AHC: Naval equivalent of Waterloo

With a pod after the combination of Trafalgar, the Peninsula War and 1812 in Russia, consider a scenario when the French fleet fights out and receives its 'Waterloo' or a second Trafalgar. Add Spanish and Russian ships to the British side if needed. [Move it to another forum such as asb if needed or suggest a more plausible p.o.d..]

P.O.D.:

After the return of Napoleon in 1815 to France, the Emperor was contemplating his war plans when he realised the strength of the coalition against him and British funding. The French emperor suddenly considered the option of his navy attacking the British and suggested that the French Mediterranean Fleet sortie from Toulon to disrupt British trade in the Mediterranean and the blockade of the Atlantic.

Under political pressure, the French Navy under Admiral Allemand sortied on 8 June 1815 and headed into the Atlantic from Brest and Rochefort. The orders for the French Navy in the Mediterranean were received by Admiral Cosmao, who sortied a week earlier.

Now, the outcome must be familiar if they met the blockading Royal Navy squadrons, with a decisive French defeat. But is this possible? [Planning starting shortly after 19 March 1815.] Maybe have Napoleon win Waterloo before being defeated later.

If possible, my scenario will be posted tomorrow.
 
Potential P.O.D.: Action of 5 November 1813
[Note that this post is more than 4 months late. I had to play Silent Hunter Online and do some assignments.]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_of_5_November_1813
https://books.google.com.my/books?i...AC#v=onepage&q=5 november 1813 toulon&f=false
https://books.google.com.my/books?i...vA9AQ6AEIGzAA#v=snippet&q=1813 toulon&f=false
http://www.pbenyon.plus.com/Naval_History/Vol_VI/P_155.html

When Rear Admiral Cosmao Kerjulien saw the ships comprising the British squadron involved in the blockade of Toulon leave without the inshore squadron, he decided to attack them and sent orders with 2 frigates to his superior in the city, Vice Admiral Emeriau. After the orders were received, the remaining ships of Emeriau's fleet left within several hours of notification and attacked the inshore squadron. Despite the darkening sky, the inshore squadron [comprising of only 4 ships of the line and several frigates] was defeated and captured completely dismasted with only various degrees of damage among the 12 French ships-of-the-line and 4 frigates involved, the sheer force of the French squadron from later reinforcements involved resulting in the British defeat and capture.

For a few days, the Royal Navy was unaware of the defeat, but Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the blockade of the Toulon squadron, only received notification when his squadron returned to blockade Toulon and realised the inshore squadron's absence. It was the worst defeat of the Royal Navy for the last 20 years of war with France just as the allies were pushing Napoleon to defeat in Germany, but French morale reinvigorated, especially in the navy.

Having repaired the captured ships and readied the Toulon fleet for sea, it was decided to send it on several expeditions. Any plans for a French invasion of Britain had been thrown away from revolutionary manpower losses to the subsequent naval defeats over the 20 years and the army's preoccupation with Spain and Central Europe. Commerce raiding, attacks on colonies, Northern Europe, Britain and the Spanish coast and reinforcement of the Adriatic and Atlantic fleets were contemplated; but some were dismissed as futile and fruitless. In the meantime, the dismasted prizes took the end of 1813 to repair while the Mediterranean Fleet was reinforced from ships of the line and frigates elsewhere. Even if the American theatre, several convoys, colonies, Scandinavia and some repair or training were abandoned; it seemed to be worth the effort in the Royal Navy's mindset for the navy [or a squadron of it] to decisively defeat the French Navy once and for all, with possible Spanish and Russian support. [Colonies and Scandinavia virtually secured by December 1813 for the British.] This would be achieved by luring them to the open sea from their home ports and defeating them for good.

Both the British and French fleets spent the last weeks of 1813 preparing the fleets for sea. At least the fleets in the Mediterranean would break the blockade of France or raid British ships and colonies to achieve this. For France, the problems of diversionary French forces being would be compensated by diversion of British resources.
 
Potential order of battle before Gibraltar and Corfu [French, January 1814]
In the Mediterranean, around Toulon

2 battleships of the Bucentaure class
4 first rate battleships [3 Ocean class and battleship Commerce de Paris]
3 small battleships of the Temeraire class derivatives
8 Temeraire class battleships
4 battleship Prizes of 5 November 1813 and 1 [Hannibal] from earlier battles.
5 frigates of the Pallas class.
3 frigates of the Hortense, Armide and Amphion classes.
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_French_sail_frigates]
Naples [after arriving]
2 Temeraire class battleships.
1 frigate of the Pallas class.
1 frigate of the Uranie class.
Another unidentified frigate [Letizia or converted from merchant ship].

British order of battle around Toulon
http://www.pbenyon.plus.com/Naval_History/Vol_VI/P_255.html

Squadron under Edward Pellew in Majorca.
2 1st rate 120 gun battleships
1 100 gun battleship
1 captured 1st rate battleship
5 2nd rate battleships
6 3rd rate battleships [Pompee replacing Armada].
Frigates HMS Apollo, Bacchante, Havannah and Cerberus from the Adriatic [as reserve].
Frigates Unite, Furieuse, Undaunted, Voluntaire, Iphegenia and Redwing from the Italian coast.
To be joined by reinforcements from the Adriatic, West Africa and Spain [including Spanish ships].
 
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Departure from Toulon

On 31 January 1814, the French Navy set sail from Toulon. It was planned that the Neapolitan Navy and French ships in the Adriatic and Italian ports set sail in support of the operation, which would result in French success until entering the Atlantic or Adriatic. The aims were to disrupt convoys carrying supplies across the Atlantic to Spain, Britain and the North Sea once joined by the Atlantic Fleet despite the very low chance of success. Granted, the French fleets wouldn't have Spanish, Dutch, Russian and Danish support this time; while their commerce raiders and American warships could only disrupt trade and reinforcements, but splitting the Royal Navy into manageable chunks for convoy escort and pursuit might make their lives easier even if they were finally destroyed.

The 1st plan after the 5 November 1813 action was to disrupt British support for the Austrians in the Adriatic, but the French Navy felt that that should be done with smaller squadrons while the bigger ships would take on the Royal Navy to further disperse the latter's ships. Even threats of the French Navy roaming freely in the Mediterranean might tie the Royal Navy up until the Italian, Neapolitan and French ships unite in the Adriatic [off Corfu or Venice] and escort supplies to Dalmatia. However, many sailors were recent recruits or transfers and even veterans might not be sufficiently experienced. To support the breakout, the French Atlantic Fleet would break out of Brest and Rochefort to split British attention even more. Due to repairs, organization and training; the departure was postponed from 17 January by 2 weeks.

Like the Trafalgar Campaign, deceptions were made to confuse the British Mediterranean Fleet into them supporting Mediterranean or Adriatic operations with their entire fleet; hoping that the British would be tied up there. After all, the reason for the French victory on 5 November 1813 was because of the main British fleet's withdrawal. The breakout would them take them through Spain, where raids would be conducted while the Royal Navy's Atlantic blockade squadrons would be attacked by the French Atlantic Fleet. Then, the French Navy would sail for the North Sea or Americas, but this would never materialise. It was hoped that isolated British and Spanish units could be destroyed on the way to Spain and the Atlantic.
 
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Defeat of the Neapolitan Navy and Kingdom
Shortly before the French Mediterranean Fleet set sail, the Neapolitan Squadron set sail with supplies for the Adriatic on 24 January 1814. It was revealed that several delays in the French Navy's departure did not reach Naples on time or the preparations were hurried, with Napoleon about to cancel the Neapolitan diversion. It was hoped that the ships and supplies would liberate the Adriatic ports, French-Italian battleships and merchant ships from the British blockade and Austrian advance or destroy them before usage by the enemy. In fact, a few warships and merchant ships were readied in Venice and Ancona for departure, to be rescued and escorted or scuttled by the Neapolitan and Italian fleets. But this would come to nothing as the Neapolitan fleet was destroyed
[This scenario has very slightly better Napoleonic Army performance. The p.o.d. for the army is December 1813, or a less disastrous Leipzig at least; the naval battle off Toulon being the primary p.o.d.. Also, Murat remains an ally of Napoleon slightly longer as a result.]

The Neapolitan fleet was spotted on 3 February 1814 trying to enter the Adriatic from the Straits of Sicily, while several ships attempted to transport supplies to Corfu or leave the Adriatic earlier without success and had to meet the Italian-Neapolitan fleet for rescue. Then, the British blockade squadron under Admiral Edward Pellew came. When battle was offered on 6 February, the weight of the heavy superiority in quantity and quality of Pellew's blockade squadron, intended to stop the entire French Mediterranean Fleet from operating in the Adriatic, proved disastrous for the Italians and Neapolitans as both Neapolitan ships of the line, all [1 French and 2 Neapolitan] frigates travelling with them and most of the smaller and merchant ships [converted or not] were captured and destroyed within 24 hours.

In the battle's aftermath, the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet forced Naples to change sides in March 1814, besides completing Adriatic operations with the Austrian Army and Royal Marines. Most of the assembled convoys to be evacuated were blockaded in the Adriatic or captured and destroyed after the battle and in consequent operations.
 
Decisive Defeat of the French Atlantic Fleet [introduction]
[Note that the previous post is more about the Neapolitan Navy's defeat. The ships in the Adriatic cannot take part in local operations with Naples and Italy if they were or should be captured by January 1814.]

Potential order of battle of the French Atlantic Fleet [in France, under Cosmao-Kerjulien]:

1 Ocean class ship of the line
2 Bucentaure class [and 1 Tonnant class] ships of the line
11 Temeraire class ships of the line
2 large Temeraire class ships of the line
Several units of the Bucentaure and Temeraire class ships in Antwerp, blockaded at the moment.
A dozen frigates [some to be detached on raiding operations or reinforcement of the coming Toulon fleet].

British fleet [Home Waters and North Sea]:
3 squadrons of British ships of the line [consisting of 1 first rate and 1 second rate each for the squadrons off France], divided into:
1 squadron with 8 3rd rate ships of the line and HMS Royal Sovereign off Brest.
1 squadron of 5 ships of the line and a 2nd rate off Rochefort.
1 squadron with 12 3rd rate ships of the line and a 2nd rate on patrol in the Channel.
3 large and 5 3rd rate ships of the line escorting a convoy to the West Indies.
Ships in American waters to watch for the French and American navies in North America and to be reinforced by 2 Spanish 1 rates.
Spanish ships to patrol off the Spanish coast for French squadrons.

1 squadron of Russian ships off Antwerp and watching the North Sea.
 
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Decisive defeat of the French Atlantic Fleet
After the French Mediterranean Squadron's departure, the French Atlantic Fleet squadrons set sail from Brest, Lorient and Cherbourg from 21 February to 5 March 1814. Ships were hastily readied for sea, but demands for the army and inexperience kept several French ships in port and most were later reported to have reduced crews, ammunition and morale; crucial factors that led to the French Navy's defeat off Brest. An attempt was made to ready the French ship Cassard in Rochefort out for sea by 26 February, but it was unseaworthy and was captured before return to Rochefort. This ship had to be towed and was abandoned to the Royal Navy while under attack. Regulus had sailed during the breakout attempt to observe British ships and support the breakout, but was defeated with heavy damage and in a sinking condition. It sank in shallow waters.

Information revealed that the ships at Rochefort and Lorient were preparing to sail and conduct commerce and Spanish raiding operations separately from the bigger fleets, but the fleet at Brest was seen to be the biggest threat. A few ships in Cherbourg were tasked to escort the isolated units and unite with them for strength, but were delayed and fled home on seeing the Cassard being towed as a prize [it was later burnt]. Now that the danger from Rochefort was eliminated, all attention could be focused on Brest, with only one demoralised and badly damaged ship around Rochefort.

Around Brest, the slaughter of the French Atlantic Fleet occurred with devastation hours after its departure on 5 March 1814. The French flagship [Ocean] opened a heavy fire and duelled with HMS Royal Sovereign until it was a wreck and captured. HMS Bellerophon was taken under heavy fire and also dismasted, but was saved by the British victory in the battle, with similar memories of its experiences in other British victories recalled by its crewmembers while returning home. Bellerophon would be the only British ship to be totally dismasted before the battle ended. HMS Achille was entangled in a fight with Tourville, the latter not proving to be any match for its age. HMS Abercrombie was able to drive away attacks from its former mates in the 1809 French Caribbean Expedition to the rearguard and force their return to Cherbourg. Also, another former French 80 gun ship slated for service in America during 1814 before redeployment sent its sister to the British. 2 80 gun French ships fiercely duelled their closest British equivalent in commission. [HMS Impregnable, both British 80 gun ships not serviceable at sea in 1814.]

All escapees from Lorient in 1812 were lost in the battle to sinking and capture. The French ship Diademe was the biggest ship to survive the slaughter and Jemmapes was the oldest to remain in French hands. It was later revealed that the battle's initial 8 French survivors attempted to rescue their admiral, Julien Cosmao, but were disorganized and the counterattack failed with [the remaining 2 of] Allemand's Lorient escapees being captured and sunk along with another 74 gun ship. In all, only 5 French ships of the line survived the Atlantic breakout seaworthy when it ended on 7 March 1814, others falling into British hands and the ocean floor, scuttled or flooded until sinking or returned home either wrecked or dismasted. And 2 of them were in Cherbourg. The British lost no ships of the line until reaching Britain, all returning safely to port.
 
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'Driven off by convoy escorts'
In the mid-Atlantic, during April 1814, a large convoy of ships was spotted to be sailing from Plymouth to China. Meanwhile, the former French Mediterranean fleet was supposed to find its biggest opportunity after several weeks of fruitless searching, having lost contact with its main squadron of ships when this fleet split on 28 February 1814. The detached squadron comprised of Commerce de Paris, 5 Temeraire class battleships, one small battleship and 5 [later 8] frigates and they were asked to locate any Asia-bound convoys [including return journeys]. A convoy that consisted of 3 1st and 2nd rate ships as escorts besides 3 3rd rates and 4 frigates was now for their attack.
Of these, all were detached from the Mediterranean Fleet except for 2 3rd rates. When spotted, the French commander attempted to open fire and rake the HMS Caledonia, but failed. Nearer to the convoy, the small battleship Boree was devastated by frigates and East Indiamen and forced to surrender, causing fear among French frigates despite the fact that they only had defenceless merchant ships to raid. Boree was brought towards the French flagship in a captured state, demoralising the French navy and causing the French to retreat. During the attempt, 2 Temeraire class ships were forced to strike to the British over 20-21 April, along with Commerce de Paris.

The retreat would be more chaotic. Having left the French admiral alone, they were intercepted by the Spanish Navy and the British Mediterranean Fleet. Spain took a battleship of the line while the Royal Navy captured all frigates and surviving ships of the squadron off Toulon. The actions took place in early May 1814 and were pointless, Napoleon having been forced to abdicate on the same day as the Toulon actions. [It was 11 May, he lasted several weeks longer in this scenario due to butterflies.]

Meanwhile, the Second Squadron of the French Mediterranean Fleet, under Admiral Guy-Victor Duperre, entered the Caribbean with the remainder of the squadron. On 27 April, this squadron encountered an inferior British squadron that was intended to rendezvous with the coming British convoy to Jamaica to arrive on 30 April [having departed on 16 March], but the admiral was deceived by flashing signals and changed course for verification. It was revealed that without frigates, the potential scouts available were restricted and the French fleet was kept in doubt as the frigates escaped. More importantly, the signals might be signs that the main British fleet escorting the convoy was coming and that might even be a second supporting British fleet that was a ghost or bogus if proven but to be taken into Duperre's account.

On 1 May 1814, the convoy and supporting British squadron were in Jamaica. It was revealed that the second squadron was comprised of ships detached from the Bermuda and Mediterranean Fleets, proving that earlier French diversions and deceptions had failed with defeats. The British squadron comprised of the original convoy escort, 3 ships of the line from Bermuda [including a reinforcement from the Channel Fleet on despatch duty] and 2 large Spanish ships involved in Trafalgar to stay with the convoy supervised by HMS Queen Charlotte [an earlier escort]. It was suggested that the British frigates stay on the American coast to blockade their American counterparts and smaller vessels.

Although there were no frigates included in the escort, it was suggested that powerful ships of the line would deter attacks on the convoy. Thus, this battle became known as the only large naval battle of the Napoleonic Wars where there were no frigates involved on the French side. The French were prepared to attack the convoy and destroy it. An Ocean class ship of the line was detached for potential commerce raiding and was unable to participate in the fleet battle.

When the battle began the next day, the French flagship [Wagram] was entangled with HMS Ville de Paris and pounced. HMS Ville de Paris would be the victor, albeit badly damaged. Both Bucentaure class ships were the first to be involved, fighting ferociously until sinking after shelling from HMS Santo Domingo, HMS Donegal [recently arrived at Jamaica from Bermuda], HMS Plantagenet, HMS Diadem and HMS Acasta.

Meanwhile, 3 Temeraire class ships [the other being recaptured and barely repaired for sea other than 2 masts and its underwater hull] engaged the HMS Bedford and pounced it to a wreck that grounded, but it couldn't be taken out of harbour. The ship Imperial charged into the harbour expecting the convoy and found itself being wrecked by Spanish gunfire along with Hannibal. Both were forced to strike to the Spanish Navy and escorting British frigates, although Hannibal drifted until it could be recaptured by Britain, further damaged by shore batteries. All Spanish ships were badly damaged and declared unseaworthy for return to Europe.

HMS Gloucester recaptured its sister ship Armada while HMS Diadem forced Pembroke to strike its colours. Mulgrave was taken by HMS Norge and the earlier [recaptured] French Scipion nearly struck to HMS Acasta before retreating under cover of the ship Breslaw. The ship Austerlitz was left to cover the retreat of its fleet, consisting of 3 Temeraire class ships and the recently boarded HMS Bedford, which was abandoned under tow. HMS Donegal was attacked by 2 small battleships, but these were driven off with one of the pair lost. The action took 16 hours to complete and left the 2nd French Squadron without 2 1st rates, both 80 gun ships, a small battleship, 3 recent captures [and an earlier capture] and a Temeraire class ship [that was scuttled, it proved to be the recaptured Scipion].
 
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The return journey back to Europe and conclusion
[See post above.]
The retreat would be more chaotic for both fleets than the battles. Having left the French admirals alone, ships of the squadron previously involving Commerce de Paris were intercepted by the Spanish Navy and the British Mediterranean Fleet. Spain took a battleship of the line after it was shelled and staggered while the Royal Navy captured all frigates and surviving ships of the squadron off Toulon upon notification of the news. The actions took place in early May 1814 and were pointless, Napoleon having been forced to abdicate on the same day as the Toulon actions. [It was 11 May when these took place, he lasted several weeks longer in this scenario due to butterflies.]

After 3 May 1814, the last remnants of the French Navy's defeated Mediterranean Squadron fled back to Europe, numbering a single first rate [Austerlitz], the small battleship Breslaw, the 3 regular Temeraire class ships that set sail from Toulon [excluding a prize from the same class] and no frigates. At least the few brigs involved were detached before the convoy battles only to return to a defeated France if not captured first.

Unlike the 1st detachment, these ships were of the detachment that caused 4 ships to be wrecked off Jamaica before defeat and 2 more to be dismasted but saved, although both Spanish ships were among the wrecked and the British ships were later salvaged and returned home under heavy escort to deter American and French raiders from interception. Later, they returned to Brest on 11 July, safe from the British blockade due to the end of war and withdrawal of the Royal Navy as a result.

Most of the Royal Navy in the Americas was unable to intercept stragglers and retreating ships from both fleets as they were, after all, too busy getting the damaged and captured ships seaworthy for the voyage to Britain and fighting American ships and French privateers [the latter being unaware of the subsequent peace and recent defeat that occurred]. Although they were received with cheers at surviving and scoring initial victories, the heavy losses and Napoleon's defeat conspired to reduce celebrations along with Bourbon interference at Napoleonic supporters. Once the westernmost coordinates of European territory were reached by this second squadron of French ships, Napoleon's defeat and imprisonment became obvious to every British and Coalition fleet in Europe and this explained the safe arrival of the survivors into France.

Effectively, the Spanish ships were expandable in British eyes [non-British, 1st rate battleships but obsolete and disadvantageous with lower morale among the crew], leaving the French with no benefits against Britain but weakening a Spanish Navy and ironically, finishing the work of Trafalgar which involved them and saw them dismasted with heavy damage but escape. [The ships were Santa Ana and Principe de Asturias, having moved to Havana, Cuba in 1810 and were requisitioned in 1814 for British Caribbean duties.] Thus, there was no strategic effect to the potential balance of the British fleet against the devastated French fleet even had the Napoleonic Wars continued after 1814.

News of Napoleon's defeats and abdication couldn't reach the convoys and battle fleets on time, resulting only in battles with the strategic consequence of virtually eliminating the French Navy. What was significant was the effective annihilation of many French 1st rate battleships, the Bucentaure class [with its single remaining half-relative] and foreign built ships of the line from the French navy. Even the Temeraire class was badly decimated by the battle, along with 10 French frigates [all 8 of the Mediterranean Squadron and 2 from captures by the blockade] as a result of the ill fated sorties. The latter would ruin attempts by France to form a large frigate and overseas fleet for the 1st decade after 1814. This was compounded by the cessation of many foreign built, Temeraire and Bucentaure-class ships to the Netherlands, British and Habsburg Empire in the 1814 armistice.

[Apart from retaining 1792 borders while retaining constraints on French naval ship construction, the basic consequences [for the Congress of Vienna and 1st few years after] are similar to reality. The most significant consequences are no 'Hundred Days'; which will likely end with similar consequences to its actual counterpart if it still occurs, and a weaker French navy and colonial venture, both in appeal and action.]

After the defeats Napoleon faced at Trafalgar, Iberia, Russia, Germany, the world's oceans and seas and even his home; the final destruction of his navy would bring a negative reputation just after his abdication and exile to Elba. Depressed and shocked with inflated losses and damage pronounced to him by his captors, Napoleon died on 25 September 1814 from unrecoverable infections, although rumours of murder persisted. Later, these were found to originate from a suicide attempt. [As a result, Waterloo has been butterflied away, although British history books would mention the rather indecisive but heavily devastating naval battles against France as final factors in Napoleon's end with his death weeks after the news.] To this day, counterfactuals involving these naval battles even explained possible return attempts by Napoleon had it been not for the battles or even his death, with one about him receiving his army equivalent to them at Waterloo and another in Germany being popular.

The losses of many hundreds of French sailors to death, injuries, desertion and prison [although the latter were treated and dealt with accordingly] would also demoralise the French Navy besides lost ships and reduce planned overseas expeditions with its support. Eventually, the Congress of Vienna would cede Guadeloupe to Sweden and Madagascar became a British territory for the 19th and 20th centuries, along with Reunion, the Seychelles and Mauritius. However, the French temporarily obtained southern Madagascar and permanently regained Reunion in 1896 as they felt that they needed Indian Ocean bases when Egypt became unusable for trade. Also, Tunisia became an Italian [state] colony in this scenario with the French being newer to Algeria and Morocco was left independent albeit an effective puppet of Germany. [Final dismantling of the Ottomans and the actual WW1 being butterflied, intervention in Indochina to gain prestige and secure its fellow citizens and co-religionists still undertaken on different dates and Pacific plus some African colonies going to other powers if colonized by France after 1815 in reality.]
 
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