AHC: Make the Falklands War more lethal

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The NT-32s should have worked. No-one has ever explained what happened aboard the San Luis and why they did not. One speculation I've read was that the San Luis fired an SST-4 at HMS Brilliant and that was the torpedo that actually failed. Shrug.

I once read that the Argentines had received no manufacturer support from the Germans for the subs or torps since 1974 (76?), nor did the San Luis captain use his active sonar or periscope. In any case if the San Luis sinks 2 frigates the war isn't lost, the RN had some 60+ destroyers and frigates in service in early 1982, that's how they could afford to put them on the gun line as bait for the AAF.

As I've said before, the whole British response to the Falklands was rushed and somewhat half-arsed. They were in no real danger of losing the war once they had decided to fight it to the finish.
 
Lose your air defense (CAP) and it does not matter how many frigates are in the national OOB. The carriers (1982 there were 3 and only 2 combat ready), were the key. One gone and the British withdraw in defeat. Admiral Parry does touch upon this factor.
 
Lose your air defense (CAP) and it does not matter how many frigates are in the national OOB. The carriers (1982 there were 3 and only 2 combat ready), were the key. One gone and the British withdraw in defeat. Admiral Parry does touch upon this factor.

He says that the carriers wrre kept well away to the east and this was the right move.

People blithely say that a carrier could be lost, but fail to say how this would happen. How they would find the carriers, with any certainty, how would they be attacked at such long range, how such attacks would succeed against the defences and how ordnance that regularly failed to sink smaller ships will mission kill the carriers?
 
The Argentines are lucky. They sink the Canberra laden with troops and get the Ark Royal forcing the British to withdraw. Then the war spreads. Argentina, Peru and Bolivia jump Chile for backing Britain- ok that's the excuse. The real reason is that Chile took the Bolivian seacoast and land from Peru while Argentina wants the Beagel Islands. Brazil moves against Argentina to prevent her growth. Uruguay backs Argentina. After Chile is beaten, Bolivia then moves on Paraguay to regain the Chaco


Guatemala sees the beaten British and moves into Belize and Mexico then moves against the Guatemalans
 
I would say one simple thing that could increase the intensity would be both sides having more fuel to play with.

The Argentines could make their canbrerras into buddy tankers and fit the mirages with probes so they can do escort and fighter sweeps in support of the attack aircraft.

The Sea Haariers could get the 190 gal drop tanks, converted from excess 220 gal Hunter tanks, before the war. This would give the Sea Harriers 40 instead of 15 minutes on station and lead to more interceptions.

The RAF VC10 K2 programme could have borne fruit before June 22 1982. Having such large tankers in service would transform the long range RAF missions and most likely allow more to be conducted.
This is probably not allowable, but here goes...

IIRC the Victor tanker force was cut from 3 to 2 squadrons under the 1974 Defence Review and the number of Victors converted to K Mk 2 standard cut from the 30-odd planned to 20-odd. If no 1974 Defence Review or a less severe one there would be another 10 Victors available in No. 214 Squadron and the Tanker Training Flight in 1982. There would also be an expansion of the programme to convert VC10s into tankers as 50% more would be needed and possibly an acceleration. Though it would have to be a big acceleration as the VC.10 tanker squadron wasn't formed until May 1984.

The 1974 Defence Review also reduced the RAF's transport force from 12 squadrons (1 VC10, 1 Belfast, 2 Britannia, 1 Comet, 6 Hercules and 1 Argossy) to 5 (1 VC10 and 4 Hercules) squadrons. It also killed off plans to buy C-5 Galaxies to replace the Britannia.

Edit

I made a mistake in the last paragraph. It was one Andover squadron and not one Argossy squadron.

The last Argossy transport squadron (No. 70) had already converted to the Hercules. However, No. 115 Squadron operated Argossies in the calibration role until 1977. There was also a plan to convert 14 into T Mk 2 crew trainers, but that was abandoned. I don't know if that was part of the 1974 Defence Review or because of the 26 Scottish Aviation Jetstreams which were originally ordered to replace the Varsity as a multi-engine pilot training aircraft.
 
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This is probably not allowable, but here goes...

IIRC the Victor tanker force was cut from 3 to 2 squadrons under the 1974 Defence Review and the number of Victors converted to K Mk 2 standard cut from the 30-odd planned to 20-odd. If no 1974 Defence Review or a less severe one there would be another 10 Victors available in No. 214 Squadron and the Tanker Training Flight in 1982. There would also be an expansion of the programme to convert VC10s into tankers as 50% more would be needed and possibly an acceleration. Though it would have to be a big acceleration as the VC.10 tanker squadron wasn't formed until May 1984.

The 1974 Defence Review also reduced the RAF's transport force from 12 squadrons (1 VC10, 1 Belfast, 2 Britannia, 1 Comet, 6 Hercules and 1 Argossy) to 5 (1 VC10 and 4 Hercules) squadrons. It also killed off plans to buy C-5 Galaxies to replace the Britannia.

Good British defence policy decisions are asb, therefore are not allowed. ;)

Any universe where the Belfast survives is awesome but I was thinking about the VC10 not for the number of aircraft but the offload capacity. I think blackbuck missions could be mounted with far less vc10s than victors, assuming that the Vulcans diversion range was the limiting factor.
 
Any universe where the Belfast survives is awesome but I was thinking about the VC10 not for the number of aircraft but the offload capacity. I think blackbuck missions could be mounted with far less vc10s than victors, assuming that the Vulcans diversion range was the limiting factor.
As it happened 5 Belfasts did survive until 1982. IIRC they were operated by a civilian cargo airline and the MoD hired them to transport cargo to Ascension during the Falklands.
 
As it happened 5 Belfasts did survive until 1982. IIRC they were operated by a civilian cargo airline and the MoD hired them to transport cargo to Ascension during the Falklands.

There was one at Cairns airport about 7 years, they moved it for scrapping while I was up there, it ruined my holiday. :'(
 
Good British defence policy decisions are asb, therefore are not allowed. ;)
IIRC the 1974 and subsequent defence cuts were driven by the state of the British economy, but a better performing British economy from the early 1970s to early 1980s probably requires changes of ASB magnitude in themselves.

And if there hadn't been a 1974 and subsequent defence reviews there would have been a much stronger Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary to back it up. E.g. Fearless and Intrepid would have been in full commission as amphibious assault ships, instead of one as the cadet training ship at Dartmouth and the other in reserve. Bulwark would have been in continuous service since 1976 instead of being paid off in 1976, brought back into service in 1979 (for a projected 5 years) but paid off in 1981. Triumph would still be around either in commission or in the Standby Squadron at Chatham. There would be 70 frigates and destroyers instead of 60. And last but not least more Sea Harriers because the orders would not have been delayed for 18 months.

Edit

The Sandys, Healey and Knott defence reviews receive nearly all the attention on this board. The Mason Review of 1974-75 is hardly discussed. However, I think maintaining HM Forces at pre-Mason levels to the end of the Cold War is a lot more realistic than the "What If No Duncan Sandys and Denis Healey Reviews" threads and variations thereof that popup on the board regularly.
 
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Good British defence policy decisions are asb, therefore are not allowed. ;)
Are good Argentine defence decisions are also not allowed? E.g. the General Belgrano's sister the Nueve de Julio not being paid off in the late 1970s. Or less feasibly the Argentines keeping the Independencia and running it on alongside the Veinticinco de Mayo.

In the 1970s the Americans transferred many surplus WWII destroyers and submarines that had received FRAM refits to allied navies. Does anybody know if they would have allowed the transfer of rebuilt Essex class aircraft carriers and WWII cruisers to friendly nations? E.g one FRAM II SCB.27A Essex each to Argentina and Brazil? The SCB.27C with steam catapults didn't have a FRAM refit.
 

Zachariah

Banned
Isn't this effectively a 'pointless mass death scenario', and thus liable to get locked?
CalBear said:
Pointless mass death scenarios, which this most certainly appears to be since all it calls for is a massive increase in KIA, are not permitted on the Board.

I strongly suggest you refrain in the future.

Locked.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
Isn't this effectively a 'pointless mass death scenario', and thus liable to get locked?

No, it certainly isn't. That wasn't my intention as the OP nor has it been the aim from other posters as far as I can see.
Report the thread if you feel the need though.
 
This is probably not allowable, but here goes...

IIRC the Victor tanker force was cut from 3 to 2 squadrons under the 1974 Defence Review and the number of Victors converted to K Mk 2 standard cut from the 30-odd planned to 20-odd. If no 1974 Defence Review or a less severe one there would be another 10 Victors available in No. 214 Squadron and the Tanker Training Flight in 1982. There would also be an expansion of the programme to convert VC10s into tankers as 50% more would be needed and possibly an acceleration. Though it would have to be a big acceleration as the VC.10 tanker squadron wasn't formed until May 1984.

The Victor tankers were deleted due to wrong flight profile issues (High vs. lo/lo/lo) and a technical fault (fuel flow rates problem during droguing).

The 1974 Defence Review also reduced the RAF's transport force from 12 squadrons (1 VC10, 1 Belfast, 2 Britannia, 1 Comet, 6 Hercules and 1 Argossy) to 5 (1 VC10 and 4 Hercules) squadrons. It also killed off plans to buy C-5 Galaxies to replace the Britannia.

Britainias suffered from icing problems.

Comets? Well...

Argosy? Kind of like a flying boxcar that one.

VC10? Excellent. Why weren't more of them made?

C-5s were expensive to operate and suffered from "Lockheed disease".

The Belfast was expensive.

Good British defence policy decisions are asb, therefore are not allowed. ;)

Any universe where the Belfast survives is awesome but I was thinking about the VC10 not for the number of aircraft but the offload capacity. I think blackbuck missions could be mounted with far less vc10s than victors, assuming that the Vulcans diversion range was the limiting factor.

I prefer the Vulcan developed as a tanker.

As it happened 5 Belfasts did survive until 1982. IIRC they were operated by a civilian cargo airline and the MoD hired them to transport cargo to Ascension during the Falklands.

Okay then. They were STUFT.

There was one at Cairns airport about 7 years, they moved it for scrapping while I was up there, it ruined my holiday. :'(

Shrug. Airframe hours.

IIRC the 1974 and subsequent defence cuts were driven by the state of the British economy, but a better performing British economy from the early 1970s to early 1980s probably requires changes of ASB magnitude in themselves.

Or an invasion by alien space bats.

And if there hadn't been a 1974 and subsequent defence reviews there would have been a much stronger Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary to back it up. E.g. Fearless and Intrepid would have been in full commission as amphibious assault ships, instead of one as the cadet training ship at Dartmouth and the other in reserve. Bulwark would have been in continuous service since 1976 instead of being paid off in 1976, brought back into service in 1979 (for a projected 5 years) but paid off in 1981. Triumph would still be around either in commission or in the Standby Squadron at Chatham. There would be 70 frigates and destroyers instead of 60. And last but not least more Sea Harriers because the orders would not have been delayed for 18 months.

Full Catobar carrier.

Edit

The Sandys, Healey and Knott defence reviews receive nearly all the attention on this board. The Mason Review of 1974-75 is hardly discussed. However, I think maintaining HM Forces at pre-Mason levels to the end of the Cold War is a lot more realistic than the "What If No Duncan Sandys and Denis Healey Reviews" threads and variations thereof that popup on the board regularly.

Once the pattern is established, it continues. Witness the current US predicament?

Isn't this effectively a 'pointless mass death scenario', and thus liable to get locked?

You should read the Beatty battle cruiser thread.

No, it certainly isn't. That wasn't my intention as the OP nor has it been the aim from other posters as far as I can see.

Report the thread if you feel the need though.

I would like to amend the OP to a more relevant what if, to suppose British or Argentinian different decisions had rendered more decisive results one way or the other.

As for the carriers, posting out of air reach does not solve submarines or Exocets. Mission kill is as good as a lost war.
 
I never understood one point: why did Argentina pull out it's elite troops, marines and such, and placed conscripts to defend the islands?!

Imagine if the argentinian marines had been there; the fight would have been a lot harder...
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
I never understood one point: why did Argentina pull out it's elite troops, marines and such, and placed conscripts to defend the islands?!

Imagine if the argentinian marines had been there; the fight would have been a lot harder...

The way I understand it was that one of the conscript regiments was a nationwide rather than regional unit. This was done for symbolic reasons so the whole country could have a stake in the fighting.
Other conscript regiments were there because I believe that so many better troops were kept in the Andes facing Chile.
 
Full Catobar carrier.
Unlikely as the decision to phase out the Catobar carries had been taken in 1966 and the Heath Government didn't reverse it plus Dennis Healy was Chancellor or the Exchequer 1974-79 and only the Ark Royal was left in 1974.

More likely that the OTL force of 3 Invincibles was maintained to the end of the Cold War plus 2 new commando carriers built in the 1980s to replace Bulwark and Hermes. AFAIK the plans to build 2 commando carriers to replace Bulwark and Hermes were killed by the 1974 Defence Review.
 
Britainias suffered from icing problems.

Comets? Well...

Argosy? Kind of like a flying boxcar that one.

VC10? Excellent. Why weren't more of them made?

C-5s were expensive to operate and suffered from "Lockheed disease".

The Belfast was expensive.
AFAIK the icing problems of the Britannia were cured in the 1950s.

There were 5 Comet C Mk 4 in one squadron in 1974, I don't know how good or bad they were.

I don't know much about how good or bad the Argossy was either, however your comment that it was a Flying Boxcar makes it sound like a C-119 with 4 Dart turpboprops. I do know that plans to convert some to crew trainers was killed by the 1974 Defence Review. In a TL where the UK was rich enough to avoid the 1974 Defence Review I would expect 14 C-130s to be bought in the second half of the 1980s to replace the Comets and the last Argossy transport squadron. That is 66 C-130K and 14 C-130H for a total of 80 to support 8 squadrons of 8 aircraft plus second line units like the OCU.

VC10. The little I know is that the Boeing 707 and DC-8 were too well established and the VC.10 was tailored too closely to the requirements of BOAC.

I can't contradict you on the C-5 and Belfast because I don't know enough about them. That is other than they could carry payloads that the C-130 and VC.10 couldn't. In spite of the C-5s problems the RAF still wanted 15 of them to replace its Britannias. I've read the files at the National Archives. A C-5K with the new wing and RB.211 engines might be interesting with 40 built to support 4 squadrons of 8 aircraft plus second line units like the training flight.
 
The Victor tankers were deleted due to wrong flight profile issues (High vs. lo/lo/lo) and a technical fault (fuel flow rates problem during droguing).
I was under the impression that the plan to convert 30-odd Victor B Mk 2 and SR Mk 2 to K Mk 2 tankers was cut back to 20 aircraft because of the economic recession created by the 1973 Oil Crisis. Ditto the disbandment of No. 214 Squadron with its Victor K Mk 1 tankers on 28th January 1977. That left Nos 55 and 57 Squadrons plus the Tanker Training Flight that had converted to Victor K Mk 2s.
 
The Victor tankers were deleted due to wrong flight profile issues (High vs. lo/lo/lo) and a technical fault (fuel flow rates problem during droguing).
VC10? Excellent. Why weren't more of them made?
Instead of converting Victor K Mk 1s to replace the Valiant tankers after they were grounded, what if the RAF was made to buy 30 new VC.10 tankers? Some of them could have been aircraft ordered by BOAC but cancelled when it decided that it wanted more Boeing 707s. That would have increased the number built from 54 to 84 and it might have kept the production line open long enough to accept the Chinese order.
 

Archibald

Banned
An interesting POD would be Vickers scrapping the Valiant in 1954 and building the VC-7 instead. The VC-7 is perhaps the worse missed opportunity in British aviation history. It could have been a 707 killer and found many use in RAF service, in place of all the Nimrods, plus the VC-10 tankers.

Just think about it.

One of the many reasons that doomed the Nimrod AEW 3 was that the fuselage was too small for all those computers, and they had to dump the heat by dumping fuel used as a heat sink.
AFAIK a VC-7 or VC-10 is far roomier than a Comet / Nimrod. Plus it is 707 size.

We need a Vickers VC-7 TL. Really.
 
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