AHC: Major Ship of The Line battle...On Lake Ontario

TFSmith121

Banned
If the conflict lasts well into 1815, presumably

Ya which is why in OTL it all came to nothing. Indeed by 1818 both sides had committed to completely demilitarizing the Great Lakes. But you had to wonder that if the war had dragged on another year and both sides had multiple battleships and a handful of frigates each, that one or the other side wouldn't be willing to just sit in port and glare at the enemy from across the lake.

If Ghent is never signed I could see the US gaining back the initiative after the British invasions at the Chesapeake and New Orleans are repelled. In this situation another attack on York and then Kingston seems the logical step and that would necessitate engaging the British fleet on Lake Ontario. If the US could seize control of Kingston and Lake Ontario then they would have a dominant position and Montreal would now be extremely vulnerable.

If the conflict lasts well into 1815, presumably the Americans take advantage of Napoleon's resumption of power and the expected British focus on Europe.

Sometime that year, based simply on what was under construction, the US would end up with two ships of the line, three large frigates, and a half-dozen smaller corvettes, sloops, and brigs, plus the expected small craft; the British would end up with 1-3 ships of the line, 1-3 frigates, a half-dozen smaller vessels - manning for all of which would be difficult. The British flag officer would be Edward Owen (Yeo was being relieved because of his conflicts with Prevost); the Americans could, presumably, have chosen between Chauncey, MacDonough, or Perry.

There's also the minor issue that the Americans were already building steam warships by 1815, and, in fact, the first steamer on the Lakes was built at Oswego in 1816.

The point being in all of the above is that whatever the British might do on the Lakes (Ontario or any other) in 1815 presumably is going to be countered by the Americans, or even - in the case of steamers - perhaps surmounted. The time, distance, and resource equation in a conflict in North America is all in the US favor, certainly on Champlain, Ontario, Erie, and points west.

Best,
 
The point being in all of the above is that whatever the British might do on the Lakes (Ontario or any other) in 1815 presumably is going to be countered by the Americans, or even - in the case of steamers - perhaps surmounted. The time, distance, and resource equation in a conflict in North America is all in the US favor, certainly on Champlain, Ontario, Erie, and points west.

Really? So where's the money for all this going to come from? As of the end of 1814 the US economy was FUBAR and getting worse, because in the key theatre of US coastal waters the RN was utterly dominant. True the outcome of the various raids launched against coastal settlements was variable, but the US was utterly incapable of preventing said raids.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Same place it came from in terms of defeating the British

Really? So where's the money for all this going to come from? As of the end of 1814 the US economy was FUBAR and getting worse, because in the key theatre of US coastal waters the RN was utterly dominant. True the outcome of the various raids launched against coastal settlements was variable, but the US was utterly incapable of preventing said raids.

Same place it came from in terms of defeating the British at Lake Erie in 1813, the Thames in 1813, Lake Champlain/Plattsburgh in 1814, Hampstead Hill/North Point/Fort McHenry/Ferry Branch in 1814, and New Orleans in 1815, presumably...

For an economy that was supposedly "FUBAR" in 1814 (as yet undemonstrated, of course), the US actually won more battles, and more decisively, than they had in 1812-13... interesting, that.;)

There's also the minor point that however "dominant" the RN was in US coastal waters in 1814 (again, undemonstrated) there's also the undeniable reality that once Napoleon and his merry hommes are in Paris in 1815, the British have (yet again) more important things to worry about that are much closer to home than the sunny shores of Lake Ontario.

Best,
 
For an economy that was supposedly "FUBAR" in 1814 (as yet undemonstrated, of course)

US imports fell by almost 85% by tonnage between 1812 and 1814, and by almost 95% by value between 1811 and 1814. For a country that got 90% of government revenue from customs duties, that was catastrophic. It was insolvent, defaulting on the national debt, and suffering rampant inflation. The country was bankrupt. This is all in late 1814, and largely triggered by Cochrane's tightening of the blockade in the summer of that year. If the war had continued through 1815 then the results would have been catastrophic for the US.

There's also the minor point that however "dominant" the RN was in US coastal waters in 1814 (again, undemonstrated)

Really? Seizing control of coastal Maine, burning down the White House, bombarding Baltimore, crippling US trade as mentioned above, and landing raiding parties along the US coast wherever and whenever the local British commander pleased, all without the slightest hint of resistance from the US Navy demonstrates the RN's dominance very clearly.

there's also the undeniable reality that once Napoleon and his merry hommes are in Paris in 1815, the British have (yet again) more important things to worry about that are much closer to home than the sunny shores of Lake Ontario.

The UK always had more important things to worry about, all the way through the war, hence the minimal effort applied to it. Even after the French war ended in April 1814, the political situation in Europe (what was the Tsar doing with his 250k men, what was going to happen to Antwerp, what was the end result of the bickering in Vienna going to be) was far more important than anything happening on the other side of the pond.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Except in 1815, the French are back in the equation...

1) US imports fell by almost 85% by tonnage between 1812 and 1814, and by almost 95% by value between 1811 and 1814. For a country that got 90% of government revenue from customs duties, that was catastrophic. It was insolvent, defaulting on the national debt, and suffering rampant inflation. The country was bankrupt. This is all in late 1814, and largely triggered by Cochrane's tightening of the blockade in the summer of that year. If the war had continued through 1815 then the results would have been catastrophic for the US.

2) Really? Seizing control of coastal Maine, burning down the White House, bombarding Baltimore, crippling US trade as mentioned above, and landing raiding parties along the US coast wherever and whenever the local British commander pleased, all without the slightest hint of resistance from the US Navy demonstrates the RN's dominance very clearly.

3) The UK always had more important things to worry about, all the way through the war, hence the minimal effort applied to it. Even after the French war ended in April 1814, the political situation in Europe (what was the Tsar doing with his 250k men, what was going to happen to Antwerp, what was the end result of the bickering in Vienna going to be) was far more important than anything happening on the other side of the pond.

1) Except in 1815, the French are back in the equation... RN has other things to worry about, namely, blockading France. And even then, the British routinely were defeated in North America in 1814-15. Odd that a country that was insolvent managed to defeat the best efforts of Downie and Prevost, Cochrane and Ross, and Pakenham et al.;)

2) None of which was enough to get the British anything historically, and - in fact - the British were defeated at Baltimore to the extent that the entire expeditionary force (all 5,000 men of it) departed sadder but wiser, and without its general, after being turned away by the state of Maryland, essentially.;)

3) True; glad we agree. Explains why the British kept sending small forces under commanders like Prevost, Ross, and Pakenham that routinely were defeated in 1814 and 1815, by their American opponents - the ones without any money or resources, of course.;)

Best,
 
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1) Except in 1815, the French are back in the equation...

So? The effects of the French war on the real British effort in North America - the naval one - were always minimal. Indeed, I think the most likely PoD to increase the scale of the British victory would be to extend the French war into 1815 (perhaps by getting more men out of Russia, or avoiding Leipzig). It was peace, and the resultant disadvantage relative to other European nations that British traders suffered by still being forced to follow wartime measures, that lead to the Treaty of Ghent.

None of which was enough to get the British anything historically

It was sufficient to achieve all primary British war aims (hold Canada, do not sacrifice the right to impress British subjects, do not sacrifice the right to blockade enemy states in time of war).

3) True; glad we agree. Explains why the British kept sending small forces under commanders like Prevost, Ross, and Pakenham that routinely were defeated in 1814 and 1815, by their American opponents - the ones without any money or resources, of course.

Everyone involved routinely got thumped when they tried to cross the border. Look at what happened to the US forces at Queenston Heights, Lundy's Lane, Crysler's Farm and Chateauguay. The only examples of anyone winning anything remotely significant on the opposite side of the border I can think of were the British victories at Detroit, Washington and North Point and the US victories at the Thames and York.
 
US imports fell by almost 85% by tonnage between 1812 and 1814, and by almost 95% by value between 1811 and 1814. For a country that got 90% of government revenue from customs duties, that was catastrophic. It was insolvent, defaulting on the national debt, and suffering rampant inflation. The country was bankrupt. This is all in late 1814, and largely triggered by Cochrane's tightening of the blockade in the summer of that year. If the war had continued through 1815 then the results would have been catastrophic for the US.

There are other issues too. New England is going to be a huuuge headache in any war that drags on. The federalists got a lot of egg on their face by having their demands show up when they did, but if the war is still ongoing they're going to have a lot better go of it. If the war drags on without clear victory there's going to be a lot of hard words in New England, and I think a lot of federal ill will is going to ferment (particularly when it comes to financing the war and defences). Caleb Strong is on the verge of making a separate peace and that will come as a huge blow to the federal government.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The effects of the French war were such that

So? The effects of the French war on the real British effort in North America - the naval one - were always minimal. Indeed, I think the most likely PoD to increase the scale of the British victory would be to extend the French war into 1815 (perhaps by getting more men out of Russia, or avoiding Leipzig). It was peace, and the resultant disadvantage relative to other European nations that British traders suffered by still being forced to follow wartime measures, that lead to the Treaty of Ghent.

It was sufficient to achieve all primary British war aims (hold Canada, do not sacrifice the right to impress British subjects, do not sacrifice the right to blockade enemy states in time of war).

Everyone involved routinely got thumped when they tried to cross the border. Look at what happened to the US forces at Queenston Heights, Lundy's Lane, Crysler's Farm and Chateauguay. The only examples of anyone winning anything remotely significant on the opposite side of the border I can think of were the British victories at Detroit, Washington and North Point and the US victories at the Thames and York.

Historically, the effects of the French war(s) were such as to limit the personnel and naval stores available to the British effort on inland waters in North America and ships, men, and supplies in coastal waters across the hemisphere.

The point on the "not winning" at the table was that despite the best efforts of the British in 1814, the end result was status quo ... And this was because, of course, the realities of time and distance are such that the best the British could manage on Ontario was a strategic stalemate from 1812-14, at the same time they lost on Erie and Champlain.

One can suggest that would somehow turn out differently on Ontario in 1815, but one would expect something more is needed than what was (historically) available or under construction in 1814, given the US (historically) managed to defeat, counter, or surmount everything the British tried on Ontario in 1812, 1813, and 1814.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Actually, the New Englanders were turning out in response

There are other issues too. New England is going to be a huuuge headache in any war that drags on. The federalists got a lot of egg on their face by having their demands show up when they did, but if the war is still ongoing they're going to have a lot better go of it. If the war drags on without clear victory there's going to be a lot of hard words in New England, and I think a lot of federal ill will is going to ferment (particularly when it comes to financing the war and defences). Caleb Strong is on the verge of making a separate peace and that will come as a huge blow to the federal government.

Actually, the New Englanders were ready to turn out in response to Plattsburgh/Lake Champlain, and Strong was one governor whose efforts never actually engendered anything ... Especially considering that his adjutant general (and successor as governor, John Brooks) was a veteran with strong loyalties who was the exemplar of the era of good feelings, even though a Federalist. Massachusetts' potential for disloyalty in 1812-15 is one of those things that is pretty ephemeral when you look at it.

As an example, there were more men in the (US) "Canadian Volunteers" (Adcocks, Markle, Mallory, etc) then there were ever Americans (willingly) in British service, which should put the issue into perspective.

Best,
 
Historically, the effects of the French war(s) were such as to limit the personnel and naval stores available to the British effort on inland waters in North America and ships, men, and supplies in coastal waters across the hemisphere.

Nonetheless, as the OTL outcome demonstrates, the limitation was insufficient to allow the US to win the war.

The point on the "not winning" at the table was that despite the best efforts of the British in 1814, the end result was status quo

In other words, exactly the outcome Britain wanted at the outset.

One can suggest that would somehow turn out differently on Ontario in 1815, but one would expect something more is needed than what was (historically) available or under construction in 1814, given the US (historically) managed to defeat, counter, or surmount everything the British tried on Ontario in 1812, 1813, and 1814.

What Britain was "trying" on Ontario was to maintain control of the lake. With the exception of the raid on York, this objective was entirely successful throughout the war, and allowed the repulse of every US offensive on the Niagara front.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Well, Britain's only allies certainly lost, so there's that...

Nonetheless, as the OTL outcome demonstrates, the limitation was insufficient to allow the US to win the war

In other words, exactly the outcome Britain wanted at the outset.

What Britain was "trying" on Ontario was to maintain control of the lake. With the exception of the raid on York, this objective was entirely successful throughout the war, and allowed the repulse of every US offensive on the Niagara front.

Well, Britain's only allies on the continent certainly lost, so there's that...

The British failed twice in attempts at Sackett's Harbor, but okay...:rolleyes:

Best,
 
Massachusetts' potential for disloyalty in 1812-15 is one of those things that is pretty ephemeral when you look at it.

On the other hand, the British occupation of Maine in 1814 was met with profound indifference rather than resistance. I suspect the locals didn't care who was in charge so long as they were able to get on with their lives and livelihoods unmolested. The notion of New England being pro-British may come from the fact that they preferred being free of the blockade than subject to it, and the former only happened when the RN showed up and took charge. Freedom to trade was a more important factor than whose flag was flying
 
Admittedly, this is just Wikipedia, so a detailed look at the articles primary sources may be in order (unfortunately they are books locked behind Google Books pay-wall), but it does show the actual naval forces of both the RN and USN as well as the vessels they had under construction:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engagements_on_Lake_Ontario#Vessels_on_Lake_Ontario_in_1814

According to this, the disposition of both navies on Lake Ontario in 1814 are as follows:


Ships under commission in the Royal Navy:

1 First Rate Ship of the Line (HMS St. Lawrence)

2 Frigates (HMS Prince Regent, HMS Princes Charlotte)

2 Sloops (HMS Montreal, HMS Niagara)

3 Brigs (HMS Charwell, HMS Star, HMS Netley)
-another brig, HMS Magnet had been set on fire in August 1814 to avoid capture

4 assorted schooners and gunboats


Ships under commission in the United States Navy:

2 Frigates (USS Superior, USS Mohawk)

1 Sloop (USS General Pike)

1 Corvette (USS Madison)

4 Brigs (USS Jones, USS Jefferson, USS Sylph, USS Oneida)

12 assorted schooners and gunboats


At this stage in OTL it seems like the RN has a pretty significant firepower advantage due to having a first rate when the USN only has frigates, but if we include ships under construction (assuming they are completed before the war of 1812 in our ATL ends) the situation becomes very different.

Major ships under construction at the end of the war:

RN

2 Battleships (HMS Wolfe, HMS Canada)

1 Frigate (HMS Psyche)
*HMS Psych was a very small frigate at only 769 tonnes more in size to a sloop although armed more heavily

USN

2 Battleships (USS New Orleans, USS Chippewa)

1 Frigate (USS Plattsburgh)
*Note although Plattsbugh was listed as a frigate she was planned to be 1748 tonnes and armed with 64 cannons really making her more of a USS Constitution style "Super-Frigate"

Assuming all these ships were completed and commissioned before the end of 1815 we would have fleets composed of:

RN:

3 Battleships

3 Frigates

2 Sloops

3 Brigs

4 schooners and gunboats

USN

2 Battleships

3 Frigates

1 Sloop

1 Corvette

4 Brigs

12 Schooners and gunboats



What is worth noting here is that the US battleships under construction are listed as being significantly larger (2805 tonnes vs 2152 tonnes) and more heavily armed (the largest guns on the RN ships were 32 pounders whereas the USN ships were to have 42 pounders- although it doesn't say whether these are long guns or carronades) then the British Battleships, so the 3v2 nominal battleship superiority the RN would have had is much less significant then at first glace. Ultimately I am no sure whether 3 lighter armed battleships or 2 heavier armed battleships would have had the edge in a fleet action like this, so input from anyone with experience in this area would be appreciated. Also, I wonder if the discrepancy in sources citing the intended armament of USS New Orleans (ranging from 74 to 130 guns) represented changes in the design that occurred during construction (did the builders modify and enlarge the ship to counter the St. Lawrence class ships)? I guess it could just also be that some of the sources are simply incorrect. If anyone could shed light on that I would appreciate it as the design details around the planned American battleships seem pretty inconsistent.
 
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Well, Britain's only allies on the continent certainly lost, so there's that...

It's also utterly irrelevant to any discussion about Lake Ontario - Techumseh's main effort was always in the western theatre around Detroit. In any event, the confederacy would have been a useful bonus and a means to help achieve the primary goals, rather than a key war aim in and of itself. Poland was one of the losers of the Second World War - does that therefore mean that Germany won it? Of course not.

The British failed twice in attempts at Sackett's Harbor, but okay...

Again, a means to an end - maintaining control of Ontario would have been a lot easier if the US flotilla on the lake were destroyed and its harbour in British hands. The failure of individual operations doesn't change the fact that the overriding strategic objective was achieved.
 
Again, a means to an end - maintaining control of Ontario would have been a lot easier if the US flotilla on the lake were destroyed and its harbour in British hands. The failure of individual operations doesn't change the fact that the overriding strategic objective was achieved.

You could make a pretty strong case that second raid was extremely successful strategically. Chauncey was extremely reluctant to leave his main base of operations after that and it really hampered American efforts along the Niagara until the end of the war.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Might want to check how much of Maine was

On the other hand, the British occupation of Maine in 1814 was met with profound indifference rather than resistance. I suspect the locals didn't care who was in charge so long as they were able to get on with their lives and livelihoods unmolested. The notion of New England being pro-British may come from the fact that they preferred being free of the blockade than subject to it, and the former only happened when the RN showed up and took charge. Freedom to trade was a more important factor than whose flag was flying


Might want to check how much of Maine was occupied and how many people actually lived there in 1814... Eastport was not Portland, for example.

Likewise, considering the realities of how the volunteer RA infantry regiments were recruited in 1813-15 (16 of the 46 were raised entirely or partly in New England states; the "partially" New England ones were generally mixed NY-VT units), that seems rather questionable, as well.

Plenty of New Englanders in the USN and at sea as privateers, as well.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yep, that gibes with the 1815 order of battle I posted above

Admittedly, this is just Wikipedia, so a detailed look at the articles primary sources may be in order (unfortunately they are books locked behind Google Books pay-wall), but it does show the actual naval forces of both the RN and USN as well as the vessels they had under construction:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engagements_on_Lake_Ontario#Vessels_on_Lake_Ontario_in_1814

According to this, the disposition of both navies on Lake Ontario in 1814 are as follows:


Ships under commission in the Royal Navy:

1 First Rate Ship of the Line (HMS St. Lawrence)

2 Frigates (HMS Prince Regent, HMS Princes Charlotte)

2 Sloops (HMS Montreal, HMS Niagara)

3 Brigs (HMS Charwell, HMS Star, HMS Netley)
-another brig, HMS Magnet had been set on fire in August 1814 to avoid capture

4 assorted schooners and gunboats


Ships under commission in the United States Navy:

2 Frigates (USS Superior, USS Mohawk)

1 Sloop (USS General Pike)

1 Corvette (USS Madison)

4 Brigs (USS Jones, USS Jefferson, USS Sylph, USS Oneida)

12 assorted schooners and gunboats


At this stage in OTL it seems like the RN has a pretty significant firepower advantage due to having a first rate when the USN only has frigates, but if we include ships under construction (assuming they are completed before the war of 1812 in our ATL ends) the situation becomes very different.

Major ships under construction at the end of the war:

RN

2 Battleships (HMS Wolfe, HMS Canada)

1 Frigate (HMS Psyche)
*HMS Psych was a very small frigate at only 769 tonnes more in size to a sloop although armed more heavily

USN

2 Battleships (USS New Orleans, USS Chippewa)

1 Frigate (USS Plattsburgh)
*Note although Plattsbugh was listed as a frigate she was planned to be 1748 tonnes and armed with 64 cannons really making her more of a USS Constitution style "Super-Frigate"

Assuming all these ships were completed and commissioned before the end of 1815 we would have fleets composed of:

RN:

3 Battleships

3 Frigates

2 Sloops

3 Brigs

4 schooners and gunboats

USN

2 Battleships

3 Frigates

1 Sloop

1 Corvette

4 Brigs

12 Schooners and gunboats



What is worth noting here is that the US battleships under construction are listed as being significantly larger (2805 tonnes vs 2152 tonnes) and more heavily armed (the largest guns on the RN ships were 32 pounders whereas the USN ships were to have 42 pounders- although it doesn't say whether these are long guns or carronades) then the British Battleships, so the 3v2 nominal battleship superiority the RN would have had is much less significant then at first glace. Ultimately I am no sure whether 3 lighter armed battleships or 2 heavier armed battleships would have had the edge in a fleet action like this, so input from anyone with experience in this area would be appreciated. Also, I wonder if the discrepancy in sources citing the intended armament of USS New Orleans (ranging from 74 to 130 guns) represented changes in the design that occurred during construction (did the builders modify and enlarge the ship to counter the St. Lawrence class ships)? I guess it could just also be that some of the sources are simply incorrect. If anyone could shed light on that I would appreciate it as the design details around the planned American battleships seem pretty inconsistent.

Yep,,that gives with the order of battle I posted above (by numbers, not names) which basically makes it clear that St. Lawrence which only commissioned in the autumn of 1814, was enough to break the stalemate on Ontario before the winter.

Best,
 
1 Frigate (USS Plattsburgh)
*Note although Plattsbugh was listed as a frigate she was planned to be 1748 tonnes and armed with 64 cannons really making her more of a USS Constitution style "Super-Frigate"

Bloody hell. :eek: That's not a frigate, even by the standards of the US heavies. That's a third rate ship of the line.

What is worth noting here is that the US battleships under construction are listed as being significantly larger (2805 tonnes vs 2152 tonnes) and more heavily armed (the largest guns on the RN ships were 32 pounders whereas the USN ships were to have 42 pounders) then the British Battleships, so the 3v2 nominal battleship superiority the RN would have had is much less significant then at first glace. Ultimately I am no sure whether 3 lighter armed battleships or 2 heavier armed battleships would have had the edge in a fleet action like this, so input from anyone with experience in this area would be appreciated.

The difference in effective weight of broadside between a 32-pdr and and 42-pdr is minimal, and the extra weight of the gun is more trouble than it's worth. RN 1st rates that had been armed with 42-pdrs on the lower deck in the mid 18th century, had them removed and replaced by 32s. If the statement that the US first rates were entirely armed with 42s is accurate (i.e. they had them on the middle and upper gun decks), they might have been in serious trouble due to having too much weight too high up.

Overall, it's fairly even, but on the numbers given I'd give the advantage to the RN, as the big ships would have been an approximate match one-on-one, and the RN would have had the significant advantage of a disengaged first rate. Plattsburg is the oddity - as described she would probably have been a liability, due to being too slow and clumsy to catch a frigate but too weak to survive against a first rate.

Also, I wonder if the discrepancy in sources citing the intended armament of USS New Orleans (ranging from 74 to 130 guns) represented changes in the design that occurred during construction (did the builders modify and enlarge the ship to counter the St. Lawrence class ships)?

As far as I'm aware that's exactly what happened.
 
Btw, does anyone have access to the book: Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812 by A. T. Mahan? Because I would really like to have more detail on the American battleships. If the Wikipedia numbers are accurate I believe that would have made USS New Orleans the biggest and most heavily armed warship on the planet at the time it would be commissioned (and it was on a land-locked lake!). I know the USN was also building ships of the line on the east coast near the end of the war as well.

Any solid published primary sources on the navy fleets of both the US and UK on lake Ontario would be appreciated as I hate having to rely just on the online secondary sources and Wikipedia.

Also I found a note on the Wikipedia article stating that by 1814 most of the American schooners had been disarmed and repurposed as transports because they were unstable, whereas the British re-rigged some of them as Brigs and re-named them. So I dont think the numbers of schooners/patrol boats I posted was actually accurate by 1814 (not that schooners would do much more then simply act as targets in a battle involving ships of the line and frigates anyway).
 
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Btw, does anyone have access to the book: Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812 by A. T. Mahan? Because I would really like to have more detail on the American battleships. If the Wikipedia numbers are accurate I believe that would have made USS New Orleans the biggest and most heavily armed warship on the planet at the time it would be commissioned (and it was on a land-locked lake!). I know the USN was also building ships of the line on the east coast near the end of the war as well.

DANFS has a few comments on [SIZE=-1]New Orleans and Chippewa, in which the most reliable description of their armament gives them 87 guns, 63 32-pdrs, 24 32-pdr carronades. That's the same as the Atlantic built ships of the line, although they might have been more seaworthy given their greater dimensions. I remain unconvinced of this - even monsters like the Santisima Trinidad, L'Orient and Caledonia only had 32-pdrs on the lowest gun deck, and with good reason.[/SIZE]
 
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