AHC: Make MX-774/Hiroc program successful enough for US to have the first ICBM

Challenge: With PoDs in any period make the MX-774/Hiroc ICBM program successful enough for US to have the first ICBM (defined as a rocket projectile with ranges more than 5500km) before USSR gets it on August 1957.
 
Challenge: With PoDs in any period make the MX-774/Hiroc ICBM program successful enough for US to have the first ICBM (defined as a rocket projectile with ranges more than 5500km) before USSR gets it on August 1957.

Have Curtis LeMay get interested in Rocketry as a way to take out Soviet Radar sites and airfields to allow the Bo,bers to get thru easier, but putting small warheads on top of them before the SAC Wings got close
 
Operation Paperclip goes better for the US, helping the US rocket program and slowing the Soviets program down.

Or even the reverse, have the Soviets grab a few more of the Germans, von Braun, even

That way, the US worries more about what's cooking on the other side of the Iron Curtain

The Rocket side of Convair, was mostly Vultee, and Charlie Bossart was the brains that led to Atlas via the MX774.

As long as North American Aviation gets Riedel and Dannenberg from VBs crew, Atlas sized rocket chambers are assured.
 

trurle

Banned
Challenge: With PoDs in any period make the MX-774/Hiroc ICBM program successful enough for US to have the first ICBM (defined as a rocket projectile with ranges more than 5500km) before USSR gets it on August 1957.
The Hiroc was too small to be effectively ground-launched (it lost about half of delta-V to air resistance). In best case, in original configuration it can hope for ~150km range. A special setup for topping it with liquid oxygen and launching from B-29 bomb bay may give it a chance, increasing range to ~350km plus the range of the B-29 itself.
To reach ICBM range even with air launch, the 2-stage design based on Hiroc as 1st stage booster was needed, but it would limit payload to likely <60kg at 5500km. The nuclear warheads of that size were not available in the 194x period, therefore Hiroc-based ICBM would likely be designed as a sort of anti-radar ICBM with gliding bomb warhead (strategic radars at period were very powerful&stationary, and therefore easy to home on with very simple electronics).
 
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Challenge: With PoDs in any period make the MX-774/Hiroc ICBM program successful enough for US to have the first ICBM (defined as a rocket projectile with ranges more than 5500km) before USSR gets it on August 1957.

Dewey defeats Truman! Actually that's a bit too late as Hiroc was already canceled but Dewey was full prepared to increase military spending and despite the Republican resistance he'd get SOME increase was going to happen on his watch. As Truman had military spending 'last' on his list with money for Air Force bombers and Atom bombs (the former due to it being the only 'viable' delivery system at the time, the later because no one could stand up to the threat of the A-bomb, well THAT worked :) ) with the Army after that and the Navy dead last, until and unless you get some more money in the general pot the US has to make a choice and then went with what the 'experts' suggested: "Manned" bombers and cruise missiles rather than ballistic missiles. (Frankly having Von Karman actually read and understand what he collected for "Beyond this Horizon" would have helped as well. While what's written clearly points out that the ballistic missile requires more work on the 'mechanics' the guidance issue for both it and the cruise missile were similar and much more daunting for the latter rather than the former, his 'conclusion' essay comes to exactly the opposite conclusion! He even echoes Lemay's initial interest in the ballistic missile but then dismiss' it as less 'near-term' than the long range cruise missile which is exactly opposite of what everything in the study says...)

In the end the US simply assumed that the USSR was doing exactly what they were doing because what they were doing in effect made the most 'sense' to everyone they talked to. The sad part is that's (again) pretty much exactly opposite of what everyone they talked to actually said. Everyone in Europe was obsessed with ballistic rockets and missiles and the possible Soviet work being done but the US only heard about 'V1' type cruise missiles being tested and ignored the reports of 'rockets' and 'missiles' being tossed about. (Arguably because they could find 'evidence' of the V1s but not advanced V2s but still even their own people in the states were making significant progress when funding got cut and they still ignored it)

Arguably the US could have had NONE of the Paperclip scientist and still moved forward as we were well on the way with purely US research.

Randy
 
Arguably the US could have had NONE of the Paperclip scientist and still moved forward as we were well on the way with purely US research.

Could we have no Paperclip but instead a massive "Skrepka" (Paperclip in Russain) and perhaps some Soviet PR stunts with rockets in late 40's, like VR-190? This would arguably boost US interest in rocketry earlier?
 
Operation Paperclip goes better for the US, helping the US rocket program and slowing the Soviets program down.
If I remember correctly there was a lot of interest service rivalry about Rockets. If we had to listen just to Von Braun and not let the military Navy in particular design their own the ones that kept blowing up on the Launchpad we would have had the first satellite in space and ICBM. If you kind of look at the historical record after the late 50s Von Braun have much more of a upper hand in design and built some very good Rockets Saturn series for instance. Had the military continued I have a feeling the Saturn Rockets would have ended up like the vanguards that blew up the LaunchPad
 
Jukra wrote:
Could we have no Paperclip but instead a massive "Skrepka" (Paperclip in Russian) and perhaps some Soviet PR stunts with rockets in late 40's, like VR-190? This would arguably boost US interest in rocketry earlier?

Thing was what ‘could’ be done early on WHERE mostly ‘stunts’ and pretty much everyone was aware of that. Hence kinda ‘why’ “Megaroc” et-al didn’t get done. Stalin seems to have initially been interested in doing such stunts but it’s arguable if they would have actually been taken seriously by the rest of the world. It also would have called attention to Soviet rocketry efforts which no one OTHER than Stalin wanted hence why they were dropped after his death.

On the US side the ‘interest’ was there but the money wasn’t and that is the main reason US efforst stagnated. The one service that was arguably getting enough funding, (it wasn’t really) the Air Force had already decided to put its effort into cruise and air-breathing missiles rather than rockets while the services that were specifically interested in ballistic missiles (Army and Navy) had their programs shut down due to a combination of political and inter-service rivally pressure.

Fscott wrote:
If I remember correctly there was a lot of interest service rivalry about Rockets.

Very much so as the US Air Force was focused on gaining all possible ‘nuclear delivery’ means under their control and they themselves had been convinced that air-breathing cruise missiles were a more ‘near-term’ system than ballistic missiles. The Army Redstone and then joint Army/Navy Jupiter coupled with the delays and inadequacies of the Navaho and Snark underlined this enough that they had to use political fait to deny the other services missile development and deployment. Once it became clear to the Navy that solid propellant was viable they dropped out of the Jupiter development program to pursue Polaris since it was quite clear that the Air Force could not operate submarines that stopped any Air Force effort to delay or side-line that program. The Air Force then managed to acquire both the Jupiter and its own Thor IRBM program, which was actually ironic in that the Air Force was in fact not initially interested in an IRBM but only ICBM development having ‘copied’ the Jupiter missile to produce the Thor in an effort to replace that missile only to end up having to run and deploy BOTH programs J

If we had to listen just to Von Braun and not let the military Navy in particular design their own the ones that kept blowing up on the Launchpad we would have had the first satellite in space and ICBM. If you kind of look at the historical record after the late 50s Von Braun have much more of a upper hand in design and built some very good Rockets Saturn series for instance. Had the military continued I have a feeling the Saturn Rockets would have ended up like the vanguards that blew up the LaunchPad

Actually this is incorrect as Von Braun wasn’t at all adverse to the Navy missile or design work. In fact part of the reason the Army approached the Navy with the joint Jupiter program was because at the time the Navy had the most experience and higher development microelectronics program in the world.

Arguably the ‘reasoning’ given for pursuing the Vanguard project were actually sound in that it was a program that would use ‘off-the-shelf’ components to create a “non-military” satellite launcher which was THE main directive of the Eisenhower White House on the satellite program. No one was more surprised than the Navy when Vanguard was chosen since everyone had ‘assumed’ that Von Braun’s Project Orbiter, (using the stretched “Jupiter-C” Redstone, another ‘off-the-shelf” launcher) would be the one chosen. That it was not was directly because;

1) Eisenhower didn’t ‘trust’ or want that “ex-Nazi” getting credit for or being connected with the US satellite program. He’d already been dealing with Von Braun’s attempts to ‘oops’ a satellite into orbit* there was no way he was going to give the man official sanction.

2) Of the three services available the Air Force had only ‘paper’ launch vehicles and no practical experience and also was specifically tasked with ICBM development. Tasking them to launch a satellite would definitely distract and undercut that development and deployment program. And it would have clearly been based on and developed from a “military” program which Eisenhower wanted to avoid. The Army (and Von Braun) had both a launcher and experience but had both the drawbacks of #1 above as well as also being a military rocket based vehicle. The Navy on the other hand, specifically the Naval Research Laboratory, had a ‘reputation’ as the most “non-military” military laboratory and a set of specifically ‘NOT weapons’ designed rockets that could be used to build a definitely ‘non-military-usable’ launch vehicle with the Viking rocket and several smaller solid boosters. Hence the “only” choice the committee could really come to was Project Vanguard as it was the only one the met all the ‘official’ requirements.

(* Von Braun had initially suggested “Project Orbiter” in early 1955 BEFORE the White House announced it would attempt to launch a satellite in 1958 and before any ‘competition’ to do so took place. In 1956 Von Braun is supposed to have ‘planned’ on ‘accidently’ launching a satellite into orbit during a test of the Jupiter-C but ‘government officials’ showed up and ensured the fourth stage was filled with sand instead of solid propellant. My opinion is those “government officials” weren’t sent by Ike but by the Army which was already in trouble for ‘going outside channels’ in the rivalry with the Air Force over missile development. This would lead rapidly to this incident: https://www.theatlantic.com/politic...-prosecution-that-lost-the-space-race/495659/)

Now having said that keep in mind that even after it was chosen as the ‘official’ US satellite program Vanguard STILL didn’t get very much funding nor priority! It’s been said this was because Eisenhower and his top advisors didn’t WANT the US to launch first so as to undercut any Soviet attempt to protest satellite over-flights. This is probable since Vanguard was so underfunded that manufacturing flaws and design deficiencies in the boosters were sent back to the factory to be re-built rather than new boosters built.

And despite the rather spectacular ‘failures’ of the TV3 flight this was after two previous flights had done successful full power flights of the first stage with no issues. As the ‘name’ implies the flight was SUPPOSED to be a third test flight and the first flight to use ‘live’ upper stages but with a dummy satellite. Due to Sputnik and the highly unexpected ‘panic’ it caused it was re-purposed as a live satellite launch and frankly with two success’ previously it was ‘assumed’ that this one would work as well so it was decided (not by the Navy mind you but in Washington) to also broadcast the launch live on TV.

Needless to say the extra pressure AND the lack of funding and support caught up with the program at exactly the wrong time. TV3 backup also failed to orbit a satellite, (first stage control failure caused the booster to break up at T+55 seconds) but TV4 successfully put up Vanguard 1 in March 1958. (And it’s still up there today)

I’m not convinced that Von Braun would have gotten an earlier ICBM as he was very conservative, (as were all the ex-V2 engineers really) and would have continued to slowly ‘build-up’ capability whereas the Air Force wanted to move directly to ICBM’s once they managed to get ‘official’ interest which is where the Atlas came from.

Now assuming that there is both ‘official’ interest and a budget then the Mx-774 program was already supposed to be followed by continued development of the Convair ‘pressure-supported’ design follow on but given the (then) size of nuclear warheads it was going to be HUGE! (http://www.astronautix.com/m/mx-1593.html, http://www.astronautix.com/p/proposedatlas.html,
) But given an actual continuation of MX-774 from 1946 you could see an ‘operational’ (very limited and very questionable on the ‘operational’ part since it would be very similar to the early R7 in that it couldn’t be launched from a hardened position and took a long time to prepare and launch) “Atlas” coming on-line in the mid-to-late 50s.

Of course that puts the US and USSR on a far more ‘equal’ footing in any following “Space Race” and I have to point out also disinclines anyone from funding some silly “Super-Jupiter” program from the Army. (Meaning we might see Von Braun’s team actually broken up instead of kept together with a ‘make-work’ program which was what “Saturn” development actually was OTL)

Randy
 
But given an actual continuation of MX-774 from 1946 you could see an ‘operational’ (very limited and very questionable on the ‘operational’ part since it would be very similar to the early R7 in that it couldn’t be launched from a hardened position and took a long time to prepare and launch) “Atlas” coming on-line in the mid-to-late 50s.

'Big' Atlas for original sized H-Bombs
xb-65.jpg

Since the Atlas lasted decades longer as a Sat-Lofter, than ICBM, this would have been useful for more payload to LEO
 
Marathag wrote:
'Big' Atlas for original sized H-Bombs
raw

Since the Atlas lasted decades longer as a Sat-Lofter, than ICBM, this would have been useful for more payload to LEO

Exactly J

On the downside though I have to mention that there’s a better than average chance the “Big Atlas” never gets out of testing as while the various pro-ICBM committees of OTL (Teapot/Von Neumann/etc) probably don’t happen since ICBM’s ARE being developed it is going to rapidly become clear that the “Big Atlas” is in fact a not very ‘operationally’ capable ICBM. As the above video shows we’ll just truck it from the nearby factory to the launch area and set up it, put the bomb and propellant on-board and then CAREFULLY count down and launch it… While hoping an enemy mean-and-nasty, (and SO obsolete mind you) “B-36-or-V1-analog” doesn’t come ambling over the horizon to blow us all to atomic dust….

(My ATL notes have America ‘side-step’ this issue initially by deciding the Nazi’s had the right idea with their initial deployment of the V2, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-2_rocket, Chateau du Molay basing, by building a ‘factory and launch complex’ in the South West into the south side of a Rocky Mountain area and getting as far as some excavation and construction that ended up being used for my alternate NORAD instead

Arguably this would be about as ‘operational’ as the Soviet R7 and probably ‘used’ if it came to that but the US would quite obviously begin work on something ‘better’ the second they can. And they in fact ‘can’ almost right off the bat.

The OTL Titan was similarly descended from the MX-774 project and is immediately capable of being ‘silo’ based so it might be that rather than ‘early’ deployment of a questionable ICBM the US might ‘delay’ and concentrate on the TTL-Titan instead.

I personally would rather have a “Big Atlas” for space launch purposes but there it is, especially if (as OLT) most advocates dismiss the IRBM as a ‘distraction’.

RAndy
 
Arguably this would be about as ‘operational’ as the Soviet R7 and probably ‘used’ if it came to that but the US would quite obviously begin work on something ‘better’ the second they can. And they in fact ‘can’ almost right off the bat.
Unlike the R7, the Atlas, be it 3 or 5 engine type, was planned for a slightly harder launcher than the open pads
762px-Atlas-icbm-erection-large.jpg

with the Coffin, 15 minutes from opening to launch, and 25 psi 'hardness'

atlas-hardened-silo.jpg

and hardened silo for 100 PSI protection and 10 minutes. In both, missiles had to be raised clear and fueled before ignition

The first Titan I Silos took 2 minutes to raise, as didn't have the fueling delay
964b.jpg
with later Titan II being able to launch from the silo without much delay, beyond the blast door slamming open
1026_tucson2.jpg


From the start, it was known that Titan from Martin would be the Superior weapon system, but wouldn't be ready in time to deploy before Atlas, or carry megaton class weapons when it was first pitched, but 'only' boosted fission warheads in the 400kt range

So Atlas, be it 'big' or 'regular' had a planned operational window of just a few years as an ICBM, and then far longer as a manned launcher ( 'Big' Atlas and Gemini, woo-hoo!) and then Satellite and probe lofter after that
 
Marathag wrote:
Unlike the R7, the Atlas, be it 3 or 5 engine type, was planned for a slightly harder launcher than the open pads

Actually initial they were and it wasn’t till the actual development program (and design) was ‘frozen’ that they began to look at protected launch platforms. While the 7/5 engine design is ‘only’ two feet wider, (12ft for the big and 10ft for the ‘standard’ Atlas) it wasn’t ‘easy’ to get the coffins to work and the added mass and yes those ‘simple’ two extra feet wasn’t going to help. Yes the coffin deployment was eventually going to be done but silo operations might not have actually happened.

The first Titan I Silos took 2 minutes to raise, as didn't have the fueling delay

Sure? I recall that Titan 1 had to be fueled just like the Atlas which gave it about the same response time. It's wasn't till the Titan-II hypergolics the fueling delay went away.

From the start, it was known that Titan from Martin would be the Superior weapon system, but wouldn't be ready in time to deploy before Atlas, or carry megaton class weapons when it was first pitched, but 'only' boosted fission warheads in the 400kt range

Initially Titan was 'only' a backup to Atlas, here it doesn't really have the payload advantage and still retains the operational issues as per OTL. OTL the deployment issue was because we already knew the Soviets had a working ICBM, TTL that's not the case so the extensive 'pressure' to get an ICBM into operation would not seem to be there. I have to wonder if Titan doesn't get moved in a different direction as well as Minuteman being accelerated while Atlas turns into a 'experimental' vehicle then launch vehicle rather than operational.

So Atlas, be it 'big' or 'regular' had a planned operational window of just a few years as an ICBM, and then far longer as a manned launcher ( 'Big' Atlas and Gemini, woo-hoo!) and then Satellite and probe lofter after that

Might be even more 'woo-hoo-ier!' Because "Big" Atlas has more payload "Mercury" might actually be a more capable design and be open to modification unlike OTL Mercury was :)

Randy
 
Sure? I recall that Titan 1 had to be fueled just like the Atlas which gave it about the same response time. It's wasn't till the Titan-II hypergolics the fueling delay went away.

I believe the non-balloon tanks could be filled faster on the Titan I
Might be even more 'woo-hoo-ier!' Because "Big" Atlas has more payload "Mercury" might actually be a more capable design and be open to modification unlike OTL Mercury was :)

Will agree with that, a 60-70 orbit flight with Alan Shepard would have been good to get that flight in before he got grounded for a few years
 
I believe the non-balloon tanks could be filled faster on the Titan I

Have to check but IIRC there wasn't much difference really.

Will agree with that, a 60-70 orbit flight with Alan Shepard would have been good to get that flight in before he got grounded for a few years

Having the ability to move around a bit and actually carry some significant experiments and or life support would have gone a long way. Sheppard's an interesting concept though as the plan was originally for all the astronauts to do sub-orbital missions first both for training and to quality the Mercury spacecraft. Obviously Redstone can't carry a 'Big-Mercury" but Jupiter maybe can loft it suborbital. Given NASA and the US were both actually pretty conservative about the initial space program I'm not sure I see them changing much of the plan even with a 'bigger' booster early on. Having said that I'm curios of the opinion of what they'd make of Sheppard probably getting 'sick' (Gagarin did while Glenn didn't because Glenn couldn't move much) on orbit and then having his later health issues. Would there be an assumption that his 'health' issues were the reason he got sick and not Adaption Sickness and therefore they pretty much ground everyone when Glenn gets sick too on suspicion there's a broader health issue? Granted a mass outbreak of Ménière's disease is unlikely but unlikely ain't zero after all and since the Soviets never really mentioned SAS NASA and their astronauts had to find out the hard way.

Randy
 
In both, missiles had to be raised clear and fuelled before ignition.
Was that because of some technical requirement of the missile or simply because they hadn't built the silo with flame and exhaust ducts? The RAF did a fair amount of research on missile silos in the mid- to late-1950s, IIRC the US Air Force showed a lot interest in the work.
 
I like the implications of Big Atlas, but Big Mercury seems a bit of a stretch. In short I think there would be talk of a kind duration service module, but Mercury had real reliability problems once it's flight time got up there. At the same time, enlarging the capsule early might happen insofar as it can carry more consumables, but the goals don't, I suspect, change. Once it's flying, well, there's so much Mercury heritage in Gemini that I have a hard time seeing something that would functionally be as interim as Voskhod actually flying (although a two man inflatable airlock mercury predicated on a larger space frame is an interesting thought). Just maybe it could be sized the same as Gemini from day 1 with the explicit intent of upgrades, but that really seems to go against the spirit of the Mercury program.
 
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