AHC: McClellan Wins the Civil War

Especially considering there's no Emancipation Proclamation TTL; who knows, then, how long slavery is extended in the US...

Depends on whether or not a majority in the north ends up believing the whole "states rights" BS. They realize that it was slavery and you could see public opinion want a dismantling of the institution.
 
Depends on whether or not a majority in the north ends up believing the whole "states rights" BS. They realize that it was slavery and you could see public opinion want a dismantling of the institution.

Which would still be exceedingly difficult if Southern states were readmitted, slavery intact, before such a movement really got going.
 
...Everybody has a personal hero, and many will champion them on AH.com...

And I'm about to prove you right.

Joseph E. Johnston not getting injured during the Peninsula Campaign might be your best and only chance IMO.

This is actually a pretty solid PoD, I think; that way, Lee doesn't take command of the ANV at this critical time, and Richmond likely falls. Any thoughts here?

It was always the plan of the Confederates to withdraw to Richmond and fight the decisive battles around the capital's vacinity.

Johnston could not hold a position on the Peninsula due to the Federal dominance of the waters and the unprepared state of any defensive position outside the outskirts of Richmond. Further he was outnumbered by an approximate ratio of 3-1 (I think) in effectives until he reached Richmond - McClellan being able to call on 120,000 men whole Johnston's army being 40-50,000, and I'm going from memory on that one by will look it up if someone asks.

The only reasonable way anyone could be expected to effectively strike out at McClellan was to fall back to a region where the Federal Navy couldn't be utilized and hope to recieve reinforcements - those reinforcements were troops from the Carolina's and Georgia being freed up by new recruits and amassed around Richmond during the withdrawal phase.

Johnston planned two offensives before Richmond. The first was an attack around the Federal Flank at Mechanicsville using G.W. Smith's wing which should have gone ahead on May 29th but didn't go forward because Smith pleaded illness. The second was the Battle of Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. When Johnston fell wounded he did so having just issued orders to rest for the night but prepare to continue the offensive the next day.

Point being, Johnston was being aggressive and prepared to continue being agressive now that the strategic necessity demanded it and Confederate resourced allowed it - with reinforcements from Georgia and the Carolina's his number of effectives prior to Seven Pines/Fair Oaks was around 60,000 and would have been around 80,000 had he waited only two days, in fact only Jackson's troops were missing of the men that would make up Lee's army.

McClellan, meanwhile, was obsessing over McDowell's Corps, and was insistant that he could not advance without him. He was not prepared to attack or to bring up his seige weapons until McDowell join him. McDowell would never join him as Jackson's Campaign in the Valley - which Johnston supported in spirit if not in the details once made aware of it (and even suggested Jackson attack Baltimore or Washington if he thought he would be able to do so effectively) - would keep him away.

So what you have is an extremely cautious Federal General who is convinced he's outnumbered and spooked by any Confederate show of aggression waiting on the arrival of troops that will never against another extremely cautious general but one that knows his numbers are getting close to parity with his enemy has been presented with the perfect opportunity to strike at his enemy split apart and is determined to take advantage of it.

Point being, Richmond falling to McClellan if Johnston was not wounded is, in my opinion, highly unlikely.

Even if one was to be uncharitable to Johnston in assessing this situation the fact of the matter is that if he had not been wounded he would have had the largest Army the Confederacy ever assembled under his command and the fact that he planned two offensives at the end of May, launched one and was determined to follow up regardless of the failure and unsatisfactory results even before his numbers had risen that high shows that he was fully prepared to use it offensively in that circumstance.

It's hard to see how a McClellan who is unprepare to comit to battle takes Richmond in that scenario.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Can it be the rebel Army of the Potomac?

Your challenge if you choose to accept it is to have McClellan win the American Civil War while commanding the Army of the Potomac.

Note: Falling off his horse and dying before he can screw things up does not count :p

Can it be the rebel Army of the Potomac?

And its still the US winning?;)

Best,
 
And I'm about to prove you right.





It was always the plan of the Confederates to withdraw to Richmond and fight the decisive battles around the capital's vacinity.

Johnston could not hold a position on the Peninsula due to the Federal dominance of the waters and the unprepared state of any defensive position outside the outskirts of Richmond. Further he was outnumbered by an approximate ratio of 3-1 (I think) in effectives until he reached Richmond - McClellan being able to call on 120,000 men whole Johnston's army being 40-50,000, and I'm going from memory on that one by will look it up if someone asks.

The only reasonable way anyone could be expected to effectively strike out at McClellan was to fall back to a region where the Federal Navy couldn't be utilized and hope to recieve reinforcements - those reinforcements were troops from the Carolina's and Georgia being freed up by new recruits and amassed around Richmond during the withdrawal phase.

Johnston planned two offensives before Richmond. The first was an attack around the Federal Flank at Mechanicsville using G.W. Smith's wing which should have gone ahead on May 29th but didn't go forward because Smith pleaded illness. The second was the Battle of Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. When Johnston fell wounded he did so having just issued orders to rest for the night but prepare to continue the offensive the next day.

Point being, Johnston was being aggressive and prepared to continue being agressive now that the strategic necessity demanded it and Confederate resourced allowed it - with reinforcements from Georgia and the Carolina's his number of effectives prior to Seven Pines/Fair Oaks was around 60,000 and would have been around 80,000 had he waited only two days, in fact only Jackson's troops were missing of the men that would make up Lee's army.

McClellan, meanwhile, was obsessing over McDowell's Corps, and was insistant that he could not advance without him. He was not prepared to attack or to bring up his seige weapons until McDowell join him. McDowell would never join him as Jackson's Campaign in the Valley - which Johnston supported in spirit if not in the details once made aware of it (and even suggested Jackson attack Baltimore or Washington if he thought he would be able to do so effectively) - would keep him away.

So what you have is an extremely cautious Federal General who is convinced he's outnumbered and spooked by any Confederate show of aggression waiting on the arrival of troops that will never against another extremely cautious general but one that knows his numbers are getting close to parity with his enemy has been presented with the perfect opportunity to strike at his enemy split apart and is determined to take advantage of it.

Point being, Richmond falling to McClellan if Johnston was not wounded is, in my opinion, highly unlikely.

Even if one was to be uncharitable to Johnston in assessing this situation the fact of the matter is that if he had not been wounded he would have had the largest Army the Confederacy ever assembled under his command and the fact that he planned two offensives at the end of May, launched one and was determined to follow up regardless of the failure and unsatisfactory results even before his numbers had risen that high shows that he was fully prepared to use it offensively in that circumstance.

It's hard to see how a McClellan who is unprepare to comit to battle takes Richmond in that scenario.

So....Joseph E. Johnston is your personal hero? Interesting. I'd love to hear more of your take on this. Particularly on his performance post-Seven Days.

But you have activated a discussion thread dormant for 8 months, usually a no-no for all but newbies and the OP. If the mods don't mind, pray go on:)
 
Depends on whether or not a majority in the north ends up believing the whole "states rights" BS. They realize that it was slavery and you could see public opinion want a dismantling of the institution.
There will probably be some sort of emancipation, but blacks will be virtually enserfed as they were after Reconstruction IOTL.

I can see a 13th Amendment that does nothing except for emancipation. Essentially, blacks are emancipated but have no rights whatsoever.
 
There will probably be some sort of emancipation, but blacks will be virtually enserfed as they were after Reconstruction IOTL.

I can see a 13th Amendment that does nothing except for emancipation. Essentially, blacks are emancipated but have no rights whatsoever.

Just remember that the "enserfment" you mention will only be for the Old South, and not even for the Border States or Virginia. Otherwise, the Great Migration goes on permanent turbo.
 

jahenders

Banned
You do, of course, see both perspectives. Clearly, the Pinkerton intel wasn't great, but a leader is ultimately responsible for what he does with the information he's given. It's been argued that McClellan actively encouraged (i.e. paid for) high numbers from Pinkerton, so they supported his intent. Whether that's true or not, he took the high numbers from Pinkerton, then made them higher, and then avoided most actions without really verifying the accuracy of the data (with probing attacks, other data sources, etc.).

Here is at least one author's judgment: "McClellan was the victim of poor intelligence during the Peninsula Campaign. He was using Allen Pinkerton to tell him what kind of Confederate forces he was facing. He trusted Pinkerton implicitly, but Pinkerton would just make up numbers out of thin air. Had Pinkerton given McClellan the real numbers and had McClellan believed those numbers, we might have seen a different outcome in his campaign for Richmond. It's certainly conceivable that McClellan might have decided to march all the way to Richmond in April of 1862. Had McClellan done that, the the Confederates would have been in a bad situation, similar to the situa tion the North would have been in had Washington been lost following Bull Run..." http://books.google.com/books?id=BCViBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA71

On the other hand, it has been pointed out that McClellan exaggerated the number of enemy troops even more than Pinkerton did: http://books.google.com/books?id=uwFBEY4BOj8C&pg=PA172
 
So....Joseph E. Johnston is your personal hero? Interesting. I'd love to hear more of your take on this. Particularly on his performance post-Seven Days.

But you have activated a discussion thread dormant for 8 months, usually a no-no for all but newbies and the OP. If the mods don't mind, pray go on:)

I see something of myself in Johnston and feel the need to speak on his behalf.

I, personally, didn't take much notice of the age of the thread when I posted I just responded to some comments. I've never paid any attention to how old a thread is when I comment and never had anyone raise any issue.

As for this scenario, I cant really add any comments about how McClellan could win the war as a General. I believe he was never able to do that. I believe was never going to be in a position to lose the war because, much like Jeffrey Amherst, he was never weak enough to actually be threatened by his enemy but he was never ruthless enough to carry out an offensive plan to win the war.

I feel, however, that had he won the presidential race then he would have continued the war until it had been won regardless of the pro-peace position of the Democrats in 1864. He was not fool enough to end a war his side was winning and was far more likely to take the credit for winning it and imortalise himself as the President who saved the Union - however little credit may truthfully have been his.

As to Johnston's potential conduct had he not been wounded, I believe he would have continued to be aggressive against McClellan as his own numbers swelled and McClellan's dwindled. There might not have been Stuart's famous ride around the Federal Army, and I doubt the battles would have been fought in quite as quick proximity as Lee's Seven Day's Battles, but once McClellan loses all hope of recieving McDowell and starts losing troops from his army he also loses whatever enthusiasm he has for the campaign and starts trying to pull out. This would have led to him being driven way from Richmond just as it did in OTL.

The interesting issue then occurs with Lee. Lee wants to be in the field, he doesn't like being in an office and thinks his talent's being wasted there. He has even offered under Johnston in some capacity just to get into the field. Johnston refused this offer because he still remembered Beauregard getting all the credit for 1st Manassas and didn't want to risk that again - he was obsessed about his reputation because it was one of the only things he had in the world - but perhaps he would be a bit more willing to do that if he had gained all the plaudits for defeating McClellan and driving him away from Richmond. Perhaps not. But regardless, Lee's presence in Richmond and absence from the field is going to cause some tension between Johnston and Richmond until resolved in some manner.

I dont know how Johnston deals with Pope. I dont believe Pope capable of defeating Johnston, but I dont believe Johnston would have condoned splitting his army as Lee did for 2nd Manassas. Johnston's offensive plans in OTL generally relied on ome kind of flanking maneuver so perhaps he would have had Jackson striking out of the valley instead of marching all the way around Pope to appear at his rear but I dont know.

My general expectation would be that come the end of 1862 McClellan would be back around the vacinity of Washington, Pope would have been defeated in some manner - possibly not a decisively as OTL - and the Confederates would hold a line near the Rappahannock having not attempted to take the war into Maryland and Lee may be on his way to Chattanooga.
 

jahenders

Banned
If it ended that quickly, the Southern states would likely be admitted without killing slavery completely. However, a Union victory (either quick or long, as IOTL) does set a precedent of union v. states rights primacy. I think to be readmitted, the Southern states would likely have to agree to some combo of:
- No cross-border recovery of slaves
- An agreed upon end of slavery date, with some level of reparation for slave owners -- kind of like the police programs to buy guns, but with slaveholders knowing that the rate will keep going down and eventually they'll get nothing
- No slavery in any new states/territories

Which would still be exceedingly difficult if Southern states were readmitted, slavery intact, before such a movement really got going.
 
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