Could it be possible to have a partial break up of the Soviet Union, where they lose control of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Baltic countries, but keep Belarus and Ukraine? How would this affect the development of the 1990s and beyond?
AHC: Partial Break up of the Soviet Union?
- Thread starter VictorVanBakker
- Start date
Konrad Sartorius
Banned
If you butterfly away the August Coup of 1991 and make some modifications in Soviet policy in Central Asia +Caucuses then we could realistically obtain the outcome you propose.
A Russia with Belarus and Ukraine especially appended would have 60 million more people and much more of its formerly state-run industry intact. Assuming someone like Putin still comes to power and reins in overt lawlessness a bit, Russia would throw significantly more weight internationally.
Would that be a good or a bad thing? On one hand, such a Greater Russia might behave like a more sated power, comfortable with what it has and less obsessed about its post-Soviet humiliation and weakness than OTL Russia under Putin. On the other hand, having control of more of the former USSR (and former Russian Empire), such a Russia might push more strongly and earlier for return of its "rightful" influence in the southern Caucasus, in the Balkans and in the Baltic states, causing more trouble in these ares than IOTL.
What effect would the existence of this Greater Russia have on NATO expansion ITTL? If as a result of Russia being stronger, NATO does not expand to include the Baltics and, say, Romania and Bulgaria, would this Russia eventually aim to retake the Baltics, using the large Russian minorities there the way Russia has been using ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine in the recent conflict? With no NATO umbrella to protect them, the Baltic states certainly would be wary of something like this happening and we can be sure that Moscow would attempt to meddle in their internal affairs at least as much and probably more than IOTL.
Giving Russia more power doesn't make it (or any other country) less power-hungry. The Baltic states and the Balkans would certainly feel the squeeze. The Baltics would probably be able to work out some sort of Finlandization process, though, with a Russia that is more confident in its own ability.
NATO probably doesn't expand beyond the Oder in this scenario, but the Balkans would defintely be a source of tension for a long time (as it is IOTL).
For the Russian and Ukrainian populace, it's probably a good thing. They will have the same issues associated with corruption and "shock therapy" that OTL brought, but at least the union would preserve the order needed for stable trade and basic relations. OTOH, if Moscow pisses off autonomy-minded Ukrainians in the early 90s, it could end up being another Chechnya.
NATO probably doesn't expand beyond the Oder in this scenario, but the Balkans would defintely be a source of tension for a long time (as it is IOTL).
For the Russian and Ukrainian populace, it's probably a good thing. They will have the same issues associated with corruption and "shock therapy" that OTL brought, but at least the union would preserve the order needed for stable trade and basic relations. OTOH, if Moscow pisses off autonomy-minded Ukrainians in the early 90s, it could end up being another Chechnya.
A limited SU/Greater Russia that kept say Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan would be an interesting beast. It would control a lot more petroleum wealth at least. The land border with China would also be much longer and it would still have an Afghanistan border too, which would make the 1990s interesting.
Really depends on circumstances of creation of a such Union and what ukrainians and belorussians feel about it. It is much more likely to implode in a Yugoslavia-like conflict then be a satisfied stable state if sutuation is roughly as in OTL.
Stronger Russia is almost bound to act to "protect" russian-speaking population in Baltics and Central Asia. It theoretically could alleviate some problems with direct and indirect discrimination of such population but only if all sides are reasonable, which is frankly unlikely to happen. More likely stronger Russia will try to resolve situation with force, though maybe not outright annexation.
As long as Russian Empire exist in any recognizable form there can be no peace. Of course it does not mean that peace comes as soon as Empire disappears alas.
Stronger Russia is almost bound to act to "protect" russian-speaking population in Baltics and Central Asia. It theoretically could alleviate some problems with direct and indirect discrimination of such population but only if all sides are reasonable, which is frankly unlikely to happen. More likely stronger Russia will try to resolve situation with force, though maybe not outright annexation.
As long as Russian Empire exist in any recognizable form there can be no peace. Of course it does not mean that peace comes as soon as Empire disappears alas.
I think Stans are most likely to stay in, due to economy. Belarus probably. Ukraine possibly but could really go either way. Baltics no way. Caucasus, I don't know.
As for NATO/EU expansion, This SU will face msot of OTL problems. economy, political instability, search for identity. It will be bigger and more diverse so solutions could be found anywhere. Former communsit bloc will rush to West, as OTL, as a confirmation that we belong there now. Baltics would do same. Question is what would these organsiations do. Of those EU is less controversial but EU and NATO were seen as two sides of same coin, economic and military integration to the West. So while it is possible that EU will invite balts but NATO won't this is not likely to go down well there.
As for NATO/EU expansion, This SU will face msot of OTL problems. economy, political instability, search for identity. It will be bigger and more diverse so solutions could be found anywhere. Former communsit bloc will rush to West, as OTL, as a confirmation that we belong there now. Baltics would do same. Question is what would these organsiations do. Of those EU is less controversial but EU and NATO were seen as two sides of same coin, economic and military integration to the West. So while it is possible that EU will invite balts but NATO won't this is not likely to go down well there.
I think the more interesting scenario here is if the Soviet Union collapsed only as a political system but was replaced with a Russian republic (or constitutional monarchy!) that lost only the Baltics and Georgia and retained the rest.
It would have rid itself of the most unhappy parts of the empire while also securing its industry and territorial security (no US military bases in Central Asia, for example).
It would have rid itself of the most unhappy parts of the empire while also securing its industry and territorial security (no US military bases in Central Asia, for example).
There is a point to be made that the OTL Baltic policies that have been discriminatory towards ethnic Russians (that is, Soviet-era Russian immigrants) were partly implemented because the majority populations feared that if the ethnic Russians gain automatic citizenship, they will have a lot of political power (up to 30% of the electorate) and Moscow can use them as pawns to meddle in the nation's internal affairs, also through elections.
Looking at things from this perspective, if Russia is stronger, there is even more incentive for the majority populations in these nations to try to politically marginalize the ethnic Russian populations, not less. Assuming Moscow will meddle anyway, they would want to take as many weapons away from Russia as they can. Even if the ethnic Russians would have full citizenship rights right off the bat, Moscow could still cook up "abuses" and "discrimination" through its propaganda, claims it could use for its political purposes in the Baltic states.
It is a sorry state of affairs all around, and it is hard to see how things ITTL could be better for both the ethnic Russians and the local majority populations in these three small countries.
I think he meant a political union between the three Baltic states, not with Russia.
About such a Baltic union... When ever the idea comes up for post-1991, I think one obvious problem is rarely brought up: there would be 2,9 million Lithuanians, 1,7 million Russians, 1,4 million Latvians and 1 million Estonians in that union in total. So in a Baltic union, Russians would make c. 24% of the population and be the second biggest ethnic and political group. So the collective bargaining power of the Russian population would be quite significant as it would even dwarf the two smaller Baltic ethnicities.
One could argue that a Baltic union would be even more under the threat of Moscow-directed political meddling than the individual Baltic states, if the Russians there can be made into cooperating across borders and pulling in the same direction, and if the Baltic peoples squabble among themselves. Also, in such a union made of several peoples, giving offial recognition and full political rights to the ethnic Russians would be a very reasonable demand, and that would serve to increase the political power of the Russian bloc.
Also, is it possible the Soviets/Russians try to shave off a country centered on Lviv so they can hold the rest of Ukraine closer to them?