7.8, Northern lights, shorter nights and sudden noises off!
The First lesson that the AM and the RAF learnt during the Norwegian campaign was that you can nether have enough aircraft and crews. With the clash of the two plans, one British/French and the other German the call to “see the other side of the hill” became strident. The losses to RAF reconnaissance aircraft quickly rose as the Luftwaffe established bases in Souther Norway . Maritime Air command crews were flying long missions over the Northern North sea, frequently in atrocious conditions trying to provide both information for the RN and to interdict the movement of German Military units as they attempted to occupy Norway as far north as Trondhiem. Both Crew fatigue and the wear and tear on the somewhat delicate new fangled RDF equipment was taking it’s toll. Maritime Command were moving technicians north to increase the serviceability of those squadrons working on the ‘Norwegian Problem’. This of course was only a short term solution as the effectiveness of the rest of Maritme Commands assets would eventually decline if to many technicians were poached. With the Luftwaffe fighters came the bombers and with that came the cry from the Norwegian Army and the Navy for fighter cover. The quickest way was to fly them off carriers to available bases north of Trondhiem. The problem for the allies was two fold, operations off southern Norway by major units of the RN were now too risky due to the Luftwaffe having air control form their newly captured bases in Denmark and southern Norway. The second problem was trying to get a coordinated campaign organised with a fragmented Norwegian army. The actions of a minority of Norwegian turncoat politicians and service officers in either delaying their response or actually giving direct aid to the invaders further complicated the allies responces. With the near total destruction of the German Naval presence in Narvik fiord Churchill pushed for the earliest possible landing of British troops to achieve this the cruisers that had already embark troops for operation R4 were ordered to proceed with all dispatch to Narvik. Warspite and her escort were ordered to proceed to the fiord to dissuade any interference from German heavy units. At that time the Admiralty were unaware of the damage inflicted on Hipper when she was rammed by Gloworm. The opposed landing at Narvik became what was known as the second battle of Narvik.
On the 10th of April Air attacks were carried out by both Furious and Courageous on Trondhiem, unfortunately the Hipper had already left and was heading south for Germany. However as a distraction and to try an persuade the Germans that the RN was still operating near the south of Norway, a squadron of Skuas had flown from RNAS Hatston in the Orkney Islands to Bergan where they sank the damaged light cruiser Konisberg.
By hurrying Glorious back from the Mediterranean, Where she had been flying off another load of aircraft to Malta. RAF Hurricanes of No 263 Squadron were then taken to Norway and flown off to frozen Lake Lesjasskou. Several operations like this were carried out with the four available fleet carriers rotating back to Scapa to refuel and re-store. The movement of additional squadrons from Maritime Air Command plus the addition of no less than three squadrons from Bomber Command (much to the disgust of RAF high command who were overruled by the politicians) principally to provide extra aerial mining capacity had been undertaken to provide further support. These reinforcements help to stabilise the situation in Norway and by the start of the second week of May it looked as if the allies would succeed in holding northern Norway.
On the 10th of May everything changed. For on that day the Germans attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. The first units involved were perforce the aircraft of the BEFAC, one thing the Phoney war had allowed was time for the various units to become complacent. The British at least had been able to set up a basic RDF system using mobile units with trucks and tents, as operations rooms. Two of these RDF units had been tasked to cover the area which had been assigned to the Polish Contingent. The British crews of these units had complained bitterly when the Polish officers insisted in relocating the mobile units at irregular intervals but at least once a week. It was only later upon hearing from their surviving colleague who had been sat in the same position for the entire phoney war and had been visited by JU87’s in dawns early light, did the wisdom of the Poles become evident. It was a harsh lesson learnt at high cost, not only in the immediate destruction of the vital early warning system but also the effect it had on the BEFAC to carry out it’s primary task of protecting the BEF. On the morning of the tenth of May the Air Component consisted of the following:-
Four Henley Squadrons (1 Polish)
One Lysander Squadron
Six Blenheim Squadrons (2 Polish)
Eight Hurricane Squadrons (four Polish)
And the Advance strike force:-
nine Fairy Battle Squadrons
Four Blenheim squadrons
Two Hurricane squadrons.
Some had considered the RAF command chain in France to top heavy with senior officers. With Air Marshal Arthur Barratt as Air Officer Commanding British Air Forces in France, with Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair as the Air Officer Commanding the Advanced Air Striking Force and Air Vice Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory as Air Officer Commanding the Air Component of the BEF. However it seemed to work with Barrat working with the French High Command and his two subordinates runnning the operational units.
One action taken by Leigh-Mallory early in his command was to arrange for the Polish Squadron due to form on Battles and be assigned to the Advanced Strike Force to actual fly Henleys and Blenheim’s and be attached with all the other Polish squadrons to the AC, BEF. This great simplified the communications and the administration for the Polish contingent. Whilst Lee-Mallory did not make an impression upon the Polish Pilots as had Sir Keith Parks they soon came to realise that he was a competent and aggressive commander who like them wanted to ‘Get at the Hun’. The AC,BEF were based in the North whilst the AASF and the BAFF headquarters were further south near Rheims. With the first reports of the German assault on Belgium and Holland coming in the AC, BEF were committed to covering the advance of the BEF to the Dyle Line and reconnaissance to locate the German spearheads. By the end of the 10th of May the news that Maastricht had already fallen and that the majority of the Belguim Air Force had already been lost either on the ground or in air combat was already causing concerns with the Headquarters of the BAFF. The loss if even only temporarily of a third of his mobile RDF units was particularly worrying Leigh-Mallory at the AC,BEF.