AHC Napoleon the Royalist Marquis

He may but this promotion would not necessarily be meaningful for a long time. The problem with the loyal troops is that, with the few exceptions, they were foreign regiments on the French service. An overwhelming majority of the French national regiments sides with "the people".

Following alleged Nappy's advice of dispersing the mob (actually, not yet very "revolutionary") with a grapeshot would work as far as dispersing the mob was involved but it would also produce a terrible political reaction that would only accelerate the revolutionary process.

Not to mention that this action would not promote him (the 2nd lieutenant) into an army commander and even would not make him a general: in the Old Regime person's pedigree (and service record) mattered too much for an obscure noble from Corsica to make such a fast career just thanks to an action which would not be uniformly applauded even in the royalist camp.

You don’t need majority support to succeed in restoring order. Just loyal troops at the right point. You strike here. The volatile groups that make the more or less radical revolutionaries are going to be divided about what to do. You behead the radicals and most of the sheeple will scatter. Then you spin the event in the right way and 75% of the population will then support the legitimate king against the parisian mob.

That’s what Napoleon did a few years later. People wanted order before anything. And most peasants, that made up some 75% of the French population and the catholics and the nobility and the priests will rally around the king’s flag.

There was no support for a republican regime then. It is rarely known that, in the first legislative elections organized by the revolutionaries after they abolished the monarchy by a violent coup, the turnout was merely 10%. They would never have won a majority to support their radical methods and program if the election had been free and if the non-radicals had not been terrified or disinterested or disgusted by the chaos in which France had begun to sink.
 
You don’t need majority support to succeed in restoring order. Just loyal troops at the right point. You strike here. The volatile groups that make the more or less radical revolutionaries are going to be divided about what to do. You behead the radicals and most of the sheeple will scatter. Then you spin the event in the right way and 75% of the population will then support the legitimate king against the parisian mob.

That’s what Napoleon did a few years later. People wanted order before anything. And most peasants, that made up some 75% of the French population and the catholics and the nobility and the priests will rally around the king’s flag.

There was no support for a republican regime then. It is rarely known that, in the first legislative elections organized by the revolutionaries after they abolished the monarchy by a violent coup, the turnout was merely 10%. They would never have won a majority to support their radical methods and program if the election had been free and if the non-radicals had not been terrified or disinterested or disgusted by the chaos in which France had begun to sink.
It's much more difficult than that. At this point in time,everyone including the peasants(they were burning the deeds of the nobles) and the nobility wanted reforms.The point of contention here is how much reform.

The peasants still haven’t turned against the Parisian mob yet—that came later.

Nonetheless,I don’t see how it is impossible for the king to put down the revolt with the 20k+ mercenary force.

In my opinion,the 1789 Revolution was more similar to the 1905 Russian Revolution. The King can turn things around if,as you have said,used loyal troops at the right time and then give a few concessions.

The level of organization the radicals of 1789 had was a joke compared to the Bolsheviks of 1917. If you take out the Parisian mob and the Estates-General,the entire movement would fragment. After the Tennis Court Oath,the nobility was increasingly against the revolution. Many nobles were on the fence. They neither ordered their troops to disperse the mob,nor did they ordered them to join them.
 
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You don’t need majority support to succeed in restoring order. Just loyal troops at the right point. You strike here. The volatile groups that make the more or less radical revolutionaries are going to be divided about what to do. You behead the radicals and most of the sheeple will scatter. Then you spin the event in the right way and 75% of the population will then support the legitimate king against the parisian mob.

All of the above completely ignores the fundamental facts that defined situation on a ground. I already explained that the mob was just icing on a cake: there was a functioning National Assembly which included representatives of all 3 Estates and which already grabbed a substantial chunk of a royal power by voting all taxes provisionally, only as long as the Assembly continued to sit, and established a committee of subsistence to deal with food shortages. King's clumsy attempts to shut down the Assembly and him firing Necker made things only worse escalating things into a full scale rebellion.

As for the 'loyal troops", a big part of the elite French Guard joined the mobs.


That’s what Napoleon did a few years later.

Bad analogy: general Bonaparte was acting against a royalist revolt with a reasonably narrow support base and without any backing by a legitimate governmental structure. Here you have a very unpopular monarch on one side and very popular National Assembly on another. See the difference?


People wanted order before anything.

In 1789 they did not want an existing order: it was what is called "revolutionary situation".

And most peasants, that made up some 75% of the French population and the catholics and the nobility and the priests will rally around the king’s flag.

The statement above is patently not true and "the catholics" as a separate group simply does not make any sense because at that time practically all French had been Catholics.

When the Estates General reformed themselves into the National Assembly, ALL representatives of the clergy Estate joined the 3rd Estate and the same goes for a part of the representatives of the nobility as well. As far as the clergy was involved, this is not a big surprise because under the Old regime its lower ranks had been extremely poor. The former clergymen of all level had been playing a prominent role in the French Revolution. Taleyrand, a Bishop of Autun, assisted Mirabeau in the appropriation of Church properties, participated in the writing of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and proposed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy that nationalised the Church. Abbe Sieyes wrote famous "What is the 3rd Estate?" and made an impressive career all the way to the Consulate. Fouche spent his pre-Revolutionary years studying and teaching in the Oratorian colleges.

The peasants had been only happy with the land reform. The revolt in Vendee started only when it came to the universal military service. But the nice thing about the peasants was that they were NOT represented in the Estates General and, as a result, in the National Assembly. And, while not being excessively revolutionary (beyond the normal level of greed), they also were not organized in any meaningful way.

The nobility was split but the people like Phillip "Egalite" and Mirabeau did not exactly came from the gutters and many of the 1st generation of the republican generals also tended to have a good pedigree like comte de Custine, commander-in-chief of the Army of the Vosges in 1792, Dumouriez, victor at Valmy, François Christophe Kellermann, future 1st Duke of Valmy and Marshal of France, Alexandre François Marie, Viscount of Beauharnais , General-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine in 1793 (and grandfather of Napoleon III).
 
It's much more difficult than that. At this point in time,everyone including the peasants(they were burning the deeds of the nobles) and the nobility wanted reforms.The point of contention here is how much reform.

The peasants still haven’t turned against the Parisian mob yet—that came later.

Most of them never did: Vendee and couple other places did not amount to a majority of the French peasantry. Parisian mob was more or less irrelevant in the provinces, unlike the revolutionary mobs (backed up by the troops) in the provincial cities.

Nonetheless,I don’t see how it is impossible for the king to put down the revolt with the 20k+ mercenary force.

He did not have 20K+ mercenary force in his disposal so this is a purely academic issue. There was a small group of the Swiss mercenaries guarding the royal residence in Paris, which was pretty much annihilated by the mob on August 10, 1792 (almost immediately after which Louis had been arrested).

In my opinion,the 1789 Revolution was more similar to the 1905 Russian Revolution.

At a risk to appear an extreme bore, it was similar to one of February of 1917 and had absolutely nothing in common with one of 1905. :p


The level of organization the radicals of 1789 had was a joke compared to the Bolsheviks of 1917.
Hopefully, you are aware of the fact that the Bolsheviks had nothing to do with overthrow of Tsarist government so bringing them into the picture does not make too much sense. :cool:


If you take out the Parisian mob and the Estates-General,the entire movement would fragment.

Yes, "and if he did not wrestle from me my revolver and did not tie my hands, I'd definitely be able to defeat him...." type of thing. Louis XVI did not have any sizable military force that would support him unconditionally. He did not have a solid support among any social group outside the court camarilia, he could not handle catastrophic economic situation on his own (new taxes had to be voted by the Estates General) and the opposition had all of the above and its organized body, National Assembly, had been speedily taking measures preventing it from being "taken out": the loyal troops were assembled and the National Guard created.
 
Bad analogy: general Bonaparte was acting against a royalist revolt with a reasonably narrow support base and without any backing by a legitimate governmental structure. Here you have a very unpopular monarch on one side and very popular National Assembly on another. See the difference?

It's kind of the AHC to come up with a different situation to fix that. "C" is challenge. Or even if the NA is popular at the time, find a way to discredit it down the line so people remember "well, they might have had a point about X, but that way an overreaction"
 
It's kind of the AHC to come up with a different situation to fix that. "C" is challenge. Or even if the NA is popular at the time, find a way to discredit it down the line so people remember "well, they might have had a point about X, but that way an overreaction"

That's exactly what I was talking about in "non-idiot Louis" option. Louis' compliance would most probably allow to avoid period of Terror (and allow him to survive) and it is only a matter of time when and how exactly the constitutional government is going to deteriorate into a Directorate-like mode of the open corruption. Louis may use situation for regaining some of his powers (not an absolute monarchy) by having a broad support base.
 
All of the above completely ignores the fundamental facts that defined situation on a ground. I already explained that the mob was just icing on a cake: there was a functioning National Assembly which included representatives of all 3 Estates and which already grabbed a substantial chunk of a royal power by voting all taxes provisionally, only as long as the Assembly continued to sit, and established a committee of subsistence to deal with food shortages. King's clumsy attempts to shut down the Assembly and him firing Necker made things only worse escalating things into a full scale rebellion.

As for the 'loyal troops", a big part of the elite French Guard joined the mobs.




Bad analogy: general Bonaparte was acting against a royalist revolt with a reasonably narrow support base and without any backing by a legitimate governmental structure. Here you have a very unpopular monarch on one side and very popular National Assembly on another. See the difference?




In 1789 they did not want an existing order: it was what is called "revolutionary situation".



The statement above is patently not true and "the catholics" as a separate group simply does not make any sense because at that time practically all French had been Catholics.

When the Estates General reformed themselves into the National Assembly, ALL representatives of the clergy Estate joined the 3rd Estate and the same goes for a part of the representatives of the nobility as well. As far as the clergy was involved, this is not a big surprise because under the Old regime its lower ranks had been extremely poor. The former clergymen of all level had been playing a prominent role in the French Revolution. Taleyrand, a Bishop of Autun, assisted Mirabeau in the appropriation of Church properties, participated in the writing of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and proposed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy that nationalised the Church. Abbe Sieyes wrote famous "What is the 3rd Estate?" and made an impressive career all the way to the Consulate. Fouche spent his pre-Revolutionary years studying and teaching in the Oratorian colleges.

The peasants had been only happy with the land reform. The revolt in Vendee started only when it came to the universal military service. But the nice thing about the peasants was that they were NOT represented in the Estates General and, as a result, in the National Assembly. And, while not being excessively revolutionary (beyond the normal level of greed), they also were not organized in any meaningful way.

The nobility was split but the people like Phillip "Egalite" and Mirabeau did not exactly came from the gutters and many of the 1st generation of the republican generals also tended to have a good pedigree like comte de Custine, commander-in-chief of the Army of the Vosges in 1792, Dumouriez, victor at Valmy, François Christophe Kellermann, future 1st Duke of Valmy and Marshal of France, Alexandre François Marie, Viscount of Beauharnais , General-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine in 1793 (and grandfather of Napoleon III).

I am very aware of all this and of much more.

The king was not very unpopular, unless among the revolutionaries and radicals that were but a minority, a significant minority but a minority of the French. Mainly the majority of the bourgeoisie and a strong proportion of the urban people. The fact that peasants wanted land reform did not make them happy to be dominated by rich burgesses instead of nobles.

If yo want an idea of the economic and fiscal reforms of the revolutionaries, think of the yeltsinian privatizations in post soviet Russia. The rich that held treasury bonds and were threatened with bankruptcy exchanged these junk bonds for real Estate taken from the church and from the nobles that opposed the revolutionary policy. Do you know what most of this real Estate did finance ? Not mainly supernumerary priests, monks and nuns (this was true but a minority of the costs) but mainly the healthcare, basic education and social security of the time to support the poor. There was no support for such reforms, except for the minority of well-off and of rich people that could buy it.

This policy but worsened the fiscal situation the revolutionary claimed they would reestablish and caused a terrible economic depression that, by economic historians’ estimates, caused the French GDP to halve (war also being an important factor, of course). They printed mountains of unbacked paper and the result was that, a few years later, the moderate revolutionary bankrupted on the public debt by two thirds.

Of course, it is not obvious to realize it since most of those who wrote the primary sources were favorable to this policy. But this was a kind of spin. One should always consider those primary sources cautiously. This is no less true for the French Revolution than it was for the russian revolution or for the Roman republic.

Louis XVI and the monarchists lost because they could not conceive the necessity to play party politics in order to check the revolutionaries that were a minority that was able to grab power thanks to a complex voting system of several levels of ballot that enabled candidates who agreed on certain philosophical principles to secure a majority of seats by eliminating those who did not share their ideas.

But as I previously mentioned, their real electoral base was rather weak. This is precisely why they had to resort to violence and serial coups inside the revolutionary movement.

The king’s popularity was destroyed only very lately, in the meaning that he let his popularity be destroyed by a minority of radicals that depicted him as a pig, a traitor, ... etc. It was mostly destroyed in the eyes of the revolutionaries and their supporters’ base, the wide mass of people that did not especially share this revolutionary radicalism not being incented to express their views because anti-revolutionary speech was not tolerated.

The king and his supporters could have turned the tide of events because only a small minority was actively committed in the course of events. And shrewd politicians could spin facts the way they found convenient once they had secured political victory, that is their opponents. The bad guy is the loser because the winner says so.
 
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Most of them never did: Vendee and couple other places did not amount to a majority of the French peasantry. Parisian mob was more or less irrelevant in the provinces, unlike the revolutionary mobs (backed up by the troops) in the provincial cities.
I never said most of the peasantry joined in,but a large part of rural France did rebel against Paris later on..

He did not have 20K+ mercenary force in his disposal so this is a purely academic issue. There was a small group of the Swiss mercenaries guarding the royal residence in Paris, which was pretty much annihilated by the mob on August 10, 1792 (almost immediately after which Louis had been arrested).
It's not a purely academic issue,and we are talking about 1789,not any time further. STOP referring to another date when we are talking about the mercs,it's annoying. France had control over 23 Swiss or German regiments in 1789. There were 25,000 soldiers in proximity of Paris in 1789.This force either consisted of foreign regiments or troops commanded by loyal officers. The Duke of Broglie,who commanded the army at the time,wanted a crackdown. Louis said no. Considering that the Duke of Broglie was a highly experienced professional soldier, I trust the Duke of Broglie's judgement more than Louis'. It was only after the dismissal of this force to the border that the only loyalist force in the capital became the Swiss guards,which as you mentioned was insufficient to protect the king--thus leaving him at the mercy of the various parliaments and the mob.


At a risk to appear an extreme bore, it was similar to one of February of 1917 and had absolutely nothing in common with one of 1905. :p

Hopefully, you are aware of the fact that the Bolsheviks had nothing to do with overthrow of Tsarist government so bringing them into the picture does not make too much sense. :cool:
No mate,it was more similar to the 1905 revolt because unlike February 1917,nobody in the country had any experience of a revolution. And my point was that the October revolution of 1917 was much harder to crush than both the 1905 and February Revolution,due to the Bolsheviks having infiltrated the entire army. Unlike the October Revolution,the there was no clear leadership in the other two revolutions.Everything was much more spontaneous.If you take out Lenin,Trotsky and Stalin in 1917 for example,someone lower in the party will step up and take control of the entire party and army units loyal to it. On the other hand,if the Estates-General is taken out in 1789,the rest will bicker about who has command over the movement.
The statement above is patently not true and "the catholics" as a separate group simply does not make any sense because at that time practically all French had been Catholics.

When the Estates General reformed themselves into the National Assembly, ALL representatives of the clergy Estate joined the 3rd Estate and the same goes for a part of the representatives of the nobility as well. As far as the clergy was involved, this is not a big surprise because under the Old regime its lower ranks had been extremely poor. The former clergymen of all level had been playing a prominent role in the French Revolution. Taleyrand, a Bishop of Autun, assisted Mirabeau in the appropriation of Church properties, participated in the writing of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and proposed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy that nationalised the Church. Abbe Sieyes wrote famous "What is the 3rd Estate?" and made an impressive career all the way to the Consulate. Fouche spent his pre-Revolutionary years studying and teaching in the Oratorian colleges.

The peasants had been only happy with the land reform. The revolt in Vendee started only when it came to the universal military service. But the nice thing about the peasants was that they were NOT represented in the Estates General and, as a result, in the National Assembly. And, while not being excessively revolutionary (beyond the normal level of greed), they also were not organized in any meaningful way.

The nobility was split but the people like Phillip "Egalite" and Mirabeau did not exactly came from the gutters and many of the 1st generation of the republican generals also tended to have a good pedigree like comte de Custine, commander-in-chief of the Army of the Vosges in 1792, Dumouriez, victor at Valmy, François Christophe Kellermann, future 1st Duke of Valmy and Marshal of France, Alexandre François Marie, Viscount of Beauharnais , General-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine in 1793 (and grandfather of Napoleon III).
The revolt in the Vendee came due to a number of things. Conscription was one of them, but seizure of church lands and the purging of clergymen were also equally important. And these clergymen were not people like Talleyrand and Sieyes,who were much higher up. These people were labelled as 'refractory' priests due to their refusal to declare an oath of loyalty to the state before the pope. People like Talleyrand and Sieyes did not represent the majority of the clergy. Talleyrand and Sieyes were more or less people that joined the clergy either for an education or as a livelihood.

At any rate,I do think that Matteo is mistaken about the clergy in general. In 1789,most people were in favor of changes,including the clergy. It's just that as the revolution gets more radical,different groups turned away from the revolution.
 
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Kaze

Banned
Or there is the other way...

After the War of Austrian Succession - Corsica becomes an independent nation under revolutionary leader Pasquale Paoli as its King. Where in the Boneparte family would be as king-makers given titles, well at least until Paoli's son has "an unfortunate accident by falling onto Napoleon's sword twice."
 
I never said most of the peasantry joined in,but a large part of rural France did rebel against Paris later on..

It's not a purely academic issue,and we are talking about 1789,not any time further. STOP referring to another date when we are talking about the mercs,it's annoying. France had control over 23 Swiss or German regiments in 1789. There were 25,000 soldiers in proximity of Paris in 1789.This force either consisted of foreign regiments or troops commanded by loyal officers. The Duke of Broglie,who commanded the army at the time,wanted a crackdown. Louis said no. Considering that the Duke of Broglie was a highly experienced professional soldier, I trust the Duke of Broglie's judgement more than Louis'. It was only after the dismissal of this force to the border that the only loyalist force in the capital became the Swiss guards,which as you mentioned was insufficient to protect the king--thus leaving him at the mercy of the various parliaments and the mob.


No mate,it was more similar to the 1905 revolt because unlike February 1917,nobody in the country had any experience of a revolution. And my point was that the October revolution of 1917 was much harder to crush than both the 1905 and February Revolution,due to the Bolsheviks having infiltrated the entire army. Unlike the October Revolution,the there was no clear leadership in the other two revolutions.Everything was much more spontaneous.
The revolt in the Vendee came due to a number of things. Conscription was one of them, but seizure of church lands and the purging of clergymen were also equally important. And these clergymen were not people like Talleyrand and Sieyes,who were much higher up. These people were labelled as 'refractory' priests due to their refusal to declare an oath of loyalty to the state before the pope. People like Talleyrand and Sieyes did not represent the majority of the clergy. Talleyrand and Sieyes were more or less people that joined the clergy either for an education or as a livelihood.

At any rate,I do think that Matteo is mistaken about the clergy in general. In 1789,most people were in favor of changes,including the clergy. It's just that as the revolution gets more radical,different groups turned away from the revolution.

Agreed with most of your statement. Let me just make clear that I did not write, even less mean, that the majority of the people were not in favor of change. Of course they were. Who would not be except the minority that had something to lose. The cahiers de doleances clearly demonstrated that people wanted reform, justice, abolition of the remaining old easements (which then concerned but a minority of people, contrary to medieval ages), ... etc. But they did not want regime change. They were not republicans. And by all standards they did not want to be ruled by an assembly of rich businessmen, lawyers, ... etc.
 
I never said most of the peasantry joined in,but a large part of rural France did rebel against Paris later on..

It's not a purely academic issue,and we are talking about 1789,not any time further. STOP referring to another date when we are talking about the mercs,it's annoying. France had control over 23 Swiss or German regiments in 1789. There were 25,000 soldiers in proximity of Paris in 1789.This force either consisted of foreign regiments or troops commanded by loyal officers. The Duke of Broglie,who commanded the army at the time,wanted a crackdown. Louis said no. Considering that the Duke of Broglie was a highly experienced professional soldier, I trust the Duke of Broglie's judgement more than Louis'.

The only thing the Duke of Broglie managed to do when push came to shove was to flee France, which should tell you something about loyalty of these troops to the regime.

It was only after the dismissal of this force to the border that the only loyalist force in the capital became the Swiss guards,which as you mentioned was insufficient to protect the king--thus leaving him at the mercy of the various parliaments and the mob.

Taking into an account that even a considerable part of the French Guard supported the National Assembly, I have serious reasons to doubt your conclusions.

BTW, do you understand that (a) the Estates General and then National Assembly were not "parliaments" in the French meaning of the term and that (b) Louis NEEDED the Estates General and could not dismiss it with or without military force: country was in a financial crisis and a king could not introduce the new taxes unless they are approved by the Estates General.





No mate,it was more similar to the 1905 revolt because unlike February 1917,nobody in the country had any experience of a revolution.

Nope. In 1789 and in February of 1917 there were functioning elective bodies (National Assembly and Duma) while 1905 was just a chaotic set of the local uprisings unrelated to each other. In 1789 and in February of 1917 the main events had been happening in the capital and resulted in overthrow of a monarchy. In both these cases the revolutions were supported by an army. In 1905 regime was not seriously endangered and the capital was almost trouble free.

And my point was that the October revolution of 1917 was much harder to crush than both the 1905 and February Revolution,due to the Bolsheviks having infiltrated the entire army.

Actually crushing them would not be as difficult as Soviet historians tended to portray. The critical thing for a coup was their control of Petrograd's garrison by pretty much the same methods that had been used by Catherine II for her coup: keep them drunk and promise that they'll not be sent to front. If the Provisional Government was not such a bunch of the nincompoops, they'd manage to have some loyal troops in their disposal and all that drunken revolutionary scum would disappear. What would happen to a light cruiser standing as a lame duck in Neva River if a battery of the 6 inch guns started firing at him from a covered position? What would happen if the drunken mob of the reserve soldiers and sailors most of whom never saw the action met with the units composed of the officers? They'd just have to move on Smolnii fast, capture and execute Lenin, Trotsky and couple others and that would be it.

Nobody controlled army (in general) at that time: it just wanted to go home.

At any rate,I do think that Matteo is mistaken about the clergy in general. In 1789,most people were in favor of changes,including the clergy. It's just that as the revolution gets more radical,different groups turned away from the revolution.

With which I completely agree.
 
The only thing the Duke of Broglie managed to do when push came to shove was to flee France, which should tell you something about loyalty of these troops to the regime.
By the time he fled,Louis had no control over any military force other than the Swiss Guard. This is because after the 20k+ army was sent back to the border, Louis and co. were left defenseless and marched to the Tuilleries(too late to recall the loyal units). After this point of time,Louis was forced to surrendered all of his authority(except for the power of veto) and thus the parliament seized control of the entire army legally.If Louis had ordered this force to fight before he lost his authority,this army most likely would have fought. But now that command has been transferred to the parliament,it answers to the parliament,not the king anymore.Furthermore,once back to the border,all the regiments of this force are spread among other native French regiments. They are not in proximity to act against Paris before they get wiped out by the native French regiments.


Taking into an account that even a considerable part of the French Guard supported the National Assembly, I have serious reasons to doubt your conclusions.
The National Guard at the time of Paris being surrounded by a 20k+ loyalist army was established for less than a month and with the exception of less than four thousand mutinous former French Guards(who had no officers),had no professional soldiers in it.At this point in time,the National Guard was not an impressive fighting force.
BTW, do you understand that (a) the Estates General and then National Assembly were not "parliaments" in the French meaning of the term and that (b) Louis NEEDED the Estates General and could not dismiss it with or without military force: country was in a financial crisis and a king could not introduce the new taxes unless they are approved by the Estates General.
Parliaments are the best way to describe the lot--given there's the Estates General,National Assembly,Legislative Assembly, and then Constitutional Assembly etc.... There's no better term to describe it other than that.Louis does not need the Estates General to introduce new taxes. It was always a matter between the nobility and the crown until the nobility idiotically told Louis that only the Estates General could introduce new taxes because they were upset at him and wanted to screw him up. The truth was that kings starting with Louis XIV have always arbitrarily introduced taxes. They never consulted any body except for their advisors. Louis XVI idiotically reintroduced the parlement,which his grandfather eliminated for trying to obstruct him from passing new laws. That's how things started to blow up. Even then, the new taxes were meant to be imposed on the nobility,not the peasants,the Parisian mob etc. At the time of the National Assembly however,which is when the National Guard got established,the Bastille Stormed and the 20k+ army brought in etc....a lot of nobles and higher ranking clergymen were already starting to break with the third estate.The whole reason why the National Assembly was even formed was due to the fact that the other two estates(the nobles and the clergy) had snubbed the third estate and were represented disproportionately. If Louis can throw the nobles a bone after the suppression of the National Assembly and come to an agreement with them,taxes can be passed either through the parlement or the Assembly of Notables.




Nope. In 1789 and in February of 1917 there were functioning elective bodies (National Assembly and Duma) while 1905 was just a chaotic set of the local uprisings unrelated to each other. In 1789 and in February of 1917 the main events had been happening in the capital and resulted in overthrow of a monarchy. In both these cases the revolutions were supported by an army. In 1905 regime was not seriously endangered and the capital was almost trouble free.
The difference is that the government in 1789 still had some loyal troops in the proximity of the capital whereas the Provisional government in October 1917 had no such troops left.Kerensky spent many hours trying to order troops to suppress the revolt but none arrived.


Actually crushing them would not be as difficult as Soviet historians tended to portray. The critical thing for a coup was their control of Petrograd's garrison by pretty much the same methods that had been used by Catherine II for her coup: keep them drunk and promise that they'll not be sent to front. If the Provisional Government was not such a bunch of the nincompoops, they'd manage to have some loyal troops in their disposal and all that drunken revolutionary scum would disappear. What would happen to a light cruiser standing as a lame duck in Neva River if a battery of the 6 inch guns started firing at him from a covered position? What would happen if the drunken mob of the reserve soldiers and sailors most of whom never saw the action met with the units composed of the officers? They'd just have to move on Smolnii fast, capture and execute Lenin, Trotsky and couple others and that would be it.

Nobody controlled army (in general) at that time: it just wanted to go home.
Would be difficult because the Provisional Government was idiotic enough to arm Bolshevik workers(due to a belief that Kornilov was trying to depose them). Most detrimental government control over the army was already thoroughly undermined due to Bolshevik infiltration and the soldiers in general agreeing not to follow orders from the Provisional government that's also authorized by the Bolsheviks. By the time the Bolsheviks tried to takeover,there was no loyal troops left in the proximity of the capital.
 
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