AHC: Marine Aviation

How could it occur that US Marine Aviation was closely linked to Marine Divisions and Corps throughout WW2, and participated in direct support of all major USMC amphibious assaults?
 

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What did Marine Corps aviation do during World War II? Was it used to augment Navy squadrons on aircraft carriers for naval actions?

Also, amphibious operations were supported by big gun ships during World War II, and most combat and landings were on islands easily covered by gunfire. There wouldn't be much reason to risk aircraft.
 
Apart from the South Pacific, Peleliu and Okinawa Marine Aviation fought as part of the general naval air campaign from land bases. They attacked shipping, airfields and bases in a general campaign rather than specifically as part of the amphibious campaign.

Given the distance between each amphibious assault it might be a bit tough, but it might be possible to give Marine Aviation a more focused role.
 
What about specialized aircraft? Something like lots of cheap amphibious aircraft, so maybe biplanes, being small and light enough to land on a beach or just offshore in sheltered waters? I am assuming that you want airpower right on the initial landings, functioning in close air support role, that then stays throughout the entire operation, while carrier aircraft are going to stay with their ships most of the time, and other land based aircraft are going to be spending time going to and fro from their airfields.

If you went with low capability aircraft like amphibious bi-planes, they can operate from tenders, which being far less of an investment could perhaps be left in situations where a fleet carrier would not be. With the low speeds and very nimble characteristics might make a very useful combination combined with large numbers of very cheap aircraft that really cannot be used for to many other missions, and thus wouldn’t be taken away from their intended role. Any more capable aircraft types would either require a nearby carrier or airfield, and would likely not be kept to the dedicated invasion operation.

So for instance, at Guadalcanal, give the Marines a tender or three, and matching squadrons, so even before the airfield is captured and completed, the invasion can have its own dedicated CAS. Taking it a step further, a dedicated tender that is beach-able, and/or has a ramp for amphibious tracked vehicles to swim ashore and carry all the munitions, fuel, and maintenance folks with their tools and such, then even the tenders could be withdrawn, and still leaving the invasion with tiny aircraft that can go ashore practically anywhere, be dispersed and concealed from enemy land based and carrier borne raids, and as they really couldn’t be used otherwise, will be left to their task.

Another benefit, as such aircraft would be taking large losses and cost less than more capable aircraft, you could see their being a good replacement rate built in to offset the expected heavy losses, and thus ensure the forward based units have reinforcements available, if they can just be delivered. Also, is it possible to build such a force from non-strategic materials, so steel and wood/fabric?

None of this precludes the OTL marine aircraft, but would provide the niche for CAS without the need to expose the Carriers for the duration of the operation.

One additional thought, if taking this to the extreme, what if in addition to the above posited tenders, you have some dedicated craft capable of bringing engineering vehicles and equipment ashore with their own amphibious vehicles, making construction of forward airbases somewhat faster?


Would this type of thing fit the bill?
 
I'd recommend Merskys 'US Marine Corps Aviation' as a primer for this subject.

How could it occur that US Marine Aviation was closely linked to Marine Divisions and Corps throughout WW2, and participated in direct support of all major USMC amphibious assaults?

In most campaigns or battles the USMC aviation was closely linked. there was a gap in 1943 - 44 in the Central pacific campaign.

too digress

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Also, amphibious operations were supported by big gun ships during World War II, and most combat and landings were on islands easily covered by gunfire. There wouldn't be much reason to risk aircraft.

Aircraft were heavily used in direct support of amphib landings. In all theatres.

What did Marine Corps aviation do during World War II? Was it used to augment Navy squadrons on aircraft carriers for naval actions?

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Marine aircraft did not embark aboard carriers until late in the war. the decision to put them aboard carriers was not made until well into 1944.

The original role for the Marine aviation prewar was to assist the expeditionary forces in seizing and defending advanced naval bases. There was a inherent assuption this would be done from land airbases. USMC pilots were not trained nor embarked on the aircraft carriers in sufficient numbers to constitute a carrier embarked landing support force. There was discussion of USMC air groups on carriers in the 1930s, but there were not enough carriers for fleet requirements, and there were not enough of the other amphib support ships. Funding a aircraft carrier for USMC aviation was off the budget table.

During the war the USN continued this policy, opposing carriers for USMC air support groups. It was not until USN air groups proved undertrained for the close support role that the Marines were allocated carriers. ie: The USN dive bombers flying support missions against Betio island in November 1943 were repeatedly waived off as the pilots lacked the experience & training to identify the targets correctly. The Marines on Betio suffered almost as badly from the air attacks as the Japanese. Training USN squadrons for CAS made no sense since there were already USMC pilots trained for that task, so the USN reversed policy and allocated carrier for some Marine air groups. Alexanders book 'Utmost Savagery' has a description of the Marine ground commanders aborting the USN support strikes on Betio. I think Balikowski refers to the same event in his book on the Betio battle.

Not all Marine air wings made it aboard carriers in 1945. One large group left behind in the South Pacific flew CAS for the 6th & 8th Armies in the Phillipines. This continued the practice of the Marine air groups flying support from land bases in support of the Navy/Marine and Army advance in the South Pacific in 1942, 43, 44.

How could it occur that US Marine Aviation was closely linked to Marine Divisions and Corps throughout WW2, and participated in direct support of all major USMC amphibious assaults?

Assign a carrier for Marine air groups in early 1943 & build from that. The new CVE were being launched and working up then & using one of those as a start would have done it. A couple more carriers of various classes could have been added in 1943/44 as required. This would have enabled at least one and probablly more to be on hand in November 1943 when the Central Pacific campaign kicked off with Operation Galvanic.
 
What about specialized aircraft? Something like lots of cheap amphibious aircraft, so maybe biplanes,

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Would this type of thing fit the bill?

This was experiemented with before 1940 & was thought to be to resource intensive. The Japanese did deploy amphib fighter groups, including a float version of the Zero or AM5 fighter plane. Supporting these saved little in terms of logistics effort. The USN did continue with amphibs as reconissance, transport, rescue, and naval strike aircraft into the 1950s.
 
I'd recommend Merskys 'US Marine Corps Aviation' as a primer for this subject.



In most campaigns or battles the USMC aviation was closely linked. there was a gap in 1943 - 44 in the Central pacific campaign.

too digress



Aircraft were heavily used in direct support of amphib landings. In all theatres.



Marine aircraft did not embark aboard carriers until late in the war. the decision to put them aboard carriers was not made until well into 1944.

The original role for the Marine aviation prewar was to assist the expeditionary forces in seizing and defending advanced naval bases. There was a inherent assuption this would be done from land airbases. USMC pilots were not trained nor embarked on the aircraft carriers in sufficient numbers to constitute a carrier embarked landing support force. There was discussion of USMC air groups on carriers in the 1930s, but there were not enough carriers for fleet requirements, and there were not enough of the other amphib support ships. Funding a aircraft carrier for USMC aviation was off the budget table.

During the war the USN continued this policy, opposing carriers for USMC air support groups. It was not until USN air groups proved undertrained for the close support role that the Marines were allocated carriers. ie: The USN dive bombers flying support missions against Betio island in November 1943 were repeatedly waived off as the pilots lacked the experience & training to identify the targets correctly. The Marines on Betio suffered almost as badly from the air attacks as the Japanese. Training USN squadrons for CAS made no sense since there were already USMC pilots trained for that task, so the USN reversed policy and allocated carrier for some Marine air groups. Alexanders book 'Utmost Savagery' has a description of the Marine ground commanders aborting the USN support strikes on Betio. I think Balikowski refers to the same event in his book on the Betio battle.

Not all Marine air wings made it aboard carriers in 1945. One large group left behind in the South Pacific flew CAS for the 6th & 8th Armies in the Phillipines. This continued the practice of the Marine air groups flying support from land bases in support of the Navy/Marine and Army advance in the South Pacific in 1942, 43, 44.



Assign a carrier for Marine air groups in early 1943 & build from that. The new CVE were being launched and working up then & using one of those as a start would have done it. A couple more carriers of various classes could have been added in 1943/44 as required. This would have enabled at least one and probablly more to be on hand in November 1943 when the Central Pacific campaign kicked off with Operation Galvanic.

It's the 43-44 gap that I'm thinking of. Apparently the Navy stopped having Marines carrier qualified, with the agreement of Marine Gen Rowell, who also convinced the Navy that Marines didn't want to go to sea to support amphibious landings. It took a while to fix the 'damage' done by this decision and get Marine air onto escort and strike carriers and to get some more control of airstrikes into the hands of the land force commander rather than simply the amphibious commander.

What about the medium bomber squadrons, is there an opportunity to get them in on the support for amphibious operations?
 
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What about the medium bomber squadrons, is there an opportunity to get them in on the support for amphibious operations?

Definatively 100%. Twin engined bombers did directly support amphhib assaults. Perhaps the most obvious example would be the attack on Utah Beach by the 9th AF a few minutes ahead of the landing craft. I'd have to check on how many but there were Marine owned twin engined bombers operating in the S Pacific.

It's the 43-44 gap that I'm thinking of. Apparently the Navy stopped having Marines carrier qualified, with the agreement of Marine Gen Rowell, who also convinced the Navy that Marines didn't want to go to sea to support amphibious landings. .

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Thats part of the story. The foundation is the shortage of carriers though 1942. Congress would not budget any extra in the 1930s, & at the end of 1942 the Navy was down to two battered fleet carriers. The CVE were not to be spared either as the Battle of the Atlantic was still in full fury, and the IJN subs were clearly a threat. King was a key player in this as well. His decision to halt carrier training for Marine pilots came before Roswells opinion IIRC.

...get some more control of airstrikes into the hands of the land force commander rather than simply the amphibious commander.

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Confusion in this matter continues, in many other aspects as well. Doctrine is very clear, but the devil is in the details. The navy commanders wanted flexibility so they could deal with the expected enemy fleet with maximum concentration of effort. That ran counter to having a subset focused on something else & slow to respond, or less capable in dealing with the 'Primary Threat'. You can see the same thing going on with details like the mix of ammunition on the fire support ships, or the number assigned to fire support, or the positioning of the ships within the fleet off shore. The Japanese had suprised the Allies several times with disastrous results. With the examples of PH, Force Z, Java Sea, Savo Island, No one wanted to be the next commander to ignore the possible enemy threat.
 
Part of the problem is that we did not do a real opposed landing until Tarawa and that is late 1943 so nobody really knew what the air and gunfire support requirements would be. Some people thought that with all of the gunfire support at Tarawa that it would be a walk over.

It would be interesting to see the USN assign a few CVEs to be forerunners of today's assault ships with all USMC air groups specially trained for CAS over the beach.
 
Slow biplanes would only survive after USN fighters chased Zeros from the skies over contested islands.
Once the USMC achieved air superiority, even slow, float-equipped biplanes would be handy for close air support.
Keep in mind that few seaplanes can take-off and land in the open ocean. Most floatplanes are so fragile that they can only operate from the comparatively calm waters inside atolls.
And yes, dedicated seaplane tender ships are needed for re-fuelling, re-arming and maintenance. With sufficient cranes and catapults (as found on battleships) they could launch over-loaded seaplanes during rough seas.
 
From http://www.microworks.net/pacific/aviation/pbj_mitchell.htm

The USN accepted 188 PBJs in 1943, 395 in 1944 and 123 in 1945. These aircraft equipped 16 USMC squadrons, eight of which served in the Pacific. In 1945, four squadrons were decommissioned without having left the U.S. and four others were redesignated torpedo bomber squadrons and re-equipped with the Eastern Aircraft TBM Avengers.

The PBJ-1Cs were mainly used for training while the first Mitchell to see combat was the PBJ-1D. When operated by the Marines, the B-25s were heavily modified. Since two of their major missions were anti-shipping strikes and night heckling missions, many aircraft were equipped with radar. Initially, an AN/APS-2 airborne search radar system was installed in PBJ-1Ds; the remote ventral turret was removed and a radome installed housing the radar antenna. As with the turret, the radome was retractable. Later, the AN/APS-3 airborne search radar system with the radome mounted on the nose above the bombardiers station was installed on PBJ-1Ds; this configuration was nicknamed Hose Nose. NAA delivered versions of the PBJ-1J with the radar antenna housed in a pod on the starboard wing tip but the Marines felt that the nose mounted radar was superior because (1) it gave about 20 degrees more coverage, (2) better weight distribution and (3) ease of maintenance. Many of the PBJ-1Js received in the Pacific were modified into the Hose Nose configuration.

Armament was also an area where the PBJ-1Ds were heavily modified. Like the USAAF's Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces, these aircraft were modified into strafers by installing four fixed 50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns in the nose and two 50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns in blisters on both sides of the forward fuselage. Another modification was the installation of 50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns in the small waist windows between the dorsal turret and the tail; later PBJ-1Ds were modified with the larger "bay windows" of the B-25H and J. The last major modification was the addition of a tail turret with one 50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine gun. The canopy of the tail gun was similar to that used on the B-25H and J.

The Marine PBJ squadrons served ashore as a garrison air force to attack bypassed Japanese bases and other installations. The primary operations were at night against shipping and land targets. In the South Pacific, five squadrons flew missions against Japanese installations at or near Rabaul (4.12S, 152.12E) on New Britain Island and Kavieng (2.35S, 150.50E) on the northwest coast of New Ireland Island in the Bismarck Archipelago and Bougainville Island in the British Solomon Islands. One squadron, based in the Marshall Islands, was tasked with preventing resupply of bypassed Japanese bases in those islands while one squadron was based in the Mariana Islands, and later Iwo Jima and Okinawa, flying night anti-shipping missions. The eighth squadron departed the U.S. in July 1945 and ended the war based on Midway Island.
 
The Marines also used SBDs well past their retirement from the USN's CAGs. Marine SBDs were very effective at CAS in the Philippines.
 
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It would be interesting to see the USN assign a few CVEs to be forerunners of today's assault ships with all USMC air groups specially trained for CAS over the beach.

Those would have been a good start in early 1943. The larger carriers were available as 1943 spun out.

Rowells objection to Marines on carriers may have in part come from a fear they would be suborned into Navy squadrons. That happened to many of the Marine pilots in late 1944 after carrier qualification restarted. The USN used a portion of them as fillers in navy squadrons. One of the subtle points in the formation of Fleet marine Forces Pacific was that it controled the equipment and ground support personnel of the Marine air wings general control of the pilots was in the hands of the Navy. Since the 10,000+ Marine pilots were more than needed to support four air wings this did not become a serious problem in 1945. More of a anoyance,
 
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