AHC more effective China in WW 2

I have been reading China's War with Japan and the thought occurred to me, how could the Nationalists improve their performance against the Japanese in WW 2?

I note that China remains fragmented at this time, they have little to no industrial capacity and the international community was reluctant to provide arms.
 
The Chinese theater is one of the places I'm not as familiar with, but I do know delaying the Japanese invasion is an obvious option. Even with an additional year, Chiang would have a considerably more industrialized state and better-equipped army then he did in 1937.
 
For me improving their logistical chain is key here ensuring that sufficient supplies of bullets, beans and bandages get to the front line. Which goes hand in hand with reducing or eliminating shrinkage or corruption. If that occurs then I believe we will see an improvement in fighting ability prior to considering tactics or strategy.
 
I have been reading China's War with Japan and the thought occurred to me, how could the Nationalists improve their performance against the Japanese in WW 2?

I note that China remains fragmented at this time, they have little to no industrial capacity and the international community was reluctant to provide arms.

After the revolution and subsequent warlord era, China was in too much turmoil for the nationalists to improve their situation much on their own. Chiang was already doing all he could. Rather, I think external factors might be the key to improving China's position in two major facets: internal stability, external aggression.

If China had not collapsed into warlordism in the 20's and 30's, they would be in a better position. If the communist revolution and Chinese Civil War were butterflied away or greatly reduced in significance, that would leave more ground and resources for the nationalists to use.

If Japan had conentrated more on their Souther-Advance strategy (towards Philippines/Indonesia) instead of their Northern-Advance strategy(towards China/Siberia), then the whole Sino-Japanese war could have been avoided from the very beginning.
 
Somehow keeping the Burma Road open would improve their supply situation later on. Not sure that's easily doable, but it would go some way towards fulfilling the letter of the challenge.
 
There are theoretically lots of things that could be done to improve China's performance in the Sino-Japanese War. Unfortunately, most of them have practical limitations because of domestic politics.

China was in the position where Chiang knew what needed to be done and was implementing them, but he just needed more time to either complete those projects, or achieve enough dominance against the warlords and Communists to be secure enough to launch those reforms. The vast majority of reforms Chiang wanted to do (and did do once kicked off the mainland) were just not politically possible when he relied so much on local warlords.

Absent more time or a stronger domestic political position, our options are much more limited. I think there are a few things China could have done differently.

1) Manage the air force better. Do not fire US Major John Jouett who was training the Chinese Air Force in 1934. Jouett refused to let his US pilot trainers participate in quelling the 1934 Fujian rebellion. In retaliation, Chiang fired him and turned it over to the Italians (who had no such scruples, and were assisting the Chinese at the same time) who botched it terribly. In 1937, things were so bad Chiang turned to another America, Claire Chennault, to fix things just as the war started. It would have been better had Chiang consolidated everything under Jouett, remove the Italians entirely, and had several more years to train pilots and organize the air force.

When the war breaks out, Chinese pilots would be much better trained and hopefully organized well. That means the Chinese could likely achieve air supremacy over Shanghai in the first critical months of the war and sink the Japanese ships. Without naval gunfire, the Chinese could have elminated the Japanese garrison at Shanghai and reduced their casualties in the battle.

2) Preserve the core of Whampoa junior officers. Chiang lost way too many in the initial Battle of Shanghai. He needs to conserve them as much as possible. In addition because Chinese culture revered civilian bureaucrats over military officers, China did not encourage its literate, educated youth to enlist and become junior officers during the war. This deprived the army of what should have been its primary source of junior officers.

3) Put more organic artillery and heavy weapons to the local divisions. Chiang hoarded a lot of supplies in order to reward the loyal and punish the disloyal, prevent commanders from being too independent, and keep in reserve for an "emergency". While sensible to a degree, he kept way too much. A lot of that hoarded equipment should have gone to key frontline divisions in the central army.

4) Establish a real central staff and organize clear lines of responsibility. Out of fear of political disloyalty, Chiang had some dreadful practices. He favored incompetent, but loyal generals over competent (sometimes brilliant) rivals. As a result, he constantly micromanaged military decisions that should have been made locally. This was bad. Chiang needed to do a better job at balancing this. Creating an effective staff system was essential.

5) Focus on developing an effective military hospital system. China had none, and the Chinese Red Cross took over the responsibility and did the best job they could. Many soldiers would have lived if even the basic elements of a medical corps been established.

There are a lot more things that could be done in terms of a centralized payroll, military logistics, and more, but I think the political realities don't make them feasible even though they would have greatly improved the performance. I think the above could have been done though with little or no resistance.
 
1) Probably shouldn't have followed German recommendations to fortify the lower Yangtze valley, considering that these were comparatively close to Japanese supply lines and fending the Japanese off 'at the beaches' was not going to be easy, given Japanese naval superiority. The resources poured into bunkers and suchlike could have been used elsewhere.

2) It would require some major ability of perception on Chiang's part, but perhaps not pouring in some of his best forces to fight the Shanghai/Songhu campaigns was probably the most direct thing he could do. The delay gained there came at too high a price, though you could argue that the battle did turn the Japanese advance from a north-south axis (Beiping->Guangzhou along the railroad) to an east-west axis along the Yangtze: even then, there were better options than to use the army elite. They could have been used to much better effect in Wuhan or even Xuzhou, with slightly more extended Japanese lines.

3) Probably not send Stillwell to the China theatre. The man was good enough as a general, but he had a pretty terrible working relationship with Chiang and that probably screwed over a lot of potential in the China-USA alliance. In that vein...

4) Burma. It probably wasn't the best of ideas to have Chinese participation in the Burmese campaign, considering that this probably limited Chiang's options re: Ichi-Go. I'm not sure how avoidable this was, however, given that the US-British relationship was more important than the US-China relationship.

Apart from that and replacing Han Fuju somehow (who single-handedly gave up the KMT's position at Shandong), I agree with most of Blackfox5's comments except for 1). Can't see how US-trained KMT fighter pilots in Curtiss-Hawks are going to fare much better against the Japanese A5Ms, and in any case focusing too much on the air force was just going to divert resources away from a pretty stretched regime.
 
There are theoretically lots of things that could be done to improve China's performance in the Sino-Japanese War. Unfortunately, most of them have practical limitations because of domestic politics.

1) Manage the air force better. Do not fire US Major John Jouett who was training the Chinese Air Force in 1934. Jouett refused to let his US pilot trainers participate in quelling the 1934 Fujian rebellion. In retaliation, Chiang fired him and turned it over to the Italians (who had no such scruples, and were assisting the Chinese at the same time) who botched it terribly. In 1937, things were so bad Chiang turned to another America, Claire Chennault, to fix things just as the war started. It would have been better had Chiang consolidated everything under Jouett, remove the Italians entirely, and had several more years to train pilots and organize the air force.

I wasn't aware of this at all, interesting.

2) Preserve the core of Whampoa junior officers. Chiang lost way too many in the initial Battle of Shanghai. He needs to conserve them as much as possible. In addition because Chinese culture revered civilian bureaucrats over military officers, China did not encourage its literate, educated youth to enlist and become junior officers during the war. This deprived the army of what should have been its primary source of junior officers.

4) Establish a real central staff and organize clear lines of responsibility. Out of fear of political disloyalty, Chiang had some dreadful practices. He favored incompetent, but loyal generals over competent (sometimes brilliant) rivals. As a result, he constantly micromanaged military decisions that should have been made locally. This was bad. Chiang needed to do a better job at balancing this. Creating an effective staff system was essential.

5) Focus on developing an effective military hospital system. China had none, and the Chinese Red Cross took over the responsibility and did the best job they could. Many soldiers would have lived if even the basic elements of a medical corps been established.

One of my favourite proverbs namely 'You do not use good iron to make nails.' The question that I have would be how to create a General Staff organically? Would this be assisted by Chiang pursuing further education himself at a staff college or having a military adviser that he trusts establishing one for him?

After reading about the battle of shanghai I picked up on the lack of planning regarding a planned withdrawal from the engagement. Plus the proper evacuation of wounded soldiers etc. The war between China and Japan also reminds me of the Eastern front in WW 2.
 
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