...Everybody has a personal hero, and many will champion them on AH.com...
And I'm about to prove you right.
Joseph E. Johnston not getting injured during the Peninsula Campaign might be your best and only chance IMO.
This is actually a pretty solid PoD, I think; that way, Lee doesn't take command of the ANV at this critical time, and Richmond likely falls. Any thoughts here?
It was always the plan of the Confederates to withdraw to Richmond and fight the decisive battles around the capital's vacinity.
Johnston could not hold a position on the Peninsula due to the Federal dominance of the waters and the unprepared state of any defensive position outside the outskirts of Richmond. Further he was outnumbered by an approximate ratio of 3-1 (I think) in effectives until he reached Richmond - McClellan being able to call on 120,000 men whole Johnston's army being 40-50,000, and I'm going from memory on that one by will look it up if someone asks.
The only reasonable way anyone could be expected to effectively strike out at McClellan was to fall back to a region where the Federal Navy couldn't be utilized and hope to recieve reinforcements - those reinforcements were troops from the Carolina's and Georgia being freed up by new recruits and amassed around Richmond during the withdrawal phase.
Johnston planned two offensives before Richmond. The first was an attack around the Federal Flank at Mechanicsville using G.W. Smith's wing which should have gone ahead on May 29th but didn't go forward because Smith pleaded illness. The second was the Battle of Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. When Johnston fell wounded he did so having just issued orders to rest for the night but prepare to continue the offensive the next day.
Point being, Johnston was being aggressive and prepared to continue being agressive now that the strategic necessity demanded it and Confederate resourced allowed it - with reinforcements from Georgia and the Carolina's his number of effectives prior to Seven Pines/Fair Oaks was around 60,000 and would have been around 80,000 had he waited only two days, in fact only Jackson's troops were missing of the men that would make up Lee's army.
McClellan, meanwhile, was obsessing over McDowell's Corps, and was insistant that he could not advance without him. He was not prepared to attack or to bring up his seige weapons until McDowell join him. McDowell would never join him as Jackson's Campaign in the Valley - which Johnston supported in spirit if not in the details once made aware of it (and even suggested Jackson attack Baltimore or Washington if he thought he would be able to do so effectively) - would keep him away.
So what you have is an extremely cautious Federal General who is convinced he's outnumbered and spooked by any Confederate show of aggression waiting on the arrival of troops that will never against another extremely cautious general but one that knows his numbers are getting close to parity with his enemy has been presented with the perfect opportunity to strike at his enemy split apart and is determined to take advantage of it.
Point being, Richmond falling to McClellan if Johnston was not wounded is, in my opinion, highly unlikely.
Even if one was to be uncharitable to Johnston in assessing this situation the fact of the matter is that if he had not been wounded he would have had the largest Army the Confederacy ever assembled under his command and the fact that he planned two offensives at the end of May, launched one and was determined to follow up regardless of the failure and unsatisfactory results even before his numbers had risen that high shows that he was fully prepared to use it offensively in that circumstance.
It's hard to see how a McClellan who is unprepare to comit to battle takes Richmond in that scenario.