AHC: Ney captures Quatre-Bras earlier

Napoleon sent Ney to capture Quatre-Bras to cut off Wellignton and Blücher. However, when Ney arrived, he waited some time before advancing, resulting I the Battle of Quatre-Bras. Your challenge is to have Ney capture Quatre-Bras when Napoleon wanted him to, and then explore possible ramifications.
 
Napoleon gave Ney different orders at different times

initially on the morning of the 15th they were no more than to guard the left (western) flank of the main force French force advancing on the Prussians on the river line towards Charleroi. Indeed the whole of the French reserves were on the west to support Grouchy who was the right flank guard.

Quatre Bras was NOT set as a specific objective in Napoleon's orders to Ney though perhaps a more capable strategist might have set it for himself... Whether it was a possible target on that first day is harder to judge. The western elements of Blucher's screen and the eastern elements of Wellington's screen both conducted delaying actions.

By the evening of the 15th Ney's lead elements had not quite reached the crossroads and the bulk of his force was till strung out behind. When he reconnoitered towards the crossroads with 1000 cavalry and horse guns, he was blocked by 4000 infantry and supporting field artillery (part of Wellingtons easternmost division). Quite reasonably Ney decided to wait till dawn.

The next morning Ney was given no further orders but did resume heavier probes from 5am. However the crossroads had been reinforced to over 8000 troops who had been diverted there from their designated rally point by the Prince of Oranges staff. Fearing a typical Wellingtonian "hidden" defense Ney waited until his rear echelons closed up. In fact the Duke did arrive at 10am but left at 1am to confer with Blucher.

Crucially Napoleon gave no orders for an immediate attack either at Quatre Bras or against the Prussians even ignoring reports that Prussians reserves were coming forward from Namur.

None the less during mid morning Ney DID have both a numerical and qualitative superiority and might have been able to carry the crossroads. But by then Wellington had adjusted his marching orders and was concentrating at Quatre Bras.

By noon it was obvious to Napoleon that the Prussians were making a stand at Wavre, and Napoleon began planning a frontal attack there from Fleurus.
However it was not until 2pm that he sent definite orders to Ney to take the crossroads immediately and not till 3:15 pm that this attack could begin.

Ney tried ... but Wellingtons forces were arriving in a steady stream, starting with Picton's division plus Rifles. Despite several tactical success, he could not even seize the crossroads effectively. By 5pm Wellington had attained greater numbers and Ney was depending on the arrival of his final reserve, D'Erlons division to achieve his mission.

By 5pm Napoleon realized he was not winning decisively at Ligny and sent somewhat emotional orders for Ney to swing right into Bluchers flank. At the same time (and without mentioning it to Ney) Napoleon sent direct orders to D'Erlons division to stop its progress towards Quatre Bras and head for the field at Ligny.


Told in his new orders that "the fate of France" depended on his attack, and unware of Napoleons intervention, Ney ordered D'Erlon back into his line ... and was obeyed.

British Divisions were still arriving and Wellington had rallied many of his bettered forces into a limited counter attack. By 9pm Ney was back at his start line having achieved his original orders of protecting Napoleon's flank but unable to intervene at Ligny.

As is typical of him Napoleon blamed his subordinates for his own failings and his apologists have continued that calumny for two hundred years.
 
Last edited:
Even if Ney attacked earlier and took the crossroads, wouldn't he be so strung out and exposed that Wellington can come down on him like a ton of bricks with the rest of his forces. If like OTL D'Erlon's corps was paralyzed with contradicting issued commands, can Ney's wing hold or more importantly once Ney realizes Wellington's got numbers and is coming en masse, will he even TRY to hold? By this point i'm sure riders have been sent to find out where the fuck D'Erlon's corp is, and word has gotten back that he aint gonna get there before Wellington's merry men.

Thus Ney likely gets the hell out of dodge after scoring more kills than OTL, but will it be enough to swing the next coming battle. Perhaps if Ney really wrecked some shit, and Wellington hear's how the Prussians got stomped, he might just decide to turn tail to the sea, preserve his army to threaten Napoleon when the rest of the coalition marches to the front.

Regardless, Nappy really wasnt on his game by that point of time and the Coalition is straight HUGE. Woulda been interesting to see how long he can holdout if he were healthy and had all his best marshals/generals with him.

If Davout was at Quatre-Bras he'd prolly carry the crossroads, made damn sure D'Erlon was coming to reinforce him and shatter Wellington's troops as they try to swarm in piecemeal to take on his exposed wing or take time to form up giving D'Erlon time to reinforce, further showing why he was prolly the best commander of the Napoleonic Era. Then of course Nappy would just claim that temporarily repulsing the Prussians was waaaay more important than shattering of Wellington's reputation and forcing the British off the continent for awhile :cool:
 
Davout & Berthier would probably be better Ney & Soult respectively

except of course Napoleon had Berthier murdered for keeping his word to disarm (given upon surrendering in 1814)
and Davout was needed to keep order in Paris.

There are plenty of misconceptions about Napoleon's Belgian campaign;
the most fundamental being that he tried to drive between Wellington and Blucher.

A simple look at the maps shows he did not. All the weight of his initial attack was on the Prussians, admittedly on their western centre but that was based on his desire that they would retreat eastwards onto their bases.

Equally he assumed Wellington would not move east to support Blucher in time but would edge east onto the Channel ports.
Wellington did keep his best commanders to the west but had plans to cover the central zone if given warnings by the Prussians.
This did not happen since Ziethen took 11 hours to report the first assault to W. HQ in Brussels.
Fortunately W. was better served by his inexperienced subordinates in the east than he expected and Quatre Bras was the result.

At 2pm on that second day, Wellington met Blucher at Ligny and promised to come to his aid unless he was attacked himself at Quatre Bras.
By 4pm it was clear that all the Allies could do was hold the crossroads, which they managed (just about).
Wellington was still at QB all night while the Prussians had retreated from Ligny without sending a warning leaving his left left flank in the air.


On the third day, Napoleon delayed moving against Wellington perhaps because he expect Wellington to retreat to the coast not simply back up the Brussels road. In addition Grouchy was sent to pursue Blucher and Napoleon failed to recognize the significance of his parallel move towards Wavre, rather than east to Namur.


despite the evidence of Blucher reinforcing at Ligny and Wellington reinforcing at Quatre Bras, and this evidence of a coordinated retreat
Napoleon persisted in his beliefs of a lack of Allied cooperation.

On the critical fourth day, Napoleon completely ignored the possibility that Blucher would march to Mon St Jean and again delayed delayed his attack for several key hours.
He refused to acknowledge the need for urgency until his forces were fully engaged to the front with Wellington and his right flank was being attacked by Prussians.

Being completely untrustworthy himself, Napoleon could not believe that Wellington and Blucher would do their best to honor their commitments to support each other.

It cost Napoleon the campaign ... but unfortunately no one had the guts to put him against a wall.
 
Last edited:
Quatre Bras was NOT set as a specific objective in Napoleon's orders to Ney though perhaps a more capable strategist might have set it for himself... Whether it was a possible target on that first day is harder to judge. The western elements of Blucher's screen and the eastern elements of Wellington's screen both conducted delaying actions.

Wrong. The original plan was for Ney to take the Quatre-Bras crossroads. Then he was to deal with any enemy army he found there and then march on to the direction of Napoleon's army as he attacked and flanked Blucher's army from the south while Ney would attack it from the west.

By the evening of the 15th Ney's lead elements had not quite reached the crossroads and the bulk of his force was till strung out behind. When he reconnoitered towards the crossroads with 1000 cavalry and horse guns, he was blocked by 4000 infantry and supporting field artillery (part of Wellingtons easternmost division). Quite reasonably Ney decided to wait till dawn.

Big mistake. He should have known that time was of the essence because both Blucher and Wellington was trying to link up with each other. He already knew that Blucher's army was a more immediate threat since it had already formed effectively and was marching toward Wellington; it needed to be finished off quickly to prevent a link-up.

Crucially Napoleon gave no orders for an immediate attack either at Quatre Bras or against the Prussians even ignoring reports that Prussians reserves were coming forward from Namur.

That's because he ALREADY expected Ney to adhere to the original plan and take the Quatre-Bras crossroads.

By noon it was obvious to Napoleon that the Prussians were making a stand at Wavre, and Napoleon began planning a frontal attack there from Fleurus.
However it was not until 2pm that he sent definite orders to Ney to take the crossroads immediately and not till 3:15 pm that this attack could begin.

He was getting impatient that Ney still had not taken the crossroads.

By 5pm Napoleon realized he was not winning decisively at Ligny and sent somewhat emotional orders for Ney to swing right into Bluchers flank. At the same time (and without mentioning it to Ney) Napoleon sent direct orders to D'Erlons division to stop its progress towards Quatre Bras and head for the field at Ligny.

Perfectly understandable. Napoleon had an opportunity to destroy Blucher's army with D'Erlon's corps.

The funny thing is that if Ney had D'Erlon's corps, he would likely have destroyed Wellington's army but Napoleon could not have known that just like Ney could not have known that Blucher's army would have been destroyed if Napoleon had D'Erlon's corps. If either Wellington's or Blucher's army were destroyed that day, the French would have achieved their objective that day which was for one of the two armies to be destroyed that day so that the other could be destroyed later.

Still, it was Ney's fault since Ney was only supposed to support Napoleon and the main French army, not the other way around. He should have assumed that if Napoleon wanted D'Erlon's corps he had a good reason for it.

British Divisions were still arriving and Wellington had rallied many of his bettered forces into a limited counter attack. By 9pm Ney was back at his start line having achieved his original orders of protecting Napoleon's flank but unable to intervene at Ligny.

If Ney had stuck to the original plan, then he would have achieved both objectives and achieved a complete victory that day.

As is typical of him Napoleon blamed his subordinates for his own failings and his apologists have continued that calumny for two hundred years.

Wrong.
 
except of course Napoleon had Berthier murdered for keeping his word to disarm (given upon surrendering in 1814)
and Davout was needed to keep order in Paris.

That is a serious accusation that Napoleon murdered Berthier. Show me proof.


There are plenty of misconceptions about Napoleon's Belgian campaign;
the most fundamental being that he tried to drive between Wellington and Blucher.

A simple look at the maps shows he did not. All the weight of his initial attack was on the Prussians, admittedly on their western centre but that was based on his desire that they would retreat eastwards onto their bases.

Equally he assumed Wellington would not move east to support Blucher in time but would edge east onto the Channel ports.
Wellington did keep his best commanders to the west but had plans to cover the central zone if given warnings by the Prussians.
This did not happen since Ziethen took 11 hours to report the first assault to W. HQ in Brussels.
Fortunately W. was better served by his inexperienced subordinates in the east than he expected and Quatre Bras was the result.

At 2pm on that second day, Wellington met Blucher at Ligny and promised to come to his aid unless he was attacked himself at Quatre Bras.
By 4pm it was clear that all the Allies could do was hold the crossroads, which they managed (just about).
Wellington was still at QB all night while the Prussians had retreated from Ligny without sending a warning leaving his left left flank in the air.


On the third day, Napoleon delayed moving against Wellington perhaps because he expect Wellington to retreat to the coast not simply back up the Brussels road. In addition Grouchy was sent to pursue Blucher and Napoleon failed to recognize the significance of his parallel move towards Wavre, rather than east to Namur.


despite the evidence of Blucher reinforcing at Ligny and Wellington reinforcing at Quatre Bras, and this evidence of a coordinated retreat
Napoleon persisted in his beliefs of a lack of Allied cooperation.

On the critical fourth day, Napoleon completely ignored the possibility that Blucher would march to Mon St Jean and again delayed delayed his attack for several key hours.
He refused to acknowledge the need for urgency until his forces were fully engaged to the front with Wellington and his right flank was being attacked by Prussians.

Being completely untrustworthy himself, Napoleon could not believe that Wellington and Blucher would do their best to honor their commitments to support each other.

It cost Napoleon the campaign ... but unfortunately no one had the guts to put him against a wall.

Everything you said here is wrong. I don't have time to go through each point.

Suffice it to say that the Prussians disliked Wellington since they felt that Wellington didn't do his best to honour his commitments to aid Blucher. After their defeat at Ligny, they would have abandoned Wellington and retreated to join the Austrian and Russian armies that were coming. Blucher overruled them and came to Wellington's aid. Wellington was lucky that Blucher was playing dead under a dead horse after Ligny. Waterloo would have been different if Blucher did not manage to slip out out of the battlefield and rejoin the Prussians.
 
Would D'Erlon's presence at Quatre Bras been that decisive? While i can see his troops woulda helped rout and capture scores of Prussians at Ligny if he were there, i dont think QB woulda had the same consequences. Best case Ney does secure the crossroads, score some more kills, capture a few more banners, but Wellington's army is still intact and skulking about Napoleon's rear.

Assuming Wellington reforms and decides to stand miles behind Waterloo, perhaps the extra damage suffered, slightly less favorable defensive terrain, and a bit more travel time for the Prussians to reinforce, would result in a defeat.

However Wellington's boys fought well while Nappy didn't eat his wheaties that day, so i personally still think the results would be much the same just with a differently named battle.
 
Top