AHC: More successful Tet Offensive for the Vietcong

It is often argued that, in tactical terms, the Tet Offensive of 1968 was disastrous for the North Vietnamese. After watching a BBC programme about the Ho Chi Minh trail, my mind clicked into the question: how could this be improved for the North?

Lets see how long this lasts before someone mentions Dolchstosselegende/whizz kids...
 
The Viet Cong were given inflexible orders on what they were to do and when it was to happen. No local initiative was allowed. Attacks were carried out even where it was patently obvious that they were facing an alerted and well armed enemy.

The short answer is give them the ability to have some flexibility in how to carry out their orders and allow them to retreat when the situation turns to custard and the net result for the VC will be better post Tet.

However since that would require a highly centralised system to stop being that, and as elimination of the VC leadership was a desired side effect of Tet (desired by the North Vietnamese anyway), this seems rather unlikely.
 
I don't think that's actually plausible. IOTL it achieved tactical surprise all over Vietnam, translating that into a strategic victory is IMHO beyond Vietcong means, and the NVA wanted no part of that idea to start with. If the prolonged battle at Hue City and literally attacking all over Vietnam. showing Westmoreland was talking out of his ass in terms of understanding what was going on in RVN territory, couldn't lead to a strategic victory anywhere IOTL, then that's a scenario that is difficult to improve upon (from their POV) in an ATL.
 
translating that into a strategic victory is IMHO beyond Vietcong means, and the NVA wanted no part of that idea to start with.

Cough. The journal articles regarding the minutes of the VWP on this point have been published. The VWP were firmly behind the General Uprising / General Offensive line. Despite Giap's criticisms of the line.

* * *

A better Tet might involve an understanding in 1966 that a General Uprising is simply not going to happen while the US are in country. This leads to a movement towards a purely General Offensive line as far as ending the war, and a purely PRG-formation line as far as consolidating control in the South.

The ideal Tet for the NFL-PLAF keeps its military capacity intact, eliminates a significant body of competent RVN administrators, and perhaps some major ARVN units. Seizure of culturally or political significant locations prior to rapid retreat is a plus; but, should only be accomplished if lines of retreat are available.

* * *

The biggest problem facing the VWP, and the NFL for that matter, is that the only way to make a General Offensive successful is to remove the Americans. The only way to remove the Americans is attrition. And in 1967-1968 attrition was reducing the NFL's political campaign in the South. Tet was poorly chosen for a wide variety of reasons. It did ease the political situation for the NFL sufficiently; but, at stupid costs. Giap's line, that a General Offensive would not cause a General Uprising in 1968 was correct in hindsight. Even with sufficient change (Giap's criticism being accepted, with the infighting involved), serious action is going to have to be taken in 1968 to protect NFL political goals and a General Offensive will be dangerously expensive in assets.

yours,
Sam R.
 

pnyckqx

Banned
It is often argued that, in tactical terms, the Tet Offensive of 1968 was disastrous for the North Vietnamese. After watching a BBC programme about the Ho Chi Minh trail, my mind clicked into the question: how could this be improved for the North?

Lets see how long this lasts before someone mentions Dolchstosselegende/whizz kids...
There is no way for the Viet Cong forces to win. HOWEVER, what you want to do is to improve the situation.

An entirely plausible solution is to have General Westmoreland deny IIFF Commander Lt. General Fred C. Weyand's request to pull back his forces from the border areas.

The Viet Cong will then have US Forces out of position, and will be able to do more damage before they are eventually suppressed.

It may be possible that Westmoreland gets relieved in disgrace over the incident.
 
I was convnced that the Tet achieved its main objective: Get US to understand that the war cannot be "won" in any traditional way.

Did it really matter to North Vietnam how many got killed or whether a position was "conquered"? Not really. It was important to show that the entire South could be reached and attacked. "Victory" in the classical sense, I believe, was not part of it.

Ivan
 

pnyckqx

Banned
I was convnced that the Tet achieved its main objective: Get US to understand that the war cannot be "won" in any traditional way.

Did it really matter to North Vietnam how many got killed or whether a position was "conquered"? Not really. It was important to show that the entire South could be reached and attacked. "Victory" in the classical sense, I believe, was not part of it.

Ivan
Actually not.

It wasn't until Cronkite made his statement on CBS that Giap reasoned the Tet Offensive to be anything but a disaster.

Militarily speaking it was a disaster for the Viet Cong. The North almost gave up the war.
 
I was convnced that the Tet achieved its main objective: Get US to understand that the war cannot be "won" in any traditional way.

Did it really matter to North Vietnam how many got killed or whether a position was "conquered"? Not really. It was important to show that the entire South could be reached and attacked. "Victory" in the classical sense, I believe, was not part of it.

Ivan

The objective of the Tet-1 offensive was very plainly the General Offensive / General Uprising line's success. Given that urban uprisings did not occur, and as the General Offensive was an unexpected[*1] failure, Tet-1 was a bloody disaster. The fact that elements of Tet-2 and Tet-3 were allowed to proceed shows just how backwards the VWP Political Committee were in 1968.

Tet did not have any focus on the internal politics of the United States, but was meant to be a culminating offensive leading to a revolution (of sorts—certainly not the self-emancipation of the urban and rural Vietnamese working class). Tet failed to achieve this.

yours,
Sam R.

[1] In contrast to a post-1968 willingness to continue General Offensives aimed at destroying the RVN on a two to three year cycle, until success was achieved.
 
Thanks for the comments. Amazing to see what "bad memory" and Concrite can do.

I had this fixation that Giap really aimed at a PR success in the US.

well, goes to show...

Ivan
 
Thanks for the comments. Amazing to see what "bad memory" and Concrite can do.

I had this fixation that Giap really aimed at a PR success in the US.

No worries, don't feel bad, history is a process and a method; each of us can be wrong, as long as there's enough of us to spot when one of us is wrong! (I know I've certainly been very wrong in the past on points).

Giap was on the outer prior to Tet, in the year and a half or more of planning for it. Giap's "line" in the VWP central apparatus had been systematically attacked, and Giap's supporters had been purged. Tet was a result of the more dominant line in the party, and Giap did pay for opposing it... until mid to late 1968 when Tet was evaluated by the VWP.

yours,
Sam R.
 
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