isn’t this largely a matter of sticking a decent high-altitude engine into it? The bf109 was after all pretty much a contemporary of the 109 and the Germans managed to squeeze an amazing amount of performance out of it. The US instead deployed better more modern aircraft rather than pursue every possible option for wringing more out of the old stuff.
The Allison was not perfected to the same stage the Merlin was. Also, the decision to turbo from exhaust instead of supercharge off the crankshaft was a P-38 decision that misled Allison engineers down the wrong aspiration path. It could have been fixed if caught early in the engine's development cycle. But it is now 1941 and the war is on and the necessary fixes and back-fits will take years. It is just as quick to take the existing Merlin and license it and drop it into the better Mustang. Curtiss tried to Merlin the P-40 and they boloed it. Same problems with cleanup and windtunnel time not put in.
The failure of most such RAF operations was that they went after targets the Germans didn’t care that much about, and could therefore decline combat if they felt the odds were against them. Things like massed raids against the Ruhr or an invasion they can‘t ignore. A sustained offensive against airfields would likewise force them to fight or cede control, as OTL. So in the run up to D-Day there would be options for blunting the Luftwaffe to the point they could be held off the beaches.
Hence the USAAF target priorities lists and the American air generals' obsessions with choke points in industrial production (ball bearings). Should have hit Ploesti and kept hitting it at all costs until the oil choke-off happened. Same for the coal fields. Kill the coal miners and impede mining operations. Disrupt the U-boat war cause dead coal miners=s no U-boat crew recruits. LACK of USAAF imagination. Post war OBVIOUS because of the USSBS lessons learned, but during the war? Second best was the bomber bait and kill the LW pilot cadre gambit. At least that one worked, because without it there can be no amphibious landings on northern France. LET ME WRITE THAT CLEARLY...
If the LW does not die IN GERMANY, there can be no OVERLORD. If as few as 300 LW TACAIR or so sorties can strafe or bomb the transports off Sword, Gold or Juno and break up the first waves of Anglo-Canadians then the vital left shoulder which the Anglo-Canadians have to establish so the Americans can try for Cherbourg does not happen, the Mulberries do not successfully deploy and the Wallies cannot sustain a lodgment. Then you have to go with Plan B which is too horrible to contemplate for a Wally offensive option.
Maybe it wouldn’t be feasible to weaken the Luftwaffe as much as they were OTL, but OTL the Luftwaffe was outnumbered something like 40:1 over Normandy. And that’s with the US going the “quality not quantity“ route.
This is the result of the first competently fought air campaign in WWII that was not purely defensive in nature. I think the original American model was the French air service's air campaign of 1917-1918 where they wore the German air corps down through pilot attrition. Veterans of WWI such as General Spaatz would have remembered what the French did and how they did it. Murder German pilots by any means necessary. If that meant dead bomber crews and dead French fighter pilots, too, the French played the attrition card. They also made sure to make their machines just good enough to make the numbers game work. Wonder why the AdA forgot what they did in WWI?
Burying the FW190s under an avalanche of P-40s would be rough on the allied pilots, but it would work. Bear in mind that the early unescorted B-17 raids were taking losses of 10% per mission and the generals in charge were going “hmm, if these losses get much worse we may need to re-think”, they only folded when losses were getting to double that.
The unescorted bombers were sent in, not because the American air generals thought the bombers could do it without fighters, but because the targets the American bomber generals wanted to "precision" hit, the choke points, were beyond the range of any fighter (Aside from the A6M and the P-38 which was not ready.) known to be able to reach from the British midlands. The planned fighters would not be ready until 1943 at the earliest. In the meantime, the LW had a practical free hand against the Russians. SOMETHING had to be done to take German TACAIR off the Red Army. The Russians (Stalin, the rat bastard.) would not allow British or US TACAIR to help on the eastern front, thinking politically and logistically, that Russian pilots flying Wally aircraft made more Russian front sense. Cannot have Russians seeing British and American air forces ACTUALLY saving the Red Army IN RUSSIA. Makes Stalin look bad in front of the Russian people. So let the Wallies do it from the British Isles. Cynical save his own neck Stalin, there, folks. What's 40,000 American and British bomber crews killed as LW fighter bait as long as Uncle Joe can still draw oxygen and murder a few hundred thousand more "political enemies" during his nation's fight for its very life?
Anyway... as soon as the fighters were ready, the escorts went in. This was always American planned. The USAAF were not idiots. It was a technical issue of time in hours aloft in machines that could compete with German target defense interceptors. Pure and simple.
McP.