10.21.The Losses mount to Critical levels.
August the 26th
Day Airfields in Kent and Essex attacked. Bombs on Dover and Folkstone. Raids in the Solent.
Night Wide spread raiding, Targets industrial centres and airfields.
Weather Mainly Cloudy, but dry. Brighter in south but Channel cloudy.
As daylight pushed the dark of night aside Fighter Command and especially Eleven Group was expecting a renewal of the onslaught on the airfields the cloud cover predicted for the day would be considered favourable by the Luftwaffe High Command. RDF on the other hand especially the growing experience of the GCI/PPI stations in tracking multiple raids irrespective of cloud that obscured the view of the Observer Corps was giving the home defence a force multiplying advantage. Unfortunately the GCI/PPI stations were easily located by electronic direction finding and were vulnerable to attack. RAF High Command and the Air Ministry fully expected the stations in southern England to become a priority target of the Luftwaffe any day now. To counter this, rather than complete the coverage of Scotland and Northern Ireland these PPI/RDF units were being held as spair units to be rushed into replace any GCI/PPI station that was knocked out. Also a number or truly mobile systems were being completed, although they had less range than the permanent version and could handle fewer interceptions, they would suffice as gap fillers in the short term.
After the usual series of reconnaissance flights the main attack of the morning commenced around eleven o’clock when one hundred and fifty enemy aircraft took the short route to cross the channel at Dover with the main objectives once again being the sector stations at Biggin Hill and Kenley, Eleven Groups counter of seven squadrons was sufficient to break up the attack and send both the bombers and their escort scurrying for the safety of the occupied coast. In the early after noon the Luftwaffe came again this time with various elements gaining height then coalescing into three formation crossing the channel simultaneously, being reported as sixty plus, twenty plus and thirty plus aircraft from bases of KG2 and KG3, whilst some aircraft threatened Dover yet again the main weight of the attack was directed at sector stations of North Weald and Hornchurch. Various small elements diverged from the main raid to cause diversions in east London. Eleven squadrons were scrambled by Eleven Group in response and despite all four of the PAC spitfire squadron throwing themselves pell-mell into the melee the German bomber succeeded in planting over one hundred bombs onto the sector Station at Debden, despite the best efforts of the Controllers to place their squadron in advantageous interception positions. However good the plots from the GCI/PPI stations in cloudy conditions an entire squadron could fly past an enemy formation with out actually seeing it and by the time the plots were seen as divergent rather than closing, the opportunity for an interception had been lost. With the newer VHF radio system at least there were enough channels available to give the controllers discreet communications with each squadron but unfortunately not all squadrons could talk directly to all the squadrons and this could and did on occasion lead to friendly formation attacking each other despite the use of IFF. What the Controllers saw on the plot and what the airborne pilots saw around them did not always correspond.
The day light raids on this day concluded with a major high altitude attack of one hundred and fifty aircraft on Portsmouth, accompanied by a couple of small diversionary raids attempting to split the defence. Co-ordinating their defensive response eleven group scrambled five squadrons and ten group a further three squadrons. This raid resulted in a protracted and fierce engagement over the Isle of Wight and the waters of the Solent. The bombers from KG55 and their escort were intercepted short of their target and jettisoned most of their bombs into the sea. Within an hour the raid had been turned back but the descending smoke trails and parachutes doting the sky spoke of significant losses to both sides. Once again the pilots of Fighter Command had flown over eight hundred sorties the one engagement over Ports mouth had resulted in two thirds of the entire Fighter Command losses for the day, twenty defending fighters with four pilots dead and no less than twelve wounded to some degree. The Luftwaffe losses totalling fifty aircraft was not sufficient compensation for such a heavy toll.
The night brought attacks on the Midlands industrial centres with diversionary raids spread far and wide, principally targeting air fields. Despite the cloudy skies the night fighter continued to exact a toll of the intruders.
(1) Daily summary quoted verbatim from the The Narrow Margin by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster
August the 27th
Day Reconnaissance chiefly in Portsmouth-Southampton area.
Night Widespread activity industries and airfields from Lincolnshire to Portsmouth.
Weather, Central and east England light rain. Some cloud in Channel and haze over Dover straits. (1)
After the sheer pressure of the two previous days the respite caused by todays weather brought brief if welcome relief to everyone in Fighter Command. Hover there was still work to be done. Very necessary maintenance was undertaken on the RDF stations with some shutting down completely for short periods. These shutdowns had to be as short as possible and seemingly random, for if a pattern was discerned and the enemy could predict an imminent shutdown then a breach in the defence might occur. The lull also gave Sir Keith Parks and Sir Hugh Dowding time to confer and to plan the next moves in the defence of the UK. The continued high rate of pilots loss, greater at current levels than the supply of replacements was of course the most pressing cause for concern, for at the moment it meant that Fighter Command was a wasting asset and eventually would cease to be able to provide a viable defence unless the situation changed. One hope was that the proportionally greater losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe would cause critical damage to it’s ability to prosecute the current campaign strategy before Fighter command lost the battle of defence. One major problem highlighted by the actions of the previous day was the continuing problem of accurately getting the height of enemy formations on cloudy days when observer corps observations were intermittent. Though new dedicated height finding RDF sets were starting to be fielded there were far to few of them at the moment. Where practicable Anti Aircraft command were using their range finding RDF units to provide height data but again in cloudy conditions it was proving problematical to identify formations and get timely information to the plotting centres. To try an improve the information flow Parks issued an instruction that all intercepting squadrons should report the number height and location of an enemy formation when they Gave their ‘Tally Ho’ signal prior to engaging the enemy.
On the morning of the twenty seventh Douglass Bader had requested an interview with Sir Keith Parks. That afternoon Douglass Bader as humbly as it was possible for him do so requested that he be returned immediately to operational flying stressing the fact that every experienced pilot was needed. Sir Keith upon receiving Bader’s request for an interview had sought the opinions of the controllers he had been working with at Uxbridge, specifically if Bader seemed to have learnt how vital it was for the controllers to be obeyed. The response was a qualified yes, Bader however had remained critical of the instructions being given by some Controllers, who he thought lacked a grasp of the tactical element of interception process. However on talking about this to Bader, Sir Keith was pleasantly surprised to hear from the Squadron Leader that he could see that, the controllers instructions had to be followed explicitly, as the controller could see the bigger picture and most importantly the relative movement of all the defending fighters. Sir Keith agreed to return Squadron Leader Douglass Bader to the command of 242 Squadron with a dire warning that a breach of the trust being placed in him by Sir Keith would not be tolerated at all, there would be no second chance.
Excellent writing as always!