving at the target but that is about all. This and other matters pertaining to Bomber Command will be explored in a post soon.
I could see suppression missions into France being tried. An attempt to open up the channel more for shipping by supressing enemy aircraft. It would learn pretty quickly that the enemy are just as good at defence. All the home field, AAA, sensor and reaction advantages come into play. So a peerless ministry might petition for shallower intruder missions and more CAP over the channel? Tropical, carrier and desert optimised MB-4? (thank you @Lord Hogmeister for reminding me about the MB-4) The Malcom Hood is probably standard for all high speed types now.
Air, Sea and Rail assets in the channel area seems like a reasonable target, but what worked for the LW was specifically airfields and radar.
Things were tried that had been shown to be ineffective when tried by the LW. Also the wider war is being neglected by focus on Britain. Rather than turn all assets on France to keep them available for BoB2 (electronic warfare boogaloo), shipping or ferrying squadrons, AAA and sensors out to the Med and it's vital trade route should take a higher priority.
We have been focusing on Fighter Command for obvious reasons, but what has been going on with Coastal, Transport and Bomber (in that order of priority)?
Looking back on my picture of the MB-4, the sight line, for over the engine view, parallel to the ground, is very poor. I'd like to propose that the land gear legs wind in (partially retract the leg length) before folding up and for take off. This would be a second lock position and part of the same retraction mechanism.
It might not be possible to retract against the shock spring/rubber while in flight as the weight of the aircraft assists while on the ground. So once you are wheels down, you are wheels down. Not ideal for belly landing. Geared motor or hydraulic retraction still offers a point of failure.
Suspension can just be a bit stiffer and shorter for take-off over chosen ground. Shorter legs lowers the engine, offering more view over it, from the point of view of the cockpit and pilot. I would be limited to prepared surface landings however.
Any reason why the rear wheel can't be larger and/or longer from the tail? Seems from initial reading that p-factor turning due to prop ground effect is reduced. The deck angle improves for a better view. The main drawbacks are rear weight and the angle of attack. Getting enough angle on the wing for take off and landing is just a question of flaps. Huge flaps for nice low stall speed. It seems to me that tricycle gear takes the deck angle down loads, without insurmountable problem. Rear wheel weight could be kept down with a retractable wheel fork pillar, but I'm not clear on the harmonics. Also is ground looping effected?
Any use or too (c)? I'm not sure what counts as fair use. Bringing forward the cockpit alters the entre of gravity so extra weight in terms of radiator, armour and fuel tank behind the pilot would help put it back towards the centre of lift.
This "every mission we can" approach is pushing things way too far. Looking at what worked for the Luftwaffe in the BoB should direct towards a more sensible and focused counter-attack. I'm amazed that we had Roadstead, but no dive bomber. The mission statements seem tailored to suit a lack of effective targetting. No specific strategy for winning, just an aim to damage or even just attack.
Air, Sea and Rail assets in the channel area seems like a reasonable target, but what worked for the LW was specifically airfields and radar.
Things were tried that had been shown to be ineffective when tried by the LW. Also the wider war is being neglected by focus on Britain. Rather than turn all assets on France to keep them available for BoB2 (electronic warfare boogaloo), shipping or ferrying squadrons, AAA and sensors out to the Med and it's vital trade route should take a higher priority.
We have been focusing on Fighter Command for obvious reasons, but what has been going on with Coastal, Transport and Bomber (in that order of priority)?
Looking back on my picture of the MB-4, the sight line, for over the engine view, parallel to the ground, is very poor. I'd like to propose that the land gear legs wind in (partially retract the leg length) before folding up and for take off. This would be a second lock position and part of the same retraction mechanism.
It might not be possible to retract against the shock spring/rubber while in flight as the weight of the aircraft assists while on the ground. So once you are wheels down, you are wheels down. Not ideal for belly landing. Geared motor or hydraulic retraction still offers a point of failure.
Suspension can just be a bit stiffer and shorter for take-off over chosen ground. Shorter legs lowers the engine, offering more view over it, from the point of view of the cockpit and pilot. I would be limited to prepared surface landings however.
Any reason why the rear wheel can't be larger and/or longer from the tail? Seems from initial reading that p-factor turning due to prop ground effect is reduced. The deck angle improves for a better view. The main drawbacks are rear weight and the angle of attack. Getting enough angle on the wing for take off and landing is just a question of flaps. Huge flaps for nice low stall speed. It seems to me that tricycle gear takes the deck angle down loads, without insurmountable problem. Rear wheel weight could be kept down with a retractable wheel fork pillar, but I'm not clear on the harmonics. Also is ground looping effected?
Any use or too (c)? I'm not sure what counts as fair use. Bringing forward the cockpit alters the entre of gravity so extra weight in terms of radiator, armour and fuel tank behind the pilot would help put it back towards the centre of lift.
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The biggest butterfly to take off so far is the greatly improved night fighter force in Fighter Command. In OTL the Luftwaffe bombe Britain at night with virtual impunity. They lost far more aircraft and crew to accidents than enemy action. ITTL Fighter Command are taking a low but steady toll of the enemy bombers, unlike OTL this steady success has quelled any calla for the use of single seat daytime fighters at night. With virtually full GCI/PPI cover for the UK not only are the night fighters being guided onto the enemy bombers but also the real time tracking of raids makes identifying the potential target easier and gives better information and warning for the AA guns. 80 wing is also out at night hunting for the Luftwaffe navigation beams and gathering information the German navigation system and other electronic signetures.
formion
Banned
The otl lack of effort to fortify Crete in the 6 months before the first Luftwaffe attack was criminal. In 6 months the British managed to half-build an airbase in Maleme, in a crappy location with uneven terrain, exposed to seaborne raids and they improved the rudimentary civilian airport in Heraclion.
The RAF & RN didnt need squadrons or valuable equipment, just one or two battalions of engineers. According to the wages of the era, I have calculated that 1000 cretan workers, working everyday for 6 months would cost less than 3,000 pounds. Considering how enthousiastic the Cretans were, I wouldnt be surprised if whole villages worked for free to support the war effort.
The choice of Maleme is baffling to say the least. The obvious location would have been on the north side of Souda Bay, in the site of the current civillian airport and NATO base, as :
- The terrain is even
- The logistics are way better
- From the north side it is protected by 500m hills that are an excellent base for AA guns.
In the six months of relative peace, at the very least there should have been developed 3 airbases (Souda, Heraclion, Tympaki in the south to protect the lines of communication with Egypt). Moreover, a road connecting Heraclion to Tympaki was a priority and build a breakwater and a pier in Tympaki itself. Last but not least, Souda should have been developed as a base for destroyers, submarines and MTBs.
The RAF & RN didnt need squadrons or valuable equipment, just one or two battalions of engineers. According to the wages of the era, I have calculated that 1000 cretan workers, working everyday for 6 months would cost less than 3,000 pounds. Considering how enthousiastic the Cretans were, I wouldnt be surprised if whole villages worked for free to support the war effort.
The choice of Maleme is baffling to say the least. The obvious location would have been on the north side of Souda Bay, in the site of the current civillian airport and NATO base, as :
- The terrain is even
- The logistics are way better
- From the north side it is protected by 500m hills that are an excellent base for AA guns.
In the six months of relative peace, at the very least there should have been developed 3 airbases (Souda, Heraclion, Tympaki in the south to protect the lines of communication with Egypt). Moreover, a road connecting Heraclion to Tympaki was a priority and build a breakwater and a pier in Tympaki itself. Last but not least, Souda should have been developed as a base for destroyers, submarines and MTBs.
Excellent ideas, formion, the real problem is getting the Greek Government to allow such work to be done. Providing such permission is granted building a series of airfields on Crete would be of great benefit to the British forces, both the RN running convoys to Malta and the Army fighting the Italians.
formion
Banned
Considering the attitudes of otl, the greek government would provide not only its blessing but also enthousiastic support, even if said support was not material (the albanian front and infrastructure in Epirus and Macedonia take priority).
As you will see in the following book, the Greeks wanted as many British as soon as possible in Crete so that the local division could be shipped to the mainland. Wavell was taken back by the greek action to leave rather quickly the defence of Crete completely in british hands. Thus, based on the otl actions, there wouldnt be a problem at all.
To illustrate the point on my previous post, in November 6th, 8 days after the italian invasion of Greece, Churchill mentioned that the Air Ministry "knew nothing about airfields in Crete". A more active Air Ministry would have sent "tourists" to survey Crete as soon as Italy declared war to Britain. In early November there was not even a notion when to survey the island.
Their Lordships in the Admiralty had in the first week of November 1940 decided that Souda needs a mobile naval base defence of 8,800 men with 72 AA guns and 10-15 coastal defence gun. In April 1941 this deployment was still under discussion without a timetable set.
This timeline has unleashed interesting butterflies. I am of the opinion that even just 2 additional cannon-armed squadrons in Athens would bleed the RA white (instead of the OTL initial half squadron of Gladiators). If the UK has not a great need of american aircraft they may not keep greek orders for themselves and may assist the Greeks obtaining more american and british planes. For example, a greek commission in America wanted to buy 50-75 Vultee Vengeance and 60 fighters.
Lastly, in Christmas 1940, a british general suggested to Wavell to send 400 of the american 75mm guns they received in summer. Lets say that 400 put of the 1070 in total is a way too big a number. Even if 200 of these were sent to Greece, they would have been a valuable addition to the greek artillery park. Another solution would have been to send 3 half trained artillery regiments (with 75mm WW1 guns) to Crete to finish their training in the backwater and provide some muscle to the british infantry brigade that acted as a garrison.
Source
Diary of a Disaster
On October 28, 1940, the Italian army under Benito Mussolini invaded Greece. The British had insisted on guaranteeing Greek and Turkish neutrality, despite the fact that Greece was never more than a limited campaign in an unlimited war as far as they were concerned. The British, however, were...
books.google.com
Edit: A major Air Ministry failure in the greek campaign was not harvesting) the local talent. Let me explain. The prewar greek pilots were few but excellent flyers with many flight hours. They were stupidely brave as well, with examples of ramming their fighters on bombers when things became desperate. However, they were pretty bad in tactics, especially at squadron level. The intensity of the fight, the few machines and high losses in the first months prohibited them to spread their new hard earned knowledge. The failure is that the RAF didnt send a training mission to Greece to both train the existing cadre and find new blood. The greek 1940 cadet class was 40 pilots and the 1941 one 130. A few RAF instructors and a couple dozen training aircraft would have been a cheap and valuable investment. In this way, you may see in 1941 , lets say 200 (instead of 130) cadets and a few dozen veteran greek pilots (instead of less than 10, i dont remember exactly) escaping to Egypt to continue the fight.
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I am currently working on posts for the war post the BoB (having lost a lot when I drowned by laptop!) and hope to post something by the end of the week end, initially the post will be mainly scene setting for the Butterflies already flying from the first 10 chapters. November 1040 will be a busy month!