AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
- Thread starter perfectgeneral
- Start date
8.2 Regrouping
8.2, Regrouping,
With the losses in Norway, Belgium and France plus the depletion of the squadron reserves to enlarge the squadron sizes the available reserves in Britain were dangerously low. There being less than 200 fighters of all types held in storage ready for issue. Despite the factories working flat out and up to the end of May achieving the figures espoused in the Harrogate program of January 1940 or actually exceeding them. Part of this was due to three new types of fighters attaining volume production, these being The Defiant at Bolton and Paul, The Gloster Reaper at Westlands and the Beaufighter at Bristols. The Beaufort being built with Alvis Pelides engines and the cancellation of the Taurus engine had really hurt the pride of the Bristol company and finally spurred the management into taking action to cure the mass production problems of the Hercules. The fact that the Alvis Maeonides was entering limited production at Armstrong Siddley and a trial installation on an early production Beaufighter had been flown may have had something to do with this change in Bristol’s attitude.
Harrogate Plan. Aircraft production from January 1940
Month Planned Production Actual Production Planned fighter Actual Fighter
All Aircraft Types All types Production Production
February 1940 1,001 751 171 173
March 1940 1,137 893 203 210
April 1940 1,256 1,118 231 288
May1940 1,244 1,309 261 355
Looking at the figures two things were very apparent to Sir Phillip one was that fighter production was exceeding that planned and the continued upward trend was widening the margin. Even a few weeks of uninterrupted production would reinstate the reserve stocks. So panic measure to boost fighter production would likely have more of a negative long term effect on the RAF than any short term gain.
There were one or two things that could be done and would have an immediate benefit. One was to cut down on the Fairey Battle production. That would have the effect of freeing up Merlins for fighters thereby removing one possible bottleneck. Though it would be the shadow factories that were effected the semi-skilled workforce could be redirected to building components for other manufacturers to remove bottle necks. Suspending production of the Henley at Glosters would provide an instant boost to capacity to produce Hurricanes at Hucclecote. Any other tweaks would require a little more consideration. Currently Spitfires were being built at Southampton and Castle Bromwich. Hurricanes at Kingston, Langley and Hucclecote. Defiants at Wolverhampton, Reapers at Yeovil and Beaufighters at Filton. The icing on the cake was that the FAA had the Fulmar in full production at Follond down at Hamble so there was a back up fighter that could be utilised if Merlin production was hit. Of the current fighters in production the best candidate for changing from an inline Merlin to a radial was the Hurricane and a project to that effect had been on the backburner for some time.
As to bomber production, yes it could take a backseat but not to cut it to far. The Manchester and the Stirling were entering squadron service but not yet operational. Stirling bomber production might need to be curtailed due to the capture of the French Atlantic ports requiring more LRMP Stirlings to counter the new U-Boat bases. This meant that work on the Halifax should also continue as cover Bomber Command for the loss of the Stirlings. Of the existing types the following would be dropped from production or reduce to minimum priority, Battle, Blenheim and Henley. The Hampden, Whitley and Wellington would continue in production at existing rates where this did not impact fighter production. A problem here was allocating engines and propellers, to get a performance gain and to offset the extra weight of the cannons, armour and other additions both the Hurricane MkIc and the Spitfire MKII had been made priorities for the new constant speed propellers that gave both additional ceiling and speed at height. The Bomber clique in the RAF had tried to snaffle the entire production of constant speed propellers for the bombers. This had been countered by pointing out that the Fairy Monarch came with it’s own unique constant speed counter rotating propellers four of which went on each Sterling and two on each Manchester. The Tornado was due to enter production by the end of the summer and Richard Farey was expanding the engine construction plant to try and keep up with demand. However supply of the Monarch and its propeller were at the moment proving the limiting factor.
With the Hudson and the Harvard arriving in increasing numbers from American, two proposals had been made. One was to cut the Flamingo Production as it was doing largely the same tasks as the Hudson and the second was to cut the production of training aircraft as the Harvards were available.
To the first proposal upon talking to both the manufactures and Maritime Command it was pointed out that the Hudson could fill in for the Blenhiem in most of it’s roles and that would free up Bristol’s capacity to ramp up production of both the Beaufighter and Beaufort. Whilst the Flamingo was Maritime Commands premier mid-range ocean patrol aircraft and there were never enough of them.
With the losses in Norway, Belgium and France plus the depletion of the squadron reserves to enlarge the squadron sizes the available reserves in Britain were dangerously low. There being less than 200 fighters of all types held in storage ready for issue. Despite the factories working flat out and up to the end of May achieving the figures espoused in the Harrogate program of January 1940 or actually exceeding them. Part of this was due to three new types of fighters attaining volume production, these being The Defiant at Bolton and Paul, The Gloster Reaper at Westlands and the Beaufighter at Bristols. The Beaufort being built with Alvis Pelides engines and the cancellation of the Taurus engine had really hurt the pride of the Bristol company and finally spurred the management into taking action to cure the mass production problems of the Hercules. The fact that the Alvis Maeonides was entering limited production at Armstrong Siddley and a trial installation on an early production Beaufighter had been flown may have had something to do with this change in Bristol’s attitude.
Harrogate Plan. Aircraft production from January 1940
Month Planned Production Actual Production Planned fighter Actual Fighter
All Aircraft Types All types Production Production
February 1940 1,001 751 171 173
March 1940 1,137 893 203 210
April 1940 1,256 1,118 231 288
May1940 1,244 1,309 261 355
Looking at the figures two things were very apparent to Sir Phillip one was that fighter production was exceeding that planned and the continued upward trend was widening the margin. Even a few weeks of uninterrupted production would reinstate the reserve stocks. So panic measure to boost fighter production would likely have more of a negative long term effect on the RAF than any short term gain.
There were one or two things that could be done and would have an immediate benefit. One was to cut down on the Fairey Battle production. That would have the effect of freeing up Merlins for fighters thereby removing one possible bottleneck. Though it would be the shadow factories that were effected the semi-skilled workforce could be redirected to building components for other manufacturers to remove bottle necks. Suspending production of the Henley at Glosters would provide an instant boost to capacity to produce Hurricanes at Hucclecote. Any other tweaks would require a little more consideration. Currently Spitfires were being built at Southampton and Castle Bromwich. Hurricanes at Kingston, Langley and Hucclecote. Defiants at Wolverhampton, Reapers at Yeovil and Beaufighters at Filton. The icing on the cake was that the FAA had the Fulmar in full production at Follond down at Hamble so there was a back up fighter that could be utilised if Merlin production was hit. Of the current fighters in production the best candidate for changing from an inline Merlin to a radial was the Hurricane and a project to that effect had been on the backburner for some time.
As to bomber production, yes it could take a backseat but not to cut it to far. The Manchester and the Stirling were entering squadron service but not yet operational. Stirling bomber production might need to be curtailed due to the capture of the French Atlantic ports requiring more LRMP Stirlings to counter the new U-Boat bases. This meant that work on the Halifax should also continue as cover Bomber Command for the loss of the Stirlings. Of the existing types the following would be dropped from production or reduce to minimum priority, Battle, Blenheim and Henley. The Hampden, Whitley and Wellington would continue in production at existing rates where this did not impact fighter production. A problem here was allocating engines and propellers, to get a performance gain and to offset the extra weight of the cannons, armour and other additions both the Hurricane MkIc and the Spitfire MKII had been made priorities for the new constant speed propellers that gave both additional ceiling and speed at height. The Bomber clique in the RAF had tried to snaffle the entire production of constant speed propellers for the bombers. This had been countered by pointing out that the Fairy Monarch came with it’s own unique constant speed counter rotating propellers four of which went on each Sterling and two on each Manchester. The Tornado was due to enter production by the end of the summer and Richard Farey was expanding the engine construction plant to try and keep up with demand. However supply of the Monarch and its propeller were at the moment proving the limiting factor.
With the Hudson and the Harvard arriving in increasing numbers from American, two proposals had been made. One was to cut the Flamingo Production as it was doing largely the same tasks as the Hudson and the second was to cut the production of training aircraft as the Harvards were available.
To the first proposal upon talking to both the manufactures and Maritime Command it was pointed out that the Hudson could fill in for the Blenhiem in most of it’s roles and that would free up Bristol’s capacity to ramp up production of both the Beaufighter and Beaufort. Whilst the Flamingo was Maritime Commands premier mid-range ocean patrol aircraft and there were never enough of them.
Driftless
Donor
Wow! Several significant benefits to the British here....
* 18 planes and more importantly experienced crews saved
* One more carrier saved
* Wrecking the Gneisenau and crippling the Scharnhorst for the near term is a major coup. Depending on when the Scharnhorst is ready to fight again, that alters any convoy raider/anti-raider plans, and any potential invasion planning - again for both sides. They would have been the Germans primary capital ship threat for invasion support. **edit** Plus, the Germans still need to get the Scharnhorst home safely over 1000 miles of contested waters - but that's mainly an RN problem to cipher through.
Even though the Fall of France remains an utter disaster, the situation seems to be less dire than in our history and much of the planning and execution at the core of the OP will come to fruit. There seems to be a greater willingness to apply lessons-learned at a plausible earlier date.
Last edited:
It started as a change with the RAF, and the biggest change so far is on the Naval front. One carrier up, and the Germans won't be fielding anything bigger than a heavy cruiser for the rest of the year. I don't thing using Norway as a base for a fleet in being will work as well as OTL.
Having Castle Bromwich spamming out cannon armed Spitfires from late 1939 makes a huge difference. Couple that with Glosters building an extra three hundred plus Hurricanes and you get major possible Butterflies.
8.3 Rebuilding
8.3 Rebuilding
Sir Phillip along with Sir Hugh Dowding at Fighter Command was acutely aware that the limiting factor in Fighter Command was likely to be the number of available Pilots rather than sufficient aircraft for them to fly.
As to suspending training aircraft production this was exactly the kind of panic measure that Sir Phillip was concerned about and his instructions to Sir Archibald at the MAP were unequivocal, ‘training aircraft production would retain equal priority to fighter aircraft’ as the flow of replacement pilots to fighter command would be critical to the continuation of the defence of Great Britten. One action taken which came into effect in mid May was to split Training command into two, Flight Training and Technical Training commands. This removed some conflicts of interest and also allowed each command to focus on it’s core task that were so very different.
Various stupidities and bottle necks within the Training Command had been drawn to Sir Phillip’s attention over the previous months and with the assistance of Sir Arthur Newall as CAS, these had hopefully been removed. One such stupidity within training command that had resulted in Sir Phillip’s intervention and the removal of a degree of dead wood personnel was that all entrants to flying training irrespective of their previous experience were being sent through the full elementary flying training school syllabus. It did not seem to matter to the RAF that the recruit might have hundreds of flying hours, the reason purportedly for this was that the RAF required all their pilots to fly the RAF way! Whatever that meant Sir Phillip was not sure but what he was sure of was that this was patently a waste of resource and time and experienced pilots once they had completed their basic military training should be sent to the flying training establishment most suited to prepare them for service, whether that be an advanced flying school for say multi-engine training or fighter flying and in certain circumstances posting directly to an OTU. At Christmas 1939 there were only three fighter OTU’s, This was patently insufficient for the expansion of Fighter Command from three groups to five and possibly later to six.
Also at this juncture the only one OTU for night fighters was the night fighter development unit. Therefore as the Spitfire Mk2 and the Hurricane MkIc had entered service in numbers some of earlier marks had been used to form two further fighter OTU’s and a full night fighter OTU had been formed using Blenheim NF’s and a flight of the new Night Reaper for type familiarisation. These changes would help to increase the flow of fighter pilots, when asked to justify such a training expansion during the early part of what was now being called the phoney war Sir Phillip pointed out that Fighter Commands flying training requirements had been based upon a fighter force of fifty two squadrons had had not taken any account of the additional fighter squadrons required for the AASF and the AC,BEF. The increase was therefore to partially cover these needs and to enable further expansion.
At the time when the MAP had wrested control of Castle Bromwich from the Nuffield Organisation the AM and MAP had set up the Civilian Repair Organisation. This Organisation was as it’s name implied was created to repair aircraft for the RAF but outside of the RAF workshops. Civilian Repair Units and Depots were set up to which aircraft could be sent for repair. This service was actually run by the Nuffield Organisation from their Cowley works.
The sense of this system had become apparent when the German Blitzkrieg had broken on the AC of the BEF and it became apparent how many reparable aircraft had had to be abandoned on the airfields in France. Part of this was down to the aircraft availability/repair classifications in use by the AC,BEF in France.
The classification was as follows;- 1, reparable by unit, 2, reparable by contractor or RAF depot and 3, recommended for stripping of parts and eventual salvage and scrapping. In France the RAF depot could not cope and there were no contractors, so aircraft and engines beyond repair by the squadron mechanics had to be recovered to the UK. This resulted in the RAF airfields in France becoming clogged with unserviceable aircraft which were subsequently lost. Taking lessons from these events the AM and MAP reclassified aircraft requiring repair into three new categories known as 4,5,and 6. Category four was for those aircraft that could be repaired quickly on station using station mechanics and facilities. Category Five was for aircraft that require more work than category four aircraft but were still able to fly to a depot for repair. Category six was for any aircraft that was unfit to fly, which would be recovered to the nearest CRU. Any aircraft that could not be returned to service within 36 hours on the station was reclassified from category four to either Five or Six.
Aircraft in category Five became known as fly-ins and if the aircraft could be returned to service in twenty four hours or less then often the pilot would wait and then fly it back. One of the largest of these ‘first aid’ depots was at RAF Henlow which would play an important part in the subsequent battle where the CRO would exceed all expectations. No 50 RAF Maintenance Unit had been set up as part of No 43 Group of the RAF. It’s task was to transport damaged and crashed aircraft from all over the country to the repair depots and was staffed by civilians and based at the Nuffield works in Cowely.
Another critical facility had been set up at the RR development centre at RAF Hucknall, not only were Hurricanes repaired here but also merlin engines were assessed, repaired if only minor works required or sent to Derby for rebuilding or salvage. This was also the home base of the RR liaison team who spent their time travelling around RAF bases disseminating the latest information of the engines and learning of recurrent problems and defects from those at the sharp end. By these Means the AM and the MAP hoped to maximise the availability of serviceable fighter aircraft during the subsequent months. To help ensure this in late May the CRO was taken under direct MAP control in Harrogate.
Sir Phillip along with Sir Hugh Dowding at Fighter Command was acutely aware that the limiting factor in Fighter Command was likely to be the number of available Pilots rather than sufficient aircraft for them to fly.
As to suspending training aircraft production this was exactly the kind of panic measure that Sir Phillip was concerned about and his instructions to Sir Archibald at the MAP were unequivocal, ‘training aircraft production would retain equal priority to fighter aircraft’ as the flow of replacement pilots to fighter command would be critical to the continuation of the defence of Great Britten. One action taken which came into effect in mid May was to split Training command into two, Flight Training and Technical Training commands. This removed some conflicts of interest and also allowed each command to focus on it’s core task that were so very different.
Various stupidities and bottle necks within the Training Command had been drawn to Sir Phillip’s attention over the previous months and with the assistance of Sir Arthur Newall as CAS, these had hopefully been removed. One such stupidity within training command that had resulted in Sir Phillip’s intervention and the removal of a degree of dead wood personnel was that all entrants to flying training irrespective of their previous experience were being sent through the full elementary flying training school syllabus. It did not seem to matter to the RAF that the recruit might have hundreds of flying hours, the reason purportedly for this was that the RAF required all their pilots to fly the RAF way! Whatever that meant Sir Phillip was not sure but what he was sure of was that this was patently a waste of resource and time and experienced pilots once they had completed their basic military training should be sent to the flying training establishment most suited to prepare them for service, whether that be an advanced flying school for say multi-engine training or fighter flying and in certain circumstances posting directly to an OTU. At Christmas 1939 there were only three fighter OTU’s, This was patently insufficient for the expansion of Fighter Command from three groups to five and possibly later to six.
Also at this juncture the only one OTU for night fighters was the night fighter development unit. Therefore as the Spitfire Mk2 and the Hurricane MkIc had entered service in numbers some of earlier marks had been used to form two further fighter OTU’s and a full night fighter OTU had been formed using Blenheim NF’s and a flight of the new Night Reaper for type familiarisation. These changes would help to increase the flow of fighter pilots, when asked to justify such a training expansion during the early part of what was now being called the phoney war Sir Phillip pointed out that Fighter Commands flying training requirements had been based upon a fighter force of fifty two squadrons had had not taken any account of the additional fighter squadrons required for the AASF and the AC,BEF. The increase was therefore to partially cover these needs and to enable further expansion.
At the time when the MAP had wrested control of Castle Bromwich from the Nuffield Organisation the AM and MAP had set up the Civilian Repair Organisation. This Organisation was as it’s name implied was created to repair aircraft for the RAF but outside of the RAF workshops. Civilian Repair Units and Depots were set up to which aircraft could be sent for repair. This service was actually run by the Nuffield Organisation from their Cowley works.
The sense of this system had become apparent when the German Blitzkrieg had broken on the AC of the BEF and it became apparent how many reparable aircraft had had to be abandoned on the airfields in France. Part of this was down to the aircraft availability/repair classifications in use by the AC,BEF in France.
The classification was as follows;- 1, reparable by unit, 2, reparable by contractor or RAF depot and 3, recommended for stripping of parts and eventual salvage and scrapping. In France the RAF depot could not cope and there were no contractors, so aircraft and engines beyond repair by the squadron mechanics had to be recovered to the UK. This resulted in the RAF airfields in France becoming clogged with unserviceable aircraft which were subsequently lost. Taking lessons from these events the AM and MAP reclassified aircraft requiring repair into three new categories known as 4,5,and 6. Category four was for those aircraft that could be repaired quickly on station using station mechanics and facilities. Category Five was for aircraft that require more work than category four aircraft but were still able to fly to a depot for repair. Category six was for any aircraft that was unfit to fly, which would be recovered to the nearest CRU. Any aircraft that could not be returned to service within 36 hours on the station was reclassified from category four to either Five or Six.
Aircraft in category Five became known as fly-ins and if the aircraft could be returned to service in twenty four hours or less then often the pilot would wait and then fly it back. One of the largest of these ‘first aid’ depots was at RAF Henlow which would play an important part in the subsequent battle where the CRO would exceed all expectations. No 50 RAF Maintenance Unit had been set up as part of No 43 Group of the RAF. It’s task was to transport damaged and crashed aircraft from all over the country to the repair depots and was staffed by civilians and based at the Nuffield works in Cowely.
Another critical facility had been set up at the RR development centre at RAF Hucknall, not only were Hurricanes repaired here but also merlin engines were assessed, repaired if only minor works required or sent to Derby for rebuilding or salvage. This was also the home base of the RR liaison team who spent their time travelling around RAF bases disseminating the latest information of the engines and learning of recurrent problems and defects from those at the sharp end. By these Means the AM and the MAP hoped to maximise the availability of serviceable fighter aircraft during the subsequent months. To help ensure this in late May the CRO was taken under direct MAP control in Harrogate.
Excellent updates, saving the Glorious will have big dividends as the RN still has the Courageous, Glorious and Furious as the core of their CV groups and you've got the large number of very well trained crewmen and pilots that the FAA will need later. saving the pilots from Norway also means more pilots available with combat experience. In reality, the 18 pilots and their planes are not much, their value though is their experience which they can share with other pilots much like the Polish pilots are doing in this TL. The RAF abandoning the 3 plane formation is also a good thing.
A better organised training schedule and repair system is also great as this will eliminate wastage for aircraft damaged in battle and keep the flow of pilots hopefully within the losses. The RAF never ran out of aircraft, it was pilots it was coming up short. With the success of the Polish pilots, perhaps the RAF wouldn't be so against letting the Czechs, Norwegians etc fly in their own squadrons. That decision in OTL seemed to take far too long and the addition of extra pilots now could well be critical.
Also good control on stopping an invasion panic, at least in the RAF.
Superb updates!
A better organised training schedule and repair system is also great as this will eliminate wastage for aircraft damaged in battle and keep the flow of pilots hopefully within the losses. The RAF never ran out of aircraft, it was pilots it was coming up short. With the success of the Polish pilots, perhaps the RAF wouldn't be so against letting the Czechs, Norwegians etc fly in their own squadrons. That decision in OTL seemed to take far too long and the addition of extra pilots now could well be critical.
Also good control on stopping an invasion panic, at least in the RAF.
Superb updates!
Needs Threadmarking.
Benjamin Britten I'm sure, would have been touched.
Hello RR Meteor?
Anyway to weigh in on the kills controversy, the more Germans downed by 20mm means less Brits downed means more Germans downed means less Brits downed...
As a member of the cabinet Sir Phillip would have received the usual cabinet papers. However As the AM, he would have actually been briefing the war cabinet himself in real time as to the efforts of Maritime Command to find and fix the Twins. ITTL the Admiralty and the AM have a commendable relationship based on shared goals and cooperation.
Driftless
Donor
IF an extra carrier were used for Taranto, that should wreck the RM even more, and that could have knock-on effects, such as more carriers for the East.
So the gap between available fighters at the top and available pilots at the bottom is even bigger than OTL to start with?
8.4 Reassessing
8.4 Reassessing,
Between the end of operation Dynamo and the final capitulation of France in June the British Government and in particular the AM, MAP and the RAF had to carry out a rapid reassessment of the defence requirements to reflect the changed circumstances. Some of these changes and their effects have already been described, here we will concentrate on Fighter Command and the matter of a German invasion of England.
Historians will continue to argue for generations over the German plans for an invasion. Some would postulate that it was never a serous option for the German Military and was never more than a chimaera designed to frighten the British Government into seeking terms, Others would contend that the gathering of shipping and barges, with its dislocation of German industry, on it’s own indicate that it was a serous endeavour on the part of the Nazi’s.
What is unarguable is that in May, June 1940 Great Britain and it’s government had to take the initiation of a German assault as a distinct probability and plan their defences accordingly. After Dunkirk the British Army was in disarray and would require time to re organise and rearm. The RAF and in particular Fighter Command had to regroup and prepare to face the bulk of the fighting for the immediate future, whilst the RN would plan and prepare for what would probably be the defining event in all it’s long and glorious history. In addition to attending Cabinet meetings Sir Phillip also called a series of meeting in early June at the AM at which the entire high command of the RAF participated with representatives from the Admiralty and the War department also in attendance.
The first of these meeting started with Sir Phillip reading a statement from Dudley Pound the first sea Lord which said ‘if I may paraphrase my esteemed predecessor the 1st Earl St Vincent- “I do not say, my Lords, that the Germans will not come. I say only they will not come by sea.” As long as the RAF is able to deny the Germans air superiority over the Channel’. If the RAF cannot do that, then a successful German landing will only be over the wrecks of the RN ships sent to stop them’.
Having read the statement Sir Phillip waved Sir Newall aside and asked for Sir Hugh Dowding to respond. Sir Hugh’s statement was short and to the point. There were three threats, Invasion which would require the Luftwaffe to obtain air superiority over the channel and sustain it until Britain was defeated, Concentrated night bombing which might take months, and the submarine menace to the nations supplies. Only the first two were of direct concern to Fighter Command and these were the two Sir Hugh and his staff were working on. With the return of the units from France and Norway Fighter Command could count on around Fifty operational squadrons with around a further ten recouping and rearming. Though there were shortages of reserve aircraft. At the moment the factories were working hard to remedy the deficit.
The extension of the CH RDF system to the North and more importantly to the West was complete, the CHL was nearly complete with only the far North and far West to be completed and those stations should be operating by the end of June. The Inland and night fighter RDF cover was not yet complete with the Wales and the far north west of Scotland currently lacking cover. With the flanking of the current cover by Luftwaffe units in the Brest peninsular Sir Hugh requested that priority was given for RDF,PPI installations to cover Cornwall and South Wales. This would also have the benefit of adding cover to Liverpool and Northern Ireland from the South.
A reassessment of the required number of fighter squadrons to provide an adequate defence from the expected air assault by the Luftwaffe had been hastily undertaken by the AM and the RAF, the high command had concluded that the original requirement for sixty fighter squadrons previously arrived at had now risen to one hundred and twenty, Of course this force would not be available for months if not years. Therefore Fighter Command would have to do the best it could with the resources currently available and to maximise their effectiveness. Sir Hugh then went on to define a series of proposed measure. These were to form another fighter group to be called 14 Group in the north of Scotland to take over the area north of Glasgow and Edinburgh, thereby permitting 13 Group to concentrate on defending the north of England and southern Scotland.
Further south it was proposed that the Duxford and Colchester sectors would be moved under 11 Groups command and the Middle wallop sector would go to 10 group. This gave a better balance of forces to counter the concentration of the enemies’ aircraft to the south. It was also proposed that the limited number of AA guns available would be relocated and re assigned to defend principally the aircraft and aero engine factories and London. The existing defences at the major naval bases would not be altered under this scheme.
10 group would need additional stations in order to provide sufficient cover against the new threat axis. Immediately some fighter squadrons would need to share Maritime Command stations. A particular problem was providing adequate cover for Plymouth Naval Base, the current grass field at Roborough was not large enough to handle modern monoplane fighters. The proposed plan was to use grass satellite fields at Bodmin/Millfield, Tavistock and Bolt Head. Squadrons would fly in each day from other bases principally the new airfields at Exeter and at Davidstow. Both these airfields were being completed as a matter of urgency and would have concrete runways by mid July. The full wartime standard facilities would take some further weeks to complete at which time each airfield could support a wing of fighters.
Sir Keith Park also noted the limits of the current Chain Home Low in that it could not detect aircraft below 500ft and with the Germans setting up fighter stations close to Calais by the time that these aircraft were recorded 11 Group had very little time to react and this made Manston airfield particularly vulnerable. Sir Phillip confirmed that a new set of RDF stations would be constructed which were based on an amalgamation of the Armys Coastal Defence Gunlaying RDF and the Navies 280 series of radars using the standard 1.5m wavelength transmitter chassis. This could detect aircraft down to about 100ft across the sea. When coupled to a modified version of the Navies Precision Ranging Panel and linked to the Vickers Predictor this was becoming the standard AA low/medium level gun control system. Hence the first unit placed at Dover would serve to give low level warning and control the Dover AA Defences. Sir Phillip commented that as always it depended on the Germans give us the time to set them all. Additionally a number of mobile units were being made available to act as emergency gap fillers to replace CH stations temporally put out of service by enemy action.
Between the end of operation Dynamo and the final capitulation of France in June the British Government and in particular the AM, MAP and the RAF had to carry out a rapid reassessment of the defence requirements to reflect the changed circumstances. Some of these changes and their effects have already been described, here we will concentrate on Fighter Command and the matter of a German invasion of England.
Historians will continue to argue for generations over the German plans for an invasion. Some would postulate that it was never a serous option for the German Military and was never more than a chimaera designed to frighten the British Government into seeking terms, Others would contend that the gathering of shipping and barges, with its dislocation of German industry, on it’s own indicate that it was a serous endeavour on the part of the Nazi’s.
What is unarguable is that in May, June 1940 Great Britain and it’s government had to take the initiation of a German assault as a distinct probability and plan their defences accordingly. After Dunkirk the British Army was in disarray and would require time to re organise and rearm. The RAF and in particular Fighter Command had to regroup and prepare to face the bulk of the fighting for the immediate future, whilst the RN would plan and prepare for what would probably be the defining event in all it’s long and glorious history. In addition to attending Cabinet meetings Sir Phillip also called a series of meeting in early June at the AM at which the entire high command of the RAF participated with representatives from the Admiralty and the War department also in attendance.
The first of these meeting started with Sir Phillip reading a statement from Dudley Pound the first sea Lord which said ‘if I may paraphrase my esteemed predecessor the 1st Earl St Vincent- “I do not say, my Lords, that the Germans will not come. I say only they will not come by sea.” As long as the RAF is able to deny the Germans air superiority over the Channel’. If the RAF cannot do that, then a successful German landing will only be over the wrecks of the RN ships sent to stop them’.
Having read the statement Sir Phillip waved Sir Newall aside and asked for Sir Hugh Dowding to respond. Sir Hugh’s statement was short and to the point. There were three threats, Invasion which would require the Luftwaffe to obtain air superiority over the channel and sustain it until Britain was defeated, Concentrated night bombing which might take months, and the submarine menace to the nations supplies. Only the first two were of direct concern to Fighter Command and these were the two Sir Hugh and his staff were working on. With the return of the units from France and Norway Fighter Command could count on around Fifty operational squadrons with around a further ten recouping and rearming. Though there were shortages of reserve aircraft. At the moment the factories were working hard to remedy the deficit.
The extension of the CH RDF system to the North and more importantly to the West was complete, the CHL was nearly complete with only the far North and far West to be completed and those stations should be operating by the end of June. The Inland and night fighter RDF cover was not yet complete with the Wales and the far north west of Scotland currently lacking cover. With the flanking of the current cover by Luftwaffe units in the Brest peninsular Sir Hugh requested that priority was given for RDF,PPI installations to cover Cornwall and South Wales. This would also have the benefit of adding cover to Liverpool and Northern Ireland from the South.
A reassessment of the required number of fighter squadrons to provide an adequate defence from the expected air assault by the Luftwaffe had been hastily undertaken by the AM and the RAF, the high command had concluded that the original requirement for sixty fighter squadrons previously arrived at had now risen to one hundred and twenty, Of course this force would not be available for months if not years. Therefore Fighter Command would have to do the best it could with the resources currently available and to maximise their effectiveness. Sir Hugh then went on to define a series of proposed measure. These were to form another fighter group to be called 14 Group in the north of Scotland to take over the area north of Glasgow and Edinburgh, thereby permitting 13 Group to concentrate on defending the north of England and southern Scotland.
Further south it was proposed that the Duxford and Colchester sectors would be moved under 11 Groups command and the Middle wallop sector would go to 10 group. This gave a better balance of forces to counter the concentration of the enemies’ aircraft to the south. It was also proposed that the limited number of AA guns available would be relocated and re assigned to defend principally the aircraft and aero engine factories and London. The existing defences at the major naval bases would not be altered under this scheme.
10 group would need additional stations in order to provide sufficient cover against the new threat axis. Immediately some fighter squadrons would need to share Maritime Command stations. A particular problem was providing adequate cover for Plymouth Naval Base, the current grass field at Roborough was not large enough to handle modern monoplane fighters. The proposed plan was to use grass satellite fields at Bodmin/Millfield, Tavistock and Bolt Head. Squadrons would fly in each day from other bases principally the new airfields at Exeter and at Davidstow. Both these airfields were being completed as a matter of urgency and would have concrete runways by mid July. The full wartime standard facilities would take some further weeks to complete at which time each airfield could support a wing of fighters.
Sir Keith Park also noted the limits of the current Chain Home Low in that it could not detect aircraft below 500ft and with the Germans setting up fighter stations close to Calais by the time that these aircraft were recorded 11 Group had very little time to react and this made Manston airfield particularly vulnerable. Sir Phillip confirmed that a new set of RDF stations would be constructed which were based on an amalgamation of the Armys Coastal Defence Gunlaying RDF and the Navies 280 series of radars using the standard 1.5m wavelength transmitter chassis. This could detect aircraft down to about 100ft across the sea. When coupled to a modified version of the Navies Precision Ranging Panel and linked to the Vickers Predictor this was becoming the standard AA low/medium level gun control system. Hence the first unit placed at Dover would serve to give low level warning and control the Dover AA Defences. Sir Phillip commented that as always it depended on the Germans give us the time to set them all. Additionally a number of mobile units were being made available to act as emergency gap fillers to replace CH stations temporally put out of service by enemy action.
With inter service relationships being rather chummyier than OTL could the carriers and Bomber Command come up with something rather nastier than the OTL Taranto attack. Something along the lines of several hundred heavy bomber using the fires in the harbour started by the FAA to guide them into the correct area and then pounding the base facilities before landing in north Africa.
At the time of Taranto OTL Bomber Command did not have the aircraft or capability of flying such a mission to my knowledge. Proximity fuses would not really have been advanced by any of the changes I have so far outlined ITTL as far as I have written it. British gun laying radar down to 50cm wave length ITTL would be about six months ahead of OTL Centimetric radar would not have been advance by any time at all as the Magnetron is as per OTL.