AHC: Major Ship of The Line battle...On Lake Ontario

It seems like there is still a lot more to be analyzed on this topic. In OTL in at the end of the war there were already two squadrons of warships each containing multiple frigates and 1 (112 gun) battleship already commissioned and sailing Lake Ontario. If the war had continued, within a year both sides would have had fleets led by multiple battleships and frigates, all contained on a small fresh-water lake. Anyone want to weigh in on how this may have turned out if the war had lasted an extra year?

You'd need a different war. If the British win at Plattsburgh (easy enough to do, regardless of what others say) they might try and push for a longer war.

After the raid on Sacketts Harbor Chauncey was extremely reluctant to leave his main base of operations. And the British building programme in 1815 was equally as extensive as the Americans except they already have a battleship constructed. I don't think Chauncey would sail out and engage Yeo unless something forced his hand. OR... if the St. Lawrence explodes when she's struck by lightning and the battleship race is reset.

Controlling the water the British are probably better supplied in Niagara throughout 1815, there could be more fighting around Buffalo. The British might try and attack Sacketts Harbor by land.

THAT would be a neat scenario for the new year. The Americans have suffered a devastating blow at Plattsburgh in September (but Prevost doesn't really follow it up being as cautious as he is and he's only managed to march south to Saratoga). And Chauncey gets a bit of deus ex machina when the St. Lawrence gets struck by lightning and sinks with all hands, and now control of Lake Ontario is in flux once again. Setbacks and gains for the new year.
 
Considering the US gained control of Erie in 1813 and Champlain (not one of the Great Lakes, but similar issues in terms of the resource differential) in 1814, it seems a fair bet the same will hold true on Ontario in 1815. Time and distance is all in the US favor, as are the relative local resources.

The biggest question, however, is why? The British had been fighting the French almost without a respite for five decades, and the Americans had their fill of being on the periphery of the Anglo-French conflict by 1815, as well - the strategic situation in North America (as a whole) was a stalemate between the US and UK, as witness the inability of the US to operate north of the Lakes into BNA and the inability of the UK to operate south of the Lakes into the US, or make much of an impact on the Atlantic or Gulf coasts. In addition, with the overarching stresses of the Anglo-French conflict(s) finally put to rest, the foundational issue of the conflicts in the Western Hemisphere in (roughly) the same time frame was decided, and quite decisively.

The French, Spanish, Portuguese, and British empires in the Western Hemisphere, certainly in terms of the majority of the populations that had been subject to those same empires in the Eighteenth Century, were (essentially) gone by the end of the second decade of the Nineteenth Century, and none of them were not going back...

The end of the Anglo-French rivalry for Europe and the Med in 1815 is really comparable to the end of the Cold War in the 1990s; it took several decades before new (potential) conflicts in Europe arose, and by then, the US and UK were (essentially) reconciled.

Best,

Lake Champlain could have just as easily gone the other way, and even Lake Erie wasn't written in stone. If Macomb dies in the opening salvo from the Confiance (not hard when a full 20% of the crew went down in the blast) instead of Downie dying early on the whole battle changes.

Or just not have Downie fighting the wind the whole time and he can better get his ships into position.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yeah, but...

Lake Champlain could have just as easily gone the other way, and even Lake Erie wasn't written in stone. If Macomb dies in the opening salvo from the Confiance (not hard when a full 20% of the crew went down in the blast) instead of Downie dying early on the whole battle changes. Or just not have Downie fighting the wind the whole time and he can better get his ships into position.

I think you mean MacDonough (Macomb was a US Army officer).

Yeah, but... the coin flip always averages out to 50/50 heads and tails, which suggests that when the evidence is a US sweep in two of the three and a stalemate in the third, there's something else going on... which, given that control of the Lakes were vital to the US in 1812-15, but a sideshow of a sideshow to the UK in the same period, sort of answers the question.

Put it this way - when was the last time the RN truly could be seen as having lost control of the Channel? The Medway, right?

Consider the relative importance of the Channel to the UK in the era under consideration, and then consider that the Lakes are, essentially, the analogue for the US - even more so than (say) the Bay of Maine, Massachusetts and Cape Cod bays, Long Island Sound, Upper and Lower New York bays, Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay, the sounds of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of Florida, the Gulf coast east of the Mississippi, the Mississippi passes, and the Gulf Coast west of the Mississippi, and the entire Pacific Coast - from San Diego Bay to Los Angeles-Long Beach, to San Francisco Bay, to the Columbia, to Puget Sound...

You can have a battle, even a campaign, turn on chance, but not a war - not at the distances inherent in a European power trying to intervene decisively in the Western Hemisphere in the Nineteenth Century and after, or, for that matter, for a Western Hemisphere power trying to intervene decisively in Europe in the same period.

Best,
 
I think you mean MacDonough (Macomb was a US Army officer).

Yeah, but... the coin flip always averages out to 50/50 heads and tails, which suggests that when the evidence is a US sweep in two of the three and a stalemate in the third, there's something else going on... which, given that control of the Lakes were vital to the US in 1812-15, but a sideshow of a sideshow to the UK in the same period, sort of answers the question.

Put it this way - when was the last time the RN truly could be seen as having lost control of the Channel? The Medway, right?

Consider the relative importance of the Channel to the UK in the era under consideration, and then consider that the Lakes are, essentially, the analogue for the US - even more so than (say) the Bay of Maine, Massachusetts and Cape Cod bays, Long Island Sound, Upper and Lower New York bays, Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay, the sounds of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of Florida, the Gulf coast east of the Mississippi, the Mississippi passes, and the Gulf Coast west of the Mississippi, and the entire Pacific Coast - from San Diego Bay to Los Angeles-Long Beach, to San Francisco Bay, to the Columbia, to Puget Sound...

You can have a battle, even a campaign, turn on chance, but not a war - not at the distances inherent in a European power trying to intervene decisively in the Western Hemisphere in the Nineteenth Century and after, or, for that matter, for a Western Hemisphere power trying to intervene decisively in Europe in the same period.

Best,

I'd argue that the British (especially Yeo) in knowing that in the defense of Canada, Lake Ontario was the lake that mattered was quite astute. If the other lakes are won, great! If not, such is life. And you're correct that this was a sideshow for Britain, but that doesn't mean Britain is destined to lose. But in all honestly I think you and I are beyond arguing on this subject.
 
I think you mean MacDonough (Macomb was a US Army officer).

Yeah, but... the coin flip always averages out to 50/50 heads and tails, which suggests that when the evidence is a US sweep in two of the three and a stalemate in the third, there's something else going on... which, given that control of the Lakes were vital to the US in 1812-15, but a sideshow of a sideshow to the UK in the same period, sort of answers the question.

Put it this way - when was the last time the RN truly could be seen as having lost control of the Channel? The Medway, right?

Consider the relative importance of the Channel to the UK in the era under consideration, and then consider that the Lakes are, essentially, the analogue for the US - even more so than (say) the Bay of Maine, Massachusetts and Cape Cod bays, Long Island Sound, Upper and Lower New York bays, Delaware Bay, Chesapeake Bay, the sounds of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of Florida, the Gulf coast east of the Mississippi, the Mississippi passes, and the Gulf Coast west of the Mississippi, and the entire Pacific Coast - from San Diego Bay to Los Angeles-Long Beach, to San Francisco Bay, to the Columbia, to Puget Sound...

You can have a battle, even a campaign, turn on chance, but not a war - not at the distances inherent in a European power trying to intervene decisively in the Western Hemisphere in the Nineteenth Century and after, or, for that matter, for a Western Hemisphere power trying to intervene decisively in Europe in the same period.

Best,

@TFSmith

I think you are underestimating the effect of superior US naval leadership played on Lake Erie. The actual size and strength of the two fleets were pretty similar. Furthermore a potential battle of Lake Ontario would dwarf the schooner skirmishes on Erie and Champlain by several orders of magnitude (Battleships! :D) so I am not sure that US success on Erie and Champlain would automatically mean the same would occur on Ontario (although the evidence suggesting the superior quality of US naval leadership on the lakes could certainly have played a major, even decisive role in this future conflict) As to the US simply outbuilding British North America on Lake Ontario in a longer war I am not so sure: BNA actually got the first battleship out on the lakes (St. Lawrence) and the number and quality of ships both sides had under construction at the end of the war in OTL suggests a relative parity at least at the end of next year. You would think that the UK could have made up for its lack of skilled colonial sailors on the Great Lakes by bringing in sailors from its blue water fleet (perhaps from Halifax or bases in the Caribbean?) to crew its Lake Ontario fleet? The Americans certainly would have had an advantage of being able to rely more heavily on the local population for able sailors though, which maybe would have given them an advantage.

If you really think it is impossible to extend a war of 1812 an extra year until both sides get multiple battleships, then what do you think would happen if the St. Lawrence led a fleet to attack Sacketts Harbor in the final weeks of the war?

Still, it would be nice to achieve the original AHC of a scenario with full-fledged Battleships slugging it out on a lake! It looks like it was so close to happening in OTL.

PS: I agree with your earlier posts on the ACW. 1815 seems to be the only time in history this is possible to achieve.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
And yet the RN never chose - or managed - to bring

I'd argue that the British (especially Yeo) in knowing that in the defense of Canada, Lake Ontario was the lake that mattered was quite astute. If the other lakes are won, great! If not, such is life. And you're correct that this was a sideshow for Britain, but that doesn't mean Britain is destined to lose. But in all honestly I think you and I are beyond arguing on this subject.

And yet the RN never chose - or managed - to bring the USN's Lake Ontario squadron to battle, whereas they attempted just that on Erie and Champlain and were utter failures.

So what makes the difference on Ontario? For every sailor the RN can send to a godforsaken swamp in the middle of North America (from the perspective of Portsmouth or Plymouth or wherever), the USN can send ten ... plus, of course, the Americans know the Lakes, intimately; the British do not.

It's like arguing Iran can assemble a squadron on the Caspian Sea and take on the Russians sucessfully, except the advantages of the Americans over the British on the Lakes are astronomically better than those even of the Russians over the Iranians on the Caspian.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Okay, but again - the Lakes were the key theater

@TFSmith

I think you are underestimating the effect of superior US naval leadership played on Lake Erie. The actual size and strength of the two fleets were pretty similar. Furthermore a potential battle of Lake Ontario would dwarf the schooner skirmishes on Erie and Champlain by several orders of magnitude (Battleships! :D) so I am not sure that US success on Erie and Champlain would automatically mean the same would occur on Ontario (although the evidence suggesting the superior quality of US naval leadership on the lakes could certainly have played a major, even decisive role in this future conflict) As to the US simply outbuilding British North America on Lake Ontario in a longer war I am not so sure: BNA actually got the first battleship out on the lakes (St. Lawrence) and the number and quality of ships both sides had under construction at the end of the war in OTL suggests a relative parity at least at the end of next year. You would think that the UK could have made up for its lack of skilled colonial sailors on the Great Lakes by bringing in sailors from its blue water fleet (perhaps from Halifax or bases in the Caribbean?) to crew its Lake Ontario fleet? The Americans certainly would have had an advantage of being able to rely more heavily on the local population for able sailors though, which maybe would have given them an advantage.

If you really think it is impossible to extend a war of 1812 an extra year until both sides get multiple battleships, then what do you think would happen if the St. Lawrence led a fleet to attack Sacketts Harbor in the final weeks of the war?

Still, it would be nice to achieve the original AHC of a scenario with full-fledged Battleships slugging it out on a lake! It looks like it was so close to happening in OTL.

PS: I agree with your earlier posts on the ACW. 1815 seems to be the only time in history this is possible to achieve.

Okay, but again - the Lakes were the key theater of the war for the US; they were a secondary theater at best of what was a secondary theater for the RN in the Anglo-French wars ... its like expecting the USN of WW II to send TF 38 to the North Pacific.

HMS St. Lawrence was commissioned in September, 1814; even if she rushed her shakedown, that puts her off Sackett's in the autumn or early winter; its worth noting that the two previous attempts by the British - bpoth defeated - were in the spring-summer.

Based on the previous assaults, the British need a landing force; Sacketts is not going to fall simply to a bombardment ... but that runs into the same issues the British faced when they had tried it previously, in 1812 and 1813.

Again, the strategic situation that led to two British defeats had not really changed in 1814.

Best,
 
Okay, but again - the Lakes were the key theater of the war for the US; they were a secondary theater at best of what was a secondary theater for the RN in the Anglo-French wars ... its like expecting the USN of WW II to send TF 38 to the North Pacific.

HMS St. Lawrence was commissioned in September, 1814; even if she rushed her shakedown, that puts her off Sackett's in the autumn or early winter; its worth noting that the two previous attempts by the British - bpoth defeated - were in the spring-summer.

Based on the previous assaults, the British need a landing force; Sacketts is not going to fall simply to a bombardment ... but that runs into the same issues the British faced when they had tried it previously, in 1812 and 1813.

Again, the strategic situation that led to two British defeats had not really changed in 1814.

Best,

By 1814 the Napoleonic wars are over, so by default the American campaign ceases to be secondary, claiming that in a hypothetical extension of the war through 1815 would continue to see the UK treat the war as a side-show is incorrect because it is the only show, so to speak. As stated previously the idea that the USN could simply swamp its way to victory by simply outbuilding and outnumbering the RN on Lake Ontario simply isn't borne out by the facts: Both sides were building similar numbers and similar classes of ships and by the end of 1815 both fleets on Lake Ontario would be of roughly similar strength, hence the potential for an interesting and uncertain battle. Indeed, if anything the British had the initial advantage as they had already built, armed, crewed and commissioned a first rate by the end of the war in OTL, whereas the USN was still building their first battleship, giving them effective control of Lake Ontario at the end of the war (BTW, does anyone have more precise detail on what armament the USS New Orleans was supposed to carry? Because different sources seem to very significantly from 74 to 130 cannons. An authoritative reference would be appreciated.). None of this is to say the USN wouldn't or couldn't have won a major fleet battle on Lake Ontario by the end of 1815, just that the two sides were on relatively equal footing and that the outcome isn't some set-in-stone certainty (although I would love to hear people's views on how they thought the battle would play out:))

As you point out there are some challenges to just continuing the war of 1812 an extra year. In OTL a war weary UK sees little to gain (the best possible outcome for them would have been the establishment of an Indian buffer-state in the West but hopes for that ended when Tecumseh's was killed and his Confederacy fell apart) and more to lose (money in loss of trade and war expenses and the potential for more embarrassing military defeats) in a continued war with the US and a financially crippled USA is not looking keenly at facing the full military attention of newly minted hegemon of Europe. This as we know is why in OTL the war did not continue: To much cost, too little payoff for both sides. Although this isn't really the point of the thread, the challenge would be to motivate both the UK and US to reject peace and press for victory, as neither side was decisively defeated in the field and both had the capacity to extend the conflict. The trick is to make the potential rewards worth the cost.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Ahem...

By 1814 the Napoleonic wars are over, so by default the American campaign ceases to be secondary....


Treaty of Ghent was signed on December 24, 1814;
Battle of New Orleans was fought January 8, 1815;
Treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate February 18, 1815;
Napoleon escaped from Elba 1 March 1815;
Waterloo campaign was (more or less) June 15 to July 8, 1815;

So, no, actually.

Best,
 
HMS St. Lawrence is an interesting Ship of the Line, as she has no poop deck, and presumably no fresh water storage. The former means the Captain must have climbed up from below decks to get to the wheel or quarterdeck.

hms-st-lawence.jpg


Good site on HMS Ontario wreck here http://2eyeswatching.com/2012/06/18...iscover-1780-british-warship-in-lake-ontario/
 
Treaty of Ghent was signed on December 24, 1814;
Battle of New Orleans was fought January 8, 1815;
Treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate February 18, 1815;
Napoleon escaped from Elba 1 March 1815;
Waterloo campaign was (more or less) June 15 to July 8, 1815;

So, no, actually.

Best,

Allies enter Paris on 30 March 1814

Napoleon abdicates on April 6 1814

Nearly 8 months with the USA as the primary enemy of the UK

Treaty of Ghent signed December 24, 1814

If in AH, the treaty of Ghent does not occur it is nearly 1 full year in which the UK's primary enemy is the US not Napoleon.

Napoleon escaped from Elba 1 March 1815

Napoleon's "Hundred Days"

Restoration of Louis XVIII on July 8 1815

Post July 8th the UK can again turn its full attention to North America.

Furthermore, the bulk of the land forces that defeated Napoleon during the 100 days (and at Waterloo) weren't even British, the bulk of their forces were not in Europe during the 100 days, and they instead opted to pay subsidies to the other coalition members. In OTL they were not even able to get most of their forces that were garrisoned in Canada at the time back to Europe before the threat of Napoleon had died down (Chartrand, 1998), so again, if the war with the US had continued Napoleon's escape from Elba and the 100 days would not have been able to significantly alter UK troop deployments in North America, and hence would have kept the North American war as a primary concern (although had Napoleon been successful during the 100 days this would have obviously changed but that's a different POD entirely).

So yes, actually



And none of this affects shipbuilding on Lake Ontario anyway! The ships were already being built or commissioned in OTL, that's not going to change regardless of how the RN views the Great Lakes theater during Napoleon's 100 days, as every major ship built on Lake Ontario is stuck there and cant be re-deployed to European waters even if they wanted to (Napoleon didn't even have any real sort of navy to threaten the RN with during to 100 days). The reason this AHC is interesting at all is because in reality the Great Lakes (and most importantly Lake Ontario which is isolated from the rest of the Great Lakes) are almost completely isolated from other naval theaters. The RN and USN can transport sailors into the region to crew the ships but all the ships themselves have to be built on site. More than any other naval theater in the world the Great Lakes are insulated from the effects of the war in Europe. This is why the USN can even contend for control of Lake Ontario with the RN in the first place.
 
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To answer the original post, a naval battle is fairly easy to engineer. The British had several thousand troops at Kingston in late 1814 that were tasked with attacking Sackett's Harbour as soon as the HMS St. Lawrence was ready. However, Major General George Izard was ordered to move his 4000 troops from Plattsburgh to Sackett's Harbour, and so the British called off the attack.

If the troops had not been moved, Sackett's Harbour probably would have faced an attack too large to easily fight off, and Chauncy would have had to bring his ships out or face destruction in port, and the British fleet would be waiting and ready to attack.

George Izard moved his troops under protest, because he knew that Plattburgh would soon come under attack from Prevost's army. If his superiors had listened, then both Plattburgh and Sackett's Harbour likely become major battlefields.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
You've sunk your own argument

Allies enter Paris on 30 March 1814

Napoleon abdicates on April 6 1814

Nearly 8 months with the USA as the primary enemy of the UK

Treaty of Ghent signed December 24, 1814

If in AH, the treaty of Ghent does not occur it is nearly 1 full year in which the UK's primary enemy is the US not Napoleon.

Napoleon escaped from Elba 1 March 1815

Napoleon's "Hundred Days"

Restoration of Louis XVIII on July 8 1815

Post July 8th the UK can again turn its full attention to North America.

Furthermore, the bulk of the land forces that defeated Napoleon during the 100 days (and at Waterloo) weren't even British, the bulk of their forces were not in Europe during the 100 days, and they instead opted to pay subsidies to the other coalition members. In OTL they were not even able to get most of their forces that were garrisoned in Canada at the time back to Europe before the threat of Napoleon had died down (Chartrand, 1998), so again, if the war with the US had continued Napoleon's escape from Elba and the 100 days would not have been able to significantly alter UK troop deployments in North America, and hence would have kept the North American war as a primary concern (although had Napoleon been successful during the 100 days this would have obviously changed but that's a different POD entirely).

So yes, actually



And none of this affects shipbuilding on Lake Ontario anyway! The ships were already being built or commissioned in OTL, that's not going to change regardless of how the RN views the Great Lakes theater during Napoleon's 100 days, as every major ship built on Lake Ontario is stuck there and cant be re-deployed to European waters even if they wanted to (Napoleon didn't even have any real sort of navy to threaten the RN with during to 100 days). The reason this AHC is interesting at all is because in reality the Great Lakes (and most importantly Lake Ontario which is isolated from the rest of the Great Lakes) are almost completely isolated from other naval theaters. The RN and USN can transport sailors into the region to crew the ships but all the ships themselves have to be built on site. More than any other naval theater in the world the Great Lakes are insulated from the effects of the war in Europe. This is why the USN can even contend for control of Lake Ontario with the RN in the first place.

You've sunk your own argument; it's true, the British had eight months in 1814 where - theoretically - they could focus on the US - the results were defeat on Lake Champlain and Plattsburgh in the north, at Baltimore on the Chesapeake, and, finally, at New Orleans in the south.

Not exactly omens for a British triumph on Lake Ontario, are they?

The reason, of course, is that every naval artillery piece, barrel of powder, shot, sail, rope, etc the RN needed for the Lakes came from the UK, along with the officers and experienced men...

Not the same for the US, obviously.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Which speaks to the basic point the Americans

To answer the original post, a naval battle is fairly easy to engineer. The British had several thousand troops at Kingston in late 1814 that were tasked with attacking Sackett's Harbour as soon as the HMS St. Lawrence was ready. However, Major General George Izard was ordered to move his 4000 troops from Plattsburgh to Sackett's Harbour, and so the British called off the attack.

If the troops had not been moved, Sackett's Harbour probably would have faced an attack too large to easily fight off, and Chauncy would have had to bring his ships out or face destruction in port, and the British fleet would be waiting and ready to attack.

George Izard moved his troops under protest, because he knew that Plattburgh would soon come under attack from Prevost's army. If his superiors had listened, then both Plattburgh and Sackett's Harbour likely become major battlefields.


Which speaks to the basic point that the Americans were a) on the defensive b) in theater, and c) able to provide sufficient forces in 1814-15 to both thwart the British on Ontario and defeat them on Champlain.

Best,
 
You've sunk your own argument; it's true, the British had eight months in 1814 where - theoretically - they could focus on the US - the results were defeat on Lake Champlain and Plattsburgh in the north, at Baltimore on the Chesapeake, and, finally, at New Orleans in the south.

Not exactly omens for a British triumph on Lake Ontario, are they?

The reason, of course, is that every naval artillery piece, barrel of powder, shot, sail, rope, etc the RN needed for the Lakes came from the UK, along with the officers and experienced men...

Not the same for the US, obviously.

Best,

I fail to see how anything in your post shows that I have "sunk my own argument". If by that you mean my argument that after the initial defeat of Napoleon (and after his final defeat and exile to St. Helena assuming the treaty of Ghent doesn't occur in the ATL where the war of 1812 stretches into 1815) the RN turns its full attention to the naval war with America and doesn't continue to regard it as some sort of secondary sideshow as you suggested (your posts seem to imply that the RN doesn't seem to care about the outcome and thus isn't willing to devote resources to the North American theater), then yes the campaigns you mentioned show that my assessment is correct. I never claimed that the increased military attention the UK focused on North America would necessarily lead to an overall UK victory, especially not on the ground. If that is what you believe I meant I am sorry for the confusion. However I will note that none of the battles you mention involve a major fleet engagement, which is what the Battle of Lake Ontario would be in this situation. I am not sure what purpose you see in comparing a battle between land armies in an amphibious invasion at New Orleans with battleships fighting on Lake Ontario, nor how the outcome of one is an omen for another (was the British burning of Washington an omen for the result of the Chesapeake campaign?). As for Plattsburgh and Champlain these are small engagements with brigs and such, there were no fleet engagements with ships-of-the-line on fresh water in the war of 1812 because ultill the very end of the war their were no ships of the line. The ATL 1815 battle of lake Ontario is going to be several orders of magnitude bigger than any other naval battle (on fresh or salt water) in the whole war, but still (hilariously) fought on the same small bodies of water.

Again your comment about the RNs supposed inability to build and supply equipment to build a fleet to match the USN on lake Ontario rings hollow for the simple reason that they did exactly that in OTL and the record suggests that the to fleets would be at relative parity by the end of 1815. Also do you really think that "every naval artillery piece, barrel of powder, shot, sail, rope, etc the RN needed for the Lakes came from the UK" ? Because its not like they couldn't build rope or sails on site in Canada, you know along with the ship hulls they were building with local timber. The cast iron cannons and powder along with the metal components of a man-of-war would be more difficult to produce in sufficient quantities on site, but I doubt it had to all be shipped directly from the UK. Halifax itself would likely have big stockpiles of all these things. Anyway, however the RN was doing it, their shipbuilding on Lake Ontario was set to match the USN for at least the duration of 1815. After that its pie in the sky as we don't really know what new ships would be laid down by either side, and that's not relevant to this AHC anyway.

So in summary we are back to where we started at the end of 1815 with two relatively evenly matched each with multiple battleships leading a flotilla of several frigates and an array of smaller vessels, and the stage set for the biggest (and weirdest) fresh-water battle in history.

Any input on that campaign would be interesting, as it was the whole point of the AHC.
 
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Again your comment about the RNs supposed inability to build and supply equipment to build a fleet to match the USN on lake Ontario rings hollow .
How about the RN's ability to supply personnel for the Lake Ontario fleet? IIRC, several commanders refused appointments to the theatre, and many (most?) of the British warships on the Lake were crewed and/or fought by army or militia personnel.

I've got a reference somewhere I'll dig up on that.
 
So in summary we are back to where we started at the end of 1815 with two relatively evenly matched each with multiple battleships leading a flotilla of several frigates and an array of smaller vessels, and the stage set for the biggest (and weirdest) fresh-water battle in history.

Assuming the US can still afford a fleet (or an army, or anything else) after another year of the blockade. Their economy was starting to collapse under the pressure by the end of 1814, so it's questionable whether they'll be able to continue the war for another year.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Considering the Americans won on

How about the RN's ability to supply personnel for the Lake Ontario fleet? IIRC, several commanders refused appointments to the theatre, and many (most?) of the British warships on the Lake were crewed and/or fought by army or militia personnel.

I've got a reference somewhere I'll dig up on that.

Considering the Americans won on Lake Champlain in 1814, when a) the odds were even; b) the British were not "distracted" by the war in Europe; c) the British had, in fact heavily reinforced their forces in Lower Canada specifically for the offensive; d) the Americans were certainly no better off economically in 1814 than they were at any point in the conflict, one really wonders why the insistence that somehow having more or different types of ships on Ontario is going to be a game changer.

The British built one ship of the line there, commissioning her very late in 1814, and the Americans had two large frigates, along with a mix of smaller vessels, as did the British; the British also did not have a sufficient expeditionary force (as was demonstrated), and however lacking the US commanders were, the British had Prevost and Yeo was to be relieved by Owen, who hadn't arrived before winter set in...

It's not like the battle of the carpenters is unknown.;)

Best,
 
How about the RN's ability to supply personnel for the Lake Ontario fleet? IIRC, several commanders refused appointments to the theatre, and many (most?) of the British warships on the Lake were crewed and/or fought by army or militia personnel.

I've got a reference somewhere I'll dig up on that.


Is it even possible to crew a first rate like St. Lawrence with land-lubbers and even have it remotely functional? If it is true that the main combatants of the British fleet were crewed by militia with little or no sailing experience (not just in place of marines but as actual deckhands) rather than proper sailors I am sure that would have had a major factor affecting their combat ability. If this is the case, once Napoleon is defeated you would have to think the RN would move to try and replace the crews on these ships, but still this would not bode well for the RN. I would appreciate the reference if you are able to find it.
I assume the USN would be able to properly crew its ships with sailors by being able to draw on sailors from the population of merchant seamen who were stuck in port because of the RN blockade.

As to the unwillingness of British officers to command in this theater, I remember that this was a factor, at least on land (Isaac Brock was himself less than thrilled to be in Canada and desperately wanted to get noticed so he would be given a command in Europe). As to whether this view was shared by Navy commanders, I don't know. On the other hand I don't think there even was a flag command available on the Great Lakes as all the battles consisted of small flotillas composed largely of converted merchant ships, primarily schooners with sloops and brigs serving as flagships. Lake Ontario in 1815 is really the only naval post on the Lakes that would justify a flag command. I assume that after Napoleon is defeated and the active naval combat with France stops, there would be plenty of interest in commanding he Lake Ontario squadron, as it is the one most likely to see significant active combat in the whole RN.
 
Considering the Americans won on Lake Champlain in 1814, when a) the odds were even; b) the British were not "distracted" by the war in Europe; c) the British had, in fact heavily reinforced their forces in Lower Canada specifically for the offensive; d) the Americans were certainly no better off economically in 1814 than they were at any point in the conflict, one really wonders why the insistence that somehow having more or different types of ships on Ontario is going to be a game changer.

The British built one ship of the line there, commissioning her very late in 1814, and the Americans had two large frigates, along with a mix of smaller vessels, as did the British; the British also did not have a sufficient expeditionary force (as was demonstrated), and however lacking the US commanders were, the British had Prevost and Yeo was to be relieved by Owen, who hadn't arrived before winter set in...

It's not like the battle of the carpenters is unknown.;)

Best,

Ya which is why in OTL it all came to nothing. Indeed by 1818 both sides had committed to completely demilitarizing the Great Lakes. But you had to wonder that if the war had dragged on another year and both sides had multiple battleships and a handful of frigates each, that one or the other side wouldn't be willing to just sit in port and glare at the enemy from across the lake.

If Ghent is never signed I could see the US gaining back the initiative after the British invasions at the Chesapeake and New Orleans are repelled. In this situation another attack on York and then Kingston seems the logical step and that would necessitate engaging the British fleet on Lake Ontario. If the US could seize control of Kingston and Lake Ontario then they would have a dominant position and Montreal would now be extremely vulnerable.
 
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