Is it plausible for parliamentary, rather than Presidential, government to become the norm in Latin America? And if it is, would Latin America be better off?
This was a favorite theme of the late Juan J. Linz.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_José_Linz I wrote a post about it some years ago in soc.history.what-if at
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/0k9d0qhYf_4/Ezdo0ZefpioJ:
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US-style presidential democracy is relatively rare in the world. The prevalent pattern for democracies is either parliamentary government or the "semi-presidential" system. (In semi-presidential systems, the president is elected directly or indirectly by the people rather than by parliament, and is much more than a figurehead, even though there is a prime minister and cabinet responsible to parliament. Generally in such sydtems the president can dissolve the parliament and call new elections. As Linz points out, although the example that is always given is that of Fifth Republic France, one could also classify Weimar Germany as "semi-presidential.")
The one big exception to the rule is Latin America. There the presidential model has been prevalent. One reason is obvious--when these countries won independence, the idea of parliamentary democracy was not fully developed, and in any event the US was the only model for a modern large-scale republic. But it is not so obvious to me why, given that these countries have adopted many constitutions since their original ones, there has not been much subsequent experimentation with parliamentary government. There has been an interesting book written entitled *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* by Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Johns Hopkins University Press 1994) suggesting that the presidential model has been one contributing factor to Latin America's troubles with democracy. Linz in his opening chapter focuses on the fact that both president and legislators in Latin America can claim democratic legitimacy:
"Since both derive their power from the vote of the people...a conflict is always latent and sometimes likely to erupt dramatically; there is no democratic principle to resolve it and the mechanisms that might exist in the constitution are generally complex, highly technical, legalistic, and therefore of doubtful democratic legitimacy for the electorate. It is therefore no accident that in some of those situations the military intervenes as a 'poder moderador.'"
To the obvious response that such conflicts are normal in the US and do not generally lead to serious crises, Linz replies that various factors, especially the "unique" nature of the US party system make the US "exceptional": "In my view, the development of modern political parties, in contrast to the American type of parties, particularly in socially or ideologically polarized societies, is likely to make those conflicts especially complex and threatening." (p. 7)
Linz notes such problems as the personalized nature of the presidential regime leading--especially in countries without strong party systems--to the choice of an "outsider", someone elected with no party affiliation or parliamentary base, and indeed chosen largely because of resentment of "politicians"; such candidates have no support in parliament and no permanent institutionalized continuity (due to the widespread rule of "no re-election" in Latin American countries) and therefore find it difficult to create political parties. He also criticizes the frequent argument that presidentialism in Latin America provides the armed forces with a personalized leadership that they can identify with as their supreme commander (it would be more difficult to identify with a prime minister). Linz's response is that "in the case of delegitimation and controversy surrounding the president" precisely the personalized relationship between the military and the president might prompt the military to take unconstitutional action against the president. "A less drastic response would be likely in the case of a less personalized direct and permanent relationship, as in a parliamentary system, where a minister of defense mediates between the prime minister and the armed forces." (pp. 45-46)
Linz also argues that the presidential system tend to work best in two-party countries, whereas there have been many stable and successful multiparty parliamentary systems. Since most Latin American countries are multiparty, it is arguable that there is a misfit between the party system and the form of government.
I have only started reading the book but I do note that there is a chapter on Chile by Arturo Valenzuela arguing that a *Prime Minister* Allende would have had to govern very differently from OTL's President Allende; he would have to form a stable coalition with the Christian Democrats--and unlike OTL the Christian Democrats would have had an incentive for such a compromise in the form of cabinet posts, while Allende could tell his most left-wing supporters, "look, either I compromise or I don't get to be (or remain) prime minister at all." (Actually, even in OTL Allende could not have been elected president without the support of the Christian Democrats in Congress, but once he was elected it was easy for his more extreme supporters to urge him to use the considerable powers of the presidency in defiance of Congress. In a parliamentary regime, he could tell them, "If I do that there will be a vote of no-confidence and I will be ousted." In OTL, however, while the opposition to Allende--once the Christian Democrats moved to the right--had a majority in Congress, they did not have a sufficient majority to impeach him.) If such a coalition failed, there would be a vote of no-confidence and a Christian Democratic-rightist coalition would presumably have taken over--in other words, the *government* would have fallen but not the *regime*, and there would have been no coup or dictatorship.
Any thoughts on how parliamentary government could have been made more widespread in Latin America? Perhaps if just one or two major countries had tried it successfully, the example could have spread.
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Later in that thread, Noel Maurer
https://business.gwu.edu/noel-maurer wrote (in response to a question of whether parliamentary government could help curb caudilism in Latin America)
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/0k9d0qhYf_4/Zwr-k7nwMZkJ:
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---It might be your use of the word "caudillism" that confuses me, but there are two very different periods of instability being conflated here.
The first is in the nineteenth century, when ambitious military men regularly seized power. This period was so chaotic in most of Spanish America, and constitutional structures so weak, that I am sceptical that any particular design would have forestalled the chaos. (With the possible exception of smooth transition to a local branch of the Bourbon monarchy, but that's in the world of legitimacy, not constitutional structure. And I'm not sure I believe that would have worked either.)
The second is the post-1945 southern cone, where the military usually took power after civilian governments had either failed to govern coherently or experienced radical lurches to the left. While still agnostic, I find Dave's argument for _that_ period and place very interesting.
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Speaking of the southern cone (which by some definitions includes Brazil) I might have added in my own post that Brazil *did* briefly experiment with parliamentary government after the resignation of President Quadros in 1961. The army and much of the Congress were reluctant, to say the least, to have the left-populist Vice President Goulart take office. So what happened was that
"A compromise was agreed upon, thanks to
Leonel Brizola and the "cadeia de legalidade" (chain of legality), and Goulart was able to take the presidency, but with his powers constrained by a
parliamentary system of government.
"A Constitutional Amendment was accordingly passed which transferred most of the president's powers to the newly created post of prime minister. Only after this amendment was Goulart allowed to take the oath of office as President, to serve as head of State only. Goulart nominated
Tancredo Neves for appointment as prime minister...
"As part of the compromise that installed a parliamentary system of government in 1961, a
plebiscite was set for 1963 to confirm or reverse the changes made to the Constitution. The parliamentary system of government was overwhelmingly rejected in the referendum, and Goulart assumed full presidential powers..."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/João_Goulart
I wonder whether the referendum result would have been different if Brazilian voters had realized that giving full presidential powers to Goulart would mean over two decades of military rule...