AHC: More effective Napoleonic Marshals

When closely managed by the boss, most French marshals were competent. But outside Napoleon's direct supervision few of them really distinguished themselves. It seems that their performance dropped off considerably when their responsibilities increased.

I can't really name one who did great alone. Perhaps Massena or Lannes? Davout as far as I know did very well with one corps at Auerstadt, but never commanded his own campaign.

It seemed odd to me that Napoleon, an incredibly skilled general with complete control over promotions, wound up selecting mediocrities like MacDonald to command large forces.

How could Napoleon get a better crop of marshals under him?

Some potential ideas:

1. Better education for his existing marshals? Can't recall where I read it but apparently Napoleon didn't make any serious effort to train up his marshals or impart his thinking on them. Either a great oversight on his part, or paranoia about training someone to fulfill his role?

2. Exercises in independent command? OTL Napoleon selected his competent corps and division commanders. But they rarely got the chance to improvise and think for themselves, as Napoleon was their commander in chief.

Historically mediocrities can be removed through large scale exercises (e.g. Louisiana maneuevers of US army before WW2). Have Napoleon observe a marshal moving different corps around and evaluate them as independent leaders, not subordinates. But it feels a bit too much of a 20th century idea to me. Did any nation do something similar before at this time?

3. Using other generals who made their name without Napoleon? Jean Moreau comes to mind, as he defeated the Austrians in 1800 while Napoleon was doing his own thing in Italy. Of course, some POD will be needed to stop his exile. Those with experience as independent army commanders will be very valuable after 1808.

4. A different command culture/mindset for Napoleon? Could Napoleon have accommodated more initiative for subordinates ala Moltke? IMO, quite a stretch. Those ideas came many decades after Waterloo and was not in the nature of how he fought. Perhaps a staff and education system similar to what the Prussians implemented post Jena? But I doubt he would take lessons from the Prussians who he had trounced so badly, not until it would be too late.

Theoretically speaking if such a system were to be implemented, the Marshals would be selected/experienced better as independent commanders. Still, I think this is the least likely, unless a POD results in a major defeat for Napoleon by an army using such a system, while giving time for him to implement it.
 
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Derek Pullem

Kicked
Donor
Really find the premise here quite difficult. You are imposing a late 20th century mindset of (effective) staff colleges on an early 19th century scenario.

Compared to the opposing forces the Marshals were competent. Davout and Soult were the equal of any allied general and Berthier was possibly the best chief of staff in the Napoleonic wars.

The concept of independent i.e. Army command was somewhat unusual in this period as the majority of states fought one campaign at a time. The corps system did promote independent action but only to the extent that an independent corps was tasked with holding until reinforced if faced with unfavourable odds - Davout was an exception at Auerstadt and to be honest put Bonaparte's nose out of joint. Napoleon only really ever needed two army commanders - either Germany and Italy or Germany and Spain. Of course you have to remember that an independent command outside of a conflict posed a political threat to the Emperor - after all he did come to power in a coup himself.
 

longsword14

Banned
Greater effectiveness of the Marshalate would not change Bonaparte's diplomacy. Neither 1808 nor 1812 could be changed by them, and Napoleon did not care for their opinion anyway.
 
Mayhaps, have Hoche, Kleber and Desaix survive (all three were pretty loyal to Napoleon and quite skilled) and have the Emperor induct several new, younger marshals around the beginnig of 1810s?
 
Really find the premise here quite difficult. You are imposing a late 20th century mindset of (effective) staff colleges on an early 19th century scenario.

Compared to the opposing forces the Marshals were competent. Davout and Soult were the equal of any allied general and Berthier was possibly the best chief of staff in the Napoleonic wars.

The concept of independent i.e. Army command was somewhat unusual in this period as the majority of states fought one campaign at a time. The corps system did promote independent action but only to the extent that an independent corps was tasked with holding until reinforced if faced with unfavourable odds - Davout was an exception at Auerstadt and to be honest put Bonaparte's nose out of joint. Napoleon only really ever needed two army commanders - either Germany and Italy or Germany and Spain. Of course you have to remember that an independent command outside of a conflict posed a political threat to the Emperor - after all he did come to power in a coup himself.

Professional education for the officers is a no go then, and Napoleon wouldn't necessarily make a good teacher himself. It is a bit too 20th century but it seemed like an interesting idea.

You bring up a good point about some skilled marshals already there, but Napoleon didn't seem to make great use of them in 1813-1814. Soult and Suchet were busy in Spain/Southern France to be fair, but Davout sat besieged in Hamburg and Massena, as far as I'm aware, was doing nothing. Instead, MacDonald, Oudinot and Ney were put in charge and proceeded to lose battle after battle in Germany.

Which brings up an interesting question, why were Davout and Massena sidelined?
 
Professional education for the officers is a no go then, and Napoleon wouldn't necessarily make a good teacher himself. It is a bit too 20th century but it seemed like an interesting idea.

Which brings up an interesting question, why were Davout and Massena sidelined?
Massena was pretty burned out by 1809; while his campaign in Iberia wasn't bad, he didn't really have the fire in him anymore. On the other hand, Napoleon was using Davout as a problem solver; Hamburg was a thorny issue, and by putting Davout on the job, the problem went away and Napoleon could focus on the main effort at hand.

also @Derek Pullem
It's not really a 20th century idea; this is literally the exact period the modern conception of the general staff and war college comes from. Given that the French exemplified the revolution in warfare more than anyone else, it's very interesting that this aspect of modernization is one of the few they didn't really adopt. Instead, the Prussians in Scharnhorst's orbit (the Military Society and the Berlin Institute most prominently) blazed the trail on the professional military education of officers, with a focus on creating good commanders and strategic thinkers rather than junior officers.

Now, the marshals in question were too advanced in rank for them to be sent back to school by the time Napoleon would be able to implement such an institution, but more advanced education for French officers would be important for securing the empire in the long term. More immediately, Napoleon could have been more open about his operational methods with his generals; he did explain how he did business to Eugene, but he was his stepson, so he had to overperform to reflect well on the family.

Even more immediately, he simply could have instructed them to stay on the defensive. Jomini pointed this out; at the beginning of the Fall Campaign, he had three armies advancing in three divergent directions against equal or superior forces. He probably should have had Oudinot and Macdonald hang back behind the Elbe and the Neisse with minimal forces while he massed for a battle on reversed front with the Allied Main Army.
 

Derek Pullem

Kicked
Donor
also @Derek Pullem
It's not really a 20th century idea; this is literally the exact period the modern conception of the general staff and war college comes from. Given that the French exemplified the revolution in warfare more than anyone else, it's very interesting that this aspect of modernization is one of the few they didn't really adopt. Instead, the Prussians in Scharnhorst's orbit (the Military Society and the Berlin Institute most prominently) blazed the trail on the professional military education of officers, with a focus on creating good commanders and strategic thinkers rather than junior officers.

Now, the marshals in question were too advanced in rank for them to be sent back to school by the time Napoleon would be able to implement such an institution, but more advanced education for French officers would be important for securing the empire in the long term. More immediately, Napoleon could have been more open about his operational methods with his generals; he did explain how he did business to Eugene, but he was his stepson, so he had to overperform to reflect well on the family.

Even more immediately, he simply could have instructed them to stay on the defensive. Jomini pointed this out; at the beginning of the Fall Campaign, he had three armies advancing in three divergent directions against equal or superior forces. He probably should have had Oudinot and Macdonald hang back behind the Elbe and the Neisse with minimal forces while he massed for a battle on reversed front with the Allied Main Army.

I did qualify the statement by saying that effective staff colleges didn't really come to pass until the late 20th century (post WW2). Up to that point the level of incompetence at higher military ranks hadn't really changed since Napoleon's days. Yes there were times where a particular nation was blessed with more talented staff than others but rigorous evaluation of officer performance really wasn't established until WW2 and for most nations after it.
 
Massena was pretty burned out by 1809; while his campaign in Iberia wasn't bad, he didn't really have the fire in him anymore. On the other hand, Napoleon was using Davout as a problem solver; Hamburg was a thorny issue, and by putting Davout on the job, the problem went away and Napoleon could focus on the main effort at hand.

also @Derek Pullem
It's not really a 20th century idea; this is literally the exact period the modern conception of the general staff and war college comes from. Given that the French exemplified the revolution in warfare more than anyone else, it's very interesting that this aspect of modernization is one of the few they didn't really adopt. Instead, the Prussians in Scharnhorst's orbit (the Military Society and the Berlin Institute most prominently) blazed the trail on the professional military education of officers, with a focus on creating good commanders and strategic thinkers rather than junior officers.

What was Davout's role in Hamburg? I've only had a cursory glance at some articles about the German campaign (will read more soon) and it seems he only commanded one corps, checking his opposites and never engaging in a serious battle until after Leipzig. Theoretically would it have made sense to switch his role with MacDonald or Oudinot? He might have a better chance at Katzbach or Grossbeeren.

One POD that could get Napoleon onto the path of professional education or modern staff system would be if in his youth, he were to read some convincing book recommending it. He did take a lot of inspiration from Guibert and Bourcet. Whether such a book or author existed, I'm not sure, and I don't think they did. AFAIK the staff system was an original idea by Scharnhorst and friends.
 
What was Davout's role in Hamburg? I've only had a cursory glance at some articles about the German campaign (will read more soon) and it seems he only commanded one corps, checking his opposites and never engaging in a serious battle until after Leipzig. Theoretically would it have made sense to switch his role with MacDonald or Oudinot? He might have a better chance at Katzbach or Grossbeeren.

Napoleon considered Hamburg quite strategically important, and wanted the problem fixed quickly and smoothly; sending Davout was the best way to ensure that. MacDonald or Oudinot might have screwed it up and let the Hamburg question remain a thorn in his side while he was trying to smash the Allied armies.

Dr. Michael V. Leggiere said:
Annexed to France in 1810, Hamburg provided Napoleon with one of the strongest fortresses between the Rhine and the Elbe and served as the capital of the Bouches-de-l’Elbe Department. Possession of Hamburg, like the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser Rivers, remained an absolute necessity for Napoleon’s Continental System, which sought to close Europe to all British trade and thus destroy Britain financially. Hamburg’s merchants served as the middlemen for the distribution of goods and wealth to Central Europe. Napoleon could not claim authorship of either the continental blockade or the closure of the North Sea’s coast. Both plans had their origins in the French Revolution. During the Directory period of the Revolution, Emmanuel Joseph Sieye`s had referred to the German North Sea coast as “the most important part of the world for France. If one possessed it, one could close all British trade markets and ports on the Continent from Gibraltar to Holstein, even to the North Cape.” One historian refers to Hamburg as “the commercial nerve center for half the continent” during the eighteenth century, with wealth built on “a fortuitous combination of commerce and manufacturing. Commerce had always dominated the partnership, but never as thoroughly as it did in the eighteenth century, when Hamburg’s seemingly boundless prosperity rested almost entirely on the strength of its position in the world market.” Despite closing the continent to British commerce and greatly hampering the ability of neutral states to conduct trade in Europe, Napoleon did not desire the demise of Hanseatic trade. Had he succeeded in his economic war with Britain, Hamburg’s trade “would have experienced a new and infinitely grander recovery.” In case the Continental System should fail, Napoleon planned to build a canal system linking the Elbe and the Rhine and ultimately Paris with the Baltic Sea.
...
Possession of Hamburg provided the Allies with numerous advantages. The opening of Hamburg – being a bustling port and financial capital – to British trade dealt “the final death blow to the Continental System” and meant increased revenues for the Allied war effort. Strategically, the city formed the gateway to Napoleonic Germany and Napoleon’s 32nd Military District.41 Hamburg also served as a communication hub, particularly between the Allies and Great Britain as well as between Denmark and France. The presence of Allied forces at Hamburg facilitated the landing of 500 British troops seventy miles to the northwest at Cuxhaven. Symbolically, the great port numbered among the other historical cities, such as Rome, Antwerp, and Amsterdam, that belonged to France after Napoleon’s annexation in 1810. Thus, by occupying Hamburg, the Allies had invaded the territory of the empire itself.

While the Marshals were probably too advanced in rank to go back to school, if Napoleon did implement a proper War Academy, there were plenty of majors and colonels you probably could cycle through it in the course of ~5 years, who could then go on to serve as chiefs of staff to corps and army commanders. This would however represent a shift in the role of the chief of staff in French armies from an assistant to a junior partner of the commander. Even so, effective staffwork (or the lack thereof) was already pretty important to French armies; whatever you think of Ney's performance overall, it definitely declined when he lost Jomini as his chief of staff, and Soult's inexperience in the role lost Napoleon's best opportunity to win the Waterloo campaign. If St. Cyr's memoirs can be believed, Napoleon intended to one day write down his whole art of war and refine it to a science, so that any military man could pick it up; one day there might be a large corps of trained strategists to conserve, propagate, and refine this knowledge.
 
The concept of independent i.e. Army command was somewhat unusual in this period as the majority of states fought one campaign at a time.

Well, not necessarily so. You can start at least from the War of the Spanish Succession but actually having more than one independent army was rather usual even in the earlier periods.

By 1812 Russians had a regulated army-based organization structure and in 1813 - 14 the allies used a multi-army system (Army of Bohemia, Army of Silesia, Army of the North). Actually, during the Wars of the French Revolution both French and Austrians had independent armies operating on different fronts (Italy, Switzerland, Germany).

The corps system did promote independent action but only to the extent that an independent corps was tasked with holding until reinforced if faced with unfavourable odds - Davout was an exception at Auerstadt and to be honest put Bonaparte's nose out of joint. Napoleon only really ever needed two army commanders - either Germany and Italy or Germany and Spain. Of course you have to remember that an independent command outside of a conflict posed a political threat to the Emperor - after all he did come to power in a coup himself.

The main problem with the Napoleonic system (as was noticed by Caulaincourt) was that it was excessively Napoleon-centric. The corps commanders were good tacticians but by they tended to neglect administrative part of their duties (in the campaign of 1812 Davout was the only exception) completely relying upon emperor's orders and if Nappy overlooked to order something (take just the issue of the horseshoes proper for the winter) it was not going to happen. As a chief of staff Bertier ended up as an over-glorified clerk: he also would not move a finger with Napoleon's order even if the task was clearly falling within his area of a responsibility.
 
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