Find a way to prevent the creation of the modern political Islam. And the Islma should not be used to justify terrorism.
AHC: No Political Islam
- Thread starter Barbarossa Rotbart
- Start date
Sadly, I'm afraid that totally preventing radical Islamic terrorism is just not quite feasible, especially not with a POD of after 1900.
I think the best that can be done, however, is maybe, after the horrors of WWII some liberal-minded Muslim scholars and clergy decide to make a public stand against terror, hate, etc., and begin to foster positive relations with the Jews and other non-Muslims in the Mideast. And that is certainly not impossible, IMHO.
Deleted member 67076
Keeping the Ottoman Empire surviving until modern day would help very much. You'd still have the Caliph still around to condemn people like that.
You probably need POD during early Caliphate avoid political Islam. But with POD of after 1900 it might be lesser political/radical. Surviving Ottoman Empire or not notable colonisation in Middle East and no Israel would help. Best would be that British and French allow independence Arab states on 1920's and not any ideas about Jewish state in Middle East. And not so powerful western influence in Middle East. Speciality them would give fairer oil deals with Persia and Arab states.
Vice President Mike
Banned
Simple: No Israel and no Soviet Invasion of Afganstagn
There shouldn't be a large distrust of the United States
There shouldn't be a large distrust of the United States
Preventing it entirely? No Muhammad. You're also going to have Islam affect policies as much as any dominant religion does when it comes to policies in any country.
Preventing Islamism from becoming relevant to the extent it does today? Arab nationalism succeeds. Now, a lot of people misinterpret that this means Pan-Arabism succeeds, but Nasser really meant Arab solidarity when he talked of Arab unity. It's really similar to Pan-Africanism, the Non-Aligned movement, etc. These sort of movements are popular because they are against the real and perceived imperialist and be colonist actions of the West, or more accurately, the Global North.
Now, the 1950s is the key period where Arab nationalism was on the upswing. The British and French had been thrown out after Suez, and the Arabs were trying to preserve independence from the Cold War. Communism was unpopular among Arab leaders, but they never seriously considered the Soviets as a threat compared to the machinations of Britain and France. This wasn't a wrong view, either. The view that the British and French stopped becoming Great Powers in the Middle East immediately after Suez is a simplification, though it was certainly a great turning point. Before Suez, the idea that the Soviets were a greater player than Britain in the Middle East was laughable. The Eisenhower Administration, as usual, dropped the ball over this repeatedly over the period. To their credit, they did make the correct move in Suez, which allowed the Arabs to see the United States as a partner, not an imperialist power. We can start from here.
IOTL, the fall of Hashemite Iraq to Arab nationalism promoted Eisenhower to reevaluate his anti-Nasser position. Eisenhower indicated that incorporation of Iraq in the new United Arab Republic was preferable to Qasim making Iraq into a communist state. But he still distrusted Nasser, and never went the full hog on it. Had Eisenhower done that, and chosen not to intervene in Lebanon (which he thought over about IOTL), then the UAR could possibly incorporate IOTL Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and perhaps Jordan (the British will still intervene in Jordan but Hussein will be more fragile than ever ITTL.) This is much easier than it looks on paper: 1958 was basically an Arab Nationalist Spring year.
The biggest impediment to this success is Nasser himself, who micromanaged Syria to the point it was described as an Egyptian rule, and was reluctant to actually embrace pan-Arabism in practice unless it was done gradually. But he was forced into accepting the UAR IOTL (declining would have destroyed his image), so the formation is possible. It's keeping it together that would be a challenge. The Syrians wanted to expand the union IOTL so they could gain allies to counterbalance Egypt, but Egypt is still going to dominate the union and Nasser is going to centralize all power into himself. However, the prospect of unilateral secession is probably lessened with the UAR consisting of more states instead of just two. Arab unity was popular. But that doesn't mean it won't happen. There's also the idea of the non-Egyptian parts breaking off to form their own UAR. Nasser will probably die earlier ITTL due to greater stress, so his successor will have to navigate the UAR.
The UAR doesn't have to survive of course, but a stronger state is going to be less preyed upon by the superpowers and great powers, and if Arab nationalism is seen as the reasoning behind that success, there will be no vacuum of credibility that was eventually filled by Islamism.
Preventing Islamism from becoming relevant to the extent it does today? Arab nationalism succeeds. Now, a lot of people misinterpret that this means Pan-Arabism succeeds, but Nasser really meant Arab solidarity when he talked of Arab unity. It's really similar to Pan-Africanism, the Non-Aligned movement, etc. These sort of movements are popular because they are against the real and perceived imperialist and be colonist actions of the West, or more accurately, the Global North.
Now, the 1950s is the key period where Arab nationalism was on the upswing. The British and French had been thrown out after Suez, and the Arabs were trying to preserve independence from the Cold War. Communism was unpopular among Arab leaders, but they never seriously considered the Soviets as a threat compared to the machinations of Britain and France. This wasn't a wrong view, either. The view that the British and French stopped becoming Great Powers in the Middle East immediately after Suez is a simplification, though it was certainly a great turning point. Before Suez, the idea that the Soviets were a greater player than Britain in the Middle East was laughable. The Eisenhower Administration, as usual, dropped the ball over this repeatedly over the period. To their credit, they did make the correct move in Suez, which allowed the Arabs to see the United States as a partner, not an imperialist power. We can start from here.
IOTL, the fall of Hashemite Iraq to Arab nationalism promoted Eisenhower to reevaluate his anti-Nasser position. Eisenhower indicated that incorporation of Iraq in the new United Arab Republic was preferable to Qasim making Iraq into a communist state. But he still distrusted Nasser, and never went the full hog on it. Had Eisenhower done that, and chosen not to intervene in Lebanon (which he thought over about IOTL), then the UAR could possibly incorporate IOTL Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and perhaps Jordan (the British will still intervene in Jordan but Hussein will be more fragile than ever ITTL.) This is much easier than it looks on paper: 1958 was basically an Arab Nationalist Spring year.
The biggest impediment to this success is Nasser himself, who micromanaged Syria to the point it was described as an Egyptian rule, and was reluctant to actually embrace pan-Arabism in practice unless it was done gradually. But he was forced into accepting the UAR IOTL (declining would have destroyed his image), so the formation is possible. It's keeping it together that would be a challenge. The Syrians wanted to expand the union IOTL so they could gain allies to counterbalance Egypt, but Egypt is still going to dominate the union and Nasser is going to centralize all power into himself. However, the prospect of unilateral secession is probably lessened with the UAR consisting of more states instead of just two. Arab unity was popular. But that doesn't mean it won't happen. There's also the idea of the non-Egyptian parts breaking off to form their own UAR. Nasser will probably die earlier ITTL due to greater stress, so his successor will have to navigate the UAR.
The UAR doesn't have to survive of course, but a stronger state is going to be less preyed upon by the superpowers and great powers, and if Arab nationalism is seen as the reasoning behind that success, there will be no vacuum of credibility that was eventually filled by Islamism.
Furthermore, the idea that Israel and the Arab states could not coexist is one that is rooted in the aftermath of 1967, and a lot of it was done because Arab leaders needed to look more anti-Israel than the other. A UAR would not have this problem, as Nasser would not be pressured to discontinue even the idea of recognition between Egypt and Israel. Things could end up as badly as India—Pakistan, or could be as relatively good/bad as South Korea—Japan stuff, which would probably end up being the case if Israel and the UAR were both US allies. Israel was and is seen as the greatest and most lasting infestation of European colonization, but opposition to it need not be based on Islam. Arab nationalism is more than enough. I would contest the idea that Islamism is a dominant and essential aspect of the opposition to Israel IOTL.
Actually I don't think that would help as much as you would think. The Turkish Sultans were not widely recognized as Caliph outside of Turkey. You would probably still wind up with fundamentalist revolts against the OE. Even if the Arab provinces were peacefully granted autonomy you can't avoid Islam being a political force in those new states. There are just always going to be Imams who decide that the pious should govern the middle-east.
Probably not prevent it completely but you can certainly knock it down a peg or two. Having the Foreign Office win out over the India Office in the debate post-Great War over whether to have the British government support the Hashemites or Sauds respectively would be a good start, crushing the Ikhwan and Wahhabis so that their theology can't be aggressively exported via large amounts of oil money can only be a good thing for the world.
Abort Islam at its start.
Islam has always been political. Mohammed was both a religious leader and and a political leader. Islam for its first two hundred years or more was both a religion and a government. The Koran explicitly states that Moslems are to fight for political dominance. It has been fairly unusual for Moslems in any significant number to live in a country ruled by non-Moslems.
This condition was substantially submerged in the colonial era, but did not vanish; opposition to colonial or imperial rule in Moslem lands almost always had a religious element, even though imperial colonizers generally disclaimed religious motives.
In modern times, the trans-cultural imperative toward authenticity was certain to move at least some Moslems toward "Islamist" politics.
That's kind of hard given how no religion on earth has avoided being politicized.
EDIT: Also an important factor here is that Islamic tradition never had a seperate civil and religious hierarchy. From it's inception Islam was the official religion of whatever you call the state Mohammad ran in Medina. In this context it makes a lot of sense that traditionalists go back to the idea of politicized state islam.
EDIT: Also an important factor here is that Islamic tradition never had a seperate civil and religious hierarchy. From it's inception Islam was the official religion of whatever you call the state Mohammad ran in Medina. In this context it makes a lot of sense that traditionalists go back to the idea of politicized state islam.
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As you like, but a reading of the Qu'ran, Hadiths, and medieval history of Islam argues persuasively otherwise. Still, if one prefers to ignore all these, one can such a case.
Yes, I do ignore all these in favor of the actions and opinions of 20th century Arab leaders, because the latter is actually relevant. It was not until the 1980s that resistance towards Israel took on a distinctly Islamist, as opposed to Arabist, tone with the formation of Hezbollah and Hamas. And even today, the Arab nationalist PLO is the predominant Palestinian political entity.
To clarify my previous posts, I assumed the OP means to assuage the popularity of contemporary Islamism, as the only way to prevent "political Islam" entirely is to prevent Islam entirely. And we're in After 1900.
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HeavyWeaponsGuy
Banned
As Plumber said, Islamism as a whole is not preventable, any more than you can prevent political Christianity/Hinduism/whatever. What you can do is mitigate its spread and relevance. A marginalized Islamism might be more dangerous than a thriving one, but it simply won't be as prominent.
While the ideas behind Islamism sometimes to back centuries, politically it spent a lot of time out in the cold in Middle Eastern politics and those of the wider Muslim world. Really, the pre-1979 Middle East was seen as an overwhelming march towards the domination of secular Arab nationalist dictatorships such as those of Syria, Iraq, or Egypt, then the Iranian Revolution happened and everything was called into question. If Iran's revolution (and it almost assuredly would have happened, the Shah was not a beloved figure and his reactionary tendencies were not being alleviated by age) had taken a more secularist turn, it would most obviously have prevented Iran's Islamist turn, but quite possibly Pakistan's as well. Political Islam was out in the cold for the vast majority of Pakistan's history: Jinnah did his best to smother it from the get-go and even his less-scrupulous successors were more interested in keeping their own power rather than forking it over to the imams. It was only after the Iranian Revolution and the increasing radicalization of Pakistan's Shiites that Zia Ul-Haq promoted Sunni radicalism as a counterbalance to that of the Shia.
Pakistan's tradition of Islam was and even today remains moderate for the majority of the populace, but the double whammy of the war in Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran served to lay the foundation for a very powerful, belligerent Islamist minority.
While the ideas behind Islamism sometimes to back centuries, politically it spent a lot of time out in the cold in Middle Eastern politics and those of the wider Muslim world. Really, the pre-1979 Middle East was seen as an overwhelming march towards the domination of secular Arab nationalist dictatorships such as those of Syria, Iraq, or Egypt, then the Iranian Revolution happened and everything was called into question. If Iran's revolution (and it almost assuredly would have happened, the Shah was not a beloved figure and his reactionary tendencies were not being alleviated by age) had taken a more secularist turn, it would most obviously have prevented Iran's Islamist turn, but quite possibly Pakistan's as well. Political Islam was out in the cold for the vast majority of Pakistan's history: Jinnah did his best to smother it from the get-go and even his less-scrupulous successors were more interested in keeping their own power rather than forking it over to the imams. It was only after the Iranian Revolution and the increasing radicalization of Pakistan's Shiites that Zia Ul-Haq promoted Sunni radicalism as a counterbalance to that of the Shia.
Pakistan's tradition of Islam was and even today remains moderate for the majority of the populace, but the double whammy of the war in Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran served to lay the foundation for a very powerful, belligerent Islamist minority.
RousseauX
Donor
And yet Jews enjoyed far better life in Islamic Spain or Middle East than they did in Medieval Europe. In fact, I would argue life for Jews turned out to be better in the Islamic Middle-East than secular Europe during much of the 20th century.
RousseauX
Donor
Political Islam in the Sunni Arab world was the result of the 1967 war with Israel discrediting Nasser's regime and secular nationalism in general. The Iranian revolution revived the Sunni-Shia sectarianism and you are right about Pakistan. But ultimately political Islam is going to be an Arabic phenomenon regardless of the final result of the Iranian revolution.