AHC/PC: Finland accepts Soviet territorial demands in 1939, or loses war that year?

Could the Soviets have imposed on the Finns faster?


  • Total voters
    15

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
So, was there any plausible way the Finns might have accepted the minimum territorial demands Stalin thought he needed for protection of Leningrad?

Secondarily, was there any way, without disrupting prior wartime diplomatic and military events, for the USSR to defeat the Finns in 8 weeks or less and impose terms on them and avoid embarrassment?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Okay, so early settlement of the "Finnish problem"....

...wins the poll by a vote of 6 to 4.

How would an early positive resolution of Soviet claims on Finland (either through Finnish non-resistance or quick defeat) begin to effect Stalin's global foreign policy, and internal military policy, from January 1940 onward?

How might it affect the calculations and moves of other powers?

For comparison's sake, in OTL, after the end of the Finnish War on 13 March 1940, Moscow's next expansionist initiatives were the annexation of the Baltic republics in June 1940, and the occupation of Bessarabia in June-July 1940.

This was followed by initiatives to put pressure on Turkey for improved Soviet rights in the straits, failed attempts to form an alliance with Bulgaria, and establishment of diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia, as well as haggling over possible terms of the Soviets joining the Axis (in and around October-November 1940), and the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1940.

A knock-on effect of the Soviet move into Bessarabia was the rendering of Romania more vulnerable to Hungarian and Bulgarian pressures (Vienna Award, August-September 1940) and the German establishment of alliance and basing rights in Romania (September 1940).

There were no doubt local contributions to the timing of all these developments, as well as effects based on events in the Western Front. But perhaps the timing and conduct of the winter war in OTL influenced these events a great deal, making them subject to change if the USSR is more successful more rapidly against Finland in an ATL.
 
Here's my answer to the questions in the OP. Firstly, the Finnish government might have well accepted the demands. It was a political decision made under duress, after all, and even slight and late changes to the OTL might sway the decision towards acquiescence. Famously even Mannerheim supported accepting the demands because he thought Finland was in military terms too weak to successfully resist the USSR.

Secondly, in the case of the actual war, I can't see the Soviets do that much better without a POD or several before at least summer 1939. After all, come autumn/winter 1939 all the major things that made the Finnish Army able to resist the Red Army would be pretty much the same, and thus the Soviet forces would initially face the same brick wall they did IOTL.

The only way for a quick victory with a late POD I can see would be a combination of the two issues: Finland accepts the demands, causing internal political turmoil and and a notable drop in national morale; and then the USSR follows up with a quick, decisive attack when the Finnish troops have just started to withdraw in early/mid November. In this case a Soviet victory before January 1940 would in no way be impossible.

I just outlined a possible timeline for Finland accepting most of the Soviet demands and then being "peacefully" joined to the Soviet bloc in the same fashion and roughly same, slow timetable as the Baltics in another thread.

But a quick attack might have also been quite possible. IOTL, the discussions between Stalin and the Finnish delegation in the Kremlin ended on November 9th (de facto, though the Finns didn't immediately know that but waited in Moscow until the 13th for a new summons to Stalin's presence). Now, it is known that the Red Navy on the Baltic had already received orders to be ready for war against Finland on 3rd November, and that Voroshilov ordered the Leningrad military district to start war preparations against Finland between November 11th to 15th: at this point the decision to start war against Finland on November 30th had already been made.

Stalin being the cautious gambler he was, I think it is more likely that the armed forces would stand down for the while and the Soviet actions on Finland would follow the same path as with Estonia, with a slow eroding of the national will to fight by various diplomatic and military hijinks and an invasion in summer 1940.

But by most accounts the Soviets were ready to go to war whatever the Finnish answer was. Therefore if it suits Stalin's fancy, he might well order an immediate invasion even if the Finns accept the demands. In this case, the Finnish government and army would be definitely in a poorer position they were when the Winter War begun IOTL, and it might lead to a reasonably quick defeat.

So when you think about the butterflies and knock-on effects, it would be good to take in to account both of these options, the immediate, successful invasion and the "Baltic path": necessarily, they would have affect Stalin's actions and policies in 1940 in different ways.
 
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