translating that into a strategic victory is IMHO beyond Vietcong means, and the NVA wanted no part of that idea to start with.
Cough. The journal articles regarding the minutes of the VWP on this point have been published. The VWP were firmly behind the General Uprising / General Offensive line. Despite Giap's criticisms of the line.
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A better Tet might involve an understanding in 1966 that a General Uprising is simply not going to happen while the US are in country. This leads to a movement towards a purely General Offensive line as far as ending the war, and a purely PRG-formation line as far as consolidating control in the South.
The ideal Tet for the NFL-PLAF keeps its military capacity intact, eliminates a significant body of competent RVN administrators, and perhaps some major ARVN units. Seizure of culturally or political significant locations prior to rapid retreat is a plus; but, should only be accomplished if lines of retreat are available.
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The biggest problem facing the VWP, and the NFL for that matter, is that the only way to make a General Offensive successful is to remove the Americans. The only way to remove the Americans is attrition. And in 1967-1968 attrition was reducing the NFL's political campaign in the South. Tet was poorly chosen for a wide variety of reasons. It did ease the political situation for the NFL sufficiently; but, at stupid costs. Giap's line, that a General Offensive would not cause a General Uprising in 1968 was correct in hindsight. Even with sufficient change (Giap's criticism being accepted, with the infighting involved), serious action is going to have to be taken in 1968 to protect NFL political goals and a General Offensive will be dangerously expensive in assets.
yours,
Sam R.