AHC: Keep Convair in the Aerospace Design Buisness.

[NothingNow]

As it says, with a POD after 1945, (but before 1965,) keep Convair, as an independent company or a distinct division of a larger firm, in the Business of building it's own designs, and maybe some licensed ones. Instead of becoming a pure subcontractor, as happened IOTL.

Bonus points if you can:
1)Kill the Lockheed F-104.
2)Make Convair into the sole General Dynamics Aerospace brand.
3)Make the B-58's replacement a good, and not horribly under-powered, design.

 

[Archibald]

As of 1953, Convair was in trouble. The Boeing B-52 had kicked the ass of both B-36 and B-60.

Meanwhile the F-102 was an unmitigated disaster, with the prototypes firmly stuck below mach 1, even in dive. There were serious flaws in the aerodynamic design.
Worse, the Atlas corporation wanted to get ride of the firm.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_Corporation

What ultimately saved Convair was the F-102C.

At the beginning, it was to be a J-75 powered F-102, probably a complete redesign.
Yet a lighter variant, closer from the F-102A and powered by a J-79, was studied as an alternative... and collided head-on with Lockheed lightweight fighters proposals.
The J-75 project was soon abandoned, as the J-79 variant had similar performances at lower cost. Soon renamed the F-106, the Convair machine was proposed in two variants
- The F-106A, a day fighter pitched against Lockheed machine
- The F-106B, an all weather interceptor much like the abandoned J-75 project

The Air Force liked the prokect, and ordered both variants. In the late 50's, the F-106A was adopted by many NATO countries, and Japan, as the standard fighter to replace the F-86 Sabre.
The F-106B, by contrast, was only build in limited numbers for the Air Defence Command. 277 were build.

Because convair was so busy with the F-102C, the B-58 entry in service was delayed. IT was fortunate, since the early machines proved beast to fly. It was the YF-102 all over again, to the point that the Air Force suspended the contract late 1957. Convair was left with a handful of YB-58 prototypes and some B-58A.
The company totally reworked its bomber, which resulted in the B-58B, that flew in 1959.
J-79s were now podded side-by-side on single pylons, vastly improving handling in engine out condition. A primitive fly-by-wire system somewhat helped controlling the beast. the pod was replaced with a true bomb bay, and wing pylons.
Overall, the B-58B was a much better machine, and after many hesitations, the Air Force finally committed again to the machine. The Vietnam war, and the B-52 slaugther by SAMs in 1966, showed that low flying bombers were the way to go. The B-58B and B-58C proved their worth, filling the gap between the short range F-105s and the vulnerable B-52s.

Convair importance within General Dynamics grew in consequence, up to the point when, in 1965, they obtained the company original name was brought back.

Then, in the 70's, Convair won its biggest contract ever -the LWF, or F-16.

 

[Delta Force]

Perhaps Convair is better able to market the Convair 880 and 990, citing their cruising speed advantage and improved technology (they were the first aircraft with anti-skid brakes and the 990 was the first airliner designed around turbofan engines). Aircraft could also be ordered in the luxury configuration that Convair proposed, making the 880 and 990 more of a luxury aircraft. Convair could meet its American Airlines contractual obligation and actually achieve 635 miles per hour and a 45 minute faster flight time between JFK and LAX than competing airliners. The service proves popular with customers flying between major cities because of its speed and luxury, and Convair sales a few more aircraft as the other airlines look to jump on the bandwagon. Convair might still lose money or barely break even, but it avoids the huge losses it suffered historically.

Convair then improves on the Convair 990A's speed advantage by making the world's first SST, the Convair Model 58-9. At Mach 2.4 it can complete JFK to LAX in only two hours, while most other airliners take six, and it proves popular with its wealthy and business clientele. Depending on if the SST turns out to be successful in the alternate timeline or not, Convair could then go on to win the contract and become a major commercial aircraft manufacturer, or it could produce an advanced design that is rejected due to expense (saving it from huge losses if in this timeline SSTs are the historical disaster they were). At the very least Convair ends up as a niche aircraft manufacturer, if not the America's major SST producer.

 

[Apollo 20]

Perhaps Convair is better able to market the Convair 880 and 990, citing their cruising speed advantage and improved technology (they were the first aircraft with anti-skid brakes and the 990 was the first airliner designed around turbofan engines). Aircraft could also be ordered in the luxury configuration that Convair proposed, making the 880 and 990 more of a luxury aircraft. Convair could meet its American Airlines contractual obligation and actually achieve 635 miles per hour and a 45 minute faster flight time between JFK and LAX than competing airliners. The service proves popular with customers flying between major cities because of its speed and luxury, and Convair sales a few more aircraft as the other airlines look to jump on the bandwagon. Convair might still lose money or barely break even, but it avoids the huge losses it suffered historically.

Convair then improves on the Convair 990A's speed advantage by making the world's first SST, the Convair Model 58-9. At Mach 2.4 it can complete JFK to LAX in only two hours, while most other airliners take six, and it proves popular with its wealthy and business clientele. Depending on if the SST turns out to be successful in the alternate timeline or not, Convair could then go on to win the contract and become a major commercial aircraft manufacturer, or it could produce an advanced design that is rejected due to expense (saving it from huge losses if in this timeline SSTs are the historical disaster they were). At the very least Convair ends up as a niche aircraft manufacturer, if not the America's major SST producer.

The 880/990 was a mistake. Instead of heading into the saturated long-haul jet market, it would have been better in hindsight for them to work on a jet successor to the successful short-haul piston 240/340/440. In the mid to late 50s, that market was wide-open before Boeing began the 727 program; had Convair focused their efforts there, they would possibly have had an American alternative to the Caravelle ready to go in 1960/61, which would have been a several years head start on the 727 and DC-9. Given the production run of the 727 and DC-9, it seems thoroughly possible that this course might have seen them in the commercial airplane business to this day.

 

[Just Leo]

While I don't feel as much an affinity with Convair as I do for North American, I could offer a twin J-75 powered F-111 with modest swept wings with high-lift devices. (stolen from the Vigilante) I've always thought that the look of an F-111 taking off with the under-wing tanks askew looked silly. The Tornado fitted the pylon with pivots, looked better, but added more complexity which the F-111 didn't need. The J-75 made any aircraft fast, and was as tough as they come. The fuselage would have to be enlarged to allow a reasonable fuel fraction. Although the political genesis of the F-111 probably would have killed such a project in birth, it would have resulted in a superlative and versatile performer, with less problematical gestation.