AHC: Make Japan win the Pacific War.

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Wasn't the expectation that the USN would have to come moseying over to defend the Philippines? The Japanese attrit them on the way over, smash them south of Taiwan, then home in time for smoked sushi for breakfast. Playing to preconceived notions usually works.
That was the USN's expectation if they had to be ordered to do so but their planners and the plans warned against trying it for that exact reason. Now it's possibly that the political leadership might overrule the planners, but it wouldn't be the first time political considerations trumped sound military planning. The Japanese command, for a variety of reasons, didn't seem to have picked up on it. Finagling a PoD which makes the Japanese command less heeby-jeeby and thus be more receptive to it is theoretically possible but would have to go so far back that the butterflies might render the situation in the Pacific of 1941/42 unrecognizable.
The challenge is whether or not to hit the Philippines. Put troops on the Philippines you have MacArthur screaming for help to apply pressure on the USN.

Don't hit the Philippines you have time to build up and sharpen that spear at the Japanese throat. But the Europeans are going to be screaming blue murder. All sorts of butterflies.
Quite. I'll take a moment to further note, as you seem to be alluding too in this post, that this plan (regardless of it's variations) in no way offers the guarantee of Japanese victory and offers potential for incidents to occur that may substitute for Pearl Harbour in terms of firing up American public opinion (the Bataan Death March is an obvious one). It just gives them a better chance at the sort of peace they set out to achieve then the historical strategy of massively enraging the US with Pearl Harbor and then overextend themselves trying to hold the entirety of West, Central, and South Pacific all in one go.
 

nbcman

Donor
Interesting divergence. In all Japanese history books (and every child knows that) the famous quote goes:
「是非私にやれと言われれば一年や一年半は存分に暴れて御覧にいれます」
"If you give me the order, I will be unstoppable and run amok for one year or one year and a half."
Highly google-able, and also the quote found on Japanese Wikipedia
Can't answer why there is such a divergence especially since I have seen the English version cited for decades. Surely one of the researchers who would have read the first hand source material would have picked up the difference. Regardless, the IJN only 'ran amok' for 6 months.
 
Can't answer why there is such a divergence especially since I have seen the English version cited for decades. Surely one of the researchers who would have read the first hand source material would have picked up the difference. Regardless, the IJN only 'ran amok' for 6 months.

Part of it is because he gave different timespans to different people: six months to some, a year to others, year-and-a-half to yet others. In the end, that the "six month" figure was the one that proved true was directly because of his ill considered plan at Midway, so we shouldn't give Yamamoto any sort great powers of prophecy.
 
That was the USN's expectation if they had to be ordered to do so but their planners and the plans warned against trying it for that exact reason. Now it's possibly that the political leadership might overrule the planners, but it wouldn't be the first time political considerations trumped sound military planning. The Japanese command, for a variety of reasons, didn't seem to have picked up on it. Finagling a PoD which makes the Japanese command less heeby-jeeby and thus be more receptive to it is theoretically possible but would have to go so far back that the butterflies might render the situation in the Pacific of 1941/42 unrecognizable.

Apologies. I was assuming the Japanese expectation was the fight off Taiwan. The US having given up on it by then. Yamamoto and Pearl Harbor was the thinking outside the square.

What was Japan expecting before Pearl Harbor was suggested?


Honestly I was just riffing off your earlier post about getting the USN drinking lead paint. I can't see any obvious ways for an ultimate Japanese victory.
 
Apologies. I was assuming the Japanese expectation was the fight off Taiwan. The US having given up on it by then. Yamamoto and Pearl Harbor was the thinking outside the square.

What was Japan expecting before Pearl Harbor was suggested?

I'm not sure, actually. I'm pretty well read on US war plans and the Japanese decision-making process that led to their embracement of the Pearl Harbour plan, but I'm less well briefed on the details of the alternative and earlier plans they developed for the Southern Strike push. I know they existed, undoubtedly, but the specifics of what they entailed I'm less clear on outside of some very broad generalizations. Maybe @BobTheBarbarian can offer some insight on this?

Honestly I was just riffing off your earlier post about getting the USN drinking lead paint. I can't see any obvious ways for an ultimate Japanese victory.

I think your confusing me with GDIS Pathos.
 
Part of it is because he gave different timespans to different people: six months to some, a year to others, year-and-a-half to yet others. In the end, that the "six month" figure was the one that proved true was directly because of his ill considered plan at Midway, so we shouldn't give Yamamoto any sort great powers of prophecy.

That was particularly true since peacetime USA published its shipbuilding schedule. It didn't take the gift of prophecy to realize one all those ships were built Japan wouldn't have a prayer. It had to move then and there or be plowed under by US ship production.
 
That was particularly true since peacetime USA published its shipbuilding schedule. It didn't take the gift of prophecy to realize one all those ships were built Japan wouldn't have a prayer. It had to move then and there or be plowed under by US ship production.

Yeah. The most Yamamoto could have ever plausibly claimed is "two years" and even that would be dubious. Still, his boondoggle at Midway meant Japan achieved less then she otherwise might have and made the inevitable defeat that much faster and harder.
 
Yeah. The most Yamamoto could have ever plausibly claimed is "two years" and even that would be dubious. Still, his boondoggle at Midway meant Japan achieved less then she otherwise might have and made the inevitable defeat that much faster and harder.

Midway is all on Yamamoto.

On the other hand, the Japanese had an incredible run of good cards up to that point. So maybe it balances out.
 
I'm not sure, actually. I'm pretty well read on US war plans and the Japanese decision-making process that led to their embracement of the Pearl Harbour plan, but I'm less well briefed on the details of the alternative and earlier plans they developed for the Southern Strike push. I know they existed, undoubtedly, but the specifics of what they entailed I'm less clear on outside of some very broad generalizations. Maybe @BobTheBarbarian can offer some insight on this?

The default alternative to the Pearl Harbor strike was a Tsushima-esque fleet battle ("Kantai Kessen") in the Philippine Sea, which had been the standard OPLAN in the event of war with the US since 1907. That year a Japanese think-tank hypothesized about the then-remote possibility of a conflict with the United States and outlined a "worst case" scenario that played out as follows:

1. Hostilities begin over the Philippines (triggered by opposing 'manifest destinies,' competing spheres of influence, economic considerations, etc.)
2. Japan occupies the Philippines. The USA's primary war aim is to take back the Philippines. (In later versions of this document, America's goal is the unconditional surrender of Japan via blockade and bombardment.)
3. The US Asiatic Fleet avoids battle and escapes to the East.
4. The US Navy combines its Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and regroups for a counteroffensive ("Thruster Plan")
5. The Japanese Fleet is detected early.
6. The US Navy concentrates its superior forces and destroys the Japanese fleet.
7. The USA retakes the Philippines and begins attacks on Japanese commercial shipping.

Admiral Tetsutaro Sato, the main author, pointed out that should the Japanese Navy have been defeated mainland Japan would be helpless and its people would quickly starve. Sato estimated that if Tokyo Bay were blockaded and all shipping lanes cut, 1907 Japan would be forced to capitulate in two months. Thus, the fate of Japan rested firmly in the hands of the Navy and the outcome of its surface duel with the USN. (A fleet in being strategy, while useful for deterring a blockade, wouldn't help Japan in this case since the latter's objective would be the preservation of conquered territory). The behavior of the US opponent was predicted based on observations of annual maneuvers in the Caribbean, various intelligence channels, past military experience, and analysis of the relative strengths of the two countries at the time. As it turned out, the findings of Sato and his colleagues were more or less in-line with the precursor to America's "War Plan Orange," then in development at the same time.

Admiral Sato later opposed the 5:5:3 USN-RN-IJN tonnage limit established at the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty on the grounds that it would hurt Japan's chances in the above scenario (Sato preferred a ratio of 2:3 Jap-US). This was where the Japanese Navy's plans for an "8-8" fleet (8 battleships and 8 battlecruisers) and "8-8-8" fleet (8 slow battleships, 8 fast battleships, 8 battlecruisers) came from.

220px-Sato_Tetsutaro.jpg

(Admiral Sato)

This basic outline hardly changed much throughout the 1920s and 30s, with some alterations to account for advances in technology. The last versions envisioned the US fleet being whittled down by nuisance attacks from destroyers, planes, and submarines on the way to the Philippines, shadowed the entire time by long range patrol aircraft (H6K Mavis). For their part, Yamamoto and his supporters argued that even with the IJN fighting in its own backyard, the effects of attrition from Japanese raids and the logistical burden of operating a fleet halfway around the world would not sufficiently weaken the Americans to guarantee a victory in the Kantai Kessen, which he used as another pitch to sell his Pearl Harbor attack. Bearing in mind Japan's superiority in carrier aviation and the fact that the USN rejected the "Thruster" plan as suicide years ago makes this argument seem dubious in hindsight, but the specter of a Japan denuded of its Naval shield so close to home and at the immediate mercy of the devastating blockade predicted by Sato surely had a strong impact on both military and civilian leaders, including Hirohito.

Source on pre-WWI Japanese-American planning: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2003_4.pdf
 
could have led to the Navy being arm twisted into making a very bad play.
I have a feeling you'd find Ernie King's arm hard to twist. That said, even giving the OK to Doolittle was pretty stupid...
not attacking the Philippines would have taken balls of steel on the part of the Japanese.
It would've been the smart approach. The thing is, if IJN had effectively handed over complete control of the military budget to IJA, it would've become effectively an IJA branch, which was just not on. IJN's proposal to attack the U.S. was based on a notion of inseparability of the U.S. & Britain, following the Atlantic ops, but was more a product of fear of becoming just such an IJA tool. That being true, a P.I. bypass was next to impossible.
What was Japan expecting before Pearl Harbor was suggested?
Actually, IJN planning was a remarkable flipside to Orange (tho IDK if it was directly informed by it): wait for the U.S. to charge across the Pacific, attacking for attrition along the way, then meet them in the "decisive battle zone" for a clash of battle lines.

Prewar exercises repeatedly showed that wouldn't have worked.

Needless to say, IJN planning did not change in the face of the evidence.:rolleyes:
 
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It would've been the smart approach. The thing is, if IJN had effectively handed over complete control of the military budget to IJA, it would've become effectively an IJA branch, which was just not on. IJN's proposal to attack the U.S. was based on a notion of inseparability of the U.S. & Britain, following the Atlantic ops, but was more a product of fear of becoming just such an IJA tool.
Especially since the joke that the enemy was the other branch was at times the literal truth in Japan.
 
Especially since the joke that the enemy was the other branch was at times the literal truth in Japan.
Could the Emperor not mediate in conflicts like these? A non-attack on the Philippines doesn't render the IJN useless. There's still the British and Dutch to fight.
 
I really get the impression that the IJA and IJN, while swearing fealty to the Emperor, really only paid lip service to him. The entire mess in China seems to prove it.
 
I really get the impression that the IJA and IJN, while swearing fealty to the Emperor, really only paid lip service to him. The entire mess in China seems to prove it.
IDK. What was the bio on Hirohito that came out not so long ago? (I'm drawing a blank.:oops::oops: ) It suggested Hirohito was okay with the China Adventure, right up to about the point the U.S. nuked Hiroshima.:eek::rolleyes:
 
IDK. What was the bio on Hirohito that came out not so long ago? (I'm drawing a blank.:oops::oops: ) It suggested Hirohito was okay with the China Adventure, right up to about the point the U.S. nuked Hiroshima.:eek::rolleyes:

That Hirohito was a powerless figurehead is a postwar myth propagated by the Japanese with MacArthur's help in order to shield him from accusations of war crimes.

In truth, Hirohito, as you said, shared the core convictions of the militarist faction (Gunbatsu) through the end of the war and gave his personal approval for various decisions made during it, including the use of chemical weapons in China, the surprise offensive against the Western Allies, and so on.
 
Given the vehement anti-communism amongst all the anti-Nazis groups with any shot at power, the last thing they'd do is try to throw in with Stalin.



Pretty much. Mind you, (A) isn't inconceivable like the others are. Although the Navy planners had clearly identified that a dash to base out of the Philippines would be suicidal, MacArthur had convinced the Army otherwise and it is possible that the Army screaming for help to Washington long and loud enough could have led to the Navy being arm twisted into making a very bad play. Even within the Navy, there were those who chafed at the restrictions against offensive operations and would have been willing to attempt something more ambitious if the opportunity arose. Additionally, if America had been forced to declare war on Japan, and Japan had then sat back and done nothing (beyond conquering the Dutch and British possessions along with a blockade of the Phillipines), America's pre-war plan - to retreat back across the ocean to safety - might have come off as ridiculous and cowardly. If the US Army remained sitting securely in the Philippines there would definitely have been great pressure to move the fleet forward to Manila and try to take the fight to Japan directly now, not in two or three years when the fleet was fully ready.

So the Navy planners definitely identified the course of action that could lead them to their doom, but they could have been overruled had events conspired against them. Of course, not attacking the Philippines would have taken balls of steel on the part of the Japanese. It would have been a very gutsy play for them to leave seemingly so obvious a dagger aimed at the throat of their shipping lanes. In fact America actually had very few means to actually attack those sea lanes in 1941, nor would it have been able to improve the situation much in 1942... but the Japanese didn't know that and weren't inclined to think in that manner (using the Phillipines and even the homeland as bait to lure in the enemy) in any event.

which one was the "retreat back across the ocean to safety.." plan?
 
Can't answer why there is such a divergence especially since I have seen the English version cited for decades. Surely one of the researchers who would have read the first hand source material would have picked up the difference. Regardless, the IJN only 'ran amok' for 6 months.

I didn't dispute the period of which Yamamoto actually "ran amok", but the more interesting aspect is how the Japanese version of history does not only just give prominence to a different quote, but that Japan indeed 'ran' the Pacific for that period of time - with the beginning of the end coming down to one single tactical mistake at Midway (and that mistake alone), namely the time consuming switch of loads on the planes between bombs and torpedoes. Details, never big picture.

Post-War Japan needed its victories and heroes. Yamamoto, a Harvard-educated aristocrat, with his opposition to war and the axis, was cut out to play that role in the post-war history education and popular culture. It may seem far-fetched to you, but most Japanese see Pearl Harbor not just as an evidence of Yamamoto's “military genius”, but also genuinely believe it was a defensive act and an attempt by Yamamoto to avoid war (!) These stories (including the one fatal switch) has also been popularised by numerous books and movies in the Showa era and later. Imagine the lessons taught and what it does to the volkgeist: Sometimes circumstances leave Japan without options. Attention to details win battles. There was also a biopic in 2011 in the same vein, which I will admit I have not seen.

Also, it is widely believed that he took full responsibility for the turn of the war (thus the modern Japanese think he took responsibility for an inevitability which Yamamoto himself had predicted and warned against) and committed suicide by flying an unarmed plane into an ambush. Yamamoto in his infinite wisdom supposedly knew the US Navy had cracked the IJN naval code - yet cabled his route to Tokyo, so he would die by his enemy's sword.

Of course, the Japanese people love this kind of stuff. Perhaps it's telling that the producers of the 2011 movie (Isoroku, a block buster obviously) said their movie was "needed" because that's the kind of leader contemporary Japan needed (this was the year of the tsunami) ...
 
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the beginning of the end coming down to one single tactical mistake at Midway (and that mistake alone), namely the time consuming switch of loads on the planes between bombs and torpedoes.
Nonsense, on two counts.

One, Japan only got a draw at Coral Sea, & it was a strategic defeat. The Moresby op was cancelled. (That it should never have gone ahead is another matter.)

Two, Midway failed on Yamamoto's singularly stupid dispositions, which denied Nagumo the cruiser VSs he needed to find Fletcher before Fletcher launched. Had they been with Nagumo & his CVs, & not 600mi away defending a flagship with the fleet commander afloat (where he should never have been), Nagumo would never have been caught by surprise.

Does that, perforce, mean he wins? IDK. Fletcher could recover to Midway & launch a 2d or 3d strike from there, even if he lost all his CVs, an option Nagumo didn't have.

In short, it looks like Fletcher might get a draw tactically, maybe even a defeat, but a strategic win.

Open question if it means Fletcher gets beached for it, assuming he doesn't drown.
 
Nonsense, on two counts.

One, Japan only got a draw at Coral Sea, & it was a strategic defeat. The Moresby op was cancelled. (That it should never have gone ahead is another matter.)

The Morseby operation was postponed, then cancelled after Midway. Coral Sea delayed matters, but it was Midway that saved Port Moresby from invasion.

Two, Midway failed on Yamamoto's singularly stupid dispositions, which denied Nagumo the cruiser VSs he needed to find Fletcher before Fletcher launched. Had they been with Nagumo & his CVs, & not 600mi away defending a flagship with the fleet commander afloat (where he should never have been), Nagumo would never have been caught by surprise.

Yamamoto never expected Nagumo to "find Fletcher before Fletcher launched". He expected him, in the event of a US carrier ambush, to attack US carriers with his reserve wave of 105 aircraft, then ride out the US attack. Nagumo not only somehow managed not to be able to do that, he completely screwed it up and managed to get hit with carriers jam packed with armed aircraft.

Yamamoto's biggest mistake was that you can't fix stupid - he needed to get Nagumo out of 1st Air Fleet after Hawaii.

Fletcher could recover to Midway & launch a 2d or 3d strike from there, even if he lost all his CVs, an option Nagumo didn't have.

Fletcher had no such option - US aircraft would return to the US carriers and if these had been knocked out, they would ditch because Midway was too far, just like Leslie and a number of other Yorktown brood did. Midway also did not have the facilities after being attacked to prep large numbers of aircraft in a timely fashion.

In short, it looks like Fletcher might get a draw tactically, maybe even a defeat, but a strategic win.

The best case for the USN was 4-0 plus a few other warships. The worst case scenario for the USN was three carriers sunk for about 2-3 IJN carriers damaged but not sunk. So, even with Yamamoto's lousy plan, the USN strategic defeat card was in the deck, just not as many cards in the deck as there were for IJN strategic defeat.

Open question if it means Fletcher gets beached for it, assuming he doesn't drown.

Nimitz's prebattle interrogation of Fletcher suggests that he might have even been benched for Coral Sea had Nimitz not liked his answers to various questions. Had Fletcher lost at Midway, he was done as a carrier admiral (assuming he was still alive).
 
The Morseby operation was postponed, then cancelled after Midway. Coral Sea delayed matters, but it was Midway that saved Port Moresby from invasion.
Either way, Coral Sea isn't a win for Japan strategically.
Yamamoto never expected Nagumo to "find Fletcher before Fletcher launched". He expected him, in the event of a US carrier ambush, to attack US carriers with his reserve wave of 105 aircraft, then ride out the US attack. Nagumo not only somehow managed not to be able to do that, he completely screwed it up and managed to get hit with carriers jam packed with armed aircraft.
Except Nagumo's orders put reducing Midway #1, not sinking any U.S. CVs, expected or not. And the fact is, it didn't matter, because Nagumo was screwed once Fletcher (or Spruance, in the event) did launch. I maintain the only chance Nagumo had was to hit first.
Yamamoto's biggest mistake was that you can't fix stupid - he needed to get Nagumo out of 1st Air Fleet after Hawaii.
I won't disagree, but Yamamoto needed to look in a mirror, too: he should never have been afloat, & his BBs should not have been so damn far back their CCs couldn't provide aid to Nagumo. If it had been up to me (& this is contrary to IJN practise, AIUI), Yamato and the Mogamis would have led the attack, shelling Midway to destruction, acting as bait for Midway & Fletcher.
Fletcher had no such option - US aircraft would return to the US carriers and if these had been knocked out, they would ditch because Midway was too far, just like Leslie and a number of other Yorktown brood did. Midway also did not have the facilities after being attacked to prep large numbers of aircraft in a timely fashion.
No option to reach Midway after attacking? That I didn't know.:oops: (And unable to support any attack should have crossed my mind.:oops::oops::oops: )
The best case for the USN was 4-0 plus a few other warships. The worst case scenario for the USN was three carriers sunk for about 2-3 IJN carriers damaged but not sunk. So, even with Yamamoto's lousy plan, the USN strategic defeat card was in the deck, just not as many cards in the deck as there were for IJN strategic defeat.
IDK if I'd call it a defeat, if Midway didn't fall (& it wouldn't). IJN couldn't replace her losses whatever happened. That said, maybe I'm trying to hard to give Nimitz a win.:oops:
Nimitz's prebattle interrogation of Fletcher suggests that he might have even been benched for Coral Sea had Nimitz not liked his answers to various questions. Had Fletcher lost at Midway, he was done as a carrier admiral (assuming he was still alive).
If it had been up to me, he would've been. Not a fan.
 
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