AHC: Make either the Annapolis Conference or the Kerry Plan actually succeed

TinyTartar

Banned
The intractable status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is something I think is overstated.

In 2007, the Annapolis Peace Conference actually came a lot closer to peace than most people thought it had any chance to. What derailed it is difficult to say, but Olmert's legal troubles did not help at all. Bush and Rice apparently came into it a lot more prepared than most thought they would, and seemingly got on better with both sides than Clinton was able to at Camp David. Despite the scoffing before its onset by most experts on the conflict, there might have been room for a comprehensive peace plan to come forth.

The Kerry Plan, again, scoffed at by most experts, apparently came a lot closer to peace than most people expected. Netanyahu, usually not open to negotiation, was pissed off at his coalition and maybe out of spite was willing to make concessions he normally never would. It was the unity government that eventually scuttled the talks, but by that point, things had already gone downhill over the issue of prisoner releases that even members of Meretz winced at.

Basically, as doom and gloom as we like to see this issue, is there any way in your opinion that either of these attempts at solving the conflict could have resulted in a Palestinian state? What would have needed to happen?
 
The intractable status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is something I think is overstated.

In 2007, the Annapolis Peace Conference actually came a lot closer to peace than most people thought it had any chance to. What derailed it is difficult to say, but Olmert's legal troubles did not help at all. Bush and Rice apparently came into it a lot more prepared than most thought they would, and seemingly got on better with both sides than Clinton was able to at Camp David. Despite the scoffing before its onset by most experts on the conflict, there might have been room for a comprehensive peace plan to come forth.

The Kerry Plan, again, scoffed at by most experts, apparently came a lot closer to peace than most people expected. Netanyahu, usually not open to negotiation, was pissed off at his coalition and maybe out of spite was willing to make concessions he normally never would. It was the unity government that eventually scuttled the talks, but by that point, things had already gone downhill over the issue of prisoner releases that even members of Meretz winced at.

Basically, as doom and gloom as we like to see this issue, is there any way in your opinion that either of these attempts at solving the conflict could have resulted in a Palestinian state? What would have needed to happen?

One of the biggest recurring problem with Israel and the Palestinians is that the major concessions and promising final status talks have tended to come when the leadership on either side is weakest - both Olmert in 2007 and Barak in 2000 - when into negotiations as last-ditch efforts to save already-failing premierships. Meanwhile, Arafat's influence was at a low point in 2000 and Abbas in 2007 was reeling from the Hamas takeover of Gaza. Neither really had the political strength to carry out a deal.

Having said that, I've wondered if an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement might have been a legacy of a Kerry Administration, had he won in '04. As Kerry has shown as Secretary of State (and as a senator with things like the climate bill negotiations), he's quite happy to somewhat messianically pursue longshot endeavors. And the constellation of events may have been different. Under a Kerry Administration, there's likely to be less of a push for Palestinian elections in '06, meaning no Hamas win. There's likely to be earlier efforts to broker a ceasefire in the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2006 (whose stalemate politically ruined Olmert). You're also going to have an Administration that is extremely invested in peace negotiations (given Kerry's own interests).

Under those circumstances, you may well have a more politically powerful Olmert, a more politically powerful Abbas, no Hamas win in '06 and no Hamas takeover of Gaza, making it *just* plausible that something might be agreed to around '07.
 

TinyTartar

Banned
Keep in mind that for this, you could find a way for Annapolis to lead to a better Kerry Negotiations.
 
Maybe instead of big, grand, overall plans, maybe the ping pong method of diplomacy? I do this, you do that, we get the momentum going, etc.

And if something derails it, view it more as a pause and try and get it going again.
 
. . . As Kerry has shown as Secretary of State (and as a senator with things like the climate bill negotiations), he's quite happy to somewhat messianically pursue longshot endeavors. . .
We can work with that!

For example, if I were president ;-) I'd keep a rolodex of retired Senators, and ask them to go to various troublespots and see if they could swing a deal.

Now, you have probably heard that in a negotiation the party who cares more typically loses. So, the method of undertrying. The method of zenning and just checking if something might be there.

So, I send retired Senators to 30 troublespots, and maybe we only get two agreements, but those two agreements are well worth it. We don't invest a lot in it. I don't build up a lot of hope. We just check if an agreement might be there.

And this is all in my first year! :)
 

TinyTartar

Banned
Maybe instead of big, grand, overall plans, maybe the ping pong method of diplomacy? I do this, you do that, we get the momentum going, etc.

And if something derails it, view it more as a pause and try and get it going again.

The Kerry talks were more of this; Annapolis was more of a gathering regarding trying to make concrete efforts towards the Road Map for Peace, which by that point, was moribund.

The problem with the ping pong idea is that at any point, the ping ponging stops.

To keep it going, Israel had to release prisoners that Bibi didn't want to release, his coalition was mutinous over releasing, and even the opposition Zionist Union party was against releasing. This got delayed several times and ultimatums ended up killing the talks when the prisoners were not released on time. These were truly awful dudes, and Israel wanted something concrete in return. What they got in return was the unity government of Hamas and Fatah. This ended the talks. Had Hamas and Fatah not gone through with unity government, talks would have continued, but there is no way to know how they would have ended.

What I think was needed was for the framework of the talks to accomplish major positions of agreement for future talks. Refugees being brought up is a death knell, so why not first come to a comprehensive security and water agreement, which is easiest of the 6 major issues?

If they get done with security and water, and they very well could get these done with, you move next to borders and Jerusalem. This should be hard, but not impossible. Israel is going to want to keep Gush Etzion no matter who is in power, and they are probably willing to give away some Arab areas in the north. 1967 borders will be the framework for anything that has a chance at success, even Netanyahu acknowledges this; the wall is not seen as permanent by anyone (even the settlers oppose it, although for different reasons).

As for Jerusalem, Israel is not going to give away a Jewish area, no matter what. They MIGHT be willing to give away some eastern Arab suburbs. This is the first true talk killing obstacle, as Arafat made it clear that any Palestinian leader who gives away most of East Jerusalem will not be alive for long. Al-Aqsa is a concession I think Israel would make, provided the Jordanians stay involved.

If they somehow get through Jerusalem, you have only settlements and refugees left. It is my view that neither are possible to get through without a major reorganization of power in both sides. Israel found it traumatic to remove even the small amount of Gaza settlers; it is a nation that might find it impossible to remove most of the West Bank settlers; mutinies in the army are a huge risk, and the leader who signs off on this might find himself dead soon like Rabin. As for refugees, I don't see how this is possibly resolved. Financial compensation is easy to get through, but right of return is damn near impossible.

However, if they get 4 of the 6 done, they can make any future talks a lot easier.
 
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