AHC: Larger and/or wealthier Turkey AFTER Treaty of Lausanne

On the 23rd of August 1923, Turkey officially ratified the Treaty of Lausanne, allowing for the declaration of the Republic of Turkey on the 29th of October that same year. Since then, Turkey's borders have remained mostly unchanged with the exception of the annexation of Hatay in 1939. Their economy has also fluctuated, going from high levels of growth after recovering from WWI to then stagnating about once a decade from 1950 onwards, doing well for itself in the 1980s before stagnating again and with the last ten years seeing poor economic performance.

But how could this have turned out better for the citizens of Turkey? My challenge to you is, with a POD after the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, to have a Turkey that is either territoriality larger, economically more well-off, or even both. What would the ramifications of a wealthier and/or bigger Turkey be, internally and abroad? How would the nation be different today?
 

thaddeus

Donor
this requires the Ottoman empire to remain neutral in WWI (likely or almost certainly?)

they could lose most of their empire due to the war with Greece and their general decline, then revolution, but retain the Mosul region? that seems the most plausible change
 
The best option for Turkey would be to stop the coups from happening. The social and political instability of the 1960 and especially the 1980 coups were a massive negative. So in this alternate timeline maybe the Democrat Party leans less into the religious undertone, which i believe could be accomplished by having Adnan Menderes in a lesser role. This would also mean the American Aid money would be more focused on industrial sectors rather than the agricultural sector which was partially caused by Adnan Menderes's past as a land-owning elite. This further focus on the industrial sector means that when the US pulls out aid money, Turkish economy; while still taking a hit would suffer less. It would also mean that the country would be less de-Kemalised, which would remove the two main factors in the 1960 coup. This would also mean that Fuat Köprülü wouldnt quit and would still be the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, he might actually be President or Prime Minister alongside Celal Bayar if Menderes is sidelined early on (In our timeline, he expected to have been in a high position due to his large political experience (I cant remember spesifics, but Celal Bayar was Prime Minister briefly between 1937 and 1938).
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This could mean the further industrialisaiton of Turkey going into the 60's, where i would see the DP holding onto power in the 1962 election. The economic crisis would be subdued by then, and Democrat Party was still very popular even after the coup; to the point that after it was banned several DP wannabe parties got large percentages. Indeed, the DP got the largest margin of electory victory in Turkish History in 1954 parlimentary/mp elections. CHP carried 4 provinces, CNP (a small right-wing party) carried while province while the DP carried all the remaining (About 60-70 or so)! While their popularity certainly declined, they could probably still win in 1962 with a good campaign. From there it's hard to predict. CHP would probably come into power in the 1967 elections due to the people wanting change from the DP government, and from there probably a never generation of DP politicians would take over the party (like what happened with İnönü and Ecevit). It is essentialy unpredictable as the next election (1972) would be after 2 coups that wouldnt have happened in this timeline. I honestly cant predict.
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If we want a territorially larger Turkey the easiest place to look would be Mosul. In the Lausanne conferance the Mosul issue was not solved and instead left to a bilateral agreement between Turkey and Britain in a later date. And the Turks were not afraid to use force, Mustafa Kemal paraded with troops in the South-Eastern part of the country and chances are Britain wouldnt have the political willpower to fight another war. The main reason the Turks wanted Mosul so much was because when the Mundros Armistace that ended WW1 for Ottomans was signed, the Ottomans still held Mosul. It was occupied after the treaty as part of it's 7th clause which stated that the Entente powers could occupy any place they deemed strategically necessary. This basically gave them a blanc cheque to occupy whatever they wanted, in accordance with secret treaties such as Sykes-Picot. Thus, it was included in the Misak-ı Milli [(Which, contrary to popular belief isnt just a "Megali Idea" for Turkey. The Misak-ı Milli (Which means "the National Oath") is spesifically an ideal that the Turkish Resistance (which would later become the Republic) should retake all the territory the Ottomans still controlled at the end of WW1 and give up on all territory lost (basically the status quo) and NOT a nationalist wet-dream containing absurd lands such as Cyprus or Western Thrace. It is basically the Modern Turkish borders, + Northern Iraq (Mosul, Kerkük, Suleimaniyah) and parts of Western Caucasia, principally Batumi.)]. After this lenghty tangent, to get back to the point: The Turks considered Mosul to be illegally occupied and thus argued with Britain over it. In the end, the British resorted to funding several Kurdish Chieftains such as Seyh Said (I cant remember if this was merely rumour or if truth, homewer the British atleast were morally suportive of the rebellion as it suited their aims). This, alongside the economic hardships faced by the young republic forced it to concede their ownership of Mosul and in excahnge recieve a percentage of the oil in the region for several years, which they later turned into a one time payment that turned out to be a massive rip-off as the British started to extract MUCH more oil shortly after the Turks conceded their percentage. If the situation changes, perhaps the Turkish threat can be real enough for the British to give up Mosul in exchange for large concessions on the Oil and some other things. Also, on the issue of Batumi: It was captured by the Turks in the initial stage of the War of Independence: Homewer in 1921 the Turks agreed to hand it over to the Soviet Russians in exchange for MASSIVE amounts of cash and armaments in the Treaty of Kars. Perhaps in this alternate future the Turks give other concessions instead of Batumi, perhaps the Russians make an alt-Treaty of Kars earlier, when the Whites were much more of a threat and thus they are more accepting of not getting Batumi if it means they wil have a stronger Turkey to distract the Entente. If both of these things happen, Turkey can recieve the Oil-Rİch region of Batumi (Whatever concessions the British would take would have probably ended by the 50's and 60's), not to mention Batumi which was and is a vital centre for trade in Caucasia and in the wider East-West trade network.
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Now, this also brings with it the nasty issue of the PKK and the Kurds. Incorporating Mosul would mean a lot more Kurds and quite a few Arabs, even if it means absorbing the Turkmen people there. In any case, if we want to make a better Turkey than perhaps the best step would be to atleast make the PKK a small extremeist fringe group rather than an organisation comparable in size to what ISIS was. There are 3 main things that should need to happen for this:
.
1) The DP, which were much more willing to compromise on the secularism issue and thus were more favourable to the Kurds need to be, if not in power atleast not violently removed and repeadeatly banned. With Adnan Menderes out of the picture the party is much more "vanilla" to the average Turk, if that makes sense.
.
2) Turgut Özal, Turkish Prime Minister after the 1980 coup and 1983 election needs to have a long 2 term Presidency. While he might have brought along KDV (Katma Değer Vergisi, a general tax levied on basically everything and which inflates the prices by a lot), his economic policies were rather successful. He was also half-Kurdish, and if anybody was going to find a peaceful solution to the PKK problem, it was Turgut Özal. He defied the militaresque view many politicans adopted (no doubt a result of the Kemalist mentality and the many coups), and was generally amenable to and from the Kurdish rebels. In reality, he died in 1993 (4 years after being elected President and 5 years after being elected Prime Minister) rather suddenly, after a foreign trip. His wife put the claim that he was poisoned, and 19 years after his death an autopsy revealed that there indeed was poison (I think Arsenic) but it was unclear if he died from the poison or from more natural causes. For the sake of this timeline, let us assume that it was the poison that killed him (I dont think it was his health since it was so sudden) and that he doesnt get poisoned. This would allow a progressive, civilian President that would be willing to make peace with the PKK in exchange for concessions (We did see temporary stop to hostility several times since by peace attempts, so it isnt entirely unreasonable. Besides, back then the PKK was much less rooted). This also brings me to my third point............
.
3) Tansu Çiller MUST NOT BE ELECTED. Tansu Çiller was really out of favour with Süleyman Demirel (The Prime Minister around that time) and several other influential people. Özal's sudden death was a massive shift in inner party and general politics, and since Demirel won the Presidentship he had to lose the Party Leadership role (Until AKP i think you couldnt be both the leader of a party and the a candidate for president in Turkey), which allowed Tansu Çiller to rise to first the Party Leadership and then Prime Minister under a coalition government. Why must she not be elected? Well, she was not only involved in major corruption scandals, but her policies were also largely ineffective (For example, the economy took a turn for the worse and her Aegean policy of "Who cares if Greece takes some islands with 8 sheep on them? They pay us" ignores Exclusive Economic Zones and any general geopolitical reason, really.). Oh, and her policy on Kurds was to practically out-terrorise the terrorists, with harsh bombing campaigns and brutal military incursions that were not only stupid and costly (Read Osman Pamukoğlu's books about the subject if you want to know more about the general situation in South-West Anatolia in the early-mid 1990's. Seriously, his books are incredibly informative since well Osman Pamukoğlu was literally the highest commander there), but also destroyed any chance of fixing the PKK issue or atleast satisfying most of their members leaving only a small fringe group. And if we have learned anything from the likes of the Taliban and Vietcong, these sorts of guerilla organisations are almost impossible to destroy fully. If Turgut Özal didnt die and continued to not only finish his term but win another term (which would end in 1999), Tansu Çİller might be ostracized by the Right Way Party (a successor to the DP, and the "right" here means correct not right-wing) and thus never come to power. Come to think of it, the Right Way Party might never exist since the DP is never banned, maybe they are the "new generation" to Celal Bayar and Fuat Köprülü that i talked about before. It would also ironically mean that Erdal İnönü, son of İsmet İnönü would still lead the Social democrat People's Party since his resignation was tied to the internal chaos in the RWP and the general country. btw the SPP was the largest party in the 1989 elections, they are no small deal. Perhaps we can see another İnönü as Prime Minister after Turgut Özal's term.
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Other than that, how would this effect general global geopolitics? Firstly, this Turkey would be much more important economically and politically in the region. They would benefit from more organised and more industrialised economic base, so companies like Arçelik and Vestel (companies that make TV's, household appliances, electronics etc.) might be more popular in Western World. Ok that wasnt very geopolitical but i didnt know where to put it. Anyways, another massive source of revenue would be the Mosul Oil Fields. Iraq has extensive oil fields, and while certain numbers are hard to find due to the US occupation and ISIS etc., the wiki page says 140 Million Barrels. An unspesified but significant part of it is in the Mosul Region which now belongs to Turkey, who would be able to produce enough oil to mostly satify local needs. This could also mean that OPEC sanctions are a golden opportunity for Turkey, since due to their animosity with Iraq (Iraq would deeply desire Mosul) they wouldnt be in the OPEC (You need the approval of all 5 founding members including Iraq) and thus could sell oil at much larger than usual prices. The Turks might also get more involved in regional affairs, and due to them being more secular might not only be seen as more "Western" but also could develop a closer relationship with Israel, which would be economically good (I do not want to talk about the recent stuff happening in Gaza, if anybody is going to comment about it please do not, this isnt the place or time).
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Homewer, what would happen to this alternative, poorer Iraq? I am not very well knowledged about Iraqi history, but as far as i know the King was removed in a Baathist coup which was then countercouped by certain sections of the Baathists including Saddam Hussein. Hussein would probably desperatly want Mosul back, perhaps even conceding to certain Iranian offers to secure his Eastern Front before launching a war against the North. This would, in my opinion, have 2 consequences:
.
1) Saddam actually had good working relations with the West, recieving economic and military aid from countries like France and the US during the Iraq-Iran war. Homewer, an attack against Turkey might be seen much worse.
.
2) The Iranian theocracy might fall or atleast "soften", as they do not have the tight grip on power and popularity they acquired thanks to the Iraqi invasion whipping up patriotic fervor. Even then, Iranian anti-Islamic revolutionaries were a very real threat, and without that popularity boost Khomeni's government, the Islamic revolution may fall to a Left-Wing democratic "People's Revolution". This would have massive ramifications.
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I honestly dont believe Saddam could have beaten Turkey. The terrain is rugged, and the Iraqi's struggled with even defending the flat terrains of Khuzestan after their initial shock advantage was lost. Same would probably happen here: The Iraqi's would capture border areas, especially those with flat lands before Turkish reinforcements arrived. The Turkish Army was and is relatively large, with 769,000.00 soldiers in 1990. While the Iraqis would have technological advance initially, I believe they would quickly lose it. The turks certainly would have the capital and the means (Iraq largely couldnt trade weapons with the outside world, especially as the Persian Gulf was contested and their neighbours had closed borders) to buy advanced weaponry from an angered West, while Saddam would run on a limited supply of modern equipment that would run out rather quickly. Besides, the Iranians could overcome Iraqi technology with superior numbers, and Turkey had over 3 times the population of Iraq (Even if we dont count in Mosul being Turkish).Turkish doctrine wouldnt be the same as Iran, though. The Turks wouldnt attempt large-scale massed assoults with poorly trained conscripts to soften the defences before their actual army men broke through (Which is a bit different than Human Wave, contrary to popular belief). Rather Turkey could probably have the quality edge as they would have a larger corp of trained men at the start (700.000 ish to 250.000 ish Iraqis) and would resort to conscripts less. The Turks would also probably have good defences in Mosul constructed to overcome potential Iraqi assaults that could have materialised earlier. And the defence is similar to Iran, so i dont think it would be an Iraqi victory. The war would probably be much shorter aswell, since Turkey wouldnt attempt a counter-invasion of Iraq besides perhaps some strategically important border areas. Thus Saddam could have been defeated with ease, which could butterfly away the Gulf War and thus the 2003 Iraq War since Iraq wouldnt have racked up such a debt.
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There is a lot more that could be said, especially post the 1990's, but i will leave it here since it is already long enough and recent Turkish History is really not my strong suit. Hope this answers your question, ChrisTheCat
 
For the larger Turkey, just have Turkey annex what is now known as Northern Cyprus into Turkey after the Turkish invasion and formation of Northern Cyprus in 1974. The pod would also allow the annexation of Hatay in 1939 and WW2 to occur before the pod.
 
Wouldn’t this trigger article 5, which would just turn into a early gulf war?
Oh yeah true, but I wasnt sure if Turkey would be fully in the NATO. After all, both France and Greece withdraw from the military part of the agreement when they had their differences. I also kinda forgot Turkey was in NATO.

For the larger Turkey, just have Turkey annex what is now known as Northern Cyprus into Turkey after the Turkish invasion and formation of Northern Cyprus in 1974. The pod would also allow the annexation of Hatay in 1939 and WW2 to occur before the pod.
I would generally advise against that. In best-case scenario, the Turks stop earlier than they did in Cyprus, while the world viewed it's actions as "freeing their oppressed people", waited sometime to sign an armistace that allowed them to withdraw but enforced the original concession to the Turkish Cypriotes, maybe alongside some extra ones. Also, it would allow an actually small amount (Instead of the few dozen thousand Turkey has currently) peacekeepers, maybe like 3.000 men? to enforce this peace.

Then Turkey can rebuild their broken relationship with the Greeks somewhat (It wont heal overnight but it would be a good early-step) when the Greek Military Dictatorship collapses after they are shown to be unable to stop the Turks (The ONE thing they told the people they could do to justify their dictatorship with the usual "safety over freedom" arguement) and are overthrown by a Republic. Turkey can send goodwill and show itself actually willing to rebuild relations by aiding the new government economically and politically, and by de-escelating their claims and infringements over the Aegean (The Greeks would largely do the same, after all they are busy rebuilding democracy). This, if policy is kept consistent could allow for a renewed Turkish-Greek relationship similar to what was present before the Cyprus issue, especially in the 30's (Heck, the Greeks and Turks even commited to a formal alliance under the Balkan Pact alongside Yugoslavia and Romania. That would be an interesting POD if it survived.)
 
Another thing: The village of Dimetoka was given to Bulgaria in 1914 to sweeten the deal of them joining WW1. Dimetoka is special in that it lies on the Western side of River Maritza, which was the border between Turkey-Greece and Turkey-Bulgaria (there is Karaağaç, a town West of Maritza that is Turkish as the other special exception, homewer it was granted as War Reperations to Turkey as part of Lausanne to save face for the Greeks and basically make them not pay actuak war reperations in cash).

If the Ottomans dont cede it, or if Turkey joins WW2 in 1944 just before the Soviets captured the Balkans and lose a few thousand men attacking the Bulgarians, they could demand it at the peace conference. The Turks were also offered Rhodes i think, but i wont add it since i couldnt find consistent sources on this and also it would be largely unfair to all the Greek losses in WW2 to only give them border parts of Albania.

The area isnt big btw. Homewer, it is expansion. It also would likely be militarily important during the Cold War, a beachead to strike into Communist Bulgaria.

Also, even if Turkey doesnt get Batumi as part of an Alt-Treaty of Kars, they can potentially get it just after the collapse of the USSR. They can maybe just send soldiers in and annex it, but the "better" option would be to make a deal with Georgia, perhaps agreeing to bankroll, invest into and build an army for/defend Georgia they can get Batumi in a fair deal, and the conditions of Turkey, both social, political and economic would be much better than Georgia so the population might accept it after some years.
 
The best option for Turkey would be to stop the coups from happening. The social and political instability of the 1960 and especially the 1980 coups were a massive negative. So in this alternate timeline maybe the Democrat Party leans less into the religious undertone, which i believe could be accomplished by having Adnan Menderes in a lesser role. This would also mean the American Aid money would be more focused on industrial sectors rather than the agricultural sector which was partially caused by Adnan Menderes's past as a land-owning elite. This further focus on the industrial sector means that when the US pulls out aid money, Turkish economy; while still taking a hit would suffer less. It would also mean that the country would be less de-Kemalised, which would remove the two main factors in the 1960 coup. This would also mean that Fuat Köprülü wouldnt quit and would still be the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, he might actually be President or Prime Minister alongside Celal Bayar if Menderes is sidelined early on (In our timeline, he expected to have been in a high position due to his large political experience (I cant remember spesifics, but Celal Bayar was Prime Minister briefly between 1937 and 1938).
.
This could mean the further industrialisaiton of Turkey going into the 60's, where i would see the DP holding onto power in the 1962 election. The economic crisis would be subdued by then, and Democrat Party was still very popular even after the coup; to the point that after it was banned several DP wannabe parties got large percentages. Indeed, the DP got the largest margin of electory victory in Turkish History in 1954 parlimentary/mp elections. CHP carried 4 provinces, CNP (a small right-wing party) carried while province while the DP carried all the remaining (About 60-70 or so)! While their popularity certainly declined, they could probably still win in 1962 with a good campaign. From there it's hard to predict. CHP would probably come into power in the 1967 elections due to the people wanting change from the DP government, and from there probably a never generation of DP politicians would take over the party (like what happened with İnönü and Ecevit). It is essentialy unpredictable as the next election (1972) would be after 2 coups that wouldnt have happened in this timeline. I honestly cant predict.
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If we want a territorially larger Turkey the easiest place to look would be Mosul. In the Lausanne conferance the Mosul issue was not solved and instead left to a bilateral agreement between Turkey and Britain in a later date. And the Turks were not afraid to use force, Mustafa Kemal paraded with troops in the South-Eastern part of the country and chances are Britain wouldnt have the political willpower to fight another war. The main reason the Turks wanted Mosul so much was because when the Mundros Armistace that ended WW1 for Ottomans was signed, the Ottomans still held Mosul. It was occupied after the treaty as part of it's 7th clause which stated that the Entente powers could occupy any place they deemed strategically necessary. This basically gave them a blanc cheque to occupy whatever they wanted, in accordance with secret treaties such as Sykes-Picot. Thus, it was included in the Misak-ı Milli [(Which, contrary to popular belief isnt just a "Megali Idea" for Turkey. The Misak-ı Milli (Which means "the National Oath") is spesifically an ideal that the Turkish Resistance (which would later become the Republic) should retake all the territory the Ottomans still controlled at the end of WW1 and give up on all territory lost (basically the status quo) and NOT a nationalist wet-dream containing absurd lands such as Cyprus or Western Thrace. It is basically the Modern Turkish borders, + Northern Iraq (Mosul, Kerkük, Suleimaniyah) and parts of Western Caucasia, principally Batumi.)]. After this lenghty tangent, to get back to the point: The Turks considered Mosul to be illegally occupied and thus argued with Britain over it. In the end, the British resorted to funding several Kurdish Chieftains such as Seyh Said (I cant remember if this was merely rumour or if truth, homewer the British atleast were morally suportive of the rebellion as it suited their aims). This, alongside the economic hardships faced by the young republic forced it to concede their ownership of Mosul and in excahnge recieve a percentage of the oil in the region for several years, which they later turned into a one time payment that turned out to be a massive rip-off as the British started to extract MUCH more oil shortly after the Turks conceded their percentage. If the situation changes, perhaps the Turkish threat can be real enough for the British to give up Mosul in exchange for large concessions on the Oil and some other things. Also, on the issue of Batumi: It was captured by the Turks in the initial stage of the War of Independence: Homewer in 1921 the Turks agreed to hand it over to the Soviet Russians in exchange for MASSIVE amounts of cash and armaments in the Treaty of Kars. Perhaps in this alternate future the Turks give other concessions instead of Batumi, perhaps the Russians make an alt-Treaty of Kars earlier, when the Whites were much more of a threat and thus they are more accepting of not getting Batumi if it means they wil have a stronger Turkey to distract the Entente. If both of these things happen, Turkey can recieve the Oil-Rİch region of Batumi (Whatever concessions the British would take would have probably ended by the 50's and 60's), not to mention Batumi which was and is a vital centre for trade in Caucasia and in the wider East-West trade network.
.
Now, this also brings with it the nasty issue of the PKK and the Kurds. Incorporating Mosul would mean a lot more Kurds and quite a few Arabs, even if it means absorbing the Turkmen people there. In any case, if we want to make a better Turkey than perhaps the best step would be to atleast make the PKK a small extremeist fringe group rather than an organisation comparable in size to what ISIS was. There are 3 main things that should need to happen for this:
.
1) The DP, which were much more willing to compromise on the secularism issue and thus were more favourable to the Kurds need to be, if not in power atleast not violently removed and repeadeatly banned. With Adnan Menderes out of the picture the party is much more "vanilla" to the average Turk, if that makes sense.
.
2) Turgut Özal, Turkish Prime Minister after the 1980 coup and 1983 election needs to have a long 2 term Presidency. While he might have brought along KDV (Katma Değer Vergisi, a general tax levied on basically everything and which inflates the prices by a lot), his economic policies were rather successful. He was also half-Kurdish, and if anybody was going to find a peaceful solution to the PKK problem, it was Turgut Özal. He defied the militaresque view many politicans adopted (no doubt a result of the Kemalist mentality and the many coups), and was generally amenable to and from the Kurdish rebels. In reality, he died in 1993 (4 years after being elected President and 5 years after being elected Prime Minister) rather suddenly, after a foreign trip. His wife put the claim that he was poisoned, and 19 years after his death an autopsy revealed that there indeed was poison (I think Arsenic) but it was unclear if he died from the poison or from more natural causes. For the sake of this timeline, let us assume that it was the poison that killed him (I dont think it was his health since it was so sudden) and that he doesnt get poisoned. This would allow a progressive, civilian President that would be willing to make peace with the PKK in exchange for concessions (We did see temporary stop to hostility several times since by peace attempts, so it isnt entirely unreasonable. Besides, back then the PKK was much less rooted). This also brings me to my third point............
.
3) Tansu Çiller MUST NOT BE ELECTED. Tansu Çiller was really out of favour with Süleyman Demirel (The Prime Minister around that time) and several other influential people. Özal's sudden death was a massive shift in inner party and general politics, and since Demirel won the Presidentship he had to lose the Party Leadership role (Until AKP i think you couldnt be both the leader of a party and the a candidate for president in Turkey), which allowed Tansu Çiller to rise to first the Party Leadership and then Prime Minister under a coalition government. Why must she not be elected? Well, she was not only involved in major corruption scandals, but her policies were also largely ineffective (For example, the economy took a turn for the worse and her Aegean policy of "Who cares if Greece takes some islands with 8 sheep on them? They pay us" ignores Exclusive Economic Zones and any general geopolitical reason, really.). Oh, and her policy on Kurds was to practically out-terrorise the terrorists, with harsh bombing campaigns and brutal military incursions that were not only stupid and costly (Read Osman Pamukoğlu's books about the subject if you want to know more about the general situation in South-West Anatolia in the early-mid 1990's. Seriously, his books are incredibly informative since well Osman Pamukoğlu was literally the highest commander there), but also destroyed any chance of fixing the PKK issue or atleast satisfying most of their members leaving only a small fringe group. And if we have learned anything from the likes of the Taliban and Vietcong, these sorts of guerilla organisations are almost impossible to destroy fully. If Turgut Özal didnt die and continued to not only finish his term but win another term (which would end in 1999), Tansu Çİller might be ostracized by the Right Way Party (a successor to the DP, and the "right" here means correct not right-wing) and thus never come to power. Come to think of it, the Right Way Party might never exist since the DP is never banned, maybe they are the "new generation" to Celal Bayar and Fuat Köprülü that i talked about before. It would also ironically mean that Erdal İnönü, son of İsmet İnönü would still lead the Social democrat People's Party since his resignation was tied to the internal chaos in the RWP and the general country. btw the SPP was the largest party in the 1989 elections, they are no small deal. Perhaps we can see another İnönü as Prime Minister after Turgut Özal's term.
.
Other than that, how would this effect general global geopolitics? Firstly, this Turkey would be much more important economically and politically in the region. They would benefit from more organised and more industrialised economic base, so companies like Arçelik and Vestel (companies that make TV's, household appliances, electronics etc.) might be more popular in Western World. Ok that wasnt very geopolitical but i didnt know where to put it. Anyways, another massive source of revenue would be the Mosul Oil Fields. Iraq has extensive oil fields, and while certain numbers are hard to find due to the US occupation and ISIS etc., the wiki page says 140 Million Barrels. An unspesified but significant part of it is in the Mosul Region which now belongs to Turkey, who would be able to produce enough oil to mostly satify local needs. This could also mean that OPEC sanctions are a golden opportunity for Turkey, since due to their animosity with Iraq (Iraq would deeply desire Mosul) they wouldnt be in the OPEC (You need the approval of all 5 founding members including Iraq) and thus could sell oil at much larger than usual prices. The Turks might also get more involved in regional affairs, and due to them being more secular might not only be seen as more "Western" but also could develop a closer relationship with Israel, which would be economically good (I do not want to talk about the recent stuff happening in Gaza, if anybody is going to comment about it please do not, this isnt the place or time).
.
Homewer, what would happen to this alternative, poorer Iraq? I am not very well knowledged about Iraqi history, but as far as i know the King was removed in a Baathist coup which was then countercouped by certain sections of the Baathists including Saddam Hussein. Hussein would probably desperatly want Mosul back, perhaps even conceding to certain Iranian offers to secure his Eastern Front before launching a war against the North. This would, in my opinion, have 2 consequences:
.
1) Saddam actually had good working relations with the West, recieving economic and military aid from countries like France and the US during the Iraq-Iran war. Homewer, an attack against Turkey might be seen much worse.
.
2) The Iranian theocracy might fall or atleast "soften", as they do not have the tight grip on power and popularity they acquired thanks to the Iraqi invasion whipping up patriotic fervor. Even then, Iranian anti-Islamic revolutionaries were a very real threat, and without that popularity boost Khomeni's government, the Islamic revolution may fall to a Left-Wing democratic "People's Revolution". This would have massive ramifications.
.
I honestly dont believe Saddam could have beaten Turkey. The terrain is rugged, and the Iraqi's struggled with even defending the flat terrains of Khuzestan after their initial shock advantage was lost. Same would probably happen here: The Iraqi's would capture border areas, especially those with flat lands before Turkish reinforcements arrived. The Turkish Army was and is relatively large, with 769,000.00 soldiers in 1990. While the Iraqis would have technological advance initially, I believe they would quickly lose it. The turks certainly would have the capital and the means (Iraq largely couldnt trade weapons with the outside world, especially as the Persian Gulf was contested and their neighbours had closed borders) to buy advanced weaponry from an angered West, while Saddam would run on a limited supply of modern equipment that would run out rather quickly. Besides, the Iranians could overcome Iraqi technology with superior numbers, and Turkey had over 3 times the population of Iraq (Even if we dont count in Mosul being Turkish).Turkish doctrine wouldnt be the same as Iran, though. The Turks wouldnt attempt large-scale massed assoults with poorly trained conscripts to soften the defences before their actual army men broke through (Which is a bit different than Human Wave, contrary to popular belief). Rather Turkey could probably have the quality edge as they would have a larger corp of trained men at the start (700.000 ish to 250.000 ish Iraqis) and would resort to conscripts less. The Turks would also probably have good defences in Mosul constructed to overcome potential Iraqi assaults that could have materialised earlier. And the defence is similar to Iran, so i dont think it would be an Iraqi victory. The war would probably be much shorter aswell, since Turkey wouldnt attempt a counter-invasion of Iraq besides perhaps some strategically important border areas. Thus Saddam could have been defeated with ease, which could butterfly away the Gulf War and thus the 2003 Iraq War since Iraq wouldnt have racked up such a debt.
.
There is a lot more that could be said, especially post the 1990's, but i will leave it here since it is already long enough and recent Turkish History is really not my strong suit. Hope this answers your question, ChrisTheCat
This is possibly the most in-depth and comprehensive answer I could ever have hoped for. I wish we did Turtledoves for replies because this deserves an award, honestly. 10/10, no notes. Thank you!
 
Okay, so the challenge, with a pod after the ratifying of the Treaty of Lausanne, could be accomplished by having Mosul and the rest of northern Iraq be attached to Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne's ratifying as the first pod. In the period between WW1/ the Turkish War of Independence/ the Treaty of Lausanne and WW2, the Turks negotiate with the Soviets for more of ex-Georgian Adjara, ex-Armenian Shirak and ex-Azerbaijani Nakchivan to be incorporated into Turkey. During WW2, the British decide to give Turkey Cyprus, Bulgarian Thrace, the Dodecanese, Hatay and ex-Vichy Syria (plus ex-Vichy Lebanon if possible) in exchange for Turkish neutrality or Turkey and assure Greece that since Greece was Allied only by virtue of being invaded from Albania, Greece should be satisfied with its 1938 status quo and gains from Albania. In any event, at the most, Greece would get additional gains from Cyprus, Bulgaria and the ex-Italian Dodecanese. In the Treaty of Paris (1947) or shortly afterwards in the 1940s or the 1950s, Bulgaria would surrender Dimetoka, the Bulgarian territorial gains from Turkey from 1912 (First Balkan War) to 1915 (WW1) and any remaining Bulgarian territory demanded from Turkey to Turkey. Then, have the Greek Junta exist despite the butterflies and go to war with Turkey, causing Greece to lose Dedeageach/ Alexandroupolis. Greece might give Cyprus and the Dodecanese (if Greek- or other non-Turkish controlled) in exchange for avoiding reparations and/ or extra Greek mainland losses when the Greek Junta lost the war to Turkey.
 
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