AHC: Most Effective US Army at Counter-Insurgency

Having returned to the forum after some tedious university second-year exams (on the Tokugawa Shogunate and 19th century Central Europe, thanks for asking), it seems that little has changed. The SF/Fantasy picture threads are still works of beauty, the Nazis could still win the war according to newbies, and Snake continues to discuss various types of warfare at great length.

In accordance with the latter of these: how would it be possible for the US Armed Forces to be the most efficient and effective they possibly could be at Counter-Insurgency work after WWII? What sort of impact would this have on the wider historical context? (Including the US Army's readiness to face down Soviet armoured divisions through the Fulda Gap, for example.)
 

NothingNow

Banned
You do realize that was the Marine Corps mission, right?
Pretty much break the Officer Corps of the idea of preparing to fight the next big war exclusively, and start beating them, with the Small Wars Manual (1941 edition.)
After that, It's mostly policy, training, and better personal kit.
 
I remember reading somewhere that the US Marines had a rather better idea about Counter-Insurgency than the US Army in terms of small unit work and other important issues. How to get this more widely spread?
 

NothingNow

Banned
I remember reading somewhere that the US Marines had a rather better idea about Counter-Insurgency than the US Army in terms of small unit work and other important issues. How to get this more widely spread?

Pretty much, without a continuous string of small wars, with the Marines taking the lead, and using the Small Wars Manual to good effect, it's utterly impossible.
 
IMO you're looking at the wrong service

The US Army got really awesome at CI in the Indian wars and the Philippine Insurgency (or Failed War of Independence depending on your POV) and promptly forgot everything it learned by the time WWII came about.

The US Marines some would argue made CI their bread-and-butter from the 1900's on with the various "interventions" in Caribbean and South American nations.

SOE/Rangers/commando units practiced hard at sparking insurgencies during WWII when occupied countries hated their oppressors and wanted to fight back.
Taking any notes from the Germans and how they handled partisan units in France, Poland, Yugoslavia, or the USSR or the Soviets handled partisan movements made folks queasy and start hurling accusations of war crimes and so forth.
Plus, as the SOE/Ranger/commando types'd tell you, opposing a popular movement was largely futile if 60-80% of the population agreed with/sympathized with/supported the partisans, had some access to arms, and a clear leader/movement.

It wasn't until the decolonization push of the 1950's put Western armies up against popular movements that countering guerrilla war came into vogue.
They didn't listen to the SOE vets about what it was like sparking insurgencies and how tough it was to stop them because political expediency ruled their deployment and raison d'etre regardless of the facts on the ground. Thus, most counter-insurgency efforts were miserable failures.

For the US Army to be an awesome CI force, it'd have to be structured more or less under the SOCOM model where the folks on the sharp end would be veterans with 3-5 years as NCOs or officers, extensive lingusitics/cultural savvy, practice at cultivating and maintaining local support networks, with clear military and political goals and strategy with reliance on local commanders' initiative to accomplish long-term goals rather than catering to a bunch of anxious idiots in DC (and their consitituents) wanting results yesterday and changing their mind every six months.
In essence 180 degrees away from the reliance on firepower, tactical mobility, and heavy logistical tail that made the US Army such a juggernaut in conventional warfare.
Do you train troops for the 99% readying themselves for slugging it out in the Fulda Gap or Korea or the Persian Gulf or the 1% eating snakes and being sneaky?
 
As others have said a complete strategic shift which means the Soviet Union isn't the major threat. At the end of the day a US defeat in a guerilla conflict was bad but as Vietnam proved not the end of the world. A US defeat in a kitchen sink conflict with the Red Army probably was the end of the world, therefore preparation for defending the Fulda Gap naturally assumed top priority.
It's noticeable that the US Army has only ever focused on CI when there hasn't been a major conventional threat.
 
IMO, this isn't at all doable with a post WWII PoD, as has been suggested above. Probably the closest you can get is to keep the USMC small during WWII, so that they remain focused more on amphibious raiding and small wars.
 
The problem the USA has with counterinsurgency, at least in a Cold War timeframe is that COIN requires one structure, but the Cold War US Military was designed for a completely different purpose. In a post-1945 POD the USSR will (and rightly so) monopolize US strategic attention. If WWII is averted, the USA actually in all probability develops a rather good COIN basis building on the Philippines and the Banana Wars.
 
I remember reading somewhere that the US Marines had a rather better idea about Counter-Insurgency than the US Army in terms of small unit work and other important issues. How to get this more widely spread?

The Marines were a self-conscious elite that made all due effort to be and to stay an elite. The problem is that the Army was 1) generally smaller, and 2) less choosy, meaning that the Marines will always have a simpler time with the more tedious/discipline-requiring COIN war than the Army does, without there being a larger military (that will in any event primarily focus on conventional, not COIN threats).
 
If there was, perhaps, some sort of large scale insurgency in postwar Germany (fabulously unlikely, but bear with me) involving the "Werewolves" of the SS and fanatical ex Nazis, would it give the USA sufficient experience to fight it more effectively? Such an insurgency would be unlikely to succeed, but could teach the USA some lessons.

I also remember reading somewhere that the US Army actually had experience in fighting communist insurgents from the Greek Civil War. The problem was that it was the wrong sort of insurgent. It was assumed that a massive conventional offensive would follow soon after their work, and that they were artificially imposed by Moscow. Not following any local political conditions at all.
 
Having returned to the forum after some tedious university second-year exams (on the Tokugawa Shogunate and 19th century Central Europe, thanks for asking), it seems that little has changed. The SF/Fantasy picture threads are still works of beauty, the Nazis could still win the war according to newbies, and Snake continues to discuss various types of warfare at great length.

In accordance with the latter of these: how would it be possible for the US Armed Forces to be the most efficient and effective they possibly could be at Counter-Insurgency work after WWII? What sort of impact would this have on the wider historical context? (Including the US Army's readiness to face down Soviet armoured divisions through the Fulda Gap, for example.)
Well the bad news is that with the exception of some specialized units COIN isn't the U.S> Army's job. not in the final analysis and when you try to make us do it, we kind of suck at it.

The Marine corps does much better at it being a smaller more diverse force with a greater level of RDF emphasis, and the NAVY SEALS aremade of pure win at COIN as well as other missions.

The Army has units such as the %th Special Forces BN the 75th Rangers, and other specialized units, but in the main we fight big giant wars with big giant weapons.

We're the hand and a half bastard sword.

The Marines are the switchblade and they're REALLY GOOD at it
 
stick to your friends

since the much praised Army and Marines Counter insurgency Field Manual reads much like an updated version of the portuguese 1966 Field Manual "O Exército na Guerra Subversiva" (ours was better if you take the circunstances of the times into account) I sugest the US Army could have learned a lot from cooperating with its NATO partners who run their counter insurgency campaigns very capably instead of going "experimental" on VietNam and ordering studies from civilian think tanks without pratical experience.

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The US Army got really awesome at CI in the Indian wars
As long as one doesn't have to worry about there being any political consequences for atrocities committed by one's own side, and the anticipated victory conditions consist of forcing the enemy's survivors into reservations rather than making viable treaties with anything seriously resembling separate nations, anyway...
:p
 
since the much praised Army and Marines Counter insurgency Field Manual reads much like an updated version of the portuguese 1966 Field Manual "O Exército na Guerra Subversiva" (ours was better if you take the circunstances of the times into account) I sugest the US Army could have learned a lot from cooperating with its NATO partners who run their counter insurgency campaigns very capably instead of going "experimental" on VietNam and ordering studies from civilian think tanks without pratical experience.
THE above is the TRUTH!
 
Heres the problem as bad as this sounds 9-11 was never going to kill 80,000,000 americans as a best case scenario, the Union of socialist soviet republics could and if there was a war would but it didnt happen because SAC and the US army was there and would hit back just as hard.

Modern day China could cripple the world economy by accident but starting a pacific war agianst vietnam/phillopenes ect. but wont because the U.S navy is there.

A bunch of stinking illiterate tribesmen are not going to destroy america nore do many of them actually want to despite what Faux news and a few old bastards hiding in caves and pakistani luxuary compounds want you to hear.:rolleyes:

If I was an American I would rather a military capable of defending me than a military capable of sorting out a country I couldnt point out on a map until 9-11 made it important.
 
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Heres the problem as bad as this sounds 9-11 was never going to kill 80,000,000 americans as a best case scenario, the Union of socialist soviet republics could and if there was a war would but it didnt happen because SAC and the US army was there and would hit back just as hard.

Modern day China could cripple the world economy by accident but starting a pacific war agianst vietnam/phillopenes ect. but wont because the U.S navy is there.

A bunch of stinking illiterate tribesmen are not going to deatroy america nore do many of them actually want to despite what Faux news and a few old bastards hiding in caves and pakistani luxuary compounds want you to hear.:rolleyes:

If I was an American I would rather a military capable of defending me than a military capable of sorting out a country I couldnt point out on a map until 9-11 madde it important.
This is it in a very wel lstated nutshell. Thank you. You have a sterling grasp of the facts.
 
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