AHC: Peerless Air Ministry
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Errolwi
Monthly Donor
And if you can find a way to buy him a coffee, that's probably worth more than a book sale! I did share some pints with him in Melbourne in 2010.
"...but have you considered my new and totally original strategy of blowing up more civilians, then progressing the war from strategic bombing to simply making the rubble bounce with high explosive until the enemy is so impressed that they throw in the towel." - Air Marshal Sir Horatio Windbag-Tollemache-Tollemache-Blimp, career office officer.
Like other commentators above, you are missing a VERY real point.
In the 1920s and 30s, the public WAS afraid of aircraft carrying explosive bombs but MORE afraid of those carrying war GASES.
especially as the Italian Fascists had murdered thousands and maimed hundreds of thousands using gas in Ethiopia.
The Japanese did the same repeatedly in China a few years later
All using a very few crude aircraft and limited artillery shells.
Yes for Britain, there was the threat of retaliation, but no one knew if that would deter the enemy from a surprise attack
Therefore iOTL 1939, every Briton .. man, woman and child down to babes in their cradle ... were issued with Gas Masks
and required to carry them at all times.
That perception was reinforced by Art and Literature in the 30's
See the first half of Korda's AH movie "Things to Come". That showed how most expected the next war would be.
Destruction of infrastructure from the air of course, but death sown on the wind being decisive.
Today the film is dated and crude in philosophy and execution (especially the second half showing a utopian recovery).
We may agree today that "Guernica" is better art and longer-lived but in the 30's Picasso was known only to the few.
The flick played at every Odeon and Palais (and the novel from Wells was on every station book store)
And that Chemical Warfare threat was real ... more real than we in the democracies knew.
Rather than the crude irritant gases of WW1 which had to deployed in huge volumes
the Nazis had early forms of nerve gases that killed in (relatively) tiny doses
and BTW rendered all those protective masks useless .. which the Hitler Clique fully realised.
The only reason that the Nazis did not deploy them was that they overestimated Allied technology.
In their opinion, the basic forms of organo-phosphate agents were so obvious that everyone must have them
(kept top secret of course, as they had done their own advances)
In late 1941, When the UK threatened to use their CW agents on the German Homeland if the Nazis used gas in Russia
that conclusion was reinforced .. and MAD held.
Ironically, a regime that waged war by terror was deterred by their own terror.
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@AlanJWhite is entirely correct. If the Germans had used nerve gas in the Blitz we would be talking about how perceptive Baldwin's statement was.
While Britain didn't have nerve agents, some of their war gases were rather nasty. A civilian mask doesn't protect for that long, and some of them were blister agents which do have nasty effects if they get on the skin.
MAD is quite an effective strategy
MAD is quite an effective strategy
And there was Operation Vegetarian in reserve of course.
Not in 39 or even 41.
The key experiments on gruinard did not begin till mid 42
Imho very probably started so that Britain could make good on its warning to Hitler
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OTL There were certainly plans afoot for the deployment of gas spraying aircraft in the event of the USM actually occurring. Those plans would be extant in the PAM, but never deployed, As I think I have shown in the PAM TL the British bomber campaign will be some what different from OTL,
11.15 Bombs on target and bombing the bombers
11. 15. Bombs on target and bombing the bombers
After a series of meetings involving principally Sir Peter Cunliff-Lister , Sir Hugh Dowding, Sir Henery Tizard and Portal a proposal was made to the war cabinet in mid November to define the operational priorities of RAF Bomber Command and therefore it’s development path. In basic terms the report recommend that for maximum effect on the enemy to promote the British war Aims the RAF should prioritise targets in Germany and the Occupied nations as follows; Fuel Production (principally oil) Power Production and Distribution, Transport nodes (principally to disrupt fuel distribution) and lastly industrial capacity. All these are in effect precision targets. Contained within this report was a proposal from the Vickers Engineer Barnes Wallis titled; ‘A note on a method of attacking the Axis Powers’This out lined in engineering terms the reasoning behind targeting Power Generation, fuel production and the distribution of the same. The note also contained an appraisal of the weapons required to effectively damage such installations. Having such a technical and scientific appraisal gave weight to the argument but also a road map for the future .
The report acknowledged that with the current state of the art as far as Bomber Command was concerned Precision Bombing by day or night of targets on this list was not currently possible. Therefore with great reluctance Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh had accepted the recommendation that night area bombing centred on the precision targets was the best alternative until such time as the necessary conditions (of equipment, technology and personnel) existed to support a change to precision attacks. Tizard had set out in layman's terms the technical advances required to permit night time precision bombing and the current progress towards achieving them. The example of the accuracy of the German X-Gerait system and the success of KGR 100 was used to illustrate what was possible. The ability of the British defences, to to a large extent neutralise the German system was also used to show that more advanced and un-jammable guidance systems were required and the ultimate goal was a completely airborne self contained solution. It was agreed that a special unit should be formed to spear raids and set the aiming point for the follow on forces.
On a more immediate issue Sir Hugh had been pushing for an means of attacking and disrupting the Luftwaffe bombing force at it’s bases on the continent. To do this effectively would take a combination of a suitable aircraft, ordinance and tactical use. As to aircraft , The Havock , was a good candidate with it’s speed and bomb load. Getting permission for the new 25cm AI equipped versions to attack German bombers around their own bases was another matter entirely. As part of this ‘defence by offence’ Sir Hugh Dowding had charged the various AM and RAF departments with designing and commissioning a British area denial bomblet similar in functionality to the German Butterfly bomb. However the first practical design actually came from an armaments officer, who whilst in France in May had improvised an area weapon by using a stock of abandoned 3” mortar shells in a modified 250lb capacity Light bomb carrier , unfortunately this officer had subsequently been captured and the pilot who had flown the aircraft had no details of how it was done or how the mortar shells were fused. However he had reported that the container had worked and scattered the mortar bombs all over the target area. Using this Pilots report as a starting point officers in Number Two Group had independently developed their own extemporised anti invasion scatter bomb system using the SBC (Small Bomb Carrier) and 25 ld practice bombs. Now the same team on hearing of the requirement for an area denial bomb were proposing a similar weapon using either the 2” mortar shell weighing just over two pounds or the three inch mortar shell that weighed ten pounds. The bombs would be fitted with new tails and fuses designed for that purpose. How quickly these could be developed and produce was an important question and once a workable design had been completed Sir Hugh intended to push for a high priority for this new weapon. On discussing the current Luftwaffe night raids Sir Hugh had baldly stated that killing sitting birds was easier than shooting birds on the wing. So he was proposing to go after the Luftwaffe bomber bases in France, Belgium and Holland. His intention was that each and every bomber base should be located and identified. Helpfully the lack of radio discipline in the Luftwaffe bomber units made this fairly simple. The RDF system gave warning of when bombers were assembling and tracked them till they returned to their bases. As they returned RAF intruder bombers would follow them and then bomb the bases as the returning bombers were landing. By this means Sir Hugh intended to not only disrupt the Luftwaffe operations but also destroy not only bombers but ground crews as well.
In discussions with Portal as AOC Bomber Command it was agreed that several of the Blenheim IV squadrons from No 2 Group would be reassigned to form the bases of an intruder force to attack German air bases. Whilst the fields in occupied Holland and Denmark were easily accessible from their current stations some squadrons would be relocated to airfields in southern England to facilitate attacks oh Luftwaffe bases in Belgium and France.
Despite being unhappy with the temporary loss of some of his squadrons Portal was consoled by the fact that not only were most of Bomber Commands aircraft to be changed for bigger and better aircraft but also most of the squadrons diverted would later be returned to Two Group control as dedicated interceptor squadrons were formed.
Here there rose another potentially thorny issue, that was under whose command would these ‘intruder’ squadrons be. True to form Portal of course suggested that they should form part of Bomber Command. Sit Hugh Dowding however demurred stating that as they were to be ‘night intruders’ they would form part of the night fighter force under the control of Fighter Command.
Sir Hugh had put it very baldly to Portal that 1941 would be a year of building Bomber Command’s ability more than sheer numbers. To this end Portal was warned that he would be losing most of the remaining Blenheim IV squadrons from number 2 Group. Some 2 Group Squadrons would be retained to reform on the new bigger bombers but others would be transferred as operational units to other theatres. In a frank exchange of views Portal had again espoused the Trenchardian theory that strategic bombing of the enemies cities would force them to capitulate and further that with the current situation with Germany in control of Europe there was no other way for Britain to attack Germany. Therefore it was essential in Portal’s view that Bomber Command be given absolute priority on resources and personnel over all other commands whether Army, Navy or Airforce! Trying hard and successfully Sir Hugh managed to hold his temper. He suggested that if Portal would do well to remember the words of Sir Walter Raleigh from 1616. To wit that:
‘Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade. Whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself’
Sir Hugh told Portal that adherence to that simple truth had enabled Britain to create and control the greatest and most far flung empire so far seen on earth and nothing had yet changed the truth of Sir Walter’s words in the intervening centuries. Further bombing German cities in the next year would not preserve that empire but if Britain lost command of the sea, Britain would lose the world and unless the convoy losses were constrained that was a distinct possibility within the year. If Portal was not able to grasp that simple truth and Command the RAF bombers in accordance with the restraints that the situation imposed then Sir Hugh as CAS was duty bound to find someone who was capable of doing the task in hand with the resources given to them. As a fellow Old Wykehamist Sir Hugh enjoined Portal to stop politicking and to fight the common enemy.
This tough stance was echoed by Sir Peter when he visited Bomber Command headquarters a few days later. By the end of November it was apparent that Portal had accepted the reality and ever the political player was now keen to be seen as a team player. Supporting the transfer not only of the Hadley Page Hampdens to Maritime Command but actively pursuing a more vigorous airborne mining campaign not just of coastal supply lines but of the inland waterways as well. The transfer of Bleniem squadrons to the middle east was also being expedited. These losses to Bomber Commands Order of Battle were mitigated by the fact that no less than five new squadrons of Wellingtons, Four of Manchester and Three of Hadley Page Halifax’s were formed before the years end. Though of course it would take some months for these squadrons to become fully operational, they were gaining operational experience by carrying out coastal mining from northern Norway down to the U-Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay.
After a series of meetings involving principally Sir Peter Cunliff-Lister , Sir Hugh Dowding, Sir Henery Tizard and Portal a proposal was made to the war cabinet in mid November to define the operational priorities of RAF Bomber Command and therefore it’s development path. In basic terms the report recommend that for maximum effect on the enemy to promote the British war Aims the RAF should prioritise targets in Germany and the Occupied nations as follows; Fuel Production (principally oil) Power Production and Distribution, Transport nodes (principally to disrupt fuel distribution) and lastly industrial capacity. All these are in effect precision targets. Contained within this report was a proposal from the Vickers Engineer Barnes Wallis titled; ‘A note on a method of attacking the Axis Powers’This out lined in engineering terms the reasoning behind targeting Power Generation, fuel production and the distribution of the same. The note also contained an appraisal of the weapons required to effectively damage such installations. Having such a technical and scientific appraisal gave weight to the argument but also a road map for the future .
The report acknowledged that with the current state of the art as far as Bomber Command was concerned Precision Bombing by day or night of targets on this list was not currently possible. Therefore with great reluctance Sir Phillip and Sir Hugh had accepted the recommendation that night area bombing centred on the precision targets was the best alternative until such time as the necessary conditions (of equipment, technology and personnel) existed to support a change to precision attacks. Tizard had set out in layman's terms the technical advances required to permit night time precision bombing and the current progress towards achieving them. The example of the accuracy of the German X-Gerait system and the success of KGR 100 was used to illustrate what was possible. The ability of the British defences, to to a large extent neutralise the German system was also used to show that more advanced and un-jammable guidance systems were required and the ultimate goal was a completely airborne self contained solution. It was agreed that a special unit should be formed to spear raids and set the aiming point for the follow on forces.
On a more immediate issue Sir Hugh had been pushing for an means of attacking and disrupting the Luftwaffe bombing force at it’s bases on the continent. To do this effectively would take a combination of a suitable aircraft, ordinance and tactical use. As to aircraft , The Havock , was a good candidate with it’s speed and bomb load. Getting permission for the new 25cm AI equipped versions to attack German bombers around their own bases was another matter entirely. As part of this ‘defence by offence’ Sir Hugh Dowding had charged the various AM and RAF departments with designing and commissioning a British area denial bomblet similar in functionality to the German Butterfly bomb. However the first practical design actually came from an armaments officer, who whilst in France in May had improvised an area weapon by using a stock of abandoned 3” mortar shells in a modified 250lb capacity Light bomb carrier , unfortunately this officer had subsequently been captured and the pilot who had flown the aircraft had no details of how it was done or how the mortar shells were fused. However he had reported that the container had worked and scattered the mortar bombs all over the target area. Using this Pilots report as a starting point officers in Number Two Group had independently developed their own extemporised anti invasion scatter bomb system using the SBC (Small Bomb Carrier) and 25 ld practice bombs. Now the same team on hearing of the requirement for an area denial bomb were proposing a similar weapon using either the 2” mortar shell weighing just over two pounds or the three inch mortar shell that weighed ten pounds. The bombs would be fitted with new tails and fuses designed for that purpose. How quickly these could be developed and produce was an important question and once a workable design had been completed Sir Hugh intended to push for a high priority for this new weapon. On discussing the current Luftwaffe night raids Sir Hugh had baldly stated that killing sitting birds was easier than shooting birds on the wing. So he was proposing to go after the Luftwaffe bomber bases in France, Belgium and Holland. His intention was that each and every bomber base should be located and identified. Helpfully the lack of radio discipline in the Luftwaffe bomber units made this fairly simple. The RDF system gave warning of when bombers were assembling and tracked them till they returned to their bases. As they returned RAF intruder bombers would follow them and then bomb the bases as the returning bombers were landing. By this means Sir Hugh intended to not only disrupt the Luftwaffe operations but also destroy not only bombers but ground crews as well.
In discussions with Portal as AOC Bomber Command it was agreed that several of the Blenheim IV squadrons from No 2 Group would be reassigned to form the bases of an intruder force to attack German air bases. Whilst the fields in occupied Holland and Denmark were easily accessible from their current stations some squadrons would be relocated to airfields in southern England to facilitate attacks oh Luftwaffe bases in Belgium and France.
Despite being unhappy with the temporary loss of some of his squadrons Portal was consoled by the fact that not only were most of Bomber Commands aircraft to be changed for bigger and better aircraft but also most of the squadrons diverted would later be returned to Two Group control as dedicated interceptor squadrons were formed.
Here there rose another potentially thorny issue, that was under whose command would these ‘intruder’ squadrons be. True to form Portal of course suggested that they should form part of Bomber Command. Sit Hugh Dowding however demurred stating that as they were to be ‘night intruders’ they would form part of the night fighter force under the control of Fighter Command.
Sir Hugh had put it very baldly to Portal that 1941 would be a year of building Bomber Command’s ability more than sheer numbers. To this end Portal was warned that he would be losing most of the remaining Blenheim IV squadrons from number 2 Group. Some 2 Group Squadrons would be retained to reform on the new bigger bombers but others would be transferred as operational units to other theatres. In a frank exchange of views Portal had again espoused the Trenchardian theory that strategic bombing of the enemies cities would force them to capitulate and further that with the current situation with Germany in control of Europe there was no other way for Britain to attack Germany. Therefore it was essential in Portal’s view that Bomber Command be given absolute priority on resources and personnel over all other commands whether Army, Navy or Airforce! Trying hard and successfully Sir Hugh managed to hold his temper. He suggested that if Portal would do well to remember the words of Sir Walter Raleigh from 1616. To wit that:
‘Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade. Whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself’
Sir Hugh told Portal that adherence to that simple truth had enabled Britain to create and control the greatest and most far flung empire so far seen on earth and nothing had yet changed the truth of Sir Walter’s words in the intervening centuries. Further bombing German cities in the next year would not preserve that empire but if Britain lost command of the sea, Britain would lose the world and unless the convoy losses were constrained that was a distinct possibility within the year. If Portal was not able to grasp that simple truth and Command the RAF bombers in accordance with the restraints that the situation imposed then Sir Hugh as CAS was duty bound to find someone who was capable of doing the task in hand with the resources given to them. As a fellow Old Wykehamist Sir Hugh enjoined Portal to stop politicking and to fight the common enemy.
This tough stance was echoed by Sir Peter when he visited Bomber Command headquarters a few days later. By the end of November it was apparent that Portal had accepted the reality and ever the political player was now keen to be seen as a team player. Supporting the transfer not only of the Hadley Page Hampdens to Maritime Command but actively pursuing a more vigorous airborne mining campaign not just of coastal supply lines but of the inland waterways as well. The transfer of Bleniem squadrons to the middle east was also being expedited. These losses to Bomber Commands Order of Battle were mitigated by the fact that no less than five new squadrons of Wellingtons, Four of Manchester and Three of Hadley Page Halifax’s were formed before the years end. Though of course it would take some months for these squadrons to become fully operational, they were gaining operational experience by carrying out coastal mining from northern Norway down to the U-Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay.
Much is made of Trenchard-ist dogma. To have the power to overturn that is a huge advance for the RAF. Gardening missions are time and effort well spent at a time when many targets further inland are hard to navigate to and identify.
Are they going to improve basic navigation of Bomber Command crews so there are no more unfortunate accidental bombing of Belfast and it's environs.
So what? They'll slowly move towards direct attacks on industrial targets once they're satisfied they've got the kit and experience for precision bombing at that level.
Great to see this back and the RAF's got the right idea, I assume there's still the Oslo report to come or will bomber command be more open about its 'accuracy' And the RAF is adopting a counter force option which was always something that surprised me as they didn't seem to go after Luftwaffe air bases in France or even go after ones that were home to night fighters.
The Oslo report is already causing ripples as it has been read and it's authenticity accepted. As to navigation, there has been a root and branch revision of RAF Navigation training since the arrival of Francis Chichester and his teaching methods. Currently the Best Navigators are going into Maritime Command for obvious reasons but generally ITTL RAF Navigators can reliable arrive at the correct city at least.
How will thinking on a long-range escort Spitfire evolve here?
AIUI you can fit sufficient fuel/drop tanks on to a Spitfire to escort bombers to the Ruhr - it just wasn't done OTL. Presumably because night bombing meant no need.
Yet hindsight tells us it was escorted raids, escorted correctly, that gutted LW strength over Europe in 1944. Thus, we can imagine a PAM producing that result a year or two earlier.
But yet a lesson of the BoB, OTL and here, is that this won't actually work - against a competently led, integrated air defence you'll just attrite your own force for little gain.
So maybe a PAM analysis of the BoB will identify what the LW did right and wrong in the BoB and hence form a blueprint of how to fight Lancs through to the Ruhr in daylight, thus allowing daylight carpet bombing of precision targets
while simultaneously forcing decisive battle on the overstretched LW?
AIUI you can fit sufficient fuel/drop tanks on to a Spitfire to escort bombers to the Ruhr - it just wasn't done OTL. Presumably because night bombing meant no need.
Yet hindsight tells us it was escorted raids, escorted correctly, that gutted LW strength over Europe in 1944. Thus, we can imagine a PAM producing that result a year or two earlier.
But yet a lesson of the BoB, OTL and here, is that this won't actually work - against a competently led, integrated air defence you'll just attrite your own force for little gain.
So maybe a PAM analysis of the BoB will identify what the LW did right and wrong in the BoB and hence form a blueprint of how to fight Lancs through to the Ruhr in daylight, thus allowing daylight carpet bombing of precision targets
while simultaneously forcing decisive battle on the overstretched LW?As long as they don't repeat the useless and counter productive fighter sweeps over France.