AHC: Make Britain industrially stronger before ww2 and less dependent on Lend Lease during ww2

[Magnum]

Have them do better in the war, and the need for LL will be far lower.

Here's a draft, that still allows France to fall:

April 1940: German invasion of Norway fails; Kriegsmarine gutted

Spoiler: How to do this?

Germany had a lot of luck in their invasion, and it could have gone much, much worse. To name just a couple of things:

1. The sudden onset of fog and bad weather that helped the Germans evade British ships
2. The very slow Norwegian (and British) response, despite actually capturing German soldiers beforehand who confirmed it was an invasion
3. The sighting of Gruppe 2 apparently heading west (it was actually circling), which tricked the British to change course and miss them completely AND disembarking the troops meant to have gone Norway as part of Plan R4
4. The idiotic partial mobilization done by freaking post

This was the German invasion:
Gebirgsjäger troops commanded by General Eduard Dietl to Narvik[21]

• Gruppe 2: The heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers to Trondheim

1 & 2 travelled together for a time, escorted by Scharnhorst & Gneisenau

• Gruppe 3: The light cruisers Köln and Königsberg, with several smaller support vessels to Bergen
• Gruppe 4: The light cruiser Karlsruhe and several smaller support vessels to Kristiansand
• Gruppe 5: The heavy cruisers Blücher and Lützow, the light cruiser Emden and several smaller support vessels to Oslo
• Gruppe 6: Four minesweepers to Egersund

Also para landings at Oslo, Kristiansand and Stavanger.

How they could have been beaten:

possible POD - there is no sudden onset of bad weather, allied aircraft spot the first wave of German ships. Butterfly - Norwegian parliament issues order for complete mobilization around noon on April 8th, after information from interrogating German soldiers captured after the sinking of the German transport Rio de Janeiro and after the reports of aerial reconnaissance

Gruppe 1 & Gruppe 2 are intercepted by HMS Renown and her destroyer escorts (which were right there north of them, on the very position these would have gone past to reach their destination). OTL, Renown left her position to investigate what happened to the destroyer Glowworm. ITTL, she stays put, engages the Germans and delays them long enough for the main fleet, which was coming up from the south, to arrive. ITTL, there is no freak mis-identification of German intentions, and the fleet heads northeast as intended, catches up to Renown, and sinks most, if not all, of the German force

Gruppe 3 arrives at Bergen on April 9th, light cruiser Konigsberg damaged by coastal artillery (OTL). Germans capture fortifications, but fighting in the town still continues against freshly-mobilized Norwegian forces. Hours later, British ships carrying out plan R4 arrive at Bergen, sinking the crippled Konigsberg and the cruiser Koln. They unload their troops and after a few days of fighting defeat the remaining Germans on land.

Gruppe 4 attacks Kristiansand, loses cruiser Karlsruhe to coastal artillery (almost happened OTL). Remaining light ships disembark troops, and together with paras take the town.

Gruppe 5 heads towars Oslo, tries to take Oscarsborg fortress by surprise. However, its them that get taken by surprise, and the Blucher gets crippled by the old coastal guns and sunk by torpedoes (OTL). The coastal guns also score 3 hits on Lutzow's stern (OTL), which detonate a magazine chamber, also sinking the ship (ITTL). The loss of the two heavy cruisers means more than half of the soldiers embarked for the capture of Oslo are now gone. Remaining German ships believe Lutzow was sunk by a minefield instead of torpedo (OTL), and land their troops much further south (OTL).

German paras land at Oslo, but are heavily outnumbered by the freshly-mobilized Norwegian formations defending the city.

Gruppe 6 arrives at Egersund only to find the Norwegians mobilized. The Norwegian torpedo boat Skarv is not caught napping, and sinks the leading 2 minesweepers. The other two, who were delayed (OTL), head to Kristiansand instead.

Absent reports that there's a large invasion force at Egersund, Norwegian infantry don't retreat from Sola airbase, denying its use to the Luftwaffe and eventually defeating the 132 Fallschirmjaeger landed there.

By now, a large part of the German Kriegsmarine has been sunk, surprise has been lost, the only port captured is Kristiansand and the Oslo landing force is stranded south of the city. It's highly likely Hitler would order a retreat at this point.

[with Norway (and its huge fishing fleet) in Allied hands, the food situation will be much improved; with the surface Kriegsmarine destroyed, irrational fears of an impending Sealion (and the connected mismanagement of resources) are avoided]

May-June 1940: France falls; Second BEF is not sent and wasted

July 1940: French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir convinced to join the Allied cause

September - October 1940: Battle of Britain victory

November 1940: 4 Allied carriers sink all of Italy's BBs

Spoiler: which 4 carriers?

1. HMS Glorious, not sunk off Norway
2. HMS Illustrious (OTL)
3. HMS Eagle (no damage to fuel system)
4. French carrier Bearn

December 1940: Op. Compass - victory in Egypt and Cyrenaica

January - March 1941: German deployment to Libya delayed by increased Allied naval superiority

March 1941: no deployment of British troops to Greece

April-July 1941: western Libya conquered; Germany invades the USSR

December 1941: Japanese invasion of Malaya defeated thanks to available reinforcements in north Africa; Germans stopped at Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov

January-February 1942: Japanese-Thai invasion of Burma repulsed

March-May 1942: Java & Sumatra defended from the Japanese; renewed German offensive towards the Caucasus

June 1942: Japan runs out of oil

July 1942: Peace with Japan negotiated

September 1942: French North Africa occupied; German forces bogged down in Stalingrad

November - December 1942: Sicily occupied; end of German advance

January 1943: Sardinia & Corsica occupied; German forces trapped at Stalingrad

February 1943: Mussolini arrested, Italy join the Allies, Germans unable to intervene; Allied troops land in N. Italy, help secure fortified Alpine passes

(with bases in northern Italy, Allied short-ranged fighters will be able to challenge - and decimate - the Luftwaffe over southern Germany)

May-June 1943: German summer offensive defeated at Kursk

July 1943: Allied landing in northern France

September 1943: German front collapses in the west; Paris liberated

October 1943: Hitler assassinated, Germany obtains negotiated surrender

 

[Thomas1195]

I'm not sure where you are getting your information - British non-motorways in the 1930s were not all that bad.

http://britainforward.org/Unemployment Lloyd George.pdf

Read this carefully

 

[Aber]

http://britainforward.org/Unemployment Lloyd George.pdf

Read this carefully

That is a paper in favour of improved trunk roads, not motorways

The new roads should be highways, not speedways.

 

[Some Bloke]

You need to make Lloyd George win the 1929 election, or create a Lib-Lab coalition where Lloyd George replaces Snowden as Chancellor

A formal coalition would give MacDonald's government a working majority and butterfly away his resignation attempt in 1931 which led to an election
and the creation of the First National government. However, I suspect there would still be problems and you would have a majority Tory government in 1934
when the elections are due. Question is, what reforms and modernisations etc can be implemented in the 5 years of a Lib/Lab coalition?

 

[Thomas1195]

A formal coalition would give MacDonald's government a working majority and butterfly away his resignation attempt in 1931 which led to an election
and the creation of the First National government. However, I suspect there would still be problems and you would have a majority Tory government in 1934
when the elections are due. Question is, what reforms and modernisations etc can be implemented in the 5 years of a Lib/Lab coalition?

They would implement the proposal I mentioned under Keynes' advice, a New Deal, if the Chancellor position was held by a Liberal, by that time mostly interventionist.

 

[Thomas1195]

That is a paper in favour of improved trunk roads, not motorways

A trunk road, trunk highway, or strategic road is a major road, usually connecting two or more cities, ports, airports and other places, which is the recommended route for long-distance and freight traffic. Many trunk roads have segregated lanes in a dual carriageway, or are of motorway standard.
(wiki)

Of course they are motorways!!!

Not to mention bridges

 

[Thomas1195]

there is no sudden onset of bad weather,

This is unavoidable

 

[Aber]

A trunk road, trunk highway, or strategic road is a major road, usually connecting two or more cities, ports, airports and other places, which is the recommended route for long-distance and freight traffic. Many trunk roads have segregated lanes in a dual carriageway, or are of motorway standard.
(wiki)

Of course they are motorways!!!

Not to mention bridges

Trunk Roads in the UK has a specific meaning relating to long-established roads; most UK motorways were new build, not along existing roads.

 

[Perkeo]

Going to 29 its far too easy, you just need to fight before Germany is rearmed any date before 37 and the French will simply walk in, may I suggest the remilitarization of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 as a good date.

Too early, they don't have a case against the Nazis.

The "They broke the TOV"-solution won't work since part V of the ToV begins with:
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
Therefore, if Hitler can plausibly deny the validity of all military clauses if no such general limitation is initiated. That is AFAIK precisely the pretext that he used.

OTOH the remilitarization of the Rhineland is an excellent wake-up call to start preparations - and to be ready for war in the Sudeten crisis.

 

[Panica]

Gold, how about establishing imperial preference with pound sterling as common currency. This would give you huge economic boost. HM Government could sell lands in colonies to increase revenue source.

 

[Thomas1195]

Too early, they don't have a case against the Nazis.

The "They broke the TOV"-solution won't work since part V of the ToV begins with:
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
Therefore, if Hitler can plausibly deny the validity of all military clauses if no such general limitation is initiated. That is AFAIK precisely the pretext that he used.

OTOH the remilitarization of the Rhineland is an excellent wake-up call to start preparations - and to be ready for war in the Sudeten crisis.

Or just fight over the Rhineland is more than enough.

 

[Thomas1195]

A formal coalition would give MacDonald's government a working majority and butterfly away his resignation attempt in 1931 which led to an election
and the creation of the First National government. However, I suspect there would still be problems and you would have a majority Tory government in 1934
when the elections are due. Question is, what reforms and modernisations etc can be implemented in the 5 years of a Lib/Lab coalition?

Well, not only a large New Deal, but also a National Investment Board to facilitate investments in domestic industries.

 

[Dupplin Muir]

Surely the title of this thread should actually be 'Was Britain Dependent on Lend-Lease in WWII'. I'd argue that the positive effects of LL on the British economy was tiny - certainly less than 1%. I think you can always tell when someone has an agenda because they immediately focus on dollar values rather than looking at the actual amount of stuff involved. This is extremely misleading because American products were phenomenally expensive by British standards, which warps consideration of the true balance between Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease.

As a hypothetical case, suppose that Britain supplied the US with a thousand Spitfires in 1942, and the US supplied Britain with a thousand Mustangs in 1943. In real terms these are exactly equivalent, yet an American could point and say "Look...the US supplied $55,000,000 worth of goods, whereas the British only supplied $22,000,000 worth!" It's similar across the board. A Sherman cost twice as much as a Cromwell, and a South Dakota cost three times as much as a KGV. This is why the British, when considering the value of LL, did not use the standard exchange-rate of $4:£1, but instead used $10:£1. Thus the practical value of LL was £3.1 billion, and the value of RLL was £2.5 billion. This certainly puts a different complexion on LL, but even these figures are somewhat misleading. Oil from British (and British-controlled) refineries in Trinidad and Aruba was shipped via the US to take advantage of LL, and this is included as 'supplied by the US' even though the oil actually belonged to the UK. I don't know if the same was done with Canadian bauxite, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Secondly, the figures for RLL do not include the licence-fees on British technology manufactured in the US, which were waived during the war. For example, Packard made 55,000 Merlins, and the licence-fee would have been $6000 per engine for a total of $330,000,000 or £82,500,000. When you remember that the US also produced gyro-gunsights, proximity-fuses, cavity magnetrons, LST's, etc, I imagine that the total would be at least £400 million. In summary, LL and RLL were more-or-less equal in practical terms and without LL Britain would have been able to redirect resources used for RLL to increase production enough to compensate, or would be able to buy anything they couldn't be bothered to make for themselves.

Basically, WWII should not have been an existential crisis for the UK, and it was foolish of the British government to act as if it was, since this led to some really bad decisions that seriously damaged the country's future. It would have been ridiculously easy for Britain to stalemate Germany and to keep this up for as long as necessary. Britain had unassailable naval superiority, and easily out-built Germany in terms of aircraft, especially when you recall that the British built lots of four-engined bombers whereas Germany mostly built single-engined fighters. The Luftwaffe had suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Britain and any attempt to launch BoB MkII in 1941 would have led to an absolute massacre of German aircraft. At sea, the U-Boats had been defeated by the second half of 1941, and it was only the entry of the US into the war that gave them their second 'Happy Time'. On land, the only place Germany could get to grips with Britain was in North Africa, and they couldn't support sufficient forces there to pose any kind of serious threat. By contrast, Germany was living on borrowed time. Its economy was dependent on supplies from Russia and it has been convincingly suggested that Stalin was only waiting for the summer of 1941 to pass before switching off Germany's life-support machine. So either the German economy collapses or they attack the USSR, which gives Britain an ally and allows them to consider offensive operations. Naturally, without LL there would be no pressure on Britain to join the US oil embargo against Japan which means no war in the Far East, thus converting an enemy into an asset, since the UK could trade oil, rubber, etc for Japanese-built merchant ships, escorts and maritime-patrol aircraft.

 

[naraic]

Secondly, the figures for RLL do not include the licence-fees on British technology manufactured in the US, which were waived during the war. For example, Packard made 55,000 Merlins, and the licence-fee would have been $6000 per engine for a total of $330,000,000 or £82,500,000. When you remember that the US also produced gyro-gunsights, proximity-fuses, cavity magnetrons, LST's, etc, I imagine that the total would be at least £400 million. In summary, LL and RLL were more-or-less equal in practical terms and without LL Britain would have been able to redirect resources used for RLL to increase production enough to compensate, or would be able to buy anything they couldn't be bothered to make for themselves.

Have you a source for that license fee? I would have assumed maybe a third or a quarter per engine.

 

[Thomas1195]

Surely the title of this thread should actually be 'Was Britain Dependent on Lend-Lease in WWII'. I'd argue that the positive effects of LL on the British economy was tiny - certainly less than 1%. I think you can always tell when someone has an agenda because they immediately focus on dollar values rather than looking at the actual amount of stuff involved. This is extremely misleading because American products were phenomenally expensive by British standards, which warps consideration of the true balance between Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease.

As a hypothetical case, suppose that Britain supplied the US with a thousand Spitfires in 1942, and the US supplied Britain with a thousand Mustangs in 1943. In real terms these are exactly equivalent, yet an American could point and say "Look...the US supplied $55,000,000 worth of goods, whereas the British only supplied $22,000,000 worth!" It's similar across the board. A Sherman cost twice as much as a Cromwell, and a South Dakota cost three times as much as a KGV. This is why the British, when considering the value of LL, did not use the standard exchange-rate of $4:£1, but instead used $10:£1. Thus the practical value of LL was £3.1 billion, and the value of RLL was £2.5 billion. This certainly puts a different complexion on LL, but even these figures are somewhat misleading. Oil from British (and British-controlled) refineries in Trinidad and Aruba was shipped via the US to take advantage of LL, and this is included as 'supplied by the US' even though the oil actually belonged to the UK. I don't know if the same was done with Canadian bauxite, but it wouldn't surprise me.

Secondly, the figures for RLL do not include the licence-fees on British technology manufactured in the US, which were waived during the war. For example, Packard made 55,000 Merlins, and the licence-fee would have been $6000 per engine for a total of $330,000,000 or £82,500,000. When you remember that the US also produced gyro-gunsights, proximity-fuses, cavity magnetrons, LST's, etc, I imagine that the total would be at least £400 million. In summary, LL and RLL were more-or-less equal in practical terms and without LL Britain would have been able to redirect resources used for RLL to increase production enough to compensate, or would be able to buy anything they couldn't be bothered to make for themselves.

Basically, WWII should not have been an existential crisis for the UK, and it was foolish of the British government to act as if it was, since this led to some really bad decisions that seriously damaged the country's future. It would have been ridiculously easy for Britain to stalemate Germany and to keep this up for as long as necessary. Britain had unassailable naval superiority, and easily out-built Germany in terms of aircraft, especially when you recall that the British built lots of four-engined bombers whereas Germany mostly built single-engined fighters. The Luftwaffe had suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Britain and any attempt to launch BoB MkII in 1941 would have led to an absolute massacre of German aircraft. At sea, the U-Boats had been defeated by the second half of 1941, and it was only the entry of the US into the war that gave them their second 'Happy Time'. On land, the only place Germany could get to grips with Britain was in North Africa, and they couldn't support sufficient forces there to pose any kind of serious threat. By contrast, Germany was living on borrowed time. Its economy was dependent on supplies from Russia and it has been convincingly suggested that Stalin was only waiting for the summer of 1941 to pass before switching off Germany's life-support machine. So either the German economy collapses or they attack the USSR, which gives Britain an ally and allows them to consider offensive operations. Naturally, without LL there would be no pressure on Britain to join the US oil embargo against Japan which means no war in the Far East, thus converting an enemy into an asset, since the UK could trade oil, rubber, etc for Japanese-built merchant ships, escorts and maritime-patrol aircraft.

No, you forgot that the Brits imported lots of steel and machine tools, which were capital goods required for virtually every war industry (Britain could not produce sufficient steel and machine tools for itself; not to mention American machine tools were the best in the world at that time).

They were also dependent on LL for oil and high-performance fuel.

With the exception of food, British dependence on LL was clearly higher than Soviet, despite the latter losing a big chunk of their industrial regions.

Without LL, British inferior industrial engineering would not allow for the mass production of the technology you mentioned.

 

[Aber]

No, you forgot that the Brits imported lots of steel and machine tools, which were capital goods required for virtually every war industry (Britain could not produce sufficient steel and machine tools for itself; not to mention American machine tools were the best in the world at that time).

Are you sure about steel - my understanding that steel was imported because finished steel used less shipping capacity than importing iron ore?

 

[Thomas1195]

Are you sure about steel - my understanding that steel was imported because finished steel used less shipping capacity than importing iron ore?

Even take this into account, British output was insufficient, as it was not even enough to meet peacetime demand. Note that Britain was a net importer of steel by 1913.

 

[hipper]

No, you forgot that the Brits imported lots of steel and machine tools, which were capital goods required for virtually every war industry (Britain could not produce sufficient steel and machine tools for itself; not to mention American machine tools were the best in the world at that time).

They were also dependent on LL for oil and high-performance fuel.

With the exception of food, British dependence on LL was clearly higher than Soviet, despite the latter losing a big chunk of their industrial regions.

Without LL, British inferior industrial engineering would not allow for the mass production of the technology you mentioned.

everything you posted is misleading

Britain could produce machine tools at the rate of 100,000 per year in 1942 which is 2 1/2 times the size of the Pre war american machine tool industry. Imports of American machine tools increased the rate of rearmament

Shell produced 100 octane fuel in 1940 in the UK and by 1944 was producing enough 150 octane fuel to run the fighter squadrons of the 8th Air Force.

America had concentrated its mass production on 100 octane fuel and was unable to produce 150 octane fuel by the end of the war (penalty of mass production vs sheds).

imports of foreign steel to the UK ceased with the introduction of tariffs in the 1930's so it was indeed sufficient to meet domestic demand. The production of Armoured Steel was insufficient to meet the demand of rearmament in the late 1930's but that was the same for every other country in the world.

regards

Hipper

 

[Thomas1195]

imports of foreign steel to the UK ceased with the introduction of tariffs in the 1930's so it was indeed sufficient to meet domestic demand. The production of Armoured Steel was insufficient to meet the demand of rearmament in the late 1930's but that was the same for every other country in the world

Well, one thing was that Britain, unlike the US and Sweden, was dominated by parties that were unwilling to implement large-scale public works to improve infrastructures and industrial capacity. Keynes' National Development plans, which aim to systemically develop roads, bridges, rails, telephone systems, agriculture, as well as speeding up CEB works and forming National Investment Board, were never realized. These programmes would demand a huge quantity of steel and machinery. IOTL, except for CEB, most of these infrastructures were developed in a peacemeal way. Someone might argue that these programs might worsen confidence in financial markets if implemented in 1929-1930, but the Liberals actually wanted to implement such progrmas as early as 1924 or even 1921.

 

[Thomas1195]

Actually, a whole-hearted Saarland Offensive scenario would have easily butterfly away Lend Lease.

However, I originally aimed to focus more on exploring which alternatives could have been done to make British industry stronger during the interwar period and on the eve of the Second World War.