AHC: More Successful Arab Spring

Libya collapsed once NATO came in. The Libyan army would probably have rallied otherwise.
As for using the military to crush the protestors, the issue is that Armies have an institutional aversion to shooting their own countrymen.
Oh they’ll do it, as history has shown. But the focus on General officers and their corruption obscures the fact that the rank and file and even junior officers buy into the whole “defenders of xyz country”, and firing on crowds is something which requires some convincing. A leader needs to convince them that such an action is the path of least evil. In Syria, the military as an institution concluded that a crackdown, regrettable as it may be, was better than the alternative.
This is a good point about how armies behave in these sorts of domestic situations. Nicolae Ceaușescu kept his own armed force separate from the military for precisely this reason.
 
Libya collapsed once NATO came in. The Libyan army would probably have rallied otherwise.
As for using the military to crush the protestors, the issue is that Armies have an institutional aversion to shooting their own countrymen.
Oh they’ll do it, as history has shown. But the focus on General officers and their corruption obscures the fact that the rank and file and even junior officers buy into the whole “defenders of xyz country”, and firing on crowds is something which requires some convincing. A leader needs to convince them that such an action is the path of least evil. In Syria, the military as an institution concluded that a crackdown, regrettable as it may be, was better than the alternative.

Syria are complex the officer corps are heavily dominated by Alawite (60-70%), while the standing army are more representative, but still have a Alawite overrepresentation. The conscripts are in general representative. Early on many of the Sunni defected, which both weakened the army, but also hardened its opposition to the Rebels. The Syrian Arab Air Force which are mostly Sunni also stayed very loyal to the Regime and Assad personal, but that wasn’t surprising as it’s ironic the main base of the Assad family. It’s important to understand in Syria that Assad have much less power than most Arab strongmen, he’s more of a figure head of a ruling junta than a ruler in his own right, and he and his family represent the Air Force in that junta. So it was not impossible to imagine that the army had thrown him under the bus, but because the army fundamental represent the Alawite minority especially as many Sunni defected, they had no interest in giving in to Sunni supremacists on anything, the remnant of the army was small, but also competent (by the regional standards) and united in a common goal.
 
I think sectarian considerations can sometimes be given too much focus on (esp Western) analysis of the matter.
The SyAAF mostly remained loyal. Most of the Syrian Army did as well.
 
I think sectarian considerations can sometimes be given too much focus on (esp Western) analysis of the matter.
The SyAAF mostly remained loyal. Most of the Syrian Army did as well.
There were considerable desertions within the Syrian Army, and the media played it up pretty well, saying it was an indicator of how Assad was losing control of his forces. I think the reports were something like a quarter-million defectors - but the Syrian Arab Army boasted about three quarters of a million men, so he still had quite a lot defending him.

The Syrian Air Force also seems strongly loyal, and for that matter, ISIL and rebel troops seem to prefer targeting them whenever possible.
 
The actual defections from the regulars outside of senior officers was rather less. The maximum was from reservists, who refused recall notices. Or from the soon to be conscripted. Both "count" as desertion, but are they really?
The SyAAF is mostly professional so it was more immune from it.
 
A more concerted effort by the US to support the Syrian rebels, especially around 2012-2013 would have led to a victory. OTL the USA was caught confused when the civil war broke out and it's entire policy since then has been reactive and not proactive at all. In fact they even prevented Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar from providing further support to the rebels.

If air support had been provided, especially around the 2013 Damascus Offensives, the rebels would have easily seized the capital and deposed Assad. Now what happens afterwards is anybody's guess. With Nusra's (and to an extent ISIS') raison d'etre gone, would they have garnered so much support and influence? The government of the Syrian rebels would certainly be Islamic in outlook, but more of the Brotherhood variety than some sort of extremist Caliphate. It's likely there would be continued fighting in the Kurdish areas and the Alawite coastal provinces, even if the new Syrian government manages to control the rest of the Sunni Syrian heartland.

It's hard to see a "successful" scenario here at all, aside from Bashar voluntarily stepping down and calling for elections. But that would have been impossible since the Assad's have created entire patronage networks to bolster their rules leading to powerful factions having vested interests in maintaining the status quo. If he ever tried that he'd be deposed immediately and replaced with his brother Maher. The entire officer class of the Syrian army is mostly Alawites, and they would not be dislodged from their privileged positions peacefully.
 
Syria are complex the officer corps are heavily dominated by Alawite (60-70%), while the standing army are more representative, but still have a Alawite overrepresentation. The conscripts are in general representative. Early on many of the Sunni defected, which both weakened the army, but also hardened its opposition to the Rebels. The Syrian Arab Air Force which are mostly Sunni also stayed very loyal to the Regime and Assad personal, but that wasn’t surprising as it’s ironic the main base of the Assad family. It’s important to understand in Syria that Assad have much less power than most Arab strongmen, he’s more of a figure head of a ruling junta than a ruler in his own right, and he and his family represent the Air Force in that junta. So it was not impossible to imagine that the army had thrown him under the bus, but because the army fundamental represent the Alawite minority especially as many Sunni defected, they had no interest in giving in to Sunni supremacists on anything, the remnant of the army was small, but also competent (by the regional standards) and united in a common goal.

The airforce was also dominated by Alawites with Sunni pilots not being trusted with flight missions as the civil war gained steam. It's also a bit of a stretch to call the Syrian army competent. Even their crack units were struggling against the rebels until proper Russian support arrived.

As to why the officers remained loyal, this explains it best.

https://carnegie-mec.org/2015/11/04/assad-s-officer-ghetto-why-syrian-army-remains-loyal-pub-61449
 
A more concerted effort by the US to support the Syrian rebels, especially around 2012-2013 would have led to a victory. OTL the USA was caught confused when the civil war broke out and it's entire policy since then has been reactive and not proactive at all. In fact they even prevented Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar from providing further support to the rebels.

If air support had been provided, especially around the 2013 Damascus Offensives, the rebels would have easily seized the capital and deposed Assad. Now what happens afterwards is anybody's guess. With Nusra's (and to an extent ISIS') raison d'etre gone, would they have garnered so much support and influence? The government of the Syrian rebels would certainly be Islamic in outlook, but more of the Brotherhood variety than some sort of extremist Caliphate. It's likely there would be continued fighting in the Kurdish areas and the Alawite coastal provinces, even if the new Syrian government manages to control the rest of the Sunni Syrian heartland.

It's hard to see a "successful" scenario here at all, aside from Bashar voluntarily stepping down and calling for elections. But that would have been impossible since the Assad's have created entire patronage networks to bolster their rules leading to powerful factions having vested interests in maintaining the status quo. If he ever tried that he'd be deposed immediately and replaced with his brother Maher. The entire officer class of the Syrian army is mostly Alawites, and they would not be dislodged from their privileged positions peacefully.

Obama didn’t want the rebels to win because his number one objective in these ventures be they Libya or Syria was not to end up being George W Bush and owning what came after the war which is typically messy. These states aren’t post war Germany they are sand castles head together by patronage and violence.

Obama wanted a negotiated solution between the Ba’ath Party and the FSA mediated by the international community. What he wanted was not going to happen without military victory, but then there isn’t a lot to negotiate other then who keeps their job and who gets jailed, exiled or shot.

FSA victory in Obama’s mind would have meant owning the post war era. He wanted to sit around the table with Putin who would he dictating to Assad and the FSA who the western coalition would be dictating to and he sets out the terms where ownership of the post war era would be shared.

This is what is known as over learning the lessons of the previous war, same for Libya where helping rebuild security post war would have been cheap compared to Iraq which is large and complex where the old security organs where much more hated by the population.
 
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The airforce was also dominated by Alawites with Sunni pilots not being trusted with flight missions as the civil war gained steam.

Honestly that sounds like the same propaganda we heard from Libya, where we was told that Gadaffi was only kept in power by African mercenaries (he wasn't). It's pretty common claim for the region, when we have a conflict that the other side are outsiders (or in this case minorities). We also hear claims in Syria about Iranian militias fightiong on the regime side, and while yes there's Iranians fighting for the Regime, these aren't militias, but real soldiers, the "Iranian" militia on the other hand are just what the Rebels and their backers call Syrian Shia militias. It's also why we see the hysterics when Shia who have fled from rebel controlled areas are resettled in loyalist territory, because the Rebels claim they're Iranians.

It's also a bit of a stretch to call the Syrian army competent. Even their crack units were struggling against the rebels until proper Russian support arrived.

I said by competent by regional standards.

BTW thanks for the article.
 
Obama didn’t want the rebels to win because his number one objective in these ventures be they Libya or Syria was not to end up being George W Bush and owning what came after the war which is typically messy. These states aren’t post war Germany they are sand castles head together by patronage and violence.

Obama wanted a negotiated solution between the Ba’ath Party and the FSA mediated by the international community. What he wanted was not going to happen without military victory, but then there isn’t a lot to negotiate other then who keeps their job and who gets jailed, exiled or shot.

FSA victory in Obama’s mind would have meant owning the post war era. He wanted to sit around the table with Putin who would he dictating to Assad and the FSA who the western coalition would be dictating to and he sets out the terms where ownership of the post war era would be shared.

This is what is known as over learning the lessons of the previous war, same for Libya where helping rebuild security post war would have been cheap compared to Iraq which is large and complex where the old security organs where much more hated by the population.

The problem was that the compromise suggestions by the Obama Administration was pretty much a complete surrender by the Regime. The Regime had nothing to lose by fighting on, Russia had nothing win by taking co-ownership in USA trying to recreate the post-Iraq War Iraqi political landscape in Syria.

Let me come with a example, USA suggested compromise with a surrender by the Regime and a Alawite opposition leader becoming a intermediate leader after Assad and until the first election (which was the same which happened in Iraq). Even without hindsight this suggestion was pretty obvious one the Regime would never take, unless USA decided to invade. A real compromise position would have been USA offering up a federal model with a weak central government and strong provinces. But this would have been unacceptable to the Rebels, as this protected the Alawite, Druze and Kurds from the Rebels idea of how a future Syria should look (a Sunni Arab boot on everyones else's faces forever).
 
Why do rebel groups in the middle east lack the organization ones in Europe did? Russia didn't collapse after the Tzardom was abolished for example.

Actually the Russian Empire collapsed into a massive civil war as a consequence of the revolution. Communists, anti-communists, ethnic/national separatists, and other various factions were fighting to control all or some of Russian territory. Then you throw in interventions by all the major foreign powers, which made this civil war into also a proxy war.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Civil_War
 
Squarely address youth unemployment.

Draw some lessons from the East Asian Miracle (1960 - present) of having the right kind of mixed economy, and getting smarter and better at the role of government over time.
 
Personally, I'd go with creating institutions separate from the main regime. More stable and viable political parties, a more stable and successful education system. Emphasis on progressiveness and more faith in the democratic process. Have said political parties be a part of the Arab Spring rather than be sidelined. Have the radical religious groups be less popular, whether through education

I've said this before, but the Arab Spring isn't so much a revolution as it is an act of desperation, anger, and frustration. The ruling parties of each country is unwilling to initiate change and reform. The current parties are small, ineffective, and powerless, as they have little chance of getting elected in enough numbers to make a difference. A massive wave of disappointment and sense of betrayal that "Westernization" brought nothing but massive wage gaps, social inequality, and humiliation. Between the discrediting of Western economics with the age gap, the Great Recession of 2008, and the mounting debt, the Arab populace rose. Problem is, it's more an act of anger, similar to the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, a sudden act that wasn't expected or anticipated, and the only ones who managed to benefit were generally the radicals. Tunis got by because its system is closest to a stable democracy, but the others slid back into authoritarianism or anarchy.
 
Actually the Russian Empire collapsed into a massive civil war as a consequence of the revolution. Communists, anti-communists, ethnic/national separatists, and other various factions were fighting to control all or some of Russian territory. Then you throw in interventions by all the major foreign powers, which made this civil war into also a proxy war.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Civil_War
But like, the Communists tore down the old institutions and built a new one, and then managed to secure stable political control. In the middle east things descended into eternal anarchy.
 
Honestly that sounds like the same propaganda we heard from Libya, where we was told that Gadaffi was only kept in power by African mercenaries (he wasn't). It's pretty common claim for the region, when we have a conflict that the other side are outsiders (or in this case minorities). We also hear claims in Syria about Iranian militias fightiong on the regime side, and while yes there's Iranians fighting for the Regime, these aren't militias, but real soldiers, the "Iranian" militia on the other hand are just what the Rebels and their backers call Syrian Shia militias. It's also why we see the hysterics when Shia who have fled from rebel controlled areas are resettled in loyalist territory, because the Rebels claim they're Iranians.



I said by competent by regional standards.

BTW thanks for the article.

The presence of Iranian trained and organized militias is incredibly well documented, and these aren't just Syrian Shias. These are Iraqi Shia militias (Kataeb Hezbollah, Badr Organization etc), Hazara Afghans (Fatemiyoun), Pakistanis (Zainabiyoun Brigade). And while the rank and file aren't made up of Iranians, they are trained and led by IRGC so the monicker "Iranian militias" fits.

The story of Sunni pilots being barred from flying was told by multiple pilots who defected. One of them did a verified AMA on Reddit. https://www.reddit.com/r/syriancivi..._syrian_air_force_pilot_staff_colonel_ismael/

Reddit might not be everyone's idea of reliable source, but the Colonel in question here has written for Arabic publications like Zaman al-Wasl.
 
"Obama adopted the contemptible strategy of only giving pro-democracy rebels enough support to weaken the Assad regime, but not enough to topple it, despite the rebels' pleas for anti-aircraft weapons."

Syria is way too important to Moscow for them to fall, Putin was annoyed at Medvedev for not being more supportive of Ghaddafi, there is no way they are watching their last meaningful ally go down, especially when it's a hop skip and a jump from the Caucauses and a mild but still ongoing insurgency...no one is going to risk war with Moscow over Syria. The only way is a small window where the protestors don't scare the living shit out of the influential sectors of society (they were largely poor, and conservative which doesn't bode well for a multi cultural and multi religious country)

Bahrain would be a no go, because fears of Iran (basicially Bahrain is a mini Iraq pre 03 being ruled by a Sunni minority with the exception of it being a monarchy) and so the US would somehow have to be convinced that the fall of the Sheikh would be in their interests and not in the interests of Iran.

Algeria and Sudan are the ideal but even now both seem on the way to going the way of Egypt.
 

BigBlueBox

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But like, the Communists tore down the old institutions and built a new one, and then managed to secure stable political control. In the middle east things descended into eternal anarchy.
If ISIS or al-Qaeda had decisively crushed the government in the early years of the war then they likely would have established a somewhat stable regime within a years after that. But they were unable to, and no other group had both the capacity to overthrow the government and the organizational structure and discipline to establish a new regime.
 
Well in Egypt, for one, Sisi's coup was far from preordained. While it's true the military would retain a heavy hand under any plausible scenario, something akin to 1990s Turkey or present-day Pakistan was perfectly plausible - more-or-less democratic regime that's semi-subordinate to the military establishment.

Had either Hamdeen Sabahi or Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh made the runoff, Egypt would have had a more conciliatory, non-Brotherhood, civilian president who might have been able to negotiate an acceptable constitutional settlement. Had Shafik won the runoff against Morsi you'd have had a Sisi-lite regime, but it's plausible that may have worked out better than OTL - without Morsi's disastrous tenure (which discredited them in the eyes of the security establishment and much of the public) - the possibility of a crackdown may have been more remote and a more democratic system might have consolidated. Alternately, had the fall 2013 Gaza conflict not erupted and Morsi not pulled his attempted constitutional coup he wouldn't have burned through so many of his reserves of goodwill.

In Libya, the best case scenario is probably that Gaddafi falls when the revolt first reaches Libya, rather than his regime being able to fight back and the conflict militarizing.
 
Well in Egypt, for one, Sisi's coup was far from preordained. While it's true the military would retain a heavy hand under any plausible scenario, something akin to 1990s Turkey or present-day Pakistan was perfectly plausible - more-or-less democratic regime that's semi-subordinate to the military establishment.

Had either Hamdeen Sabahi or Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh made the runoff, Egypt would have had a more conciliatory, non-Brotherhood, civilian president who might have been able to negotiate an acceptable constitutional settlement. Had Shafik won the runoff against Morsi you'd have had a Sisi-lite regime, but it's plausible that may have worked out better than OTL - without Morsi's disastrous tenure (which discredited them in the eyes of the security establishment and much of the public) - the possibility of a crackdown may have been more remote and a more democratic system might have consolidated. Alternately, had the fall 2013 Gaza conflict not erupted and Morsi not pulled his attempted constitutional coup he wouldn't have burned through so many of his reserves of goodwill.

In Libya, the best case scenario is probably that Gaddafi falls when the revolt first reaches Libya, rather than his regime being able to fight back and the conflict militarizing.
The Egyptian scenario is pretty much spot-on.

The Libyan scenario is... very ugly, to put it lightly. Should Qaddafi and his family fall, there's not going to be anyone else capable of running the government. Qaddafi quite literally made sure the entire system revolved around him. Replacing him requires international peacekeeping forces and help in reconstructing the system and protecting any future elections.
 
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