AHC: Non ASB Axis victory?

[Deckhand]

<weary sigh>
Yeah ok - Ribbentrop is a super villain that can see the future

Go and read the wiki page on Ribbentrop - the damage that one man does to the nazi cause really is staggering. A half smart Ribbentrop might delay WW2 for years.
"largely due to Ribbentrops influence it has been argued that in 1939 Germany went to war with the country it regarded as an ally (Britain) and was allied with the country it wished to regard as an enemy (Russia)"

Oh sure, I agree. But unless you change his dna, and his upbringing, ribbentrop is ribbentrop. and he will act in much the same way. If you change him to be smarter and more rational, there is no guarantee he is FM or a senior Nazi at all.

That is the fundamental problem with all these smarter nazis scenarios, smarter nazis, or in fact authoritarian right wing german leaders of the old fashioned junker variety, were too rational to do half of what hitler and crew did. The nazis were crazy enough to start a war that they were too crazy to win. Rational german leaders would not have started it in the first place.

 

[Julian]

Define what you mean by Soviet defeat. Hitler's plan AA line was not feasible, but something along the lines of a Brest-Litovsk is not outside the realm of possibility...provided the West is not involved in the war.

The only part of the air war that wore down the LW as the BoB; the Blitz actually saw LW strength increase, because the loss rate was so low until 1942 that strength was climbing, not decreasing, during the night bombing.
The earlier they start the night bombing and the longer it runs, the more Britain has its strength worn down due to lack of resources, making it increasingly hard to pivot away from daylight defense increase to night defenses.

What other front was there in 1940-41? ITTL the LW won't have a reason to get involved in Libya if they start bombing Liverpool in July, because the convoys that allowed the British to launch Op. Compass originated from Liverpool; being bottled up by air deployed naval mines in the Mersey, while port facilities are being degraded by night bombing seriously hampers the British ability to unload/load convoys once France falls, because of the port areas in the West, the only area 'safe' from German naval units and close LW bases, have limited areas to handle the necessary tonnage.

Also because once its enacted it becomes much much harder for the British to import the necessary raw materials and machine tools it needs to make the defenses that are necessary to defend the ports. Also there is the time factor; AI radar cannot be moved up any sooner than it was available IOTL, which means effective units are not available until March-April 1941 and then only in limited numbers. Even the Beaufighter needed time to get operational, otherwise rushing it means accidents and problems, delaying its effective usage. Also getting the necessary machine tools and raw materials for its require getting them into the country, which is disrupted by port bombing. Its kind of hard to start making them without imported aluminum or special purpose machines (of course there are general purpose machine tools, but that requires a lot of training to introduce a totally new type of aircraft and reduces output, pushing back their introduction vis-a-vis OTL). Then there is opportunity cost; what is Britain not producing to make night defenses? With less imports thanks to the mining/bombing of Liverpool and other ports there is much less material incoming than IOTL, so rather than just having OTL's resources to choose between, Britain has to cut across the board AND then make a choice about what gets cut to supply night defense projects.

Where are the resources coming from to build up other ports? How long would it take? AFAIK building up ports with modern facilities is a process of years, rather than months. Then there is the issue of building up sufficient rail connections between these other ports and the rest of Britain; one of the major problems of the Western ports as that there were only a few that had the necessary rail connection to support the necessary volume of imports needed (Merseyside, Clydeside, and Bristol/Avonmouth; the later two only accounted for less than 15% of import capacity, meaning if Liverpool goes down, then the others could not pick up the slack). So any build up of other ports requires the build up of rail infrastructure. Not only that, but it requires the right port conditions (tides, natural harbor conditions, distance from LW bases). This would be a process of years, which would at the same time drain resources from the war effort; opportunity cost again. What can Britain spare when its imports are being smashed, limiting the ability of Britain to fight? What doesn't get produced to spend years building up alternate rail and port infrastructure?

That is another assumption that doesn't necessarily hold water. IOTL what was US aid prior to May 1941? In September 1940 there were the 50 destroyers, all of which were nearly useless and required between 9-12 months to even get into service. Lend-Lease didn't pass Congress until March 1941 and only after it was apparent that the Germans weren't going to defeat the British via bombing (US Congressmen were very leary of giving Britain anything until it was confirmed the British weren't going to lose and turn it over to the Germans at the peace deal). Actually Lend-Lease didn't start until May 1941 though, which meant that the British were still paying cash for imports, by this time using Belgian loans, as Britain had run out of hard currency in January 1941.

Roosevelt may have been fully committed to keeping Britain in the war, but he couldn't get the votes to do much until March 1941, once the worst of the Blitz had passed. The US public didn't want to get involved in the war in Europe in the majority until some time in 1941. Here if the British looked like they were going to be in for serious trouble right after France falls, then there is opposition in Congress to supporting the British for fear of whatever materials given ending up in German hands. Without the BoB to rally the US public to the cause of Britain, there isn't going to be the same sort of support.

The BoB was the Western Front 'Moscow Moment' when it was clear the Germans weren't going to take Britain out of the war quickly. It was Hitler's first major defeat and showed the US that Britain was worth supporting. Without that moment, rather a start to a blockade, then the US public doesn't have the romantic story of US pilots helping the British in their hour of need, nor do they get the story of the evil Germans bombing British civilians in terror raids (Liverpool is a legitimate military target, as was Hamburg when the British started trying to bomb it in 1939). Especially if the import situation gets serious, rather than the US public being willing to support Britain, they instead will look at it as a lost cause and resource drain when the American military needs all of the US's resources to build itself up. IOTL Britain was viewed as a reliable shield to give the US time to build up it military and as a future base against the Germans, but that was only because the British had proven they could survive on their own; here that's not the case, as they wouldn't have a 'shining moment' to show they could beat the LW in a standup fight. Rather the LW would be able to bomb and mine the British lifeline with impunity (especially in 1940), which would result in serious damage to their ability to resist. So they end up looking like a lost cause, rather than a cause worth supporting.

Any kind of peace is impossible; the attitude of the Soviet Union's government and military was unequivocally committed to a war to the death. Despite some rumors to the contrary (Mostly stemming from attempts at delaying tactics in 1941 that never got off the ground) there's no evidence that Stalin ever seriously considered peace. Even the people themselves regarded the war as one that would end "At the Urals or at Berlin"; Vasily Grossman's private notes taken from his conversations with civilians, military personnel, etc gives enormous insights into what the common people believed.

Indeed the Battle of Britain was the most costly phase for the Luftwaffe, but the attrition from night bombing was, in comparison to actual results achieved, insufficient to justify a continued campaign. The attrition of experienced pilots is also an even greater threat. Further that attrition will only continue to increase overtime as British defensive methods improve. Resources will also be needed for other theaters; if Germany isn't carrying out a campaign against the Soviet Union then it will almost certainly be campaigning in North Africa, which will require an enormous commitment of aircraft in order to achieve an improvement over OTL (Though it's debatable how much of an improvement really could be achieved).

There's also the problem of achieving any kind of unity of strategy for an air campaign against Britain. Milch, Goering, Jeschonnek, Hitler, etc all differed in their opinions about how the air war should be prosecuted. This prevents a single concentrated campaign against any one target, diluting resources for different operations. The Germans also lacked reliable means to determine the effects of their attacks, leading to an inability to justify continued aerial operations on a large scale. At the same time the ability of the Luftwaffe to conduct a strategic campaign was exaggerated pre-war, overestimating how much damage it could do and thus leading to insufficient force commitment. Having Wever survive and shift the Luftwaffe towards a strategic air force would resolve some of these difficulties, but that creates another set of butterflies entirely in the early war.

The entire basis of your proposed plan combines hindsight with an overestimation of the strategic unity and ability of those directing the Luftwaffe. In July Britain was believed to be on the verge of collapse and vulnerable to invasion; a long term campaign of strangulation appeared unnecessary, and focusing on such a specific subset of that campaign requires hindsight; far more likely is a general, spread out campaign against multiple targets which as dilutes the Luftwaffe's resources.

Comparing expanding port facilities elsewhere and shifting shipping to constructing Mulberries is a bit fallacious. Expanding existing port facilities and rail lines, especially in areas outside of potential air attack, is a much simpler task than constructing a new dock within a few days on open beach. Plus the Luftwaffe's campaign against shipping would be a gradual campaign of strangulation, not producing instant results, thus giving the British time to both counter it directly (Air defenses, etc) and indirectly (Expanding other ports). It's also notable that the Allies during their landing operations in Sicily and Italy loaded and unloaded hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies onto open beaches.

You're also underestimating the strength and support for lend lease and aid to Britain. IOTL polls in Fall 1940 showed a clear majority in favor of unconditional aid to Britain, even if it risked potential war. Indeed, the main obstacle to lend lease was that, except for the initial months of summer 1940 where opinion was evenly divided, the public believed that Britain would eventually win the war and thus that enormous amount of aid were unnecessary. The public above all supported defeating Germany, but with the smallest cost to America. Lend lease was never even suggested until December 1940, when Britain was unable to continue with the cash and carry policy, and greater aid became necessary to defeat Germany. From there public opinion sharply favored lend lease, and the only obstacle were isolationists and anti-Roosevelt Republicans in Congress who were defeated by March.

If Britain is suffering more economically, Roosevelt will in turn adjust his policies towards greater economic aid sooner. Public support was available even in late summer or fall 1940 for lend lease, and with it passing in late 1940 Britain would be receiving a major morale and economic boost even sooner than IOTL.

That's not to mitigate the effects of an earlier German shift to strategic bombing as opposed to trying to gain air superiority; it's certainly a more cost effective method, and worse for Britain. But it's not a war winner as you imply, and isn't worth sacrificing the vast economic boost Germany received from conquering most of the western Soviet Union.

 

[M79]

Points for your timeline that could be considered, in no particular order:

1. Make the Germans *appear* to support the Ukrainian and other minority desires to see the Communists defeated. Turn them on each other and deal with the victors after the war.

2. Contain Italian Fascist incompetence by keeping them neutral. Italy is to become a big pro-German supply house for vital war material via neutral powers in exchange for key territories after the war (Greece, Tunisia, Corsica, Dalmatia, and chunks of SE France). "Volunteers" can be recruited as needed and Germany will license and/or buy Italian-made "variants" of needed war material.

3. Storm into Russia starting in March instead of June and have Stalin killed or captured as Moscow is bombed. He elected to stay despite the percieved danger and his death will cause significant disruption of the USSR organization.

4. *Maybe* one scenario would be to have Stalin die following an invasion of Moscow and Hitler die for any number of reasons around the same time. Germany and Moscow want peace, a formal treaty is discussed but not made. It lays the groundwork for a later treaty after German planes get into bombing range of Tankograd et al

5. Japan needs to stay away from angering the US such that she does not draw Washington into the war. This can include diverting forces into Russia proper and cutting off Vladivostok with an eye on cutting off Irkutsk and isolating a large Russian army in Siberia, though that is pushing the ASB boundary.

 

[Julian]

Points for your timeline that could be considered, in no particular order:

1. Make the Germans *appear* to support the Ukrainian and other minority desires to see the Communists defeated. Turn them on each other and deal with the victors after the war.

2. Contain Italian Fascist incompetence by keeping them neutral. Italy is to become a big pro-German supply house for vital war material via neutral powers in exchange for key territories after the war (Greece, Tunisia, Corsica, Dalmatia, and chunks of SE France). "Volunteers" can be recruited as needed and Germany will license and/or buy Italian-made "variants" of needed war material.

3. Storm into Russia starting in March instead of June and have Stalin killed or captured as Moscow is bombed. He elected to stay despite the percieved danger and his death will cause significant disruption of the USSR organization.

4. *Maybe* one scenario would be to have Stalin die following an invasion of Moscow and Hitler die for any number of reasons around the same time. Germany and Moscow want peace, a formal treaty is discussed but not made. It lays the groundwork for a later treaty after German planes get into bombing range of Tankograd et al

5. Japan needs to stay away from angering the US such that she does not draw Washington into the war. This can include diverting forces into Russia proper and cutting off Vladivostok with an eye on cutting off Irkutsk and isolating a large Russian army in Siberia, though that is pushing the ASB boundary.

1. The Ukrainian nationalists weren't stupid, nor were they patient. They realized within weeks that the Germans had no interest in giving them any autonomy. As soon as their desires weren't met they went insurgent. And in any case, the Nazis aren't about to go around promising groups they consider to be animals anything.

2. Which bites Germany in the ass in later years of the war when it can't build up a fuel reserve because it can't capture it from Italy as it did IOTL; likewise, it can't get Italian forces in the east.

3. Starting in March would leave Germany bogged down in mud and swollen rivers until June.

4. No one considered negotiating with Germany; even Zhukov and Vasilevsky were patriotic and committed to the Soviet Union. It was a war to the death.

5. Japan's military would have to redeploy hundreds of thousands of men, vehicles, horses, etc to Manchuria, delaying an offensive until late 1941. Further, it lacked the modern equipment to achieve any kind of success, or the fuel to sustain its war effort for more than a year, even assuming Britain doesn't declare war. Further, there was an enormous bloc within the Japanese government and military opposing an invasion of the Soviet Union. America will also inevitably enter the war by 1942; it was already de facto at war in the Atlantic, and becoming increasingly aggressive; all that was required was another incident to spark an official war.

 

[M79]

1. The Ukrainian nationalists weren't stupid, nor were they patient. They realized within weeks that the Germans had no interest in giving them any autonomy. As soon as their desires weren't met they went insurgent. And in any case, the Nazis aren't about to go around promising groups they consider to be animals anything.

Probably because getting treated like servants or worse tends to shatter your worldview of a "liberator". Again, the Germans should *play nice* with the Ukrainians and wait until the end of the war to run roughshod over them.

2. Which bites Germany in the ass in later years of the war when it can't build up a fuel reserve because it can't capture it from Italy as it did IOTL; likewise, it can't get Italian forces in the east.

"Volunteers" can go east (read: Italian forces under German command) and Italy can buy/sell supplies like any other neutral faction. Italy is the junior partner, its people are still alive, and it will still get turf if the Germans win. You do not think the Germans could negotiate fuel for technology somehow?

3. Starting in March would leave Germany bogged down in mud and swollen rivers until June.

The winter was unusually wet, but any time between March and May would be better for an invasion

4. No one considered negotiating with Germany; even Zhukov and Vasilevsky were patriotic and committed to the Soviet Union. It was a war to the death.

Without Stalin driving them on I am not sure how a divided USSR would react. The hierarchy would be shuffled and *anyone* under Stalin knew better than to buck the party line. Whoever succeeded Stalin as the boss, whether as an individual or oligarchy, might have thought differently

5. Japan's military would have to redeploy hundreds of thousands of men, vehicles, horses, etc to Manchuria, delaying an offensive until late 1941. Further, it lacked the modern equipment to achieve any kind of success, or the fuel to sustain its war effort for more than a year, even assuming Britain doesn't declare war. Further, there was an enormous bloc within the Japanese government and military opposing an invasion of the Soviet Union. America will also inevitably enter the war by 1942; it was already de facto at war in the Atlantic, and becoming increasingly aggressive; all that was required was another incident to spark an official war.

Their generals were debating a north vs south policy despite all of the above, and Japan does not have to attack simultaneously - if they appear to be a real threat in the East then the USSR, especially is under different leadership, will react.

 

[Julian]

Probably because getting treated like servants or worse tends to shatter your worldview of a "liberator". Again, the Germans should *play nice* with the Ukrainians and wait until the end of the war to run roughshod over them.

"Volunteers" can go east (read: Italian forces under German command) and Italy can buy/sell supplies like any other neutral faction. Italy is the junior partner, its people are still alive, and it will still get turf if the Germans win. You do not think the Germans could negotiate fuel for technology somehow?

The winter was unusually wet, but any time between March and May would be better for an invasion

Without Stalin driving them on I am not sure how a divided USSR would react. The hierarchy would be shuffled and *anyone* under Stalin knew better than to buck the party line. Whoever succeeded Stalin as the boss, whether as an individual or oligarchy, might have thought differently

Their generals were debating a north vs south policy despite all of the above, and Japan does not have to attack simultaneously - if they appear to be a real threat in the East then the USSR, especially is under different leadership, will react.

1. The Ukrainian nationalists didn't want to be "treated nicely" they wanted full independence, which the Germans can't grant. Beyond that, the Germans gained enormous economic advantages from slave labor, grain, etc from the Ukraine which they wouldn't ITTL. There's also no reason to justify playing nice under the Nazis racial policies, which saw the Ukrainians as subhuman and undeserving of good treatment.

2. Volunteers aren't the same as a full army, and if Italy send a full army of volunteers both Britain and the Soviet Union will declare war. German already had neutral conduits for resources in Spain and Portugal, neither of which proved adequate.

3. No it wouldn't; the rasputitsa would prevent any kind of offensive alone the mostly dirt roads of Russia, and swollen rivers would limit exploitation operations. June was the earliest an offensive could begin.

4. Likely the NKO would remain in charge of running the Soviet Union with a power sharing agreement until the war ends. This is a net benefit for the Red Army, as it removes Stalin's mismanagement of military matters and grants the STAVKA enormous influence. And again, the people heading the Soviet government and military were dedicated communists and patriots, and more than willing to fight to the death.

5. The Japanese defeats during the border wars, its commitment to China, and the Anglo-American oil/steel embargo, precluded an offensive against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union offered it nothing that it required, the venture had little chance of succeeding in the minds of Japan's leadership, and it would detract from the occupation of eastern China.

 

[King Augeas]

Wiking's idea of bombing ports is very interesting indeed but I'm not sure how plausible it is to implement. Germany's big problem during the BoB was that they didn't know to defeat the UK, and knew that they didn't. While I'm sure that certain elements of the Luftwaffe had their own ideas about how to do this, bombing Liverpool would be one of many ideas, alongside the historical ones of hitting Channel convoys, hitting radar sites, hitting airfields, hitting the aircraft industry and hitting London.

The Luftwaffe has a big problem in that it never knew how effective any of these strategies were. It's entirely plausible to suggest that it starts hitting Liverpool for 2-3 weeks then, unable to determine any significant effect on the UK, flip-flops to another strategy as the officers supporting bombing London gain the upper hand . Bomber Harris himself spoke of deep scepticism of people offering panacea targets, and I'm sure a similar sentiment would exist in the Luftwaffe, particularly after the first two or three strategies have failed. Elsewhere, Tooze talks about how Bomber Command unknowingly threw away its successful attrition of the Ruhr to waste its forces on the panacea target of Berlin.

So, really nice idea, but my impression is that a successful implementation would require a degree of unity and knowledge that the Luftwaffe could not possibly have had.

 

[Slowpoke]

There is one panacea target which has historically worked: aerial mining. A single ship blowing up in a harbour or at an estuary causes weeks of delays all all heavy traffic is stopped/diverted.

 

[AdA]

There is one panacea target which has historically worked: aerial mining. A single ship blowing up in a harbour or at an estuary causes weeks of delays all all heavy traffic is stopped/diverted.

Mines were extensively used. Since mine drops on a defended harbour are very unlikely to go unnoticed, its relatively easy to deal with those mines while casualties among the attacking aircraft tend to be high.

 

[AdA]

Wiking's idea of bombing ports is very interesting indeed but I'm not sure how plausible it is to implement. Germany's big problem during the BoB was that they didn't know to defeat the UK, and knew that they didn't. While I'm sure that certain elements of the Luftwaffe had their own ideas about how to do this, bombing Liverpool would be one of many ideas, alongside the historical ones of hitting Channel convoys, hitting radar sites, hitting airfields, hitting the aircraft industry and hitting London.

The Luftwaffe has a big problem in that it never knew how effective any of these strategies were. It's entirely plausible to suggest that it starts hitting Liverpool for 2-3 weeks then, unable to determine any significant effect on the UK, flip-flops to another strategy as the officers supporting bombing London gain the upper hand . Bomber Harris himself spoke of deep scepticism of people offering panacea targets, and I'm sure a similar sentiment would exist in the Luftwaffe, particularly after the first two or three strategies have failed. Elsewhere, Tooze talks about how Bomber Command unknowingly threw away its successful attrition of the Ruhr to waste its forces on the panacea target of Berlin.

So, really nice idea, but my impression is that a successful implementation would require a degree of unity and knowledge that the Luftwaffe could not possibly have had.

The LW is at a genetic (in the force generation process sense) against the RAF since it was, by necessity, mostly created to support the Army while the WW2 RAF was created to do exactly what it did in WW2. Defend Britain against an aerial assault and conducting a strategic bombing campaign. Since Germany was always on the brink of war since the Nazis took over, first order of business had to be to help the rapidly expanding Army protect Germany in the event of a French, polish, etc invasion in one of Hitler's increasingly risky gambles.
Given that factor, it is a surprise the LW did as well as it did OTL, and that was mostly due to a overachieving fighter force.

 

[gloster meteor mk3]

That and they both had a chance of having jets before WW2 and rejected the tech, we could of seen jet fighter on jet fighter, jet bombers but that is the way it goes. The Germans biggest mistake perhaps would be Hitlers decision NOT to build defensive weaponry. The ME262 could of been the war winning weapon Hitler needed.

 

[AdA]

That and they both had a chance of having jets before WW2 and rejected the tech, we could of seen jet fighter on jet fighter, jet bombers but that is the way it goes. The Germans biggest mistake perhaps would be Hitlers decision NOT to build defensive weaponry. The ME262 could of been the war winning weapon Hitler needed.

Not really, engine technology limitations would have rendered 30s jet useless unless you use jet powered butterflies to speed up engine development...

 

[gloster meteor mk3]

That and sending the scientists to the Russian front for two YEARS screwed the Reich with a decent fighter one that could possibly defeat the allied bomber streams.

 

[AdA]

That and sending the scientists to the Russian front for two YEARS screwed the Reich with a decent fighter one that could possibly defeat the allied bomber streams.

WTF? The German engine teams were working really hard on jet engines, the problem was lack o mature tech not lack of effort.

 

[gloster meteor mk3]

Hitler believed that the best defense was a good offense, hence most of the tech they made was to little to late.Plus the ban on defensive weaponry did not help.

 

[AMF]

I've searched for many Nazi victory scenarios but I can't find any that aren't ASB.

Your challenge is to have a Nazi victory with the following results:

• Nazis capture Moscow and West Russia
• Britain remains an independent nation and is not occupied by Nazis
• Japan becomes a stable Eastern power and conquers all of the East Asian coast (doesn't have to take Tibet and West China)
• Communism, as a political movement, slowly comes to an end
• Nazis become the leading superpower in the world

There is a huge difference between "Non ASB Axis victory" and "Nazis become the leading superpower in the world". In my opinion, there are several non ASB Axis victory scenarios, but making Nazi Germany stronger than the US within Hitler's lifetime, or even within the lifetime of his successor, is practically ASB.

One important thing to remember is that the war that Hitler began in 1939 had a very different alignment of opponents for Germany than the war Hitler finally lost. The most likely Axis victory scenario in my opinion (which is really only a German victory scenario) consists of Hitler being satisfied with limited territorial gains after defeating France.

Let's say Hitler wants the part of Upper Silesia that Poland gained back, an extraterritorial Autobahn plus railway line through the Polish corridor, plus Danzig, plus Luxemburg in the West. The rest of Poland (which of course lost much more territory to the Soviets) is given back genuine independence. Any British leadership would have thought then that they could not have gotten anything better by fighting on.

Perhaps it even would have been possible to get Alsace and Lorraine back with the military gains Germany made in OTL 1940. This would have been possible with some degree of likelihood after capturing the BEF and the French forces at Dunkirk.


Of course this would require a very different Hitler, but of course any person deciding differently from the historical realities requires a different person.

 

[Blue Max]

I've searched for many Nazi victory scenarios but I can't find any that aren't ASB.

Your challenge is to have a Nazi victory with the following results:

• Nazis capture Moscow and West Russia
• Britain remains an independent nation and is not occupied by Nazis
• Japan becomes a stable Eastern power and conquers all of the East Asian coast (doesn't have to take Tibet and West China)
• Communism, as a political movement, slowly comes to an end
• Nazis become the leading superpower in the world

You are allowed to:

• Have the Turkic republics in the USSR remain communist for a while
• Have Mao and the Communists remain in Western China
• Anything else that isn't ASB
• If need be, have Germany in a position to ally Britain, preventing Britain's part in WW2 altogether

Bonus points if you keep the Nazis from backstabbing any of their allies (Romania, Bulgaria etc) after WW2 ends.

Nazis take Moscow and Russia: Barely Possible, probably requires the UK to peace out against Germany.

British remain independent: I think that's going to be one of the requirements for a Axis victory; this means that the Germans can dedicate their economic advantages against the Soviet Union--and the Soviets are outmatched economically and probably lose a long war on their own.

Japan: Out of the question. The Chinese are Hostile and Japan has little to offer them; horrible atrocities did result OTL. Even assuming that the UK and USA didn't aid the Chinese (and their aid was limited) Japan is in a super Vietnam situation that will end very badly for them.

Nazi only Superpower: Now you've got to take out the UK and USA. Likely ASB as well.

---

If the UK allies with Germany, the UK is the leading partner, and frankly a superpower in the aftermath. A Fascist UK will not accept being treated like a junior partner--that's non-negotiable.

Nazi Backstabbing: Please see Barbarossa, 1941.

I think the scenario is hopeless.

 

[Julian]

The problem for Germany is that American entry into the war is inevitable; public opinion, industry, etc are all pushing for greater involvement. America is going to be increasingly involved in the Atlantic as a result if it's support for Britain, meaning that just a more few incidents than OTL will lead to a declaration of war by ether party. The only real obstacle IOTL was a few isolationist holdouts, Republicans trying to obstruct FDR, and the public perception that British victory could be achieved without direct US involvement (This perception ended with the start of large scale lend lease).

US entry means that Germany will be defeated by sheer production. Allied strategic air power and fighter escorts could destroy the Luftwaffe in 1944, allowing for a concerted campaign against oil and transportation infrastructure, along with production. The strategic bombing campaign is often underestimated because it's apogee occurred just as Germany's downward spiral began, but examination of Luftwaffe losses, damage to fuel, damage to morale, and damage to productions all show that it's impacts alone were destroying the German Air Force and economy. And this isn't taking into account air campaigns in the Med or even Norway, which would dilute and arrit the Luftwaffe even more.

 

[Blue Max]

The problem for Germany is that American entry into the war is inevitable; public opinion, industry, etc are all pushing for greater involvement. America is going to be increasingly involved in the Atlantic as a result if it's support for Britain, meaning that just a more few incidents than OTL will lead to a declaration of war by ether party. The only real obstacle IOTL was a few isolationist holdouts, Republicans trying to obstruct FDR, and the public perception that British victory could be achieved without direct US involvement (This perception ended with the start of large scale lend lease).

US entry means that Germany will be defeated by sheer production. Allied strategic air power and fighter escorts could destroy the Luftwaffe in 1944, allowing for a concerted campaign against oil and transportation infrastructure, along with production. The strategic bombing campaign is often underestimated because it's apogee occurred just as Germany's downward spiral began, but examination of Luftwaffe losses, damage to fuel, damage to morale, and damage to productions all show that it's impacts alone were destroying the German Air Force and economy. And this isn't taking into account air campaigns in the Med or even Norway, which would dilute and arrit the Luftwaffe even more.

If the UK is out (and it's flat out possible that the UK and France never DoWed Germany to start with, the PoD might even be pre-1939) the USA has little reason to get involved.

But the UK has to go out before the USA gets in. That might be as simple as having the UK attack the Soviet Union over Finland or losing Churchill pre-1940, or it might mean the UK decides to deal with Germany in a "build coalitions" style resembling the Napoleonic wars instead of a long continuous war.

By some method, though, the USA can't just jump into a war with Hitler.

 

[Julian]

If the UK is out (and it's flat out possible that the UK and France never DoWed Germany to start with, the PoD might even be pre-1939) the USA has little reason to get involved.

But the UK has to go out before the USA gets in. That might be as simple as having the UK attack the Soviet Union over Finland or losing Churchill pre-1940, or it might mean the UK decides to deal with Germany in a "build coalitions" style resembling the Napoleonic wars instead of a long continuous war.

By some method, though, the USA can't just jump into a war with Hitler.

As soon as Germany went back on it's side of the Munich agreement Britain, at least, no longer placed any confidence in agreements made by or with Hitler. It's important to remember that Britain had been rearming for war as well; indeed, it was economically far better prepared than Germany for a protracted conflict. Chamberlain negotiated a peaceful accord based on the assumption that Hitler was willing to behave according to the treaties he signed. But Britain was by no means unprepared or unwilling to go to war.

France is a bit more complex because of internal political divisions, but a declaration of war over Poland was almost inevitable if Britain became involved.

The UK was never serious about going to war with the Soviet Union over Finland, and by the time Pike could have been launched the Germans were already on the offensive in France, making Pike an unnecessary diversion of resources. It's an operations that was constrained by too many logistic and weather factors to be ready before political factors made it unfeasible.

Knocking the UK out of the war assumed a Germany able to make rational political deals based on mutual trust; it wasn't. Hitler viewed himself as a conqueror able to dictate terms as he liked, not make fair deals. A British leader would accept a negotiated peace that saw Germany withdrawal from France, perhaps Norway as well, and end the war on Africa. But Hitler, and others running the show in Germany, were unwilling to relinquish their easily won gains. They believed that Britain would be defeated easily, encouraging increasingly radical solutions to quickly defeat it.

The best you'd get is a temporary armistice and failed negotiations leading to a resumption of hostilities, which would in turn provoke massive US aid to Britain and greater involvement in Europe earlier.